

should be recalled that the Arab Nationalists had just repudiated terrorist adventurism in favor of the organization of mass struggle. This recent change of heart made them all the more adamant on their stand. They feared the privileged position of the military élite in the state and furthermore they believed, not incorrectly, that once the military assumes power its activities can hardly be controlled.<sup>1</sup>

2. The ANM viewed with alarm what it considered to be a special relationship between the leadership of the Egyptian Revolution and the United States. This may be attributed to the excellent relations Ambassador Jefferson Caffery had established at this time with the new military leaders of Egypt.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 was not to the liking of the ANM. In fact the ANM called the negotiated agreement a sell-out to the imperialists.<sup>3</sup> It is to be remembered that this was taking place at a time when the CIA was especially concerned in the arrangement or rather rearrangement of political forces in

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<sup>1</sup>ANM, "Mawqifuna min al-'Askariyeen" [Our Attitude Towards the Military].

<sup>2</sup>Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1965), p. 84.

<sup>3</sup>"Hukumat Masr Tusafi Mushkilat al-Jala'" [The Egyptian Government Liquidates the Evacuation Problem], al-Ra'i, August 9, 1954, p. 1.