the Middle East.⁴ The Arab Nationalists had their doubts about the honesty of the Syrian Generals and Colonels who were then ruling Syria and were questioning the honesty of the Egyptian military rulers in turn.

3. The ANM was not at all impressed by the new rulers' emphasis on the internal problems of Egypt. They would rather have liked to see the new revolutionary leaders assume their responsibility in Arab politics early in the game. The Arab Nationalists were especially disturbed following the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement when it appeared as though the Egyptians were going to resign their duties toward their sister Arab states.⁴

4. The ANM, though not particularly keen on the preservation of the former political parties in Egypt, was not quite happy to see them dissolved by a government decree. The Arab Nationalists were all the more disappointed to learn that the alternative to the former political parties was a feable organization, the Liberation Rally, whose leader-ship was more or less an adjunct of the establishment.⁶

For the above reasons no healthy relationship could have developed between the ANM and the Egyptian Revolution. However, the Arab Nationalists remained on the whole reserved in their criticism of the Revolution. It is to be

⁴See Miles Copeland, <u>The Game of Nations: The</u> <u>Amorality of Power Politics</u> (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969).

⁵<u>Al-Ra'i</u>, loc. cit.

⁶Statement by Dr. George Habash, personal interview, July 16, 1967.

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