

the U.A.R., and as such, they were conditioned to accept whatever Nasser accepted. But still not a few of ANM militants find reason to question the ANM tactics if not the strategy. They believe that the ANM should never have accepted to join forces with the discredited traditional leaders. Instead they suggest that the ANM could have fought independently or in conjunction with the Ba'th and other progressive forces.¹⁹

As the hostilities between the warring factions came to an end in Lebanon with the election of a new president on July 31, the ANM prepared itself for yet another battle, the battle over Iraq.

The July 14 Revolution was expected to lead Iraq to join the union. However, Brig. Kassem, supported by the Communists, chose to defend Iraq's independence by welcoming friendly relations with all countries. The arrest of Col. Arif who had supported a policy of immediate union with the U.A.R. exposed the intentions of Brig. Kassem, and split the Iraqis into two factions: the unionists and the anti-union.

Soon after the July 14 Revolution, the national leadership of the ANM dispatched Hani al-Hindi, one of its most experienced and able leaders, to Iraq to help the ANM leadership there in drawing a new plan of action for the region. Al-Hindi's presence in Iraq was instrumental in bringing the Arab Nationalists to the fore. In the first

¹⁹Based on personal interviews with a number of former ANM members, December 20 and 21, 1970.