

very naive of the ANM leaders to expect this undertaking to work, for after all Nasserism outside the U.A.R. was a political trend and not a party. For the Arab Nationalists to merge into Nasserism outside the U.A.R. meant to dissolve their organizations and serve as agents of the U.A.R. intelligence network, or in the best circumstances to bring those organizations under the control of Nasser's intelligence service. In fact this is how Nasser's bureaucratic machinery interpreted the "new deal" with the ANM.

It was in the Yemen that the clash between the ANM and the Egyptian bureaucratic machinery first erupted. On January 13, 1966, the Egyptian officers responsible for South Arabia affairs carried a coup against the ANM-led National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen to impose a forceful union with the moderate Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY).³⁵ Although the Ibrahim group sanctioned the Egyptian coup as an important measure to unify all nationalist forces in the struggle against British imperialism, the Arab Nationalists on the spot refused any reproachment with the mellowed Asnaj-Makkawi group who were inclined to negotiate with the British government at a time when the Front's revolutionary forces were forcing a showdown with the imperialist forces. Both Nasser and the national leadership of the ANM tried to intervene in the dispute but little could be done, for the Arab Nationalists in Aden announced on October 14, 1966 their withdrawal from FLOSY

³⁵ ANM, "Houl al-ilaqat bayn al-harakah al-wataniyah bil-jinub" [The Relations Between the Arab Nationalist Movements in the South], p. 4.