

of Jerusalem; Musa Kazem was dismissed because of his participation in the demonstration against Zionist policies. Musa Kazem informed Storrs that under these circumstances no Arab will dare take my place.¹⁴⁰ As it turned out, a rival notable Ragheb Bey Nashashibi accepted the post the moment it was offered to him, thus demonstrating a lack of solidarity and resolution among the notables *vis-à-vis* the British Administration.

The Palin Commission Report was suppressed and until recently (1968) treated confidentially. Violent Arab opposition failed to introduce any fundamental changes in the overall British policy in Palestine. Quite the contrary, His Majesty's Government were contemplating a switch from military administration to 'civil Mandatory Government incorporating in its provisions the Balfour Declaration, despite the delay in concluding the peace treaty with Turkey. Moreover, the British Government proposed to appoint Herbert Samuel, a well-known Jewish politician, as the first British High Commissioner in Palestine.¹⁴¹ The risks involved in appointing a well-known Zionist Jew were promptly pointed out by the British Authorities in the area. Both Samuel and the Cabinet were well aware of the nature of these risks. In a letter to Lord Curzon, Samuel reported the gist of a conversation with a deputation from the Council of Jews of Jerusalem:

I told them that the Government had received a grave warning... that the appointment of any Jew as the first Governor of Palestine would likely be the signal for an outbreak of serious disorder, that there was a danger of widespread attacks upon the Jewish colonies and upon individual Jews; that raids might take place across the border; and further, that important Christian elements in the population, whose co-operation was necessary for the effective conduct of the Government, might withdraw their support. It had been represented that Mohammedan opinion was already in an excitable state, owing to the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the Turkish Treaty, and that such an appointment would be regarded as the transfer of the whole country to the Jews.¹⁴²

In his published memoirs, Samuel contended that he had been appointed 'with full knowledge on the part of His Majesty's Government of my Zionist sympathies, and no doubt largely because of them'.¹⁴³

On 31 May following the announcement of the Palestine Mandate, the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in its articles, and the appoint-

ment of Samuel as the first High Commissioner for Palestine, a number of leading Palestinian political personalities met at the *Nadi-al-'Arabi* in Damascus where they resolved to form 'The Palestinian Arab Society'. The officers of the Society were Haj Amin Hussein, 'Izzat Darwaza and 'Aref al-'Aref. The society urged all Palestinian societies and clubs to work together for the common good. Moreover, the Society protested against the San Remo Conference's decision to grant Britain a mandate over Palestine and against Samuel's appointment. It also appealed to the Muslims of India and to the Pope, drawing attention to the Jewish danger in Palestine.¹⁴⁴

The appointment of Samuel came as a severe blow to the Palestinian Arab masses, who, nevertheless, seemed determined to resist Zionism and the Balfour Declaration as their struggle against them entered a new stage.

Notes

1. *Memorandum of the Jewish-Palestinian Question*, Arab Bureau, 5 February 1917, FO 822/14, p.16.
2. He played an important role in Palestinian affairs later on when he assumed the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies.
3. Ormsby-Gore, 'Palestine Political', 12 January 1917, FO 822/14.
4. See Antonius, p.187. Also see 'al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra' ('The Great Arab Revolt'), Mulhaq *al-Hayat*, Beirut, 22 November 1966, p.41.
5. For the Hussein-McMahon correspondence see *Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, July 1916-March 1917*, Cmd. 5957 (Miscellaneous No.3) 1939, HMSO London.
6. For an early confidential discussion of the subject asserting the inclusion of Palestine in the proposed Arab state see *Memorandum on British Commitments to King Hussein*, Political Intelligence Department, 5 November 1918, FO 371/3384. For other documents written at the time the McMahon pledge was given, see McMahon to FO, 26 October 1915, FO 371/2486. Also see Grey to Buchanan, 30 November 1915, FO 371/2767. Also see Grey to McMahon 20 October 1915, FO 371/6237 and FO 141/461.
7. See FO 371/4368. The text of the Agreement also appears in E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.) *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. 1st ser., vol.IV, p.241-51.
8. The original letter deposited by Lord Rothschild in the British Museum: addl. Ms.41178 folios 1 and 3; for a reproduction of the letter and a full discussion of the efforts and negotiations leading to the Declaration, see Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London 1961, *passim*; J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, London, 1939, pp.88-186 *passim*; and Chaim Weizman, *Trial and Error*, London 1950, pp.223-52, *passim*.
9. As early as March 1916 Sir Mark Sykes of the FO reported that: 'When in Cairo Dr Feris Nimr and (Major) Faruki, poles asunder on the political question, both told me that Arabs, Christians and Moslems alike would fight in the matter to the last man against Jewish Dominion in Palestine'. See Sykes to Buchanan, 14 March 1916, FO 371/2767.