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a belief that the Administration has broken faith in the matter of immigration.r. that justice is subject to coercion from political Zionism and that the British Government will only yield to violence.<sup>106</sup>

But violence was not possible without an organisation which aimed at rebellion and had the necessary means to carry it out, 'All available information confirms the impression that there is no organisation which exists to cause it'.<sup>107</sup> Clearly this was a case of failure of leadership; the traditional leadership was anti-revolutionary, and the forces advocating revolutionary tactics failed to produce the required leaders.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the Administration's attitude regarding the Muftiship and the Supreme Muslim Council and the friendly relations with Hajj Amin played an important role in preventing outbreaks and rebellions at a time when the state of public opinion and popular sentiments were conducive to upheavals and violence.

A number of 'responsible' Muslims were involved in constructive work which included educational work for the formation of a Muslim college and development of a Boy. Scout Movement – religious and economic projects. An Arab Economic Society was founded and discussions were taking place on the possibility of forming an Arab National Bank and of establishing Bonded Stores. These activities, Deedes reported, stimulated efforts towards the attainment of an increased measure of cohesion and solidarity particularly among the Muslims.<sup>108</sup>

The beneficial outcome of this rapprochement with Hajj Amin and his associates on the one hand, and the fear that this positive development might be wrecked by the complete failure of the Arab Delegation's mission, on the other hand, spurred Samuel to visit London. Samuel's departure engendered a mood of expectancy and among many, of anxiety. Apart from Arab protestations against the Government's condonation of the existence of the Jewish Defence Force (Haganah), and the installation of benches for the accommodation of Jews wailing before the walls of the Sanctuary (Muslim shrine), no major developments took place during the month of May.

## Churchill's White Paper

As pressure against Britain's pro-Zionist policies mounted, Churchill sought to bring about an end to unrest in Palestine, and to criticism in the British Press and House of Lords, by publishing an authoritative

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statement: on British policy in Palestine. In his 1922 White Paper, Churchill maintained that the Balfour Declaration, which the Government intended to uphold, did not aim at subordination of the Arab population or culture. The Jews, however, were in Palestine 'as of right and not on sufferance'<sup>109</sup> and would be able to increase their number by immigration subject to the 'economic absorptive capacity' of the country'. The White Paper declared that it was the intention of HM Government to foster the gradual establishment of full measure of self-government. A legislative council with a majority of elected members would be set up immediately, and a committee of elected members of the legislative council would confer with the Administration upon matters relating to regulation of immigration. In case of differences between the committee and the Administration, HMG were to be the final judge.

The Churchill White Paper was accepted by the Zionists and rejected by the Arabs.<sup>110</sup> The Delegation was simply not empowered to accept any British policy based on the Balfour, Declaration. Regulated Jewish immigration would still entail the prospect of eventual Jewish majority and thus Jewish domination in Palestine. Furthermore, the promise of elected majority did not provide for the Arabs who constituted the majority of the people, an elected majority in the legislative council as a whole.

While the White Paper failed to reconcile the Arabs to Jewish immigration and to slower development of the JNH, it was necessary for the purpose of defeating the opposition which had developed in the British Parliament to accepting the Mandate with the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration. During the latter part of June, Lord Islington had traised the question of Palestine in the House of Lords and obtained the passage of a resolution which declared the Palestine Mandate unaccepttable. However, an attempt ro bring the Palestine Mandate before the House of Commons for parliamentary examination failed.

## A Turning Point

Shortly afterwards, the League of Nations approved the Palestine Mandate, and the British Government made it clear that the Mandate would be carried out in the light of the 1922 Statement of Policy.<sup>111</sup>

As it became decisively clear that the British Government did not intend to rescind the Balfour Declaration, the Executive Committee of the Fourth Congress met between 23 and 27 June to decide upon the steps to be taken in the event of the expected ratification of the Mandate. The resolution adopted at that meeting included the organisation of