

ends through cooperation with the Government instead of by opposition.¹⁴³

The hand of the new Party was strengthened following the refusal of the Executive Committee to accept the recommendations of a Cabinet Committee formed during the summer of 1923 to review British policy in Palestine. Although some of the Committee's members thought that the Balfour Declaration was both unnecessary and unwise, the Committee found it impossible for any Government to extricate itself from the Declaration without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect.

By the time the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation by the League's Council Resolution of 29 September 1923, the attitude of the three parties of the Palestinian Triangle had already crystallised.

The British Government stood firmly by the Balfour Declaration and the JNH policy, guided by the theory of 'dual obligation', and the principle of the 'economic absorptive capacity' on immigration policy. The final settlement of the Mandate removed all shades of uncertainty and precluded any possibility of drastic change of British policy in Palestine for the foreseeable future.

The Zionists were satisfied that the articles of the Palestine Mandate and British policies in Palestine were conducive to the achievement of their immediate basic aim; namely, the attainment of a Jewish majority, and thus political supremacy, through immigration and land settlement. They were opposed to representative institution and the application of the principle of self-determination in Palestine on the grounds that the Arab majority would use such institutions to fight Zionism and revoke the Mandate. The Anglo-Zionist convergence was demonstrated by the Zionist acceptance of Churchill's White Paper and embodied in the person of Herbert Samuel himself.

The Arab position was accurately assessed by Samuel in a perceptive report submitted during January 1924. He said:

The large majority of the population of Palestine are Moslem Arabs, and among them, a majority possibly equally large, favour the general views of what may be termed the local opposition to the Palestine policy of His Majesty's Government as applied by this Administration.¹⁴⁴

Samuel described the motives of the crystallising pro-Government minority party in the following terms:

They are anxious for a quiet life, and do not want to engage in political struggles. They wish to grow richer, and think that British control and guidance for the time being at all events, are best calculated to make the country more prosperous and themselves with it. Some as I have mentioned, are more largely animated by antagonisms in the Opposition camp. Some think that they may obtain advantages, direct or indirect, by standing well with the Government.¹⁴⁵

The Christian Arabs were prominent in the ranks of the anti-Zionist movement in Palestine as well as in the ranks of the Moderate Party. In general they were inclined to take a less rigid anti-Government attitude after the Kemalist victories and the revival of Pan-Islamic ideas. The fact that they occupied a high proportion of Government posts in Palestine also contributed to their moderation *vis-à-vis* Britain. Nevertheless, a number of Christian-Arab intellectuals were among the most active and eloquent anti-Zionists in Palestine.

Three Currents of Thought

Samuel attributed Palestinian opposition to Britain to three currents of thought: Arab Nationalism, anti-Zionism and Pan-Islamism. These currents attracted men of varying standards of sincerity and zeal.

There is a nucleus of genuine patriots, who would be willing to make considerable sacrifices for their cause. There are a number of young men who take pleasure in the excitement and interest of a political movement. There is a large fringe, who sympathises in general with Arab and Oriental views. . . they are ready to close their shops, if they are shop-keepers, when asked to do so by the Central Committee on some occasion of political protest, and they are willing to join a crowd in the street to speed a parting delegation or to welcome its return.¹⁴⁶

By the end of 1923 there was a growing belief among the Palestinian Arab majority that Britain and the Mandate were the real protectors of Zionism, and that the JNH policy represented the convergence of British imperial interests with Zionist colonialism in Palestine which was bound to lead to a Jewish majority and supremacy and the eventual eviction of the Palestinian Arabs from their country. The Husseini and the Muslim-Christian leadership, consistently and consciously, refused to commit themselves to any platform which would imply the