

we communicated with Fatah's Central Committee.

Answering the question about the results of our contact will be possible after Fatah's Central Committee discusses the PFLP's true point of view. Our talks with Abu Jihad included many issues, but concentrated on cancelling the Amman accord publicly and officially, and the many benefits this would mean for Fatah, the PLO, the Palestinian masses and our allies. Brother Abu Jihad promised to convey our point of view to Fatah's Central Committee in its first meeting, and to inform us of the results. I hope to hear the results in the radio before hearing them at the meeting we agreed to hold to find out the Central Committee's decision. The whole issue now depends on our brothers in Fatah's Central Committee. The meeting was beneficial in many ways, but politically speaking it will be judged by the answer to the following question: Will Fatah's Central Committee cancel the Amman accord? Is the Central Committee going to ask the chairman of the PLO executive committee to officially cancel it? We are waiting for the results and we hope that they will fulfill our masses' hopes: cancelling the Amman accord and removing this obstacle to comprehensive national unity.

**What is your evaluation of the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF) in the light of the fact that it has suffered from paralysis since its establishment? There has been no progress towards its main goal: restoring the PLO to the national line.**

In previous interviews I have evaluated the PNSF and reviewed the problems it faces. Again, I reiterate that the main problem we have faced is that some of its members wanted the PNSF as a substitute PLO, or a preliminary to a substitute PLO. Their analysis was based on the idea that the deviation of the right wing would end with sitting down at the negotiations table with the Zionist enemy, under the supervision of imperialism. According to this idea, the role of the PNSF is to speak and act as the Palestinian people's national leadership.

The PFLP agreed that in the case where the official PLO leadership sits at the negotiating table with the Zionist enemy, under US supervision, we would then say publicly that this leadership is not the PLO or the Palestinians' leader. This is also what we have told our international allies. However, until this happens, it is our duty to prevent it through broad mobilization of the Palestinian masses, and our Arab and international allies, to prevent this deviation from going all the way.

This difference of views was the reason for the paralysis of the PNSF's role. When we raised the slogans of a popular conference and national alignment, we in the PFLP had in mind that the PNSF would lead the broadest popular framework, an effective Palestinian framework that would besiege the deviation and isolate it. This would have been a step towards aborting the deviationist policy so that the PLO could be united on a nationalist basis. Every time we raised the slogans of a popular conference or national alignment, we were faced by those who wanted this conference or alignment to result in a substitute PLO, or as a step preceding the formation of a substitute PLO. These are the main problems, though not the only ones, that the PNSF has faced.

The political developments of 1986 have made clear that the door to the US solution is closed for the PLO leadership, though we have no doubt that this leadership tried to enter the US solution. Facing this new development, it became the duty of all nationalist and democratic Palestinian organizations to exploit this chance to reunite the PLO on a nationalist basis, which would mean achieving the primary goal of the PNSF. The PNSF's future depends on some of the member organizations dropping the idea of a substitute PLO and taking a new stand, utilizing this chance to reunite the PLO. If the political conditions of 1985 encouraged the idea that the US solution would be opened to the PLO, and thinking about establishing a substitute PLO, then the conditions of 1986 should encourage the dropping of this idea and instead thinking seriously about reuniting the PLO. Reuniting the PLO does not only depend on the national alignment of the Palestinian organizations present in Damascus. Rather such national alignment aims at uniting both centers of the Palestinian revolution's organizations: Damascus and Tunis. We call upon the organizations in

the PNSF to face these facts, because this is necessary for achieving the PNSF's main goal.

As for the experience of the PNSF, I am still convinced that it has played a positive role, despite some critical moments it has experienced. In Lebanon, there is a plan to eliminate the Palestinian armed presence, not only Arafat's weapons as Amal claims, but the weapons of the PNSF and all Palestinians without exception. The formation of the PNSF deprived Amal of its main pretext and exposed Amal's real goals, because the PNSF was formed with a clear political line against imperialism, and repeatedly called for solidifying the Palestinian-Lebanese-Syrian nationalist alliance. This was a supportive factor for us in the eyes of the Palestinian, Lebanese and Arab masses, and our international allies.

Developments have stressed that there are two trends in confronting the right - the realistic revolutionary trend, and the reckless, nihilist trend. What are the points of agreement and disagreement between these two trends? Moreover, is there a chance for uniting the democratic forces in view of recent joint statements and meetings among them?

When talking about tactical disagreements in confronting the Palestinian right, we should constantly remember that the conflict in the Palestinian arena is against the rightist leadership of the PLO. Tactical contradictions between the nationalist and democratic forces should not be allowed to predominate over the main contradiction with the rightist policy which is the cause of the PLO's dilemma. Of course, there are several other factors that played a role in the PLO's dilemma, such as imperialist aggression, the loss of the central leadership position in Beirut, the dispersion of the fighters, the determination of surrounding Arab states to benefit from these new conditions to contain or eliminate the PLO, etc.

Among these factors, it is necessary to scientifically pinpoint the main cause of the conflict in the PLO. Maybe the PFLP bears a degree of responsibility; maybe the democratic and nationalist forces do. However, if we ask what is the main reason for the conflict, we should get a clear answer that it is the policy pursued by the influential leadership of the PLO, betting on US solutions and consolidating relations with reactionary regimes. This policy ignited the Palestinian arena and paved the way for the other factors to play a role. I concentrate on this point because of my conviction that it is correct. When we think of how to reunite the PLO, this analysis leads us to define our positions and tactics correctly.

On this basis, I can answer the question specifically. The factors of agreement between the two trends are mainly rejection and confrontation of the rightist trend in order to abort it, and a clear concept of the Palestinian revolution's nationalist and progressive alliances on the Arab and international levels. The factors of disagreement mainly concern the means of confronting the rightist trend. The reckless trend, as it is called in the question, thinks that the right can be confronted by scratching it out of our minds, and creating a new position that would lead to a substitute PLO, a PLO formed of nationalist and progressive forces with a clear political line. In contrast, the realistic revolutionary trend cannot ignore the fact that the right exists, that it is represented on the popular level, that it has cadres and bases, and that, unfortunately, it heads the PLO officially. Accordingly, the scientific, successful way to deal with the right is by aligning the broadest range of Palestinian, Arab and internationalist forces to besiege the rightist policy, isolate and abort it. The ultimate success of this approach is that we would retain the united PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people, recognized by the Arab countries and people, by national liberation movements, nationalist governments, socialist countries and progressive forces all over the world.

I will answer the last part of the question about uniting the democratic forces in brief. (Editor's note: The PFLP defines the democratic forces as the DFLP, the Palestinian Communist Party, the Popular Struggle Front, the Palestinian Liberation Front, and itself.)

First, we can never forget that uniting the democratic forces is a concept adopted in our main documents. It is a guiding