

generation of the PLO as more radical than the older leaders, and warns that prolongation of the conflict holds out the possibility of radicalization of the Arab world. He advocates negotiations now, while the Arab states are «beset with problems,» because the «crude balance of forces» is evolving in favor of the Arabs due to their greater ability to absorb losses. Harkabi cautions that «damage to Israel from Arab civil unrest will be much greater than the damages from terrorism,» countering the common contention that the West Bank will become a «base for terrorism» in the event of withdrawal.

3. Harkabi's most compelling argument is related to Israel's moral fiber. He decries the country's moral decline and lack of self-criticism as more serious than the economic crisis or the Lebanon war. He connects the moral decline to the ascent of the Likud and Revisionist ideology, the growth of religious fanaticism and chauvinism, and harnessing the Jewish religion to the wagon of territorial maximalism. For him, it is a question of survival that Israel abandon the «Zionism of acreage» for the «Zionism of quality.» He connects this with the international aspect, emphasizing Israel's relationship with Jews all over the world: «Should the Zionist enterprise collapse, the Jewish religion will be blamed for its share in the calamity since it recommended the path that led to disaster, and the major factor in the Jewishness of most Diaspora Jewry - identification with Israel - will vanish» (op. cit., p. 208). He also notes: «The capacity to achieve goals does not depend only on the size of the local forces that have to be overcome, but also on the support for these goals in the world community...» (op. cit., p. 215). «The need to behave in accordance with international norms... has now become a condition for the survival of both the state and the people» (op. cit., p. 199).

Harkabi's book in English is based on a book he published in Tel Aviv in 1986, i.e., well before the outbreak of the intifada. In the preface to the English edition, he writes: «Three years ago, when I began to write this book, the urgency of changing Israeli policy arose from the opportunity offered to

Israel after Jordan and the PLO, in February 1985, reached an agreement based on a principle unprecedented in the history of the Arab-Israeli dispute - namely 'land for peace'.» He continues that the intifada has only strengthened his arguments, and urges Israel to negotiate with the PLO, based on mutual recognition.

LIMITATIONS TO CHANGE

No matter how comprehensive their analysis and compelling their arguments, these think tanks and experts suffer from significant limitations due to their own relationship to Labor Zionism, at least in its original version. It is this mainstream Zionism which has actually shaped Israel as it is today, yet most often they analyze Israel's problems without taking into consideration that they stem from Zionism's very nature, not simply a wrong interpretation or implementation of Zionist principles.

While on one level, the 1977 Likud election victory appeared as a rupture in traditional Israeli politics, on another level it was the logical ripening of a society which evolved via colonialism, military conquest and expansionism - processes begun by Labor. Parallel to the rise of the Likud, we have witnessed the rightward evolution of the Labor Party, culminating in the 1984 national unity government and continuing up to today. Thus, those who see the two poles of Zionism as fundamentally different may lack the means to draw the Israeli body politic towards their ever so rational arguments, for Israel's inner dynamics are moving in another direction, according to a different logic.

This point will have importance in evaluating how the intifada has affected Israeli security thinking. For example, in as much as the Labor Party and various analysts view the demographic danger as the greatest one, they advocate the «land for peace» formula. The right has another recipe for this problem; it is called «transfer.» However, these two models are not so far apart as they seem. For one, the territorial compromise envisioned by Labor is generally much less than needed to fulfill Palestinian demands for an independent state. Moreover, according to Heller, «The purpose of territorial compromise is to transfer the bulk of the Palestinian population to Jordanian jurisdiction» (op. cit., p. 35, our emphasis). Harkabi, in *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*, 1977, wrote: «by announcing its readiness to withdraw and let a Palestinian state be set up outside Israel's borders, Israel would return the Palestinian problem to its true natural habitat - inter-Arab politics - and free itself from a heavy burden» (quoted in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 54, Winter 1985).

It is a far cry from such thinking to attitudes which would enable Palestinian-Israeli coexistence in two parallel states, as many now advocate. It is hard to separate in the Zionist mind between the perceived need for security and the racism that has accumulated from years of being colonizers. Why else does the Israeli army persist in brutalizing the masses of the intifada all the while many soldiers and officers are reported to think that the problem can only be solved via political means? We will try to address these questions in the next issue of *Democratic Palestine* when we discuss the impact of the intifada on Israeli security thinking.

Children in Khan Al Sheeh camp, Syria: Do they threaten Israel?

