

First: The influential Palestinian leadership has a broad network of relations with the Arab regimes. As a result, its policies have gotten closer to the overall Arab line. Although its policies distinguish themselves from those of the regimes, by the demand for an independent Palestinian state, the Palestinian right wing often adopts the harmful tactics of the Arab regimes. The inside, however, is relatively free of this tie.

Second: Over the past 20 years, a particular social strata has crystallized in the ranks of the Palestinian revolution, mainly in Fatah, as a result of the political relations and organizational style of the right wing. This strata became bureaucratic; to a big degree, it lost its militant character and became corrupt; its interests are contrary to the revolution's. This reality was clearly seen in the thinking and practice of this strata that holds

sion-making process has been less than their actual contribution to these battles. Adjusting this ratio will have a positive effect on front work in the Palestinian revolution, as well as on the mass work of all forces, and the democratic struggle within the PLO. The more the leftist forces, and consequently the masses, participate in decision-making, the more effective will be the democratic struggle for maintaining a clear and firm nationalist line; capitulationist tendencies will be isolated.

Fourth: Transforming the interior into an active participant in the decision-making process will broaden the mass base of the uprising. A greater mass dimension will consolidate the social base of the Palestinian revolution, paving the way for it to seize the initiative in confronting the occupation. It is nothing new to say that the mass dimension is one of the principal factors in the continuation of the uprising.

Greater participation by the exterior in decision-making will not only contribute to the continuation and escalation of the intifada. It will also shield both the interior and the exterior from the pressure of the Arab regimes. Due to the uprising, the Arab regimes are no longer able to impose their political conditions in isolation from the will of the people who are resisting the occupation; they cannot but be supportive, at least verbally. This makes the PLO's political moves relatively free of the conditions of the prevailing Arab order. Furthermore, it gives the PLO the possibility of pressuring Arab officialdom. The PLO leadership, however, has not been utilizing these chances, especially not at this time when it is called upon to do so more than ever before.

The uprising and the armed struggle

One of the important issues raised by the uprising is it itself being one of the different forms of the Palestinian struggle. Some have tried to create a contradiction between the intifada, as a militant mass struggle, and the armed struggle. This contradiction is false and doesn't exist. The proper form of struggle is not determined by the wish of any one party, but is based on the objective and subjective conditions, as well as the nature of the struggle and of the enemy we are confronting. Economic battles for better wages or social conditions are not usually waged through armed struggle. However, homelands cannot be liberated via strikes alone.

Although there is no contradiction between the uprising, as a new phenomenon and form of mass struggle, and the armed struggle, there is a need to study the relation between the two. Throughout their history of national struggle, the Palestinian masses have experimented with all forms of struggle - peaceful and violent, armed and unarmed. From its inception, the Palestinian revolution adopted armed struggle as the main form of struggle against the Zionist army. Moreover, the achievements of the contemporary Palestinian revolution would never have been realized if not for armed struggle, due to the nature of the enemy we are confronting. The uprising itself came about as a result of the accumulated experience of the struggle, of which armed struggle was an important aspect. What is needed is a radical review of the armed struggle, aimed at gearing it to complement the uprising and contribute to its continuation and escalation. To this end, we point out the following:



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important and sensitive posts in the upper echelons of the PLO. This strata adopts policies that protect its own interests, relinquishing all revolutionary policies and means that are not in line with its own interests. This strata constitutes the social base of the right wing in the PLO. In contrast to the exterior, such a strata hasn't crystallized in the interior where the objective conditions are different since there is direct occupation and daily oppression.

Third: The active participation of the interior in the decision-making process will improve the internal balance of power within the Palestinian revolution, politically and in class terms. If this happens, it will be mainly to the interests of the leftist forces. In all the battles waged by the Palestinian revolution, including the intifada, the leftist forces' involvement in the deci-