

For the Jewish Agency to admit to the accuracy of Simpson's data would have been equal to political suicide. The implications this official report would have on British policy-making in Palestine would undoubtedly hamper Jewish plans to acquire more land and to establish the "Jewish National Home". This reality has not escaped Simpson who in a response to the Jewish Agency's accusations wrote the following to the Colonial Office: "...No policy short of giving the Zionists a free hand in Palestine would be satisfactory..". (8)

The availability of agricultural land has, in fact, been the backbone of the colonial settler policies. The number of settlers which the colonial government could admit to Palestine was basically dependent on the availability of cultivable land. On this Stein writes:

The J.A. and its affiliated land purchasing and land-settlement organizations were aware of the scarcity of unoccupied and unworked land still available for Jewish settlement. Yet to admit to the accuracy or semi-accuracy of Hope Simpson's estimate would have politically endangered the entire Zionist enterprise. The Jewish agency knew that, despite the lack of available land, they could continue Jewish settlementThe fact remained that Hope-Simpson with all his guess work came very close to the actual amount of cultivable land in Palestine. (Stein,1985:107)

Finally, and despite the application of capital and labour with the influx of Jewish settlers, six years later, in 1936, the Royal Commission in Palestine reported that the total cultivable land, excluding the Beersheba area was 6,850,000d.(9) A minimal difference from the estimate of 6,544,000d. provided by the Director of Survey in 1930.

Based on the size of cultivable land provided by the Director of Survey (6,544,000d.), the average size of a fallah farm, calculated by