

reforms. It examines the consequences of the reforms' implementation and attempts to assess the degree to which the new laws of property tenure had been absorbed into the local discourse of ownership. One conclusion of this study, the sum of its parts, is that the argument that Land Code and property-tenure reforms were evaded and failed to be implemented in Palestine, is untenable based on the case of Hebron. It has become a convention in historical writing to refer to the basket of property-tenure reforms that were promulgated and implemented gradually over three decades, collectively as "the 1858 Land Code". It is important to remember, this reform was a process and not an event. In this light, I will argue that the settlement-of-tenure conflicts, documentation complications, and even first-time tapu registrations that took place in the 1890s and in the first decade of the twentieth century are indications that the reform *had* been implemented and adopted, and that it was working. In Chapter 4 I discuss a variety of mechanisms that were in place to simplify the process of resolution of problems and conflicts, and to facilitate compliance with the law.

The British *Survey* and Ruedy's narratives imply that the fees and the property tax which accompanied property-tenure reform and property registration were somehow hidden from the populace. As will be shown in Chapter One, they were clearly delineated and proclaimed in laws and regulations. There was no surreptitious taxation. As for the claim about conscription, I would argue that Ottomans fearful of conscription would be more likely to fear *nufüs* registration than property registration. The registration of the population