

convenience, delicate matters, or a combination of these factors.¹²⁰ Ergene also emphasizes that there was no prohibition against retrials; litigants could and did take their cases to be re-heard in other sharia courts or before other judges. He views these comparatively flexible features of the judicial system as opportunities to privilege certain claims and to attain the “reversibility of justice”.¹²¹ “In short, the court was perhaps not a site of ultimate and unobjectionable justice and was not always considered to be so by its clients.”¹²²

Building on Işık Tamdoğan’s study of the value of *şulh* (amicable agreement) in the Ottoman courts,¹²³ I would argue the opposite. Features such as forum shopping and retrials indicate that the system aimed for “the most just” justice. First, it should be recalled that matters of venue and of re-adjudication required the consent and presence in the courtroom of *both* parties to the litigation, or legally appointed representatives for them. Secondly, no mechanism is known to have been in place to enforce court rulings and ensure their implementation. It can be argued, then, that they were carried out *because* litigants on both sides respected the judgment of the court or, more precisely, perhaps, of the judge presiding over the courtroom.

¹²⁰ Ibid.; see also the discussion in my article, “Villagers on the Move: Re-thinking Fallahin Rootedness in Late-Ottoman Palestine”, *Jerusalem Quarterly* 54 (2013): 56-68.

¹²¹ Ibid., 108.

¹²² Ibid., 105-108. Quotation on 107-108.

¹²³ Işık Tamdoğan, “*Sulh* and the 18th Century Ottoman Courts of Üsküdar and Adana”, *Islamic Law and Society* 15 (2008): 55-83.