

possibility of capital accumulation necessary for intensive cultivation. As for the investment in citrus plantations, it was undertaken by moneylenders and “merchants and not villagers.” Thus, “proletarianization [was] not the outcome of village socioeconomic change or, primarily, of the expropriation of peasants,” but “as a process [that was] dependent on wage opportunities external to the Arab village.” They explain the “lack” of expropriation of peasants as follows:

Even though a high percentage of land area remained in the hands of a small number of wealthy landlords, the composition of the rural population was that of small and very smallholders, most of them (68-70 percent) remained owners of the land they cultivated. As for the 30-32 percent classified as landless in 1930, this does not mean that they were homeless or vagrants; they were village dwellers also.<sup>32</sup>

The lack of urbanization and homelessness was thus associated with the lack of internal differentiation.

Carmi and Rosenfeld’s analysis is deficient in its theoretical formulations and empirical applications, as well as in what they chose to ignore. The most important and obvious example of the latter was their ignoring the impact of European settlement and government policies on the rural population.<sup>33</sup> The only mention of European settlers and the government was in reference to their provision of work to villagers at different times. Thus, what we have here is an

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<sup>32</sup>Carmi and Rosenfeld, 474.

<sup>33</sup>On this point, see Elia Zureik, “Toward a Sociology of the Palestinians,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977): 3-16; and Khalil Nakhleh, “Anthropological and Sociological Studies on the Arabs in Israel: A Critique,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977): 42-70.