

became obsolete due to the use of tractors' (p. 17). However, unlike the European variety, this trend occurred in the least developed regions in Turkey, where semi-feudal relations of exploitation persisted for a longer period. Keydar hypothesizes that this pattern of development is on the verge of disintegration. His reasoning is that 'since the dominant tendency in the distribution of land is that of fragmentation rather than concentration, the pure capitalist type (sic) is to be observed during its genesis and immediately thereafter' (p. 21).

A central problem with a typology of transitional forms such as Keydar's is that it collapses a number of regional attributes of villages undergoing transformation into broad analytical categories for the purpose of extrapolation. Projections from such trends is hampered by the apparently limited amount of empirical investigation involved, and secondly by a tendency to extrapolate potential future trends from embryonic forms of development, such as the case with peasant capitalism ('kulak-type' villages above). The whole issue of the nature of capitalism in agriculture poses another problematic that exists not only in Keydar's work, but also throughout the foregoing discussion on transitional forms in agriculture (cf. Harris, 1982:119-127) - an issue which I will address in the conclusions to the case studies (Chapter 13).

These qualifications notwithstanding, Keydar's conceptual schema of transitional forms can serve a useful heuristic function for our discussion. It highlights the importance of the family farm under conditions of out-migration and non-viability of capitalist agriculture given the low capitalization of the farmstead. For example, it allows for optimal use of limited technology, and prevents the continued fragmentation of land through inheritance since 'surplus' children can be sent to the cities or abroad for alternative employment. Remuneration from wage labour employment in turn sustains and reinforces 'kulak-type'