

persal and 'dislocation'. The incorporation of the refugee populations in different Arab (and Israeli) social formations resulted in various degrees of integration (and non-integration) into these societies. In contrast to the peripheralisation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Syria, they found themselves at the bottom of the class pyramid in Israel. There, a process of de-peasantisation (Zureik, 1976) and de-territorialisation (Rosenfeld, 1978) took place - merging the fate of Galilean farmers who remained on the land, with coastal refugees who lost it but remained inside Israel. Only in Israel did the pre-conditions for actual peasant proletarianisation crystallize; but this process remains subject to ideological manipulation of residual factionalism (hamula rivalries, etc.) by Zionist parties.

It was in the West Bank, the highlands of central Palestine, that the 'logic of old hierarchies' persisted. There, despite regional discrimination under Jordanian rule (or perhaps because of it), a "nation of shopkeepers and smallholding peasants" remained entrenched into five or six ruralized townships and half a thousand villages. The rural population, having lost its agricultural raison d'être under demographic pressures over the land, began to accommodate itself within the public sector of the Jordanian state (army, civil guards, civil service) and migration to the Gulf states.

Under Israeli rule (Chapter 4), a new set of socio-economic vectors set in. Urban refugees, and the rural surplus, were absorbed en masse into the Israeli construction and service sectors. The West Bank and Gaza were integrated into the economic fabric of Israel as a tariff-free zone for Israeli commodities. But the occupied territories increasingly became also the arena for intense Jewish settlement, and Israeli claims for sovereignty began to clash with the indigenous population now seen as a 'demographic' problem. This 'territorial-demographic' dilemma compelled