Reviving inter-familial rivalries is not the only means of maintaining the diminished social cleavages between the Arab and Jewish population. It is also achieved instrumentally by prolonging the physical backwardness of the Arab village, where a majority of Palestinians continue to live. While the restrictions on village development channel attempts at self-improvement in the direction of migrations to Jewish urban areas, village backwardness guarantee the continued reproduction of the peasant-worker under-class (Rosenfeld, 1978:402).

This process by which structural (socio-economic) and institutional (political-administrative) mechanisms reinforce each other in ensuring Israeli-Jewish hegemony over the Arab minority is not self-perpetuating however. Lustick (1980) has suggested such a system of control composed of three leverages: (1) segmentation, the internal fragmentation of the Arab community which prevents them from exercising united political action; (2) dependence, the reliance of Arabs on the Jewish economy for its sources of livelihood; (3) co-optation, the selective manipulation of Arab factionalism, especially at the village level, by Zionist parties and institutions (Lustick, 1980:71-76). Although these three components of control operate simultaneously to ensure Arab quiescence at the political level, they are not fool proof, as evidenced by the massive uprising during Land day in the Galilee (March 1976), and by the increased demands of Palestinians to be treated as a national entity within the Israeli polity, rather than as minority citizens. What is significant about this system of control, from Lustick's perspective, is not its coerciveness (as one might suspect) but its successful operation, with low cost effectiveness, and so far, with minimal of dissidence.

To conclude, the de-classment of Palestinians in Israel cannot be treated as a rigid process equivalent to lumpenproletarianization. Not all Israeli Arabs are landless, and an increasingly significant proportion of