

colonies have not been involved in the exploitation of Arab labour; their emphasis on the employment of Jews exclusively represents a belated attempt at reviving the notion of Hebrew labour which, for all practical purposes, has not been abandoned in Israel. Second, because the settlements, despite full government backing, are facing a serious crisis of viability, in terms of having an independent productive base. The provision of massive subsidies and incentives for settlers by the two Likud governments have not succeeded so far to bring about substantial Jewish immigration to Gaza and the West Bank. The total settler population of these two regions, if we exclude Jerusalem, still (in 1981) constitutes less than 5 percent of the total Jewish population in Israel.

This picture of marginality may yet change with the influx of middle class commuters and land speculators (as opposed to ideologically motivated settlers) to settle in the urban settlements within commuting distance from Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. The easy availability of high standard housing within the reach of a larger Israeli public has pushed the number of settlers in the West Bank alone (Jerusalem excluded) from 16 to 22 thousand in 1982 (Benvenisti, 1982:52), making it possible for one to "be a pioneer without risk and a speculator without embarrassment" (ibid.: 53).

However, the whole nature of Israeli planning in the occupied territories presumes "complete spatial separation between Jewish and Arab areas" (Benvenisti, 1982:54). Thus a totally independent infrastructure for the settlements in terms of roads, telecommunications, industry, agricultural marketing, etc., ensures this spatial insulation of Jews from the Palestinian inhabitants. If we seek the mechanisms of structural integration of the Arabs into Israel, therefore, we have to look beyond the network of settlements.