

any significant urbanisation, so that the peasant-worker remained -- and, in terms of wages and general attitudes -- was treated as a casual labourer "who had a pipeline to a village storehouse"; that is, he had one foot in subsistence farming (Rosenfeld, 1974:480). Nor, he asserts, did the increased entry of the peasant into the wage-labour market have any adverse effect on agricultural productivity, due to the presence of nonproductive surplus labour in rural society (Rosenfeld, ibid.; see also Nakhleh, 1977: 46-47, 51). Zureik, dealing with the post-state period, maintains that this transformation is the most significant single change brought about by the impact of the Israeli economy. Palestinian peasantry are seen as having undergone "marginal proletarianisation" with two socio-economic consequences: the uprootedness of Palestinians from traditional village life by the necessity of having to seek employment in Jewish urban centres, and the transformation of the Arab village into a stagnant non-productive unit (Zureik, 1976 56, 58).

So far, this process of proletarianisation is only in its beginning. As we shall see, it is lacking in the possibilities of trade-union organisation to enhance the peasant-turned-worker's bargaining position (vs. his Jewish co-workers, and Arab and Jewish employers), and limited in terms of upward occupational mobility. Furthermore, proletarianisation has been determined by the imponderables of external demands for temporary labour, accentuating the instability of the Palestinian peasant as a member of a farming community, while negating his self-conception as a worker (Israeli, 1976:232-239). One important result has been to provide Israeli industries with cheap labour-power in times of industrial expansion. This boosted the competitive potential of Israeli capitalism in the European and American markets, without threatening the employment opportunities of Jewish workers since Palestinians occupied low and unskilled positions deemed undesirable