

heritage of the Jordanian (and Egyptian) administrations (1948-67) as it was by the influx of dispossessed peasants and urban refugees during the war. While the prevailing view of stagnation and regional discrimination under those regimes is basically correct, it nevertheless, disguises a substantial amount of differentiation and mobility that was taking place during the same period. The main factors which accounted for this mobility -- especially in the case of the West Bank -- were the state sector (the army, the civil service and the school system) and the high rate of out-migration, the latter contributing significantly to changes in rural class patterns as a result of stipends sent from abroad and investments in construction and machinery by returning migrants (Lutfiyya, 1966:105-106; Rabie et al., 1973:195-198).

Given the increased demand for a variety of trained personnel in the oil-producing Arab states, and the relative decline in land possession as a source of wealth, these two channels of occupational mobility (the state sector and the educational system) enhanced the position of the professional and -- to the less fortunate masses, of its caricature, the clerk. In contrast to the situation of Palestinians who remained in Israel, where a vigorous capitalist economy had turned the majority of the labour force into potential wage-workers, there was a widespread attitude of contempt towards manual labour in the West Bank and Gaza. This attitude was partly a consequence of the overall stagnation in the economy, characterised by the marginality of the manufacturing sector and the absence of any major trends towards rationalisation or capitalism in agriculture. But it was also a cultural expression of the mannerisms of the old Palestinian elite diffused to the wider public. Only the presence of masses of refugees in the main urban centres (60 percent of the total in Gaza, 20 percent in the West Bank) produced a significant shift in the class structure from the