

workers can always take time off in the harvest season to tend their farms.⁷ A contributing factor in the opposite direction, although so far not a decisive one, is that the increase in food prices (and hence the profitability of selling crops) has been lower than the overall increase in the prices of general commodities, so that as the pattern of consumption of the rural population draws closer to that of urbanites, one would expect increased defections from the ranks of small farmers to employment in full-time wage labour. Negligence of small farms, already visible, and increased leasing to less capable peasants are inevitable consequences. An investigation of the effects of wage-labour attraction on different age categories, and on the sexual division of labour in the rural household would further illuminate this issue. In the Galilee, for example, greater involvement in wage labour was observed among the 18-34 age groups, while agricultural work inside the village was left to the 14-17 age categories, and to men over 55 (Israeli, 1976:139). Moreover, in the West Bank there is today a noticeable increase in the participation of women in tasks traditionally assigned to men (e.g., threshing and ploughing).

Consequences of Economic Integration

How stable and fixed is the edifice of economic integration that was imposed by Israel on the occupied territories? And, given a favourable political atmosphere, how reversible are these networks of dependency?

The thrust of Israeli policy towards the territories as discussed above -- to the extent that a conscious policy was formulated -- has centred around the gradual integration of the two regions into Israeli economic life through the creation of an employment market for Palestinian workers, the opening up of the territories as a major market for Israeli commodities, and the elimination of refugee camps through a process of resettlement and