

there is no fixed pattern for cropsharing arrangements over time, or within the same region, a point confirmed by Ashour for Syria and Palestine (Ashour, 1948a:37-44). They also found a positive association between the landlord's share of the crop and his participation in production costs (Bardhan and Rudra, 1980:289), and conversely, between the introduction of high-yielding varieties of grains and increased tenants' share (ibid.). Both correlations indicate a significant flexibility for the development of agricultural technology within the sharecropping framework.

In the final analysis, however, the issue amounts to how much attribution must be made to the sharecropping component within traditional agrarian institutions as the decisive factor in agricultural backwardness. Perhaps the most far-reaching critique of Bhaduri's position in this regard has been made by Griffin (1979) who reviewed the impact of the Green Revolution in Indian agriculture on the relationship between landlord and tenant. The exceptional technological backwardness of the situation in West Bengal is seen by Griffin as due not to the landlord's fear of investment in his land which might incur his loss of political and economic control (as Bhaduri implies), but because of the landlord's own surplus and the physical dispersal of tenants (Griffin, 1979:91-92). On the other hand, under altered conditions, when a larger pool of tenants is available, and higher initial capital is invested, we find that "... large farmers have ejected their tenants and begun farming with wage labour. In other cases, the landowners have retained the sharecropping system and have simply reduced the share received by the tenant." (ibid.:93).

In short, it is argued that the introduction of agricultural technology has not been hampered in most of Asia by sharecropping arrangements; on the contrary, sharetenancy is seen as having strengthened the political and economic hand of landlords in relation to their tenants as