The second compact, known as sharikat muzar'a (joint-farming partnership), usually consists of a shared investment by the landlord and tenant farmer in which the former acts, mainly, as a passive partner. The landlord receives half the net marketed yield against the provision of land and half of all inputs. In the case of irrigated farming, water is pumped from artesian wells at the expense of the landlord. Additional labour costs (for harvest, weeding, etc.) are usually born by the tenant. This is the system of sharetenancy predominant in the Jordan Valley today, especially in vegetable cultivation. Similar patterns prevail in the irrigated plains of Jenin and Tulkarem although (as we shall see below) demographic pressures and patronage alter the share division.

Since the mid-sixties, the export market in vegetable and citrus has generated an increased involvement of landlords and urban financiers (commission-agents) in the introduction of capital-intensive agricultural technology (chemicals, plastic sheaths, etc., -- and since the mid-seventies - drip irrigation; Dajani, 1979:15-16; Sharab, 1975). Unlike the mechanization of agricultural production in cereal cultivation, such intensification brought about labour shortages rather than labour displacement. Extensive areas in the Jordan Valley, as a result, were brought under cultivation by sharetenants, especially during the period preceding Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

The trend seems to have accentuated the differentiation between tenants who had access to some capital, thereby enhancing their partnership status with the landlords in the tenancy compact, and those with no access to such capital. So far there is little empirical data in support of this interpretation for Palestinian agriculture (cf. Tamari, 1980:47-48).