

West Bank and Israel) was a force towards nucleization and fission of the extended family, outmigration resulted by contrast in strengthening the extended family (Ammons, 1979:213). Emigrants tended to leave their wives and children in charge of their parents (wife's in-laws) for extended periods of time, and whatever remittances they sent contributed to the preservation and strengthening the patriarchal household. By contrast peasant-workers, by residing in the village and commuting daily to their work, established an independent income base which relatively freed them from dependence on the extended household. The result was a process of "screening" by which the more skilled and professional members of the community migrated abroad and were cut-off from the village after the 1967 war, while the less skilled members became workers in Israel. The loss of skilled migrants had a conservative effect on the village as a whole since it removed those educated and innovative segments in the community who may have been a force of change under occupation (Ammons, 1979:224). It also led to a "radical re-assessment of occupational priorities" because of the risks involved in emigration and in investing the family's savings in the education of their sons (ibid.). The implications of Ammons' analysis is quite serious for the present adaptation strategy to dislocation among West Bank villagers. Since the possibilities of providing a professional training for their sons (and daughters) is outside the scope and abilities of most peasant families and since the remuneration from whitecollar jobs is no longer (even marginally) competitive with that obtained from unskilled wage labour, then why bother to invest in higher education at all?