

much higher than those of most rainfed products. It was found, for instance, that the cost of animal ploughing has shown a rise of about 500% since 1967, as compared with only 250% rise in the price of wheat. This has resulted in a steady and marked shift in the pricing structure against the interest of farmers in dry areas.

2. Israeli research centres have generally shown little interest in improvizing forms of technology which are specifically suited for hilly agriculture in the West Bank, or for that matter, inside Israel itself. The obvious reason for this attitude stems from a deep conviction in the non-viability of most types of hilly agriculture, particularly when there is still (in Israel) a large area of untapped flat land.

Scarcity of appropriate technology is further aggravated by markedly weak connections of West Bank extension staff with sources of technology in other parts of the world, as explained earlier in the section on agricultural extension and research.

3. Even when a new technology has been proved productive and adequately remunerative (eg. chemical weed control) its dissemination might be impeded by a number of discouraging factors, such as excessively small size of land parcels and their extensive dispersion, inadequate cooperation among small neighbouring farmers, and scarcity of credit facilities.
4. Farmers in rainfed areas, in clear contrast to those with access to irrigation water, are more reserved in accepting new technologies.<sup>1</sup>

1. No attempt was made to quantify this important conclusion. But taking olive culture as an example, the evidence is convincing. As will be noted later, about 95 percent of olive growers add no fertilizer at all, almost 100 percent of them do not spray against pest infections, and very few of them have tried weed killers.

To some extent this is attributed to their usually older age and low literacy. Their reticence has been further accentuated by their poor confidence in the professional aptitude of extension staff which, they believe, may jeopardize their fragile economic base. This reservation was mentioned frequently by respondent farmers during this study. Judging by the low level of professional training of most extension staff, this reservation is not unfounded, although it is somewhat exaggerated.

The process of technological change was initiated in the late fifties in response to intensive government and private efforts. It then picked up at a fairly rapid pace in the last few years prior to occupation. In the post-occupation era, this process picked up further momentum due to sudden exposure to Israeli technology, mainly through direct contacts with dealers of farm supplies. Yet it is a gross exaggeration to attribute all progress achieved in raising productivity to exposure to Israeli sources. Counting on its pre-war record, West Bank agriculture was likely to make progress during the period in question. In fact, Jordan's agriculture which was conventionally less developed than that of the West Bank, has taken long strides over the past fifteen years in modernizing its production technology, as could be inferred from Table (VI-7).

Increased productivity has been largely a function of expanded use of several modern inputs. A comparative analogy of the rate of use of certain inputs in the West Bank, Jordan, and Israel sheds some light on the pace of agricultural technological change in the three countries (see Table VI-7).