

as the citrus plantation economy generates demand for labor only during the harvest season. Furthermore, it is not clear whether or not this seasonal employment of Arab labor on Arab citrus plantations represents capitalist relations of production and, therefore, proletarianization.

It is most likely that Arab citrus plantations were based on share-cropping. In this case, accumulation was based on non-capitalist relations as it did not involve exploitation of free wage labor.

This is different, however, from the citrus plantations owned by British and Jewish productive capital. In these cases, capital organized the labor process employing cash-croppers to create surplus value. This was free wage employment under capitalist relations of production. The employees were, therefore, agricultural proletariat; more vulnerable, however, than the industrial proletariat, owing to their subemployment as essentially seasonal workers.

Palestinian capital remained, by and large, merchant capital, i.e., circulation capital. In indigenous manufacture, the petty commodity form of production, rather than the modern capitalist labor process, prevailed. Palestinian merchant capital was never transformed into productive capital, hence the absence of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie, and therefore of the possibility of proletarianization by Palestinian capital.

The above leads us to conclude that during the Yishuv Arab labor was proletarianized only when employed by British or Jewish capital, as only then were Arabs laboring productively, subject to capitalist relations of production; only as employees of productive capital were they turned into productive labor, engaged in the creation of surplus value directly, and productive labor is the basic (but not only) criterion defining the prole-