iority is the function of technical know-how, not size of the army. In both phases, the absorption of Jewish immigrants and of Palestinian-Arabs in productive employment by local Jewish capital were necessarily mutually exclusive. The class interests of Arab and Jewish producers were, therefore, counterposed. Only in the post-1967 phase, characterized by the dominance of the economic and by a higher degree of the development of the productive forces, was the absorption of both Jews and Arabs simultaneously made possible. The rotation in dominance of instances (ideological, political and economic) is therefore not accidental. This historical review suggests that it is related to the specificity of the relations of production and the degree of development of the forces of production peculiar to each phase, as will be documented later in this thesis.

A common feature in all three phases is the massive <u>separation</u> of Palestinian producers from the means of production. A <u>distinctive</u> feature of the present phase is the massive <u>integration</u> of Palestinian labor surplus into productive employment by Israeli capital. It is simplistic, therefore, to explain the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel today in terms of the mere availability of a pool of cheap Palestinian labor in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Jewish settlement in Palestine has been historically correlated with the creation of Palestinian labor surplus. The Zionist "conquest of land" always resulted in displacement of Palestinian producers and the presence of cheap "free" labor. In order to comprehend the current proletarianization of Palestinians, it is thus more revealing to focus on the forces underlying the <u>demand</u> for, not the <u>supply</u> of, Palestinian labor in Israeli productive employment.

As expressed in the introductory quote to this chapter, the prole-