only by subordinating other modes to itself and integrating remnants of previous modes into its own system.

Unlike the "Arabs", the Bedouins and the Druzes, the other population groups included in the "non-Jews" category, i.e., the Circassians, Armenians and Bahaies, are not the by-product of the economic history of that place. They are rather national and religious minorities from European countries, who found refuge in Palestine and have chosen to integrate themselves into that social formation, hence becoming a part of and not being apart from the native Palestinian population. The size of these populations in Israel today is quite insignificant, and more importantly, they do not constitute a politically oppressed national minority in their own homeland, as the former Palestinian-Arab citizens do. What is important, however, is that the emphasis on the dividing characteristics of these groups has been systematic and instrumental for the sake of political stability and security of the State.

It will be interesting to find out how this separatist-differential treatment (which was also true under the Ottoman rule and the British Mandate) affects the class location of these various groups, and whether or not capitalist transformation in Israel today is likely to promote or impede the commonality of the class location and interest of the various religious, ethnic and national components of the labor force. The question, in other words, is whether or not capitalist class "segmentations" do ultimately assert themselves against ahistorical societal segmentations, and are not obscured by the latter.

Given that all the above segments of the labor force are <u>non-Jewish</u> citizens of an essentially <u>Jewish</u> State, they all have in common one thing that distinguishes them from Jewish citizens, including Oriental-Jews;