

in that each year large numbers of officers--majors, colonels, and generals--are ejected into the civilian market. Although these points are accurate and, in part, explain the higher rates of participation in the labor force among Jews than among Arabs of the 34+ age population, a complementary and rather stronger explanation of this increasing inseparability of the civilian/non-civilian productive forces is to be found in the irreversible shift into high technology production, which seriously affects the type of labor to be in demand, and likely to constantly generate new demands for more and more skilled labor with technical sophistication, usually found concentrated in the military. Put differently, we argue that military production is becoming, itself, the leading export sector in the civilian economy and is behind the increasing oneness of the civilian/non-civilian labor force. This is not only speaking of the linkages military production generates and promotes in the economy, but also and more importantly, of deeper structural transformations, specifically, the merger into a single division of labor. Later on, we will also see how the militarization of civilian economy integrates the Israeli labor force more directly into the international division of labor, with an increasingly privileged labor aristocracy on the one hand, and an increasingly exploited segment of the labor force, on the other.

A point directly related to the segmentation of the working class is central to a following chapter.

A concrete micro-scale example of the integration of military and civilian production is in Clal Industries, Ltd., the largest private supplier to the Israel Defense Forces. Clal Industries, Ltd. is very much in aerospace, producing and exporting sophisticated, custom-built equip-