

nate Palestinian labor force, particularly that imported from occupied territories, with the potential for security risk and sabotage. This risk, in turn, reduces its potential to replace, hence discipline and split the Jewish industrial labor force in strategic economic sectors, thus neutralizing the import of Palestinian labor as a systematic method to impede the possibility of cross-national proletariat alliance. At least one potential obstacle to such an alliance is, in effect, removed. This, however, is not to deny the possible existence of other far more impeding factors; neither is it to imply that the use of imported or resident Palestinian-Arab labor is neutralized from its disciplinary effect regarding all segments of the Jewish labor force. It is mainly to point out the potential contradictions in this realm, and the emerging need to explore other disciplinary methods and means for the labor aristocracy. Such other means can be material and non-material incentives, the import of labor with higher disciplinary potential, increasing the division of labor, already suggested by Eli Ginzberg in light of United States experience in labor management. Central to the policy of the Likud is the implementation of rather tough management of labor, especially since the penetration of the military ex-generals into civilian management and administration. The question to be posed here is how to manage the contradictions likely to emerge from these managerial alternatives? This leads us into the final issue -- prospective sources of labor, in light of the conflicting investment/immigration incentives.

V. Immigration Versus Investment Incentives: Implications on Prospective Sources of Labor

The post-1967 era, as we have previously mentioned, represents a shift in emphasis regarding the primary function of the Jewish State. The shift