

The real question that emerges in light of this information is not with respect to the effectiveness of those measures in mobilizing skilled Israelis back home; a far more serious question is, rather, the disincentive effect those measures are likely to inflict on the immigration of non-Israeli Jews, promoting reluctance among potential newcomers to come.

The Israeli Development Economist, Michael Bruno, views the problem of labor shortage in Israel as rather one of maldistribution, not absolute shortage.⁵⁵ Maldistribution, probably in terms of the tendency of the economically active labor force to concentrate in unproductive labor categories -- categories that do not involve creation of surplus, hence enlargement of the surplus product. In this sense, maldistribution is most evident in the mushrooming of the service sector among all economic branches, absorbing the largest portion of the civilian labor force. It may also apply to the mushrooming size of the police army, the latter totalling, in 1976, 75,000 soldiers in the Regular Army, which includes those serving on a permanent basis and those on a compulsory temporary basis, in addition to 307,000 in the Reserves.⁵⁶ The military force thus constitutes 30 percent of the total civilian labor force. Further, the size of the army seems equivalent to the size of the non-citizen Palestinian labor force imported from occupied territories. Does this suggest a replacement as opposed to a joining trend in the technical and/or social division of labor? This question is to be explored in Chapter V.

The training of an Israeli labor force and/or the making available of an already trained labor force neither economically nor politically present a viable alternative for Aliyah (Jewish immigration). Neither does the use of skilled migratory labor from advanced European economies, as