

striking evidence of decline or stagnation in the period between 1963 and 1967, versus expansion in the period between 1967 and 1971. Those figures are consistent with reality, the expression of historical events, a severe recession following the end of the construction boom, reaching its sharpest point in 1966 and the first half of 1967 exploding in the form of the expansionist Six Day War of June. The latter, in turn, resulting in a net territorial gain, reservoirs of cheap labor, concomitant with large inflows of capital and trained manpower, all together steering the economy and beginning a new economic business cycle -- reflected in the rates of expansion in the period following the war. In light of the 1963-1967 period figures, one can confidently conclude that when it strikes, recession hits Arabs harder than Jews. The demand for Arab craftsmen and industrial workers declined at a rate of 14 percent, compared with an increase of 1 percent in the demand for Jews in that labor category. Similarly, during the same economic crisis, the demand for miners and even construction workers declined by 33 percent in the case of Arab labor, compared with only 17 percent in the case of Jewish labor.

These indicators, again, reinforce our point regarding the relatively higher instability characterizing the Arab, as compared with the Jewish, structures of employment. The Arab structure of employment seems more responsive to external sporadic push-and-pulls than to the internal development of the labor force in terms of skill and aspirations. Unlike that, one observes a systematic pattern in the direction and rate of change within the Jewish occupational structure of employment that seems to derive from both the internal development of the labor force as well