

as centrally-oriented manpower policy. This is reflected best, for example, in the steady and constantly increasing decline in the farmers occupational category, regardless of crisis or boom, and most importantly, in the professional/scientific/technical occupational category, showing constantly, before and after the war, the highest rate of expansion among all other occupations in the Jewish structure of employment.

This observation makes much sense, knowing of the shift towards high technology production, and of course, in light of our information about the sources of current labor inflows, specifically the inflow of sophisticated technical manpower from the West as provided in the previous analysis of Israel's labor force in the seventies. The mid-sixties represent the end of Asian-African immigration and 1967 signifies the beginning of selective Aliyah, hence transforming the occupational structure, and naturally concentrating more heavily in the technical/scientific/professional labor category; thus, in turn providing a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Israel's comparative advantage in high technology production, analyzed earlier. Later in this section we will come back to discussing the resulting transformations in technical division of labor as expressed by the 1972 new occupation classification.

To come back to the point is to assert the observation of a systematic and predictable change in the Jewish occupational structure of employment compared with the unpredictable direction and rate of change in Arab occupational structure of employment. It is important, however, to realize that underlying the appearance of random and spontaneous change in the Arab occupational structure of employment is an essentially deli-