

recession on the Arab population, hence erasing the scars of discrimination between Jewish and Arab citizens and blaming it all-in-all on a conjunctural recession. In the post-1967 economic boom we witness an enlargement at a rate of 56 percent of the Arab labor force, compared with 17 percent in the Jewish labor force, in spite of the stimulating effect of the Six-Day War on Jewish immigration into Israel. This is indeed an expression of a disproportionate growth in the demand for Arab labor in a period of rapid economic growth.

We are, of course, aware of the fact that technically, the high rate of expansion in the Arab labor market is, in part, a reflection also of the previous decline in their labor force participation and not only of real processes, such as labor force maturity, the mobilization of Arab female labor, and the reactivation of the previously dismembered workers. The comparison between changes in the Arab labor force before and after 1967 does, therefore, indicate a measure of economic flexibility that the regulation of its use displays in that system of accumulation. Another example on this matter is to be seen in the growing demand for administrative/clerical Arab labor by 200 percent prior to the War; although such high rate of change in the demand for Arabs in this occupational category must be attributed, in part, to their poor representation in this occupation in previous years, as demonstrated earlier, it is partly to be viewed as the indirect effect of Jewish mobilization into the military at that time.

The increase in the demand for Arab labor in this occupational category is probably restricted to clerical and low-management levels, re-