

phase, the demand for this labor category was always higher for the veteran/Sabra labor force, who were more familiar with official Hebrew language and institutions of the State. In 1968, however, the representation of both "Western" population groups equalizes, then the Western immigrant representation exceeds that of the indigenous Israeli Jews. In this labor category the demand for Oriental-Jews continues to be much lower than it is for the rest of the Jews and much higher than the demand for Arabs, and it continues to be "of special significance that it is so."

We have already pointed out the underlying rationale behind the poor representation of Arabs in the administration and management of the Jewish State, compared even with Oriental-Jews. What is more important, however, is to indicate the significance of this point in the determination of class location, specifically in terms of the political subordination/domination criterion, addressed in the following section. The exceeding demand for Western Jewish immigrants over the Sabra labor force in this occupational category can be interpreted most accurately in light of a shift in the need for managerial skills from the State apparatus into production itself. The management of industrial relations in the pursuit of higher productivity and optimization (necessitated by concentration/centralization tendency, and consistent with the predominance of the economic over the political instance following the war, discussed previously) not only became a higher priority, but also required modern managerial skills likely to be more acquired by Europe-America immigrants.

Another prominent feature in the Israeli occupational structure of employment is the fact that among all segments of Israel's labor force,