false ideologies such as nationalism are becoming deeply internalized.

The purpose of this study is therefore restricted to examining the potential for <u>proletarian</u>, but not other, cross-national class alliances. Hence comes the significance, for example, of the distinction provided in Table A between skilled and unskilled productive labor. Citizen Palestinian-Arabs seem to be the most highly represented in the skilled productive labor category; second come Oriental-Jews; then the equally represented Sabras and Western Jews, although on the average, Israeli-Jews are more highly represented than Palestinian-Arabs (including non-citizens) in skilled labor categories. In unskilled labor categories, concentration of Palestinians in general, and non-citizens in particular, is disproportionately the highest.

A comparison between the average representation of Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in Israeli productive labor categories indicates that Palestinian-Arabs (citizens and non-citizens) are <u>over</u>-represented in agricultural work by a factor of 0.3, in skilled industrial work by a factor of 0.8, and in unskilled industrial work by a factor of 1.3, while Israeli-Jews are <u>under</u>-represented in all these labor categories by a factor of 0.92 in the first, 0.65 in the second, and of 0.93 in the third, respectively. If we compare the subethnic/national groups, non-citizen Palestinians seem <u>over</u>-represented in agricultural work by a factor of 3.6; they are nonexistent in skilled industrial work, and over-represented by a factor of 12.4 in the unskilled industrial labor categories, compared with citizen Palestinians being over-represented by a factor of 0.8 in the first, 3.1 in the second, 0.6 in the third. Among the various