

ately after the war. That is, when mobilized Jewish clerical and administrative workers are released back into their civilian positions. In fact, in 1974 the representation of Arab labor in those categories as well as in services and sales becomes even lower than it was a year prior to the war. The latter may be attributed to the economic crisis, during which Arabs lose the occupational upgrading gained during the period of rapid economic growth following 1967. This conforms with the rules that govern black/white labor mobility in the United States, as previously pointed out by Harold Baron.

Again, this is revealing and reinforcing of the point made earlier regarding the roles citizen-Arab labor plays in substituting for Jewish labor during periods of military mobilization, and as a "flexibility-displaying" factor in the Israeli economy.

These roles are expressed statistically in the form of temporary upgrading of the Arab occupational structure of employment and must not obscure the importance of their role in the post-1967 economy during political stability. Further, it is of significance that the non-citizen Palestinian workers from the occupied territories did not perform this kind of flexibility-displaying role during that period of military mobilization; rather, on the contrary, the proportion of this labor force in agriculture and services declined during the war and stagnated after the war, despite a proportional increase in the sales and unskilled labor categories. It is of significance also that by virtue of their Israeli citizenship, the former can be subjected to display economic flexibility when the security of the State is being threatened, and it is precisely