

in the United States. In both cases, political vulnerability of the minority group members of the labor force as well as the profit imperative of the ruling class are the conditions underlying these dynamics of demand for Israeli-Arab labor, as for American black labor.

If we consider the subethnic groups in the Israeli labor force, we notice that in the post-1967 era differentiation in the occupation structure is the lowest between Israeli-born Sabras and European-American immigrants (Column D35), and the highest between Sabras and Israeli-Arabs (Column D13); and it is of significance that these so-called indigenous Israeli-Jews, who have co-existed with the indigenous Palestinian population for the longest time, continue to be the least mixing with and the most different from the Arab labor force as far as locations in the technical division of labor is concerned. This fact is likely to be the result of labor-Zionist segregationist policy in Palestine since the Yishuv. Despite the above, however, a prominent trend highlighted in Table N is the tendency towards equalization in the post-1967 occupational structure of Israeli-Arabs, compared with that of all other Jewish population groups. In the case of Oriental-Jews, a counter-tendency prevails in their relation to Sabras and Western Jews; the differentiation or gap in the occupational distribution tends to get wider during that same period. To sum up this observation is to point out an increasing integration of the Israeli-Arab citizens into the Israeli-Jewish occupational structure of employment. Perhaps it is happening at the expense of Oriental-Jews, or as a result of the latter's tendency to heavily concentrate in the service labor category, especially since the June War.