

the early years of occupation seemed to flood Jewish agricultural plantations in the private and co-operative sectors (recall debates in section 3 of Chapter 2). During the period between 1968 and 1973 the relative size of non-citizen Palestinians in Israeli agricultural employment was constantly growing and exceeding both that of the Jews and the citizen Palestinians. Such increasing penetration of non-citizens into a declining economic branch, from which both Arab and Jewish citizens were moving away, is likely to indicate that the portion of citizen agricultural labor forced out of that economic branch was replaced by labor imported from the occupied territories. Of course, the latter were entering agricultural production as proletariat, while in the case of the former, a self-employed labor force is most likely to be the one shunning agriculture and entering other branches as industrial proletariat or service employees where demand for labor was very high. In this sense, the apparent replacement in the technical division of labor is not coinciding with replacement in the social division of labor. This exit/entry flow of agricultural labor force may imply precisely that both groups are joining modern proletariat class locations.

Second, the decline in agricultural employment regarding all the segments of the labor force, starting after the October War, can be interpreted both in terms of the rising organic composition of agricultural capital, manifesting itself in an increased productivity and mechanization. The latter, made possible precisely by the very extraction of