

world of consumption with inflationary prices and devaluation of the Israeli lira increasingly reducing their purchasing power.

Second, we must keep in mind that this information regarding Arab-Jewish labor mobility across economic branches lacks very important details, not only regarding cross-tabulation by occupational mobility, and social forms of labor being performed in the previous versus the recent locations in the technical division of labor, but also regarding the specific industries within the industrial sector, into which Arab and Jewish citizens are jointly or separately moving in or out. Are the particular industries into which Arabs, and off which Jews, are moving related or unrelated to military production?

Are those Jews who are shunning the industrial branch of Western or Oriental background? Are the entering Palestinian (citizens and/or non-citizens) industrial labor force joining or replacing Oriental-Jews in the various industrial labor categories? etc.

An analysis on such a micro-level requires information that is unavailable in official statistical sources. It is very hard to assess the number of wage-earners in military industries for reasons already discussed in a previous chapter, as well as because it is likely to be classified information. From scattered sources we are informed, by the Wall Street Journal, that by 1969 a minimum of 13,000 were already employed in Israel's military and aircraft industries.<sup>46</sup> The New York Times reports the number of Israelis that are said to be employed in the arms industry to reach 17,000 by 1976.<sup>47</sup> These figures clearly underestimate reality. Aviation Week & Space Technology points out that in 1976 Israel's aircraft industry alone has employed 18,000 skilled persons. Also, that