

Israel", we must include not only the labor force commuting into work places inside the Green Line (and for that matter, the illegally smuggled-in workers who, therefore, cannot commute, hence are kept locked inside the factory overnight by the Israeli employer), but also those employed by Israeli capital in the occupied territories themselves. If these wage-earners are included, and to the extent they are employed by productive capital, they are most likely to increase the size of the Palestinian proletariat significantly in absolute and relative terms.

If we use criteria less conservative than Poulantzas', say Braverman's, and thus include clerical workers in the proletariat, the relative size of the Palestinian proletariat may decline, because most clerical work is performed by Jews. This, however, will still increase, not decrease, the number of shared proletarian locations. In that case, the mobility of Jewish labor into community and public, even business, services will not represent a Jewish deproletarianization tendency.

If manual blue-collar service employees are included, the large number of Arab personal service employees in garages, restaurants, etc. will belong to the proletariat and, further, the number of shared proletarian locations. For a detailed breakdown of the service workers, see Table Y. This detailed table is not useful for our class analysis, because it does not distinguish between self-employed and employees (wage-laborers).

With ending this chapter, we answer positively a central question in our study: that is, whether or not the penetration of Palestinian-Arabs into the Israeli labor market results in a greater number of Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs jointly placed within the boundaries of the working class. We conclude that as far as the objective conditions, penetration