THE DISLOCATION AND RE-CONSTITUTION OF A PEASANTRY: THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN PALESTINE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AND THE JORDAN VALLEY, 1960-1980

by

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ABSTRACT

The war of 1948 has had a major dislocating impact on the various institutions of Palestinian society. This study attempts to examine the consequences of this dislocation on the agrarian régime in two ecological zones of central Palestine: the dry farming regions in the highlands of the West Bank, and the intensive farming areas of the Western Valley of the Jordan. Explanations are provided for the persistence and even prosperity of peasant communities which have undergone a process of protracted 'de-peasantisation' in areas of marginal and marginalized dry farming.

Variables of landlessness, wage labour, tenancy forms, and population movements are utilized to interpret current trends in Palestinian rural society in the light of four village case studies. Particular attention is directed towards the consolidation of a stratum of peasant-workers and their future in the context of Israeli annexation of Arab land, and integration of the Palestinian labour force into the Israeli economy.

At a different level of analysis, the study examines the manner in which the dispossessed peasants of coastal Palestine re-constituted themselves in a new rural economy under conditions of intensified agriculture and capitalization of farm inputs in a process identified here as 're-peasantisation'. In this context, the thesis discusses the decline of patrimonial relations and the subjugation of peasants to relations of dependency under the new agricultural technology.

Finally, changes in the social economy of Palestinian villages are compared to features of rural transformation in Europe and the third world today.

DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institution of learning.

Salim Tamari

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Israel and Occupied
Territories of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip



Source: Migdal (1980).

Chapter One

Introduction: The Study of Agrarian Transformations in Palestine

This thesis deals with the social transformation of an agrarian society whose political contours underwent major and periodic re-structuring in the last half-century. I have attempted here to describe and interpret the consequences of dislocation suffered by Palestinian society in the war of 1948 and its aftermath. More expressly, I have tried to explain why various forms of peasant communities, though perhaps not a peasant society, have persisted and even prospered in areas of marginal and marginalized dry farming, despite overwhelming challenges to their tenure in the land. At a different level, this study addresses itself to the manner in which the dispossessed peasants of coastal Palestine re-constituted themselves in a new rural economy under conditions of intensified farming in the process identified here as 're-peasantisation'.

Part I of the thesis deals with the devolution of Palestinian society as a whole in the last hundred years and provides the historical context in which agrarian dislocation occurred. Part II discusses the 'mechanisms of agrarian transition' in Palestine which I locate in landlessness, wage labour, tenancy forms, and population movements engendered by factors internal and external to the village economy. Part III examines and attempts to ground these variables in village case studies which exemplify the two processes of 'de-peasantisation' (the disintegration of traditional peasant production units and their reformulation), and 're-peasantisation' (the ascendancy of refugee landless farmers into a new peasant status through a variety of cropping arrangements) in the post-1948 period.

When I first embarked on this study a few years ago, my conceptual framework was one informed by recent studies of 'peripheral formations' in the post-colonial period, and particularly by the debates on capitalist transition and internal differentiation within the peasantry. There was the particular problem of establishing the location of Palestinian specificity into these theoretical formulations, as it would involve any such regional study. But the empirical material gathered seemed to 'fit' and be illuminated by the theoretical framework available. The emerging patterns focussed into a familiar terrain: a displaced peasantry re-located into expanding urban centres; a dislocated former landed gentry whose access to the land was blocked by the creation of a new Europeanized state; the generation of rural surplus labour which could not be re-absorbed by the fragmented and parcellized village holdings - or by the stagnating nature of the rural economy; massive demand for cheap and semi-skilled village labour internally (Israeli market) and externally (migration to the Gulf and the Americas); and finally, an emergent class consciousness reinforced by daily encounters with an employer who is also a colonial master.

The interpretation of those trends required an elaboration on, and modification of, current theories of peasant economies in peripheral societies. In particular, there was a need to take into account the actual colonial relationship with Israel - no 'neo-' or 'post-colonial' development here. There was also the problem of a society[1] whose constituent parts, as a result of war(s), were dispersed over a number of states and social formations - integrated only by a broad national movement. The attempt at a modified 'formula' was not satisfactory. It was challenged by several specificites of the Palestinian situation. To appreciate this problem of theoretical grounding, I will cite a passage of empirical generalization from Samir Amin concerning which

there is some consensus about the nature of underdevelopment in societies of the periphery (1976:333-364/Bernstein, 1979:89):

> All peripheral formations have four main characteristics in common: (1) the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the national sector; (2) the creation of a local, mainly merchant, bourgeoisie in the wake of foreign capital; (3) a tendency towards a peculiar bureaucratic development, specific to the contemporary periphery; (4) the incomplete, specific character of the phenomena of proletarianization.

Now in the case of Palestine there is a number of peculiarities that makes it difficult to locate its social formation in the above scheme. There is, above all else, the absence of a national state, and its non-replacement - as far as Amin's generalizations are concerned - by the colonial state apparatus. What obtains as a result is the absence of a stable land tenure system rooted, not in the penetration of agrarian capitalism, but in the expanding attempts at land confiscation and Zionist claims of sovereignty. The colonial state neither subsidizes, nor reforms, nor regulates the agrarian régime except to the extent that it protects its own market and insulates it from the vagaries of Arab agriculture. Thus, instead of the 'predominance of agrarian capitalism in the national sector' there prevails, outside the Jordan Valley, increasing marginalization of the land. Instead of the creation of a local mercantile bourgeoisie, we have the subordination of local capital - through the mediation of petty merchant capital and subcontracting firms - to the Israeli commodity market. Instead of the 'peculiar bureaucratic development' there is an absence of a statist sector, and its replacement by a military government which dismembered the public sector from its former connections with the Jordanian state and integrated it into the domain of the Israeli state. To compound this situation, there developed in the last five years (since 1978) a dual politico-juridical system dealing separately with the councils of

Jewish settlements in distinction to the local Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. (These consequences of colonial mediation are dealt with in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.) There are, however, a second set of peculiarities that are not related to the absence of a national state sector but still endow the Palestinian case with attributes not shared with most peripheral agrarian formations. Those are related to the persistence of features of Palestinian agriculture that pre-date Israeli and Jordanian rule. Among these features, some of which are common to the Levant and other dry farming regions, are the absence of substantive differentiation among the peasantry, the weakness of the internal market, and non-urbanization of regional centres, despite considerable demographic growth (Chapters 5 and 6). One major consequence of these features has been the phenomenon we refer to here as 'halted proletarianization', exemplified by the persistence of the family farm, and seasonal agriculture simultaneously with the massive transfer of the surplus rural labour force to wage labour in Israel and abroad (Chapter 7). In part this was possibly due to the physical proximity of the Israeli work centres to the village surplus labour, and to the nature of arbor cropping in the highlands.

Those peculiarities of the Palestinian agrarian régime, therefore, imposed themselves on the search for a theoretical model appropriate for the interpretation of the empirical data and still relevant to placing them in the context of existing development and agrarian studies.

I will discuss here three relevant theoretical excursions which have been utilized in this thesis - not always with the same degree of explicitness - and which have provided interpretative depth to the issues raised above. These theories are: the concept of 'internal colonialism' and cheap labour-power developed by Wolpe in relation to South African capitalism and the tribal Reserves; secondly, features of

the 'differentiation debate' on the nature of peasant household mobility and proletarianization in Russia (1920s) and India (1960s) as a consequence of structural change in the rural sector; and thirdly, conceptualizations of the mechanisms of rural transformation and its multi-variate typology adopted for the analysis of Turkish agriculture by Keydar.

'Internal Colonialism' and Cheap Labour

There are two facets of Wolpe's theory of internal colonialism that concern us here: his formulation of the articulation between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production with the consequence of generating cheap labour power for the capitalist mode; and his elaboration of the changing ideological system necessary to sustain and reinforce such a system. The 'articulation' argument is centred around the appropriation of the Reserves in South Africa which, through the preservation of a pre-capitalist peasant community and its kinship structure, provides and underwrites the source of cheap labour for the industrial economy (Wolpe, 1972; 1975). Wolpe draws on Meillassoux's distinction between the means of subsistence drawn by the labourer in the form of direct wage, and those drawn indirectly (in the form of social benefits, etc.). In the case of the African Reserves, the capitalist sector is freed from the latter form:

> Under certain conditions the capitalist mode of production is able to avoid, to a greater or lesser extent, the payment of indirect wages; that is, it is obliged to pay only immediate sustenance of the labourer but it can avoid paying for his subsistence during unemployment, or for the subsistence of children or cost of education, etc.
>
> The most important condition enabling capitalism to pay for labour-power which is produced and reproduced outside the capitalist mode of production.
>
> In South Africa this condition was (and still is, although to a decreasing extent) met by the presence of a non-capitalist mode of agricultural production in the areas of African concentration (particularly, but

> not exclusively, in the Reserves). In this mode of production land is held communally by the community and worked by social units based on kinship, and the product of labour is 'pooled' and then redistributed directly by means of an allocation through the kinship units in accordance with certain rules of distribution. (Wolpe, 1975:247).

This system, however, has an inherent contradiction, inasmuch as the advanced capitalist system has a tendency to dissolve the very same relationships which generate the cheap labour in the process of capital accumulation. This is what Wolpe calls the tendency of 'conservation-dissolution':

> the preservation of the conditions (migrant-labour, fixed land area, low capital investment in African agriculture) which enable labour power to be extracted from the African societies serve to destroy the productive capacity of these societies (given the increase in population, the consequent over-population on the fixed land means, backward farming methods, etc.). The diminution of the product of these Reserve economies generate rural impoverishment and also, in the absence of the assumption by the capitalist sector of responsibility for indirect wages, extreme urban impoverishment. (ibid.:249).

Increased pressure on this system in terms of African wage demands, and the disintegration of the Reserves system, created the pressure on the régime to develop the Apartheid system (as distinguished from internal segregation) and its elaborated ideology. That essentially was an attempt by the capitalist state 'to maintain the system of cheap migrant-labour, in the face of opposition, by means of the erection of a 'perfected' and 'modernized' apparatus of political domination' (ibid.: 249-250). This transformation, in turn, shifts the major contradiction in South African society from two articulated modes of production (capitalist and pre-capitalist), to a dominant contradiction within the same capitalist mode (Wolpe, 1972:317-318).

A corollary to the need for the preservation of the internal

colonial relationship in Wolpe's analysis is the elaboration of a system of control at the ideological level. Thus the conservation of the non-capitalist (peasant and tribal) modes require the development of

> (an ideology) and political policies which revolve around the segregation, and preservation and control of African 'tribal' societies. The ideological focus, it must be stressed, is always necessarily on the 'racial' or 'tribal' or 'national' elements, precisely because of the 'tribal' nature of what is being preserved and controlled (Wolpe, 1975:249).

This conception of 'internal colonialism' has been criticized because of its close approximation to the simplistic, and outdated, notion of functional dualism prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, by which a traditional rural sector feeds and supports a modernistic sector integrated into the world market (Goodman and Redclift, 1981:50). It should be noted, however, that the notion of preserving a pre-capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of its subsidized labour (by the peasant household) is neither peculiar to apartheid-type conditions, nor is it essential to conceptualize within the confines of the 'internal colonialism' model. As we shall see below, it has become part of the controversy over the location of peasant household production in the transition debate to capitalist agriculture (Patnaik, 1978; Banaji, 1978; and others), and also over the contemporary definition of the peasant producer in the process of proletarianization. I might add that the utility of the 'internal colonialism model' in a system of structured integration becomes more limited in a society in which the main antagonism is one involving class conflict (whether racially 'masked' or otherwise). However, in the relationship that prevails today between Israel and the agrarian sector in the Palestinian (and possibly southern Lebanese) territories, it has important heuristic significance. The consolidation of a labour market based on the disenfranchised commuting

peasant-worker into the Israeli economy, and the systematic control over the movement of workers through the modes of their recruitment, as well as the (voluntary) preservation of the marginalized family farm to sustain the low wages paid to the peasant-workers - all can be illuminated meaningfully within Wolpe's schema outlined above (discussion in Chapter 7; case study in Chapter 8, below).[2]

'De-peasantisation', Differentiation and Mobility

I have borrowed the term 'de-peasantization', but not the totality of the concept, from Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1977; originally, 1899). The reference is made there to the 'utter dissolution of the old, patriarchal peasantry and the creation of a new type of rural inhabitants' (1977:176). The penetration of capitalist relations in agriculture was optimistically (?) seen by Lenin at the turn of the century as generating a radical process of differentiation in which 'a commodity economy and capitalist production' prevail. The increased exploitation of peasants, through the medium of merchant's capital, was expected to lead not only to the differentiation of peasants into different strata of rural petty bourgeoisie, kulaks and agricultural wage workers (a rural proletariat) - but also to the actual dissolution of the peasantry as a class (ibid.:175, 177).

'De-peasantization' thus conceived by Lenin was an essential component of the process of polarization whose 'objective' function was the enlargement of the home market, and whose 'subjective' dimension was to lay the groundwork for the intensification of the class struggle in the (Russian) countryside. This unilinear progressive theory of agrarian development ultimately created controversies not only in its capacity as a universal model for underdeveloped countries, but also as to its applicability to the interpretation of the empirical evidence in Russia itself. The controversy involved writers with diverse political

outlooks and political perspectives such as Kautsky and Chayanov, and - in more recent years - Banaji, Patnaik, Thorner, Kerblay and Shanin.

At best there is a consensus today, if one can speak of a consensus here, that Lenin's model of differentiation - leading towards expropriation of petty commodity producers into agents of capital as free wage-labour - is not 'the sole or necessary form of development', but one possible variation within it (Bernstein, 1977:69). In the so-called Indian Debate on the nature of capitalist agriculture and differentiation of the peasantry in South Asia, the status of the small-holder as a land-locked proletarian became the subject of intense theoretical and methodological discussions (see especially Rudra, Thorner, Patnaik et al., 1978; for an excellent summary of the debate cf. Goodman and Redclift, 1981:81-99).

In this debate, Jairus Banaji (1977) and Bhaduri (1973) - whose position we discuss in more detail in Chapter 5 - take a more modified Leningist position which regards peasants basically as 'concealed wage-workers'. In contrast to the classical conception of the European model, however, where the peasantry was presumed to be fully expropriated and a labour market was formed, Banaji held that in the colonial world, capitalist production 'dependend not on the constitution and automatic functioning of the labour-market, but on the coercive subjugation of the small commodity producer' (Banaji, 1977:36). Goodman and Redclift (1981) summarize the essence of this argument as follows:

> Capitalist class relations remain concealed by direct producers' formal possession of the means of production, which imparts certain 'external attributes' to the production unit and its immediate labour process. Yet the relationship of small 'peasant' enterprises to capitalist production in the social division of labour is such that these household producers effectively are subsumed by capital as a rural proletariat. Their social reproduction is determined by capitalist production and exchange and requires, if we strip away the

> 'superficial "surface" sale of products' the sale of their labour power....the 'subsistence production' of simple commodity producers (acts) 'as the specific form of reproduction of labour-power within a capitalist process of production'.

Under such conditions,

> capitalist relations of production are mediated through household forms of production: the survival of the peasant small commodity production represents a specific form of capitalist class relations. In peripheral social formations, capitalist development in agriculture can lead to rural proletarianization which takes the form of the survival and reproduction of impoverished, small-scale peasant family-labour units. (97-98; emphasis in original).

Against this argument of peasants as 'concealed proletarians', Bernstein and others have regarded the mediation of capitalist relations of production through the peasant household as requiring a less reductionist analysis, and have suggested the notion of 'wage-labour equivalents' (Bernstein, 1977:73) as a term reflecting both the domination of capitalist relations, but also the persistence of a logic of peasant economy within it.

An alternative conception of peasant differentiation to this 'modified Leninism' has been the theoretical heritage of the Dynamic Studies approach associated with rural Russian studies at the turn of the century. Their emphasis on the farmstead as a unit of analysis, and on the demographic features of the peasant household in interpreting the mechanisms of peasant mobility and differentiation, has produced an original methodological breakthrough in the study of peasant economies. The main criticism levelled at the Chayanovian school has been its isolation of the notion of a 'peasant economy' from the wider constellation of social structure - capitalist or otherwise - in which it is embedded; and its attempt at generalizing conclusions drawn from Russian agrarian conditions, such as those created by the relatively free access

to arable land, to problems of agrarian transition in the third world today (cf. especially Patnaik, 1979).

In his re-examination of the Russian material for the pre- and post-revolutionary period, Shanin (1972) utilized budget studies of Russian peasant households to show that the process of rural differentiation was much more complex and problematic than that suggested by the linear-structural paradigm (1972:45-62; 109-112). The study of mobility patterns among peasants, according to Shanin, required the delineation of several countervailing forms of household movements tending towards levelling of socio-economic differentiation in one direction (centripetal mobility), or increased differentiation (centrifugal mobility) in the other direction (ibid.:71-80). The mobility of peasant society is thus seen as 'a net balance of the oscillation of its component peasant households' (77). In some cases, centrifugal mobility may lead to structural changes of the type discussed by Lenin, i.e. proletarianization or market-oriented farmers (ibid.:119), but this is an exceptional case and cannot be generalized.

Differentiation of peasant households is seen by Shanin as being determined by, on the one hand, the persistence of centrifugal trends ('the cumulation of economic advantages and disadvantages') and the biological life cycle of the household (i.e. consumption needs prevailing over production capacities in the peasant household). On the other hand, it is determined by the continuation of centripetal tendencies. The reference here is to the modification of polarization trends resulting from communal re-division of the land, and to 'substantive changes' leading towards levelling of stratification. 'Substantive changes' include: migration of peasant households, partitioning of extended households, extinction, and merger of weak and non-viable units (ibid.:81ff., 101-106, 119). Finally, centripetal

tendencies may also include the opposite trends of the 'biological cycles' examined by Chayanov and his school, namely, the trend towards a decrease in consumption pressures within the household, and the consolidation of the household's productive capacities (ibid.:103). The differentiation process becomes the product of the sum total of mobility patterns generated by centrifugal and centripetal tendencies.

The concept of 'substantive changes' (defined as 'the trans-mutations of peasant households resulting in the appearance and dis-appearance within peasant communities' - ibid.:81) has immediate relevance to the notion of 'peasantization' and 'de-peasantization' utilized in this study inasmuch as it deals with structural changes affecting the peasantry as a result of differential factors external (wage-labour 'pull', land availability and migration) and internal (wealth differential, 'fission', etc.) to village life.

But the historical contextual conditions of agrarian dislocation, and differentiation (or actually relative non-differentiation as we shall argue below), are radically different in Palestine from those prevailing in Chayanovian Russia or even the India of Patnaik and Bhaduri. Schematically, the distinguishing features of conditions leading to de-peasantization in Palestine in the last half-century can be outlined here:

1. A precarious existence for peasants qua agriculturalists emanating from the dominance of dry farming with small-holders' plots decreasing in size as a result of regressive parcellization and lack of meaningful consolidation of peasant property.

2. Alienation of the smallholding peasants from their land in favour of big landlords, resulting from the institution of private property in land ('Land Registration') and the

dissolution of the communal ('musha^{c}') forms of village cropping, as well as from the eviction of tenants and sharecroppers by Zionist land colonization.

3. Dislocation of the agrarian social fabric during the 1948 war through the massive expulsion of peasants (and landlords) from their land ('expulsion from means of production' - Rauf, 1973) creating a situation of pauperized urban dwellers and (potential) agricultural workers.

4. 'Halted proletarianization': the periodic expansion and recession of wage-work opportunities, without the loss of land among central highland farmers, created the conditions for the emergence of a new stratum of peasant-workers, becoming a permanent feature of Palestinian rural society. Elsewhere (e.g. in the Galilee) a 'residual peasantry' (Rosenfeld, 1970) in villages which have become virtually dormitory abodes for commuting workers persisted.

'De-peasantization' in the context of the above conditions refers to the progressive devolution of peasant existence occasioned by the combination of increasing non-viability of the peasant household (in production terms), expulsion from land, and work opportunities outside the village/camp - without the situation necessarily leading to proletarianization of the peasantry. In contrast to the 'multi-directional mobility' of peasant households (Shanin, 1972:109-121), which in the case of Russia failed to bring about forms of polarization and class conflict anticipated by Lenin and other Bolsheviks, we find here horizontal forms of mobility and vertical dislocation that resulted in homogenizing tendencies within the village community. In addition, we observe 'aggregate shifts' involving collective upward, and occasionally

downward, mobility of whole village communities. Dispossession of land, wage-labour and migration played crucial roles in these homogenizing tendencies (see Chapter 6 for a discussion). At the level of national consciousness, peasant dislocation and alienation from land generated the mystical 'cult of return' to the land (Chapter 3). The agrarian transition to capitalist agriculture was thus 'blocked' not by pre-capitalist formations, but by settler colonialism and physical dispersal.

'Peasantization' (or re-peasantization') is used in this study to designate the process of accession by landless agriculturalists and sharecroppers to the status of smallholders through one of two processes: one was the assumption of landholding status by dispossessed peasants through sharecropping contracts of the mugharasa and musaqah nature (cf. Chapter 5); the second, acquisition of land through the rejuvenation of unexploited land. The situation of refugee farmers in the Jordan Valley, during the 1950s and 1960s, being a prime example of the latter form (Chapter 12).

The Mechanisms and Typology of Agrarian Transition

In his study of modes of rural transformations, Caglar Keydar (1980) examines the diversity of rural structures which emerged in Turkey after the 1950s in response to commoditization and the development of agriculture under capitalist domination. The study is important to our analysis because of historical and geographic-ecological affinities. The Arab Levant, including Palestine, shares with Turkey both the periodization and patterns of change in land tenure forms and social relations embedded in them. As a component of the Ottoman domain, Palestine and other provinces of greater Syria were similarly affected by the 1858 land legislations and their aftermath. In both regions, the progressive dissolution of the communal peasant holdings led to the

emergence of big landlordism and a multiplicity of sharecropping arrangements.

The impact of partible inheritance of land in the context of dry farming generated comparable consequences in terms of parcellization, marginalization of agriculture, seasonal farming, substantial migration out of the rural sector and high incidence of wage-labour. In both regions, also capitalist domination and the introduction of capital intensive technology, where it was introduced, did not necessarily lead 'towards the establishment of wage-labour capital relations' in agriculture (Keydar, 1980:3). That is, peasant household production persisted despite increased commercialization and the introduction of scientific farming. That trend, of course, is by now a characteristic phenomenon not only of Levantine agriculture but also of West European farming as well (Djurfeldt, 1982:139). What distinguishes Turkey for the purposes of this analysis is the wider spectrum along which variations in agrarian structures was spread out, and a more accentuated response to the penetration of capitalist relations in agriculture in terms of peasant differentiation and cyclical mobility of farming households.[3] Since the Turkish empirical data corresponds to and includes such a wider variety than the forms under our consideration, it is possible to elucidate hypothetical constructs which illustrate the morphology of village types, and dominant developmental tendencies among peasants, more sharply than the comparable, but incipient, forms which still prevail in the Palestinian case.

In his classification scheme, Keydar outlines three divergent types of villages that highlight developmental tendencies emerging in Turkish rural structures. The assumption adopted by Keydar as a basis for his typology is that internal differentiation within farming households and patterns of land exploitation are mediated by the social

structure of the village (p. 19). Thus, the unit of analysis here is the village, and not the farming unit or the peasant household, the latter being inappropriate for the determination not only of internal (class) differentiation but also the delineation of 'social and economic complementarities on regional lines'. I will outline below the summary of this classification of village types:

1. Villages dominated by petty commodity production. This type includes villages that project 'proletarianization of the insufficiently commercial producers'; those typified by seasonal migration (semi-proletarianization); and those - because they are unable to diversify their economic activities - are on the verge of economic extinction. Those conceptual categories prevail in 90% of Turkish villages and apply to two kinds of villages, both characterized by peasant smallholdings (30-100 dunums) and high out-migration. But whereas migration in the second type of village led to internal diversification of the village economy (introduction of cash crops and commoditization), it transformed the first kind into a residential unit wholly dependent on migration stipends, with subsistence crops continuing in only some of the peasant households (pp. 5-11). The key variables here are seasonal migration and the reduced size of peasant holdings. In the first case, the traditional structure became obsolete under the permanent impact of out-migration, while in the second case remunerations from migrant sources injected the village economy with 'a new and viable economic momentum essentially based on its traditional structure'. The advantages of seasonal migration for the national economy lie in its role of reproducing the labour force under conditions undertaken in the village itself, i.e. within the farming household, and not through wages received (p. 20). At the same time, the existence of wages from sources external to the village allows for lowering the prices

of commodities produced in the village.

2. 'Kulak-type' villages.[4] These villages emerge in fertile grain cultivation areas which have undergone intensive mechanization and substantial accumulation of capital. The 'kulak' pattern refers to well-to-do peasants who, utilizing primarily household labour and intensive grain technology, have succeeded in augmenting their cultivable plots by buying off land from migrant families who lost their peasant status. This is a situation, therefore, where permanent out-migration has created a market for land (p. 13). A variation on this type exists in areas of irrigated cotton cultivation where the state undertook land settlement schemes. It is characterized by labour-intensive cultivation, predominant use of family labour, and sufficient yield allowing for accumulation (pp. 14-16). The 'kulak' type is seen by Keydar as a transitional type that will dissolve into independent farmsteads, without yielding to proletarianization since de-peasantized households accumulate enough working capital from land sales to establish themselves independently outside the village economy (p. 20). Furthermore, this second transitional type is the only pattern in Turkey where 'concentration on the principal means of production occurs exclusively through the workings of the market' (p. 13).

3. Capitalist farming villages. These villages constitute less than 1% of the total and represent the Turkish equivalent of the presumably classical (European) road to capitalist agriculture.[5] They are characterized by intensive mechanization and commercialization leading towards the expulsion of tenants from the land, and internal proletarianization which occurred mostly during the 1950s and 1960s. As in many regions of Western Europe, commercialization of cash crops and animal husbandry led to the incorporation of pasture land into the landlord's private domain (enclosures), while 'labour-rent arrangement

became obsolete due to the use of tractors' (p. 17). However, unlike the European variety, this trend occurred in the least developed regions in Turkey, where semi-feudal relations of exploitation persisted for a longer period. Keydar hypothesizes that this pattern of development is on the verge of disintegration. His reasoning is that 'since the dominant tendency in the distribution of land is that of fragmentation rather than concentration, the pure capitalist type (sic) is to be observed during its genesis and immediately thereafter' (p. 21).

A central problem with a typology of transitional forms such as Keydar's is that it collapses a number of regional attributes of villages undergoing transformation into broad analytical categories for the purpose of extrapolation. Projections from such trends is hampered by the apparently limited amount of empirical investigation involved, and secondly by a tendency to extrapolate potential future trends from embryonic forms of development, such as the case with peasant capitalism ('kulak-type' villages above). The whole issue of the nature of capitalism in agriculture poses another problematic that exists not only in Keydar's work, but also throughout the foregoing discussion on transitional forms in agriculture (cf. Harris, 1982:119-127) - an issue which I will address in the conclusions to the case studies (Chapter 13).

These qualifications notwithstanding, Keydar's conceptual schema of transitional forms can serve a useful heuristic function for our discussion. It highlights the importance of the family farm under conditions of out-migration and non-viability of capitalist agriculture given the low capitalization of the farmstead. For example, it allows for optimal use of limited technology, and prevents the continued fragmentation of land through inheritance since 'surplus' children can be sent to the cities or abroad for alternative employment. Remuneration from wage labour employment in turn sustains and reinforces 'kulak-type'

formations.

Thus, the growth of 'kulak-type' villages into capitalist estates is highly unlikely given the absence of a free market in land, while the dissolution of capitalist agriculture into the more optimal 'kulak' holdings is seen as the predominant trend especially as the national integration of the labour market is consolidated. Such a trend, we might add, is consonant with the persistence of peasant household production in areas of the third world and in Western Europe where large-scale capitalist farming has been proven inferior to peasant farming in terms of both efficiency and its ability to respond with the sufficient elasticity to recurrent crises resulting from price fluctuations (Harris, 1982:125).

Both state policies and the integration of the national economy into the world market (especially greater integration in the EEC), however, leave a number of questions about future trends unresolved. For instance, the impact of urban employment possibilities on the options of 'releasing' family labour or re-absorbing it within household production; access to credit facilities for agricultural expansion; the consequences of greater agricultural exports in curbing out-migration and creating pressures for land fragmentation, etc.

The analysis of transitional paths in Turkish agriculture also raises theoretical issues about the future of Middle Eastern rural society as a whole. In common with recent findings that emerged in several third world agrarian studies (e.g. Scott, 1976, for Southeast Asia; and Griffin, 1979, for South Asia and Latin America), the empirical evidence here does not support a unilinear (Leninist) or bipolar (dependentist) conception of agrarian development. Capitalist agriculture of the plantation type is seen as a transitional type. 'Landless peasants' which appear obtrusively in the statistical data contribute in a dis-

torting fashion to unilinear concentration-proletarianization models (Djurfeldt, 1982:139-140). Quite often they (the 'landless peasants') are disguised members of the patriarchal household who work for the family farm, or who have migrated outside the village but maintain strong organic links with the farmstead. Proletarianization, Keydar argues, occurs much more significantly at the level of the national division of labour than in differentiations internal to agriculture.

That, indeed, is our finding from the analysis of the case studies obtained in the West Bank (Chapters 8, 9 and 10 below). There is, obviously, no exact correspondence between Keydar's prototypes of transitional forms in Turkey and equivalent patterns in the West Bank - but the direction of these patterns is strikingly similar. Type I formations, those characterized by marginalized petty commodity production, prevail in the central Palestinian highlands and engulf, as in Turkey, the vast majority of peasant households. They are exemplified in the discussions about Ras el-Tin and Natufa in this thesis. Type II formations, the 'kulak-type' villages, appear in embryonic forms in the irrigated farmsteads in the Jenin and Tulkarem districts of the West Bank, but their future is less stable than their Turkish equivalents, largely due to the precariousness of the internal market and land tenure conditions. Type III formations, the capitalist farms, also incipient, appear in the southern part of the Jordan Valley (Chapter 10, below) and in the citrus plantations in Gaza. In both cases, unlike Turkey, the refugee populations supply a seemingly unlimited pool of cheap wage-labour for this type.

The Palestinian case, however, also shows significant divergencies from the Turkish situation. In two main aspects these divergencies are striking: one is the emergence of the status of peasant-workers generated by the peculiar combination of geography (proximity of Israeli

work centres to the village) and ecology (dry farming under conditions of land parcellization); the other is the significance of sharecropping as a re-distributive mechanism in Palestinian agriculture, leading to ascendancy of the small peasant holder in some cases (Chapter 5), and to a redefinition of relations of exploitation in others (Chapters 10 and 12, below). The West Bank, largely for political reasons, is also characterized by an almost total absence of a land market - a phenomenon which renders the growth of 'kulak-type' holding, and the consolidation of plantation agriculture, almost impossible.

In my analysis, I have adopted this framework for the analysis of agrarian transition, utilizing the land tenure system (fragmentation, partible inheritance, etc.), wage-labour, out-migration, and the changing composition of the peasant household, as the key variables affecting agrarian transitional forms. The rationale for the choice of the villages selected for the case studies is discussed in the introduction to Part III below.

Notes

1. It is an open and debated question as to whether the Palestinian provinces of the Ottoman empire constituted a society with autonomous cultural and socio-economic attributes within greater Syria. By 1920, however, Mandated Palestine evolved into a delineated colonial formation, with its own state, hegemonic landlord-mercantile élite, nationalist movement, and internal market.

2. Elia Zureik (1979) applied the concept of internal colonialism primarily to the Arabs in Israel where, in the sense discussed above, it has less applicability given the enfranchisement of Palestinian citizens and where a system of ethnic and national discrimination operates rather than one based on apartheid-like regulations and territorial separation.

3. The main exception, of course, is the existence of the colonial and colonial-settler relationship which does not and did not exist in Turkey.

4. The use of the term 'kulak' and 'kulak-type' in reference to peasant capitalism may be unfortunate here since under the original Russian meaning it referred to usurious and parasitic elements among

the peasantry; that is, the opposite of its present usage (for a discussion, cf. Shanin, 1983:4a9-4a10). I decided to keep the term, however, since it has gained such a wide currency in the contemporary literature in designating rich peasants who 'accumulate sufficiently to invest in production through superior means of production and/or labour power' (Bernstein, 1977).

5. See, however, Djurfeldt (1982) for an analysis which challenges this position.

PART I

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE (1850-1980)

In the following three chapters (2, 3 and 4) I will discuss structural transformations that came after the Ottoman land reform regulations beginning in the 1850s, and the integration of Palestine-Syria into the world capitalist market through the medium of merchant capital and European (mainly German) and Jewish (mainly East European) settlement activities.

During this period, extending over one century, central Palestine was ruled by four different régimes (Ottoman, British, transJordanian, and Israeli) with each introducing new socio-economic changes that affected the land tenure system and stratification patterns in the country. Initially, Palestine's relative poverty of resources, combined with its religious and strategic significance in contributing to its separation from the path of development thrust upon the other Middle Eastern provinces of the Turkish Empire. Its peripheralisation in the world capitalist economy was inhibited by a relatively diversified agriculture (dictated in part by a versatile ecology), and European lack of interest in exploiting the country for its raw materials or limited market (Scholch, 1982:56). Palestine was destined by geography and divinity for higher appropriation.

The Ottoman attempts at increasing its agrarian source of revenues, through the elimination of communal forms of cropping arrangements (musha') and the securing of private title deeds to land, had the major, and probably unintended, consequence of the emergence of big landlordism and absentee land ownership. It was this re-alignment of forces between the emergent coastal commercial bourgeoisie, and the landed and urban-

based traditional potentates (often carved from within the same notable families) that major political cleavages emerged in Palestine during the first half of the twentieth century. In Chapter 2, I discuss how these cleavages acquired a 'vertical' factional direction (as opposed to horizontal class alignments) recalling Alavi's conception of primordial loyalties among peasants (Alavi, 1973:44). Putative alignments in the countryside buttressed a hierarchical patronage system that succeeded in mobilizing peasants across the whole country in favour of village sheikhs and their urban protégés; with the latter appropriating the agricultural surplus through a combination of credit arrangements, crop-sharing, unfavourable trade terms, and forms of corvée (awnéh).

This system began to disintegrate during the latter part of the British Mandate (1920-1948), particularly during the Great Rebellion (1936-1939), when movements against tenant evictions (resulting from Zionist acquisition of absentee estates) and British immigration policies succeeded in absorbing the factional alignments within the nationalist movement. Because of the existence of two national communities in Palestine, however, class-based politics remained locked within the confines of the factional leadership.

At the structural level, the colonial state guaranteed and underwrote the growth of the capitalist sector (incorporating primarily the economic institutions of the Jewish yishuv) at the expense of, and partly through the appropriation of surplus from, the Arab peasant sector (Asad, 1976:4-8). It was in this period also that patterns of migration of peasants to the urban centres, and to British army camps, gave rise to the phenomenon of 'peasant-workers' that repeated itself - with more profound consequences - after Israeli occupation of the West Bank in the 1970s.

Chapter 3 discusses the ramifications of Palestinian physical dis-

persal and 'dislocation'. The incorporation of the refugee populations in different Arab (and Israeli) social formations resulted in various degrees of integration (and non-integration) into these societies. In contrast to the peripheralisation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Syria, they found themselves at the bottom of the class pyramid in Israel. There, a process of de-peasantisation (Zureik, 1976) and de-territorialisation (Rosenfeld, 1978) took place - merging the fate of Galilean farmers who remained on the land, with coastal refugees who lost it but remained inside Israel. Only in Israel did the pre-conditions for actual peasant proletarianisation crystallize; but this process remains subject to ideological manipulation of residual factionalism (hamula rivalries, etc.) by Zionist parties.

It was in the West Bank, the highlands of central Palestine, that the 'logic of old hierarchies' persisted. There, despite regional discrimination under Jordanian rule (or perhaps because of it), a "nation of shopkeepers and smallholding peasants" remained entrenched into five or six ruralized townships and half a thousand villages. The rural population, having lost its agricultural raison d'étre under demographic pressures over the land, began to accommodate itself within the public sector of the Jordanian state (army, civil guards, civil service) and migration to the Gulf states.

Under Israeli rule (Chapter 4), a new set of socio-economic vectors set in. Urban refugees, and the rural surplus, were absorbed en masse into the Israeli construction and service sectors. The West Bank and Gaza were integrated into the economic fabric of Israel as a tariff-free zone for Israeli commodities. But the occupied territories increasingly became also the arena for intense Jewish settlement, and Israeli claims for sovereignty began to clash with the indigenous population now seen as a 'demographic' problem. This 'territorial-demographic' dilemma compelled

the Israeli state to rely progressively for its rule on the mediation of the military government and its henchmen. This is contrasted to the situation in the Galilee where, after 1965, Jewish hegemony prevailed through the mechanism of civil society. Beneath the myriad of problems encountered by Israeli rule through the creation of dual regional, juridical, and ideological structures for the Palestinian and the settler populations, lies the framework of dependency on a commodity market and sources of cheap labour-power that have become functionally embedded into Israeli society. At the end of this chapter, we discuss the various political options open to Palestinians and Israelis within the confines of this integration.

Chapter Two

An Agrarian Society Factionalized

> The peasantry of Palestine have their factions and family alliances, which serve either to divide or to bind them together, independently of Turkish supremacy
>
> James Finn, Stirring Times, 1878:226

> It is the opinion of competent judges that the modern fellaheen or Arabic speaking peasants of Palestine are descendants of the pagan tribes which dwelt there, before the Israelite invasion, and have clung to the soil ever since, being submerged but never destroyed by each successive wave of conquest which has swept over the land.
>
> Frazer, Folklore of the Old Testament, (1918, I:17)

Until the dislocation of Palestinian society in 1948 land was the source of livelihood and wealth for the vast majority of its inhabitants. Its peasantry were legendary in their tanacity and survival instincts against the heavy odds of constant indebtedness, poor soil,tax farmers, and foreign rule. "They clung to the soil...being submerged but never destroyed by each successive wave of conquest which has swept over the land"--Frazer (1918, I:19), almost a century ago, poetically expressed their condition.

Towards the end of Ottoman rule, the Palestinian village, seemingly immobile, had gone through important transformation which affected its physical characteristics as well as its relations with the holders of power in the cities. The turn of the century heralded the harnessing of nomadic raids

on the peasantry, substantial demographic growth in the countryside, and the establishment of an effective--though rudimentary--network of transportation which linked the village to regional centres and to demands of the external markets. Structurally the period saw a radical reorganization in the land tenure system and the modes of agricultural production: from communal ownership of the land to absentee private property; from subsistance farming to monetization, commodity production and export of agricultural yield.

The village remained the source of revenue and power but not the seat of authority. Its big landlords, tax farmers, government functionaries, artisans, merchants and notables were all located in the four or five major urban centres constituting the privileged elite which established its hegemony over Palestine. Yet despite those hierarchical cleavages and disparities in wealth Palestinian society was divided by lineage units and other forms of kinship and quasikinship identifications in which class formations were hardly visible. And although the city-village dichotomy permeated the consciousness of Palestinians when they reflected on groups outside their local community (as evidenced in the folkloric literature), it was nevertheless a consciousness mediated through other identifications which they believed to be primary. These were mainly regional loyalties, religious affiliations and clan affiliations. Throughout the period under consideration, and with minor exceptions, the peasantry of Palestine were divided by factions, based on clan alliances and relations of patronage with urban landlords and notables.

Patronage and Clan Factionalism

Palestine was not quite a 'patronage society' in the sense suggested by Gellner (either during the mandate or in the late Ottoman period)-- a system characterized by an "incompletely centralized state, (with a) defective market or defective bureaucracy" and where a dominant syndrome of long-term unsymmetrical relations and inequality of power prevails (Gellner, 1977:4-5)

Nevertheless, patronage relations, in the general sense of bonds of reciprocal dependence, where one party exercises dominance over the other subordinate party, permeated relations of agricultural production (sharetenancy, taldji'a, etc.), as well as access to seats of administrative authority and allocation of posts to public office.

A word here is needed about the nature of the Ottoman state. Through a good part of the 19th century the raison d'être of the Ottoman regime was a "policy of provision", to use Issawi's term for medieval Europe (after Hecksher):

> The main objectives were not to promote local production but to meet needs of the government and to ensure that the principal towns, and in particular Istanbul, would be adequately supplied. (Issawi, 1970:409).

The role of the state during this period was largely confined to the management of the taxation system in order to increase its revenues, and the installation of a proper infrastructure for that purpose (Osman Okyar, 1980: 160-161). In addition to the passage of legislation regulating the commercial code, and laws abolishing the guilds and encouraging industrial development, a chief instrument for breaking with the 'policy of provision' was the promulgation of the land code aimed at establishing private property in agriculture.

One of the main features of the tanzimat reform in the late Ottoman period was that it marked the transition from a tribute-exacting mode of extraction (based on iltizam tax farming) to a more complex system of surplus appropriation in agriculture. This change was dictated by the pressure exercised by the European powers on the Ottoman state to repay its debts and interests on massive loans following the incorporation of the Ottoman social formation into the world capitalist economy. The Ottoman state sought to increase its revenues from land by a process of eliminating the multazimun

(tax farmers), although not always successfully, and allowing for a more direct access to the immediate producers. It also encourages the formation of large landed estates with the hope of developing agricultural capitalism. Hence the significance of land registration.

An immediate result of the reform in Palestine was the decline in rural autonomy (Stirling, 1970:156). This was a consequence of a series of administrative decrees (beginning with the Land Code of 1858) aimed at the regulation of land ownership, which facilited the dissolution of the communal (musha') ownership of village lands by the peasants and the rise of absentee landlordism (Ruedy, 1971:123-124). But since the reform aimed at increasing agricultural productivity it succeeded in having other stabilizing results. Those included the establishment of security in the countryside from nomadic pillage, a substantial growth in the urban population, and the integration of the region in a network of transportation routes and a railroad system.

Rauf describes two responses of the peasant to the mounting pressures he was facing from increased taxation and indebtedness as the cash economy penetrated his world. One was to surrender his share in the musha' system--now in the process of de-communalization--to the landlord, who relieved him from his debts and taxes. The other was the same act done collectively patronage par exellence. This is the system known as taldjia ('refuge'):

> A single peasant or a whole village crushed relentlessly under despotic taxes and debts placed themselves, together with their lands, under the protection of the town notable, who then interposed himself between his dependents and the tax collectors or creditors, and he looked after their taxes and court cases. (Rauf, 1973:10)

Both these processes were accelerated by the tanzimat and contributed to the dissolution of the patriarchal mode of land ownership and encouraged ansentee landlordism and share-cropping. But the process of the disintegration of the musha' system was prolonged and uneven and was not carried fully

even in the latter period of British rule.

What is significant in the Ottoman reforms as far as factionalism is concerned, was the administrative separation of the Jerusalem sanjak (which included, at that period, around three-quarters of the population of Palestine) from the northern sanjaks (districts) of Akka and Balqa' (which included the best agricultural lands) (Lesch, 1977:280). Jerusalem, it should be remembered, differed from the main urban centres of Palestine in that it was detached from its rural hinterland. Its elite, in the main, were not absentee landlords, nor was there any organized form of interaction between the city and its rural population (Abir, 1975:291).

Two consequences of the administrative separation of Jerusalem on factional politics can be cited here: One was the relative independence of, and possibly privilege accorded to, the Jerusalemite notables by virtue of their direct relationship to the High Porte. This independence was doubtlessly influenced by the interest accorded to the holy city (with undisguised imperialist ambitions) by the European powers. Porath suggests that this relative autonomy, however, had a marked negative consequence on general political life in southern Palestine; namely, the weakness of local voluntary associations for the advancement of education and social welfare--in contrast with the northern districts and Damascus where such associations were vigorous. This weakness flowed from the strong dependence of Jerusalem on the central government (Porath, 1975:3-4). In class terms this can be explained by Jerusalem's "parasitic" social structure: its dependence on religious endowments, international charities, and weak organic links with the rural base. The city was the Mecca of Palestine, but it certainly lacked a Quraishite ruling class!

The other consequence of administrative separatism was the intensification of factional rivalry between Jerusalem-based clans and Nablus-based

clans. The roots of these conflicts go beyond the administrative reform. Northern notables traditionally used to complain from the way their fate was tied to "the whims of the Jerusalem effendis"--as expressed by the Nablus historian Ihsan al-Nimr (al-Nimr, 1973:17). This hostility persisted even after the unification of Palestine under the British Mandate. Several decades later, when al-Istiqlal, the only mass-based pan-Arabist party began to mobilize Palestinian Arabs around an anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist program it invariably encountered factional opposition from the Jerusalem clan-based parties of the Husseinis and Nashashibis. Those difficulties were due in no small degree to the fact that the leader of al-Istiqlal, Awni Abdul-Hadi, belonged to a family of big landowners in the Jenin (Nablus) area. (In his history of the Palestinian national movement, E. Tuma, however, attributes the downfall of al-Istiqlal to other causes; those include: British opposition, financial difficulties, and the restrictive conditions for its membership, cf. Tuma, 1976:199).

What was the social basis for clan power? It seems to have been associated with two related variables. One was the number of men that clan notables can mobilize on their side in factional struggles--a factor which was dependent, as far as peasants were concerned, on the amount of land under control by the clan head and the intricate system of patronage he concluded with his sharecroppers and semi-autonomous peasants, including his ability to act as their creditor in an increasingly monetized economy. The second variable was the accessibility of the clan head and his relatives/aides to public office--hence his ability to extend services to his clients in return for their support in factional conflicts (including votes for municipal elections, which became a major arena of rivalry under British rule).

Power over the peasantry, expressed in this system of patronages, and the reinforcement of that power by the holding of public office mutually rein-

forced each other. Influencial village patriarchs who succeeded in consolidating large estates for themselves after the dissolution of the musha' system, would soon send few of their capable sons or relatives to establish themselves in the regional centre or alternatively acquire a public post themselves. It has been suggested that the power of those potentates can be measured by the degree of transition in residence from their rural base to the district centre (Shim'oni, 1947:331).

Landownership under semi-feudal conditions (i.e. leasing the land to share-croppers through the wakil, the landlord's agent), were not always necessary as a basis for factional power. There were cases in Palestine where a clan's power was rooted almost exclusively on the holding of public administrative office--that is, on its ability to organize its members' skills in the service of the state, with landownership and mercantile activities playing a marginal role. This seems to have been the case with the Nashashibi clan (Shim'oni, ibid), who--after the Husseinis became central contenders for the leadership of the nationalist movement, despite the small size of their landholdings. (Tuma, however, describes the Nashashibis as "one of the two great feudal families in the country," 1976:203; compare also with Kanafani, n.d., 75-76).

The challenges posed by the Zionist movement and its success in creating modern and independent Jewish institutions, as well as the inability of the colonial government to accommodate Palestinian nationalist aspirations, all compelled the machinery of factional politics to perform a role to which it was thoroughly unsuited. While the Arab leadership was capable of effective mobilization of the masses against the British colonial presence, and for independence, dislodging the Zionist colonies would have required a radically different strategy. Such a strategy would have involved the nationalist movement into a protracted struggle and class alignments which in all likli-

hood would erode the system of patronage on which their very power was based.

But who were the groups and social strata in Arab Palestine that were capable of transcending factionalism, given the appropriate political leadership? The social structure of factional alliances seemed to permeate the whole fabric of urban and rural society:

> The pyramidal family and clan network which built on relationships of support and protection from the village level through local potentates to leading families at the distant level, offered the means of rapid articulation of opinion and mobilization of all levels of society. The main political parties were based on this structure, the parties of the particularly influential Husayni and Nashashibi families having ties throughout the country. However, this structure made it difficult to unify the national movement. Since each leading family had a political power base in client villages or town quarters, it felt itself the equal of the others and bargained vigorously before forming alliances. Even then the alliances shifted rapidly, on the basis of personal and family differences rather than policy. (Lesch, 1973:17, emphasis added).

It would be a mistake however, to think of Palestinian national politics during the mandate as based entirely on factionalism. Both al-Istiqlal party and the communists had social bases (especially among urban professionals and sections of the working class) which were secular and devoid of patronage. But both were unsuccessful in challenging the factional leadership of Haj Amin al- Husseini and the Arab Higher Committee, and remained marginal movements.

On the other hand factional alliances in Palestine were remarkable in that, following the intensification of Jewish settlement, they transcended both regional divisions (especially the endemic rivalries referred to above between the Jerusalem and Nablus clans), and religious-ethic divisions. We have suggested furthermore, that the urban-rural dichotomy has little explanatory value in Palestinian factional politics since faction leaders were mainly urban-based 'representatives' of the hierarchical system of rural 'clients'

and kinsman reaching all the way to the small peasant debtor and landless labourer.

The extended role of the colonial state apparatus after the Great War paradoxically strengthened the role of the 'leading families' of Palestine since alternative institutional mechanisms of 'intermediate' power were absent. They became the mediators of the state to the rural masses and urban poor as well as their representatives (or rather, their clemencers) to the central authorities, (Sabella, 1976:38; Migdal, 1980:20-22). Both the limitations and strengths of the factional system were demonstrated in the response of the traditional leadership to the 1936 revolt.

The spontaneous peasant uprisings which marked the initial period of the revolt compelled the two main nationalist parties--the Arab Palestinian Party representing the Husseini faction, and the National Defense Party, representing the Nashashibis--to merge in the framework of the Arab Higher Committee. Both clans represented the same class (if the term can be used here), and both stood to lose their privileges if independent peasant politics were to prevail, even temporarily. However, the Husseini's stronger links to the land, al-Haj Amin's role as the mufti of Jerusalem, and the Defense Party's past record of collaboration with the British authorities, all ensured that the Nashashibis would play a secondary role on the Committee.

In that merger we observe the appearance of factional politics defactionalized. What happened, however, was simply the temporary suspension of factional politics at the national level of leadership, while the institutional linkages of the hierarchical pattern of vertical alliances remaining intact.

Putative Alignments Among the Peasantry of Palestine

Among the peasantry, factional alignments were expressed during the 19th century and for a good part of the twentieth, within the framework of putative, or fictitious affiliations which cut across regions, religious sects and classes. The most important of those peasant divisions were the Qaisi and Yemeni factions.

Although common to many regions of greater Syria under the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was unique in that these divisions persisted as forms of political affiliations a long time after they lost their (seeming)function. In Syria and Lebanon Qaisi and Yemeni factions seem always to have been expressed through clan alignments (Haddad, 1920:212). In the majority of cases extended families, and certainly individuals, could not belong to different factions within the same clan, but there were exceptions (Hoexter, 1973:269). Nominally these factions trace the origin of the clan to its fictitious roots in northern or southern (Yemeni) Arabia during the Arab migrations to greater Syria after the Islamic conquest. In practice however, they had the primary function of establishing the basis for loose alliances in the event of inter-clan conflicts. Such alliances cut across the village/city dichotomies and often united Christian and Muslim families. Haddad, a Palestinian ethnographer writing after WWI notes:

> In Jerusalem the headship of the Qaisi is in the hands of the Haldi family, of the Yemeni with the Husseinis. There are still (in 1920) traces of the old party rivalry; when the peasants get into trouble with the government, or find themselves in pecuniary difficulty, they resort for help to the patrons of their respective parties. In nearly every village there are members of both parties. In some districts most of the inhabitants belong to one faction, as for example in the district of Hebron, where the majority is Qaisi. In Beit Jala most are Qaisi; in Bethlehem on the other hand, most are Yemeni, etc. (Haddad, 1920:213).

If Haddad's description is accurate, then what we obtain here, except for the big cities, is a pattern of fictive alignments on a regional basis, or at least one in which inter-regional or inter-village conflicts would not disrupt the internal solidarity of the village. But we should not overlook the fact that many towns and villages did include a minority clan which occasionally would act as a potential disruptor of village solidarity. In my own town of Ramallah, for example, all the indigenous clans were Qaisi with the exception of one, al-Shaqara, who were Yemenis. Whenever a dispute arose with the neighbouring village of Bitunia--which is both Yemeni and muslim--this one Yemeni clan--which, like the rest of the indigenous Ramallah clans, is Christiian· would ally itself with the Bitunians against the other Ramallah (Qaisi) clans. On the other hand we have instances of regional conflicts which involved exclusively Yemeni clans, e.g. Lahham of Bethlehem and Abu Ghosh clans, near Jerusalem, (Lesch, 1977:278).

Fictive affiliations, however, do not seem to have taken the same,form throughout Palestine. In a comprehensive study of Qaisi-Yemeni divisions in nineteenth century Palestine Miriam Hoixter distinguishes two main regional patterns of clan alliances; those prevailing in the Nablus mountains and in the Judean hills (Hoexter, 1973). In Nablus indigenous notables and landlords ruled the countryside, while in Jerusalem the local majlis was governed by an Ottoman Pasha. Hoexter convincingly argues that while the terms 'Qais' and 'Yemen' were used more frequently in identifying the contending factions in the Judean hills, the participation of town landlords (in Jerusalem) in their struggles was marginal and secondary. In Nablus, by contrast, town notables were the actual leaders of factional disputes (Hoexter, 1973:300-303, 310-311). The reasons for this lie in the different character of Nablus and Jerusalem as regional centres; the former was a "ruralized city", the abode of successive waves of wealthy landlords (Jarrar, Abdulhadi, Nimer) who moved through-

out the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from their local villages and set out to rule the peasantry from Nablus on behalf of the High Porte. Jerusalem, on the other hand, was a city having its own economic foundations (mainly based on its religious institutions and related crafts); its notables were relatively isolated from their rural hinterland (ibid; 301). In factional disputes the Jerusalem notables were the arbitrators rather than the contenders among the Qais-Yemeni parties (ibid:304).

The use of the term 'party' (i.e, hizb) in most references to Qais and Yemeni factions should not obscure the tribal character of these affiliations. The divisions acted as symbols of permanent identification around which members of a clan can be mobilized to secure various (and variable) objectives of their clan heads and tribal leaders. Owen, in dismissing the picture of a perennial 'tribal' conflict in which this factionalism has traditionally been portrayed, suggests a framework on which Qaisi/Yemeni divisions can be seen as "part of a process designed both to augment the resources of a particular family (or clan) leaders as well as, in the Jabal Nablus and Jabal al-Khalil, to persuade the Ottoman authorities to award them a lucrative public office or the right to collect taxes" (Owen, 1977:2). Furthermore, it provides a mechanism of re-directing "internal dissent against an external enemy."

The decreasing isolation of the Palestinian village (cash-crops, Jerusalem-Jaffa railroad, centralization of government), and the decline of the patronage system associated with the rise of share tenancy during the mandate period affected these alignments negatively. Qaisi/Yemeni affiliations lost their effectiveness as foci of clan identification when a new more complex system of alliances was needed to meet the transformed relations between the peasantry and the urban sector on the one hand, and the Jewish social structure on the other. Nevertheless, they continued to surface throughout the mandate period, and villagers took account of them in public festivities lest the

amassed crowds in one place should trigger latent conflicts to explode along Qaisi/Yemeni lines. Granqvist, writing in 1933, provides a striking example of these fears from the village of Artas, in the Bethlehem district:

> Although now, in the days of zionism and the strong central government of our days in Palestine, the fights between Qais and Yemen do not occur--or only rarely--the memory of them continues in this custom. (...) When Muhammad Yusef in the autumn of 1926 fetched his bride Sa'da Derwis from al-Khadr, this wedding was preceded by rumours that disturbances would take place and when the bride was brought out in her white dress there were mutterings and grumblings of Qais and Yemen among the crowd of people, although a policeman had been sent by the local authorities, they did not come to blows. "It was the first time a policeman was present at a wedding in order to keep order in this part of the country" 'Aliya remarked. (Granqvist, 1935:88).

Weddings, it should be recalled, are the cementing bonds of clan alliances, and as such act as occasions in which clan solidarity and expressions of rivalry are displayed. Even in the recent past, in marriage ceremonials and other public festivities, a token recognition of the family's past affiliation to one of the two factions is observed through the gowns worn by womenfolk; white for Yemen, and red for the Qaisi party. However, as rallying instruments for clan alliances and mobilization these factions had lost their influences by the third decade of this century.

Qaisi/Yemeni factionalism thus disappeared because it was no longer an appropriate channel of organized politics in the changed patronage and class relations in Palestinian society. Its limitations can be located in its relatively fixed character (label) and its emptiness of any ideological content. Although fictitious in origin it is seldom that we encounter cases where a clan had changed its faction affiliation (e.g. the behaviour of the Jarrar clan in the 19th century power conflicts in the Nablus district (Abir, 1975:288-289). Such flexibility would be necessary for a clan striving to secure its interests in the network of shifting alliances between patrons and

their dependents as the pattern of land tenure began to change in Palestine under the mandate. Neither did Qaisi/Yemeni factionalism present alternative ideological affiliations for peasants in the struggle against their landlords or the central authority. In Spain, to provide a contrasting example, peasant factionalism affiliated with Carlists or Liberals--each providing an opposing position on questions of land reform and state decentralization (Terrades, 1978). In Palestine we observe occasional and isolated such cases of peasant factionalism having a class content (the nearest example is perhaps the struggle between the Baraghteh clans and the fellaheen in the Bani Zeid areas, towards the end of the 19th century--Barghuti, 1979).[1] But both these factions, and the more important Qaisi-Yemeni affiliations, belonged to a different era. With Zionist land purchases increasingly encroaching on the stability of Palestinian land tenures, a new framework of alliances was called for.

Class Formation and Factionalism

The foregoing analysis attempted to demonstrate how a combination of sectional alignments, based on putative and clan-patronage relations, channelled the political consciousness of Palestinians into forms of identifications which countervailed over the development of class formations and class consciousness. These "diversions" took various forms as we have already suggested: whole villages siding with one clan leader against another set of villages (as in the civil wars in Jebel Nablus, 1841-1858); members of a socially differentiated urban clan acting in solidarity against members of another clan (Tuqan vs. Nimir; Husseinis vs. Nashashibis, the latter especially during the revolt of 1936); and village potentates recruiting poorer peasants to act as cannon fodder in factional politics. But it is not sufficient here to say that factionalism diverted the masses from potential forms of class solidarities; that would be a teleological escape. Rather we must show with historical examples that it could have been otherwise (i.e. that class politics

belonged to the realm of the 'thinkable' and 'do-able'--to borrow an imagery from M. Godelier). Specifically for the term 'deflection' to have any substantive meaning in this context, it is necessary to show that alternative bonds of class solidarity, among poor peasants, middle farmers, professionals, urban wage earners, etc., were a feasible proposal which could have ensured their prospects of livelihood in case they broke way from their factional loyalties.

I shall tackle this problem on two levels: First by referring to concrete examples--some of them already introduced above--indicating the challenge to factional politics provided by groups mobilized along non-factional lines; indeed, in some cases, along class lines. Second, by suggesting the limitations of class politics inherent in a situation, where the structural conditions for the growth of a hegemonic class, and in particular--a bourgeois class, were not obtainable.

Class politics in pre-1948 Palestine manifested itself in several small groups, and in trade union federations, but on occasions it appeared within the framework of the factional parties themselves. The Husseini/Nashashibi factions in particular could not have rested exclusively on relations of patronage since they had to mobilize masses of urban inhabitants at crucial intervals with whom they had no direct or indirect relations of reciprocity. In practice, therefore, the thousands of Palestinians who followed the lead of the Defense Party (Nashashibi), or the Arab Palestinian Party (Husseini) included many who by no means can be considered clients of either clan-based factions. They were attracted, for instance, by the solid stance taken by APP against the Jewish National Home and the mandatory authority--while, in the case of the DP they have been attracted by the 'moderation' of the Nashashibis and their strategy of alliance with the colonial authorities against the Zionist movement. Each position, of course, implied a different perspective of class alignment for

those supporters of either of the two factional parties who were not involved in patronage relationship. These class 'intrusions' into factionalism became more disruptive as clashes with the colonial authorities and the Zionist movement became more intense (1936, 1938, 1945-1948), thus challenging the capacity of the hegemonic stratum of landlords to maintain its political leadership.

The factional leadership in its turn had to make concessions to followers who were not tied to it by patronage relationship, and also to conclude alliances with other parties in the context of a united front (e.g. the formation of the Arab Higher Committee). Thus class politics and factional politics had periodic fusions, especially in periods of crises, but which always ended with the dominance of clan sectional interests over class solidarities. Moreover, these 'fusions' were always characterized by strains on the political system as a whole. That strain reached its height in the 1936-1938 period when landless peasants entered the nationalist movement en mass and compelled the factional leadership to take increasing positions of militancy which threatened its organizational foundation. It was at this point that the hegemonic class of landlords and urban notables chose to intervene directly and diffuse the Revolt. In the case of the Nashashibi's Defense Party, they even went overboard and organized "Peace Units" to crush the rebels. (Kanafani, n.d.: 105). But this process of confrontation had its price for the factional leadership; disgruntled elements in the nationalist movement began to desert them and establish their own political base, forged outside the factional system. We will refer to three such groups here, each reflecting a different class (or potential class) position.

Case One is the Qassamites. This was a movement of peasant warriors who fought against the British in 1935 under the leadership of a minor religious sheikh, Izz ed-Din al-Qassam, and then as an amorphous contingent within the revolt of 1936-1938. Evidence shows that they were recruited by al-Qassam

from among the landless peasants in the Jenin area and from the destitute labourers of the shanties on the outskirts of Haifa (Alush, 1967:102). The class character of the Qassamites put them clearly outside the reaches of the factional system. More importantly al-Qassam himself came into open conflict with leadership of the Arab Committee on several occasions (Tuma, 1973:225; Alush, ibid.). Altogether the armed followers of al-Qassam did not exceed 200 in his lifetime (Alush, 1967:103), but the exemplary conduct of the Qassamites after their leader's death at the hand of the British exposed the vacillations of the factional leaders and temporarily took the initiative from their hands.

Case Two is the PKP and the League for National Liberation during the 1940s. Both constituted the Arab and Jewish sections of Palestinian communism. Here it was the national conflict rather than factionalism which prevented them from making inroads into the Arab working class. Palestinian communists however, succeeded in forging an alliance with the left wing of the nationalist movement under the leadership of Hamdi al-Husseini, of the Istiqlal party (Alush, 1967: 84; Beinen, 1977:9), and when the Arab Higher Committee collapsed after the defeat of the Revolt in 1939 the PKP became the only organized party in the Arab Community until 1946, when factional politics re-emerged (Beinen, 1977: 13).

As a general rule it may be said that when the communists of Palestine organized along class lines (which in practice meant along bi-national lines, such as in the 1920's and 1940's) they were marginalised by the nationalist movement. When, on the other hand, they became an active contingent within the nationalist movement (1935, and 1936 when the party joined the coordinating military committee of the revolt) they were submerged by the factional leadership. Nevertheless, the Palestinian working class succeeded in retaining a certain degree of autonomy from factional politics. The two main Palestinian

trade unions--the Palestine Arab Workers' Society (under social-democratic leadership) and the Federation of Arab Trade Unions (under communist leadership)--remained free from the control of the Husseini and Nashashibi parties. In 1948 it is generally acknowledged that Sami Taha, general secretary of PAWS, was assassinated on orders of Haj Amin al-Husseini because of his active opposition to the Mufti's leadership.

Case Three is the Istiqlal (independence) Party. Led by Awni Abdul Hadi, himself a member of one of the largest landowning families in Palestine, al-Istiqlal was founded in 1932 and became the most militant of the nationalist parties./ The social composition of al-Istiqlal's membership reflected a high concentration of intellectuals and members of the nascent bourgeois class. Tuma describes it as "the nearest party (in Palestine) which expressed the ambitions of the Arab nationalist movement led by the bourgeoisie, and reflecting, to some extent, mass sentiments" (Tuma, 1973:197). The significance of the Istiqlal lies, however, in its conscious attempts to create an alternative political movement to the factional leadership of Jerusalem. In order to do this it was willing to cooperate even with the communists (see above, p.), but its real asset was the important contacts its leader, Awni Abdul Hadi, had established with King Faisal of Iraq and the Saudi ruling dynasty, and his ability to use these contacts as a leverage in the Arab Higher Committee (Lesch, 1973:23).

Naji Allush, who refers to al-Istiqlal as a party composed of "semi-bourgeois, semi-feudal elements" concludes that the vacillations of the party from its class basis (presumably the bourgeoisie) to its links with the mass movement brought its downfall. "By raising slogans such as 'the English are the roots of the disease', 'resistance until victory', and calling for total boycott and abstaining from payment of direct taxes, at a time when the national leadership was following the path of compromise and concessions, (al-Istiqlal)

was bound to expose and embarrass the traditional leadership. It is not surprising therefore, that the 'bosses and notables' took a hostile attitude towards the party." (Allush, 1967:85).

But later Allush describes how the leaders of al-Istiqlal "due to their class instincts, returned to the bosom of the traditional leadership, while the peasants and workers took up arms to resist British colonialism, under the leadership of organizations founded independently." (ibid.:86).

But al-Istiqlal was not the party of the Palestinian bourgeoisie, for the simple reason that the bourgeoisie had no party during the period.[2]

The amorphous character of the Palestinian bourgeoisie brings us to a second problem in conceptualizing class formation; namely, the limitations of class politics inherent in a situation where the structural conditions for the growth of a hegemonic class were not obtainable.

Can we speak of a Palestinian bourgeoisie as having existed prior to 1948? We have referred earlier to a 'hegemonic class of landlords and urban notables'. This intentionally ambiguous formulation--one which will have to remain ambiguous until more rigorous research is undertaken on the subject--rests on the observation that only the landlords and associated urban functionaries have behaved politically as a class. They were 'hegemonic' because they had a certain degree of access (through municipalities, judgeships, etc.) but no control over the colonial state apparatus, and because, as landlords and patrons, they appropriated the largest portion of the agricultural surplus. The factional political system was, to them, the most appropriate system for the preservation of their privileges and the reproduction of the social order in which they prevailed. Within that order class conflict, social conflict and potential class conflict persisted: between landlords and share-croppers, between landlords and peasant proprietors (through unfavourable market relations), between urban capitalists and wage labourers, between the village

patriarchs and their poorer kin, and finally--probably the most insoluble of all these conflicts--between the Jewish Yishuv and the Arab community as a whole. All these contradictions were diffused, 'deflected', and even protected and nourished within the context of the factional system. The strain they produced, although occasionally, it would disrupt the functioning of the system, never succeeded in breaking it.

But what about the bourgeoisie? To determine the existence of a capitalist class in Palestine, a brief sketch of its terrain is necessary. While the old regional divisions in Palestine--based on administrative zones under Ottoman and British rule--began to lose their original significance, new divisions began to emerge reflecting the integration of the region's economy into the European capitalist market. Colonial penetration also contributed to the development of a modern infrastructure, to a large extent for reasons of military strategy. By the First World War, Palestine had the greatest ratio of railroad track per capita in the Middle East, although the economic impact of modern transportation was not as dramatic as in Egypt (Baer, 1975: 497).

The building of the Jaffa-Haifa railroad line (later Jerusalem-Haifa, and linked to the Hijaz railway), the growth of citriculture with a European market, and the proliferation of wage labour related to the British war efforts and the employment of Palestinians in the government bureaucracy--all led to the decline of subsistance character of agriculture and the semi-feudal relations hinging on it.

Many absentee landlords who resided in the main cities, and a few state functionaries whose wealth did not rest on land, began to re-invest their agricultural surplus in export/import trade, and in light industries. A Royal Commission Report prepared during the revolt year of 1936 challenges the predominant picture of a vigorous modern Jewish industrial economy dwarfing an

Arab sector based presumably on craft production. "Arab industry", the report states, "is also diversified (as Jewish industry) and consists of some large undertakings and numerous small ones which, in the aggregate, form an appreciable contribution to the industry of Palestine" (Himadeh, 1938:245). The main urban industries in the Arab sector included soap manufacturing, flour mills, textiles and construction material (ibid). Agrarian capitalism also flourished during the mandate and was based on citrus plantations in Jaffa, Gaza and the Ramla-Lydda regions. Olive oil extraction was the main form of manufacture in the rural sector in which wealthy peasants and landlords invested their capital-although it tended to remain primitive in its technology.

Thus a new class of merchants and manufacturers was growing in the coastal cities of Gaza, Jaffa and Akka--all constituting the Mediterranean outlets of Palestine to Europe. This growth of a coastal bourgeoisie was accompanied by important demographic changes; the town population in general, and the coastal cities in particular, increased substantially. The city of Jaffa had the fastest rate of growth, even before the mandate. It quadrupled its size between 1880 and 1922 alone (Ben-Arieh, 1975:68), becoming the economic and cultural nerve centre of Arab Palestine. The thirties also saw the beginning of large-scale rural-urban migration, which reflected both the increase in the employment potential of the cities, and a rise in the agricultural labour surplus (for figures see Hopkins, 1938:12-15). A new regional dichotomy was emerging between the main coastal cities--centres of trade, newspapers and literary magazines, and of urban Jewish migration; and the inner mountain cities (Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron)--seats of conservatism and the traditional leadership. But this was not a dichotomy between the abode of the bourgeoisie and the abode of the landed classes. For unlike the landed elites, the Palestinian bourgeoisie did not behave as an integrated class during this period. The reasons for that, I propose, lie in the compo-

sition of the mercantile and manufacturing bourgeoisie in Palestine. As in the neighbouring Arab countries it was a stratum organically linked to the landed classes. Those entrepreneurs who were not landlords either had patronage relationships with them, or were related to them by marriage. Furthermore, most landlords found it convenient to invest their agricultural surplus either in real estate transactions, construction, or in 'buying' posts for their sons (e.g. through marriage bonds)--in all cases, non-productive activities.

I am not suggesting a closed circle here. The fact that capitalists and merchants belonged to the same families, and were often the same people, in the form of the landed elite, does not necessarily negate the possibility that these were indeed <u>two</u>, functionally separate, classes: entrepreneurs and landlords. After all, capitalists have to come from somewhere, and in Palestine-as elsewhere in the Middle East--there was a process of differentiation taking place within the landed classes. But this process of differentiation did not generate the growth of a proper bourgeoisie. Because the Palestinian hegemonic class, the class of landlords and urban notables, did not have control over the colonial state apparatus, and because of the heavy competition from the autonomous Jewish sector (which, except for the period of the boycott, had unhindered access over the Arab consumer market) the <u>external</u> condition for the growth of the Arab bourgeoisie did not obtain. Nor did it have its own internal dynamic. A very small portion of the agricultural surplus was invested in manufacturing enterprises. Those 'landed-businessmen' who did invest in manufacture, (such as al-Masri family, of the Nablus soap industries), were few and together were not capable of generating enough employment for the masses of dispossessed peasants, peasant-workers, and urban labourers who were looking for jobs. Those entrepreneurs were too closely linked to the landed elite to develop their own distinct consciousness and separate ideology. Most of them belonged

to, and even helped build, the very factional parties which presumably blocked their own "potential class interests." And on such grounds they never transcended factionalism.

Note

1. The conflict between the Barghuti clans and fellaheen factions took on a violent character in the revolt of 1936, with the Baraghteh (descendents of the big tax farmers in the Banu Zeid region) siding with the Nashashibi party and most of the fellaheen clans joining the rebels. Dr. Abdul-latif Barghuti informs me that after the rebellion was crushed in 1938 numerous acts of revenge were exacted from peasants who supported the revolt, he himself having personally witnessed several such cases. (This was the case in Deir Ghassaneh, Beit Rima, and Kafr Ein villages). It should be added that all the Baraghteh families of the Banu Zeid region were Qaisis while most of the fellaheen were Yemenis. (Barghuti, 1979:inter.).

2. This ambiguity is clearly reflected in the tortured attempts of Allush, Tuma and many other writers to characterize its class content--either in terms of membership or political program which in any event does not differ in substance from the programs of the factional parties--compare the texts in Allush, (Allush, 1976:191-196).

Chapter Three

An Agrarian Society Dislocated

The consequences of factionalism became evident when the frontal collision finally came about between the Zionist and Arab forces in 1948. The vertical segmentation of the Palestinian society, on which the ediface of its primodial political fabric prevailing in the thirties and forties operated, was shattered from without -- with the resulting physical dislocation of both the agrarian and urban communities, (the city of Haifa, for example, had its population reduced due to the outflow of Arab refugees from 80,000 to 4,000 in one week only).

In a study of stratification in Palestinian society Peretz refers to "the pattern of vertical and horizontal stratification among the Palestinian Arabs during the mandate as a major institutional factor in the community's disintegration" during the 1948 war (Peretz, 1977:55). He notes that during the initial period of communal clashes (between Jew and Arabs) which extended over the latter part of 1947 and early 1948 a substantial section of the Palestinian elite (landlords, businessmen, and professionals) constituted the bulk of the 30,000 who fled the country in this period. Given the absence of an extra-governmental body in Palestinian society (equivalent, for example, to the Jewish Agency) which could coordinate the Palestinian resistance and provide basic services to a community steadily being deserted by its bourgeoisie and landlords, the impending breakup of its political will was unavoidable. More than the effects of military assaults and massacres, concludes Peretz, "the collapse of communal institutions probably caused more disruption leading to the exodus of some 80 percent of the Arabs living in Israeli-controlled

territory " (ibid). Peretz's account, whose main features we find convincing, raises important questions about the nature of what he calls the 'Palestinian elite'. In chapter two we tried to cast some light on the nature of hierarchical bonds that linked Palestinian rural society to their hegemonic elites in the urban centres and the political forces that articulated these bonds and conflicts between them. In our analysis we held that to the extent that these forces expressed at the time class interests of groups that were threatened by Jewish colonization, these forces were either incorporated into the factional structure (e.g. al-Istiqlal party), or were marginalized because of their inability to overcome the factionalism of the national movement (e.g. the Communist Party and the League of National Liberation).

With the major dislocation that affected Palestinian society since 1948, and the disappearance of relations of patronage upon which factional politics rested, we are compelled to look to different categories of analysis to understand these changes. Although most Palestinians remaining in Palestine still dwelt in rural districts (in the Galilee, the Triangle, and the West Bank--but not Gaza), their collectivity can no longer be characterized as a peasant society; that is, a society that derives its main livelihood from agriculture and in which the family farm constitutes the basic unit of social organization (Shanin 1971:14-15). This is especially true of the Arab rural sector in Israel, which was progressively incorporated into the Jewish economy, and its former peasants began to relate to it mainly as wage workers. To the extent that factional politics persisted in the Arab village it was due to the external manipulation by Israeli political parties of a traditional clan structure that was losing its viability and inner dynamic.

As a consequence of the war the peasantry of Palestine was dismembered and relocated in three different social formations: (1) those who remained in the state of Israel constituting a submerged underclass of peasant-workers

(approximately 25% of the total); (2) those who became refugees in the neighbouring Arab states and the remaining regions of Palestine, constituting a reserve army of labour in the periphery of the major urban centres of the host countries (Amman, Nablus, Gaza, Beirut, Damascus, Jericho and Ramallah), --together amounting to 40% of the total; (3) those who remained in their villages in those parts of Palestine that were appropriated by Jordan and Egypt in 1948, the West Bank and Gaza, and whose social fabric was altered as a result of being incorporated, albeit in a different manner, from the refugees, into the new social formation -- those latter constitute approximately 30% of the peasantry.

The urban refugees, composed predominantly of the artisans, professionals, landowners and the traditional working class of colonial Palestine, were successfully integrated, at least at the economic-occupational level, into the Arab host countries -- most notably in Jordan, Kuwait, the Gulf States, and to a lesser extent, in Lebanon. It was from their ranks that the Palestinian intelligentsia, unable to assimilate itself politically into these new formations, became an arch proponent of pan-Arab nationalism, and later -- of Palestinian nationalism. Above this intelligentsia lurks an eminently successful Palestinian bourgeoisie whose members were re-constituted from the sons of the defrocked landed elite of old Palestine, and whose fortunes were accumulated in the new diasporia of Middle East oil. In every state or statelet in the Arab-Persian Gulf they are found today among the most prominant bankers, export-import merchants, ministers, government advisors, managers of companies and planners. Their less fortunate kinsmen swell the ranks of the professional and semi-professional groups in these states.

The process of de-classment of Palestinians thus affected the different segments of the dispersed population in a desperate manner, depending on their former location in the class structure and on which social formation

they were re-located in. The term "de-classment" itself cannot be used as an all-explanatory category for the fate of the Palestinian, especially since large groupings among the Palestinians, including a substantial segment of the landed elite, simply changed their status horizontally, and in a few cases, improved its standing. Others like the peasants of the West Bank, retained their land and social fabric intact. Some writers prefer to use the term in a more restrictive fashion, preferring to confine it to describe changes in Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Rosenfeld, for example, makes the following observation about the consequences of the 1948 war:

> The main difference between today's Arab population in Israel and the mandatory period (in Palestine) is that the Arab population was stratified during the mandate; there were urban merchants, clerks, and landowners, as well as fallahin and labourers. Today these strata have been levelled; most of the first group is gone, and the population is, more or less, a single (declassed) class. The structure has become fragmented and the Arab village is not simply part of a new structure; it is a fragment of what it used to be. (Rosenfeld, 1972:70)

Using a different conceptual framework a Palestinian sociologist refers to Israeli 'internal colonialism' as having "managed to transform Palestinian Arab peasantry into a lumpen-proletariat with a 'declassed' status, while at the same time diminishing the likely emergence of a viable bourgeoisie" (Zureik, 1976:66).

This 'arrested' growth of an Arab bourgeois stratum among Israeli Arabs is seen as a distinguishing feature of Israeli dominance in contrast to British and Ottoman rule. In both the latter forms of colonialism Palestinian class differentiation emerged which contributed to the formation of both a nascent working-class and native bourgeoisie. Israeli rule on the other hand led not only to a lopsided class formation, but also a 'beheaded' one. Zureik goes further than Rosenfeld in characterizing the nature of Israeli rule.

He suggests that the pattern of 'internal colonialism' which occurred between 1948-1967 in the Galilee is repeating itself in the West Bank (Zureik, ibid.). Here a dual process of 'de-peasantization' (West Bank farmers deserting their farms to work in Israel as wage labourers) and 'de-bourgeoisification' (my expression, not Zureik's, referring to professionals and businessmen emigrating to Arab countries) is also taking place.

It is our contention however, that the social structure of those Palestinian communities which sought refuge in the Arab states and those that remained in the West Bank and Gaza cannot be understood in the same terms applied to the Palestinian experience under the first phase of Israeli rule (1948-1967). Moreover, changes which have occurred within Israeli society itself, both in the realm of Arab national consciousness, and in recruitment patterns of Arab employment, warrant a re-definition of Palestinian class structure in Israel since that period.

In order to grasp the character of this transformation, especially since 1967, I submit the following general propositions on the relationship between the notion of de-classment and the varieties of the experiences of the segmented Palestinian communities:

1. The declassment of the Palestinians in Israel in the past contain no inherent impediments for their proletarianisation in the present.

2. A more complex pattern of social differentiation and adaptation in the West Bank and Gaza is evolving under Israeli rule (1967-1981) than the one experienced by those who remained originally in Israel (1948-1967).

3. The social base of the Palestinian national movement since 1965, has been primarily located among the de-classed former peasants who are concentrated in refugee camps in the host Arab countries. The intelligentsia of that movement, by contrast, has been recruited disportionately form the ranks of the dispersed Palestinian bourgeoisie and professional strata. The re-focusing of Palestinian national strategy from seeking "total liberation of Palestine" to the more concrete and limited objective of "independence and sovereignty" compelled the leadership to re-think its ideological direction in the light of its new objectives. This change can be expressed as a shift from the politics of de-classment (whose social base is the refugee camps) to one involving substantial class alignments (within the occupied territories).

In the following analysis we shall examine the validity of those propositions:

<u>De-classment of Palestinians in Israel</u>

Whether substantial class differentiation has occurred among the Arabs of Israel or not remains the subject of some controversy. There seems to be a concensus however, on that the quantitative integration of the Arab 'underclass'--mainly rural labourers and peasants commuting daily to Jewish urban centres from their villages--has led to a qualitative impact on the relationship between Arab and Jewish society. In formal terms this change can be described as the transformation of Arab and Jewish societies from two <u>parallel</u> social structures into a single social structure <u>hierarchically integrated</u> in a relationship of dominance. What is still in need of elaborate emperical substantiation is the amount and character of social differentiation which

took place within Arab society corresponding to its progressive subordination to Jewish society.

Sherif Kana'ana in a study of survival strategies of Arabs in Israel (1975), provides a sharp case for such differentiation focusing on the Arab villages in the Galilee. Kana'ana dismisses the centrality of 'hamula' organization for explaining Arab social structure, stressing a conception of the situation "along the lines of socio-economic classes which cut across hamulas" (1975:8). (It should be noted that the author classifies a clan as a sub-category of hamula, rather than the reverse). If Palestinian society was 'beheaded' in the cities Kana'ana -- in contrast to Rosenfeld, above -- holds that it nevertheless retained its rural hierarchies, especially in the Galilee. Here three distinct classes are suggested: landlords, middle peasants and landless or poor peasants (ibid.). The latter stratum is crucial in explaining the character of Arab integration into Israeli society since it constitutes the first link between the two structures through wage labour:

> The village has changed from a self-contained subsistance to a cash economy. This has undermined the landowner's previously privileged position. As wages for labour have increased outside, the availability of poor peasants to work cheaply have declined. (Kana'ana, 1975:10)

Since middle peasants have the capacity to sustain themselves for a longer period in a 'subsistance economy', and the landlords were looked at suspiciously by the Israelis (because of their former leadership role in the resistance), poor peasants were "rewarded" by being given permits to work in Jewish towns. Thus "a true lumpen-proletariat had been created."

> At night they slept mainly in the ruins of Arab homes bordering the Jewish section, in deserted mosques or in bus depots. Soon these bunking places became labor markets where employers came and announced what they wanted and asked who among this reserve army of the unemployed would accept the lowest wages. This usually

> resulted in fights among the workers, and the employers got all the help they needed for minimal wages. (Kana'ana, 1975:12)

Alternatively and despite their low incomes the cash earnings of poor peasant/labourers contributing to enhancing their status within the rapidly changing village heirarchy. But it was the middle peasants (more than 70% of the rural population according to Kana'ana) whose survival strategies guided the adaptation of Palestinians under Israeli rule. Forms of adaptation included: turning to cash crops in agriculture, introduction of 'Jewish' technology in their farms, and 'investing' their sons in higher education. Theirs was a strategy of "hostile competition" with Israeli society (Kana'ana, 1975:16).

Kana'ana regards the strengthening of the extended family as crucial to these adaptations, contrary to the observation of many Israeli writers--almost to the point of idealising the new function of the hamula (ibid:15).

Although enlightening in terms of describing the mechanism of post-1948 patterns of change in the Arab village, Kana'ana's analysis has certain pitfalls: he tends to overestimate the intensity of class conflict among Palestinian peasants in Israel. For example, in dismissing notions of inter-generational conflict and the presumed weakening of hamula power, he goes all the way in the opposite direction, suggesting a pattern of class conflict "between the old from one class, the previously upper and landowning class, and the young from the middle peasant class, with the former steadily losing out" (ibid). The problem here is that lines of demarcation between rich and middle peasants are nowhere clearly suggested (aside from the former being the descendents of "ancient good families", and "the rulers and manipulators of society"--ibid:8). Landlessness, on the other hand, seems to be the condition for the definition of poor peasantry, the two terms being used inter-

changeably (ibid:11). No functional categories are utilized for peasant class differentiation.

Another arbitrary separation is introduced to separate town from village. The Palestinian village is persumed to be self-contained before 1948 (ibid:10; also see quote above), while wage labour was the medium of Israeli intrusion into its autarky during the 1950's and 1960's. Evidence does not support the first assertion (see, for example, Johnson and Crosbie, 1930:22-23), and while the second assertion is partly true, Palestinian villagers of all strata are known to have seasonally been engaged in labour in British, Jewish, and Arab enterprises since the 1920's (Himadeh, 1938).

Nevertheless, Kana'ana's work is valuable in that it modifies our conception of Palestinian de-classment under Israeli rule by challenging the notion of a de-stratified and (implicityly) homogenious Arab underclass (e.g. in Rosenfeld, above). It suggests a useful approach to the study of inner village conflict and class mobility, and focuses on the necessity for examining Palestinian social structure within the parameters of agencies of political control (the kinship system and the state) in terms of adaptation and survival strategies.

Studies of a more emperical nature about the modes of political articulation in the Arab village, such as that conducted by Nakhleh in Rameh and Beit Jann (Nakhleh, 1975) and earlier by Cohen (1965) are likely to further illuminate the relationship between changes in social structure, de-classment, and political consciousness. From such studies it is possible to establish trends that are general to the Arab population in Israel as a whole, and those that are regional and local. One such general relationship that is suggested by Nakhleh is the manner in which the Israeli state, through limiting the options of political affiliation open for Palestinian villagers, and by trying voting behaviour to the Zionist parties with material inducements for

the voters (jobs, etc.), reinforces faction-based conflicts in the village, especially those with a strong confessional (religious) base (Nakhleh, 1975: 512). Thus factionalism here persists but in a clearly different context than the one prevailing prior to 1948: patronage today is related to access of privileges spared by the Israeli state to the Arab population through the Zionist parties. It has become a means for Zionist legitimisation in the Arab sector.

Non-patronage politics expressed by support for the Israeli Communist Party (ICP) is usually interpreted as a demonstration of nationalism rather than a reflection of (working) class consciousness. This at least is Nakhleh's position (who calls it a 'protest vote', ibid.:515). It is not clear, however, why a party which articulates the national aspirations of an ethnic minority cannot also be working class based. Since there has been wide-range proletarianisation among Palestinian villagers in Israel, and since the CP happens to capture, on the average, at least half the Arab votes there is indeed every reason to believe this to the case. Malik, in fact, suggests that there is a positive correlation between the increased size and proletarianisation of Arab villages in Israel and the tendency to vote communist (Malik, 1978); on the other hand Arab vote for the communist list in the Histadrut (Israeli Federation of Labour) has been traditionally smaller than the communist vote for parliamentary elections (Zureik, 1979:170). One should remain aware, moreover, that even class politics in the Arab village (to the extent that it is expressed in communist voting) is subject to factional manipulation at the kinship and confessional level.

An indicator of the qualitative changes in the class composition of Israeli Arabs can be observed in the shifting employment structure. The most notable shift has been the absolute decline in farm employment, from 58.2% in 1954 to 15.2% in 1980 (A. Israeli, 1976; Statistical Abstract of Israel 1982:

331). But the alternative avenues of employment have been in those sectors which display a high degree of instability in work tenure (e.g. in construction and catering), and hence in the formation of a cohesive working class. In the past two decades Arab employment in construction and public works alone increased by 270% (Israeli, 1976; Statistical Abstract of Israel 1982: 331-333).

Even more significantly the seventies witnessed a richer diversification in the class structure of Israeli Arabs, who while maintaining their village-based dwellings and (sometimes) plots succeeded into promoting themselves, in considerable numbers, into the ranks of self-employed (construction subcontracting, retail, etc.), into professional employment (Rosenfeld, 1978: 396) and have produced a militant intelligentsia (trained, in part, in Hebrew educational centres) which openly identifies itself with Palestinian nationalism (Nakhleh 1980; Smooha 1978). Rosenfeld (1978) refers to a policy of "de-territorilization", based on land confiscation, and aimed at maintaining the submerged underclass character of the Palestinian population, as having backfired as a result of changes eminating from the work process itself. This process has objectively diminished the class-ethnic cleavages which previously separated Jewish and Arab social structures within the Israeli state, and now has to be reinforced at the political level by the state:

> Instead of regarding Arabs as a working class whose historical and cultural ties with (Jewish) immigrants from Middle East countries whose lack of employment and local development possibilities is often matched in new immigrant towns, and whose wages and standard of living, far below the middle class, are among the decisive features that join them to a Jewish working class, the Arabs are instead joined to their clans, and differences in character are posited as reasons for the separation between the two peoples (Rosenfeld, 1978:400-401).

Reviving inter-familial rivalries is not the only means of maintaining the diminished social cleavages between the Arab and Jewish population. It is also achieved instrumentally by prolonging the physical backwardness of the Arab village, where a majority of Palestinians continue to live. While the restrictions on village development channel attempts at self-improvement in the direction of migrations to Jewish urban areas, village backwardness guarantee the continued reproduction of the peasant-worker under-class (Rosenfeld, 1978:402).

This process by which structural (socio-economic) and institutional (political-administrative) mechanisms reinforce each other in ensuring Israeli-Jewish hegemony over the Arab minority is not self-perpetuating however. Lustick (1980) has suggested such a system of control composed of three leverages: (1) segmentation, the internal fragmentation of the Arab community which prevents them from exercising united political action; (2) dependence, the reliance of Arabs on the Jewish economy for its sources of livelihood; (3) co-optation, the selective manipulation of Arab factionalism, especially at the village level, by Zionist parties and institutions (Lustick, 1980:71-76). Although these three components of control operate simultaneously to ensure Arab quiescence at the political level, they are not fool proof, as evidenced by the massive uprising during Land day in the Galilee (March 1976), and by the increased demands of Palestinians to be treated as a national entity within the Israeli polity, rather than as minority citizens. What is significant about this system of control, from Lustick's perspective, is not its coerciveness (as one might suspect) but its successful operation, with low cost effectiveness, and so far, with minimal of dissidence.

To conclude, the de-classment of Palestinians in Israel cannot be treated as a rigid process equivalent to lumpenproletarianization. Not all Israeli Arabs are landless, and an increasingly significant proportion of

those that are landed are using their village base to challenge their submerged class status. Yet the fact remains that a considerable section of the Arab wage-earning population in Israel is dependent on employment in relatively unskilled and ustable occupations (construction, the services, and seasonal agriculture), and suffers from the institutional obstruction by the Israeli state of the emergence of viable Arab enterprises and a professional stratum (e.g. through unofficial quotas on the number of available seats for Arab students in the scientific departments in Israeli universities). But such dependence and obstruction are not defined by the rigidity of the occupational structure, or other strictly economic factors. Rather it is limited and constantly being modified by political considerations, such as the Israeli conception of 'security', and the maintenance of a Jewish majority in 'sensitive' fields of employment--i.e. by ideologically defined factors. The present need of the Israeli state for a 'positive' Arab intelligentsia (as local Arabs who accommodate the general policies of the state are referred to) invites its opposite: the emergence of a radical intelligentsia within and without the communist movement which has contributed effectively since the early sixties to the opening-up of the universities and other previously closed avenues of employment and mobility to a new generation of Arab youth.

The Palestinian Exile: "Expulsion from the Means of Production"

The refugee camp population in the Arab exile constitute the core of Palestinians dispersed in 1948, and again in 1967. Unlike the camp refugees in Gaza and the West Bank, those living in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon do not reside in the periphery of a relatively dynamic and expanding capitalist economy in need of constant sources for a cheap labour force as the case was in Israel. The construction boom in Jordan (mid-seventies), enhanced with the influx of (rich) refugees from the Lebanese civil war changed this situation there, but only temporarily. In general it may be said that the camp

refugees (a majority of Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria--and almost a third of the Palestinians in Jordan) act as a reserve army of the unemployed for the host economies (Sayigh, 1979:120-122).

The position of those refugees has been described succinctly by F. Rauf as "expulsion for the means of production" (1973:34). Until 1982, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon shattered the social fabric of the Palestinian community, wage labour in the refugee camps supplemented UNRWA and other stipends from migrant relatives. Together with Kurdish and illegal Syrian migrants, as well as Lebanese Shite farmers from the south, the Palestinians constituted a competing source for cheap and expendable labour for local Beiruti industries. A comprehensive survey conducted in Tel Za'tar camp in Beirut (Mundas, 1974) confirms this position. Tel Za'tar which was destroyed and many of its inhabitants massacred by Phallangist forces in 1976, was not untypical of other urban refugee camps such as those situated in Amman, Damascus Zarqa and Irbid. (It had certain features, however, that set it apart from those camps: for example,it contained a substantial proportion (23%) of non-Palestinian refugees, and it had a considerable number of Palestinian refugees from pastoral nomadic background (mainly from the Huleh region)). The camp, located in Eastern Beirut in a district containing 29% of all Lebanese manufacturing industries, employed 22% of the total labour force, and absorbed 23% of the industrial capital investments in Lebanon (Mundas, 1974:25).

The legal status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as 'Alien Residents render them most suitable for manipulation by the medium-sized workshops and factories that employ them. Refugees, as Rauf noted, "are not involved in the process of capitalist social reproduction" except marginally. Work provided them with only 20% of what they need to survive on as income (Rauf, 1973:35). The rest comes from UNRWA rations, migrant stipends, and scavanging. In the case of Tel Za'tar camp 24.8% of the active population was in the labour force,

5.89% of whom were females (Mundas, 1974:179)--a slightly higher rate than the one mentioned because of the proximity of the camp to the industrial district.

Even in a labour force dominated by 'lumpen' elements a considerable degree of social differentiation exists. Mundas suggests the following classification for the camp workers: (1) 'Proletarian workers': those situated in manufacturing enterprises employing more than 50 labourers--in Tel Za'tar, those constituted 7% of the total male workers; (2) 'semi-proletarian workers': those constituted 50 male workers (3% of total) and 150 female workers (18%) employed mostly as lottery peddlers, porters, sanitation workers, and house servants--probably the most insecure sources of livelihood in the Middle East (Mundas, 1974:173-175). Although one may question the stratification criteria employed by Mundas here, the picture of differentiation intended is clear. It must be added that the employment structure also includes a number of shopkeepers, drivers, teachers, artisans, vegetable peddlers and other semi-professionals (e.g. nurses). The camp in addition had a number of contractors and medium-sized merchants (10 altogether) who live in the periphery of the camp, some of whom had become Lebanese citizens. A limited degree of occupational mobility was enhanced by the availability of free university education to refugee students.

Unemployment figures, though high, were actually lower than those for the Lebanese labour force, even when seasonal fluctuations are taken into account (Lebanese Bureau of Statistics/Mundas, 1974:49). But there is an important difference: Palestinian refugees constitute in their majority former peasants who have lost their lands and whose residence in Lebanon, by virtue of their insecure legal status, is far more vulnerable than that of indiginous migrant peasant-workers. The latter, a considerable number of whom have access to land, or to relatives with land, can cushion the impact

of recession, or individual unemployment, by periodic return to their villages.

It was this situation of de-peasantization and economic marginality which established the camp refugees as the bearers of the 'cult of return' (al-awdah) to Palestine as the core of their political ideology, and it was from their ranks that the fighting cadres of the various contingents of the Palestine Liberation Movement were recruited. The 'cult of return' and the organizational independence of Palestinian movements which it entailed, however, were not always forms of self-imposed political restrictions. We are not suggesting here a necessary determination of ideology and organizational structure dictated by refugee de-classment. Both in Jordan and Lebanon the Palestinians entered into various forms of alliances with the local forces in order to face the repression of the national authorities--but the conditions under which the Palestinian refugees lived and worked rendered these alliances much weaker than if they were fully integrated in the host countries. In Lebanon, where these alliances were more effective, the capacity of their combined force was severely limited by the historic predicament of the Lebanese left into the webs of the confessional system. The civil war (1975-present) finally brought this system into a dramatic convulsion, and pushed the Palestinians as a chief protagonist not only of their own cause but also of the cause of secularism and anti-confessionalism for the Lebanese themselves.

But although the effective social base of the PLO existed in Jordan (1967-1971) and Lebanon (1971 - 1982) among its refugee camps and rootless intelligentsia, its political constituency was dispersed in several social formations, throughout the Arab world and the state of Israel. As the quest for nationhood altered the movement's ideological direction, from the "cult of return" to the quest for sovereignty, from total liberation to limited statehood, so did the PLO's political centre of gravity began to gravitate from its de-classed diaspora to those segments of Palestine that remained

"intact": the West Bank and Gaza.

The West Bank and Gaza: the Logic of Old Hierarchies

The prototype of de-classment and de-peasantization which is often projected from the conditions of dispersed refugees in urban Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, overlooks the fact that over half the Palestinian people still live in (historic) Palestine--now 'united' through common Israeli rule--most of them residing in relatively stable communities, in or near the place of their birth. If we use the term 'de-classment' in the sense utilized by Rauf to mean 'expulsion from the means of production', then we refer basically to communities living in refugee camps. Only in Gaza do refugee camps constitute a slight majority (around 55%) of the population. In the West Bank they are less than 20%, and in the Galilee and the Triangle refugees (though not living in camps) constitute less than 15% of the total Palestinian population. Furthermore, most of the remaining Palestinians living in other parts of the state of Israel (villages around West Jerusalem, the Naqab, Lydda-Ramleh area and Jaffa) have retained their places of residence.

Although conditions of work for those in the occupied territories is relatively unstable, and remains concentrated in sectors which are most exposed to economic recessions (especially construction) unemployment remains low--2% in official data (for 1980) and about 4% if we incorporated unemployment in semi-professional, academic and white collar occupations (all of which are underestimated in Israeli figures--see ATSQ, 1981:117-133).

But considerations of employment in themselves are deceptive if we are seeking indicators of stability in class structure. What is crucial for the occupied territories is the manner in which the Palestinian labour force was incorporated into the Israeli economy. (This subject is discussed at greater length in chapters 6 and 7). Here I will merely sketch the main

features of this development, as it affects the subject of de-classment. The most striking aspect about the process of Israeli integration of the occupied territories is the employment of more than one-third of the Palestinian labour force from the territories in Israeli enterprises on a daily basis and the opening up of Gaza and the West Bank as markets for Israeli commodities. Of those workers involved the overwhelming majority were of peasant origin (73.2% were rural-based, as opposed to 26% evenly divided between urban and refugee residents--Israel Ministry of Labour, 1980:23), but few of them today are agriculturalists.

Israeli rule did give rise to a stratum of war profiteers--connected mostly with labour contracting, construction, and real estate transactions. But it did not change qualitatively the character of the local bourgeoisie. Any growth effects it may have had (there) were probably cancelled by the desertion of sectors of the commercial bourgeoisie to Jordan since 1967. Israeli-Palestinian joint enterprises emerged in the form of sub-contracting firms (in textiles and construction) but their growth rates soon declined after 1974, probably due to political uncertainty for business transactions. Employment in Israel, the most crucial variable in this connection, did create a new stratum of workers from urban refugees and surplus rural labour.

What is certain is that peasant agricultural labour has become supplementary to wage labour and not vice versa, although in Gaza, where refugees (and not farmers) constitute a majority in the labour force, a different perspective for interpretation is needed to take into account the absence of a subsistance economy to which they may resort to. The diversity between Gaza and the West Bank is rooted partly in the different forms of agricultural production, (the predominance of capitalist citri-culture in Gazan agriculture as opposed to small and medium-sized farms in the West Bank), and partly to the massive weight of the refugee population in Gaza. But it is

also related to the nature of Jordanian and Egyptian rule between 1948 and 1967 in those two regions.

The West Bank escaped the destruction of its landed-commercial elite, and underwent a pattern of limited structural mobility in its occupational and class composition. The Jordanian army and bureaucracy, the expansion of the educational system, and a high rate of outmigration (the latter supplementing a sizable portion of household incomes)--all combined, modified the direction of social change in a different way from that experienced by Palestinians who remained in Israel and from Gazans under Egyptian rule.

As we know from similar situations in the third world, unproductive surplus labour in rural districts is easily disguised due to the nature of the agrarian economy in non-capitalist agriculture. In the West Bank and Gaza the problem was compounded by the influx of masses of ex-peasant refugees, and 'resolved' in the Galilee by the proliferation of wage labour in villages of high employment in Jewish industries. The phenomenon of the peasant-worker status was enhanced by and the physical proximity of Jewish sources of wage-labour and employment, the seasonal character of agriculture, and the unstable character of employment in the construction and service sectors.

Mediation of Israeli Rule

On the surface the difference between the West Bank and the Galilee would seem to be the degree of integration within Jewish society, which obtains--among other things--from the civic engranchisement of the Israeli Arab population (tenious as it is) into the state of Israel, and conversely, the colonial relationship between the state and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. This is admittedly a controversial position; for there are those who argue that the difference is one in the degree of colonial domination between the two communities, rather than one of qualitative dichotomy (cf.

Zureik, 1978). What this problem amounts to is how one interprets the nature of mediation in Israeli rule in the two Palestinian communities.

In the Galilee, where 80% of Israel's Palestinians are concentrated, this mediation is articulated through civil society; through the system, political parties, local councils, clan alliances and a personal nepotistic network of favouratism which permeates these agencies. The structural foundation of this mediation is the occupational integration of the Arab labour force in the Jewish economy. A considerable degree of coercion and intimidation is nevertheless used to supplement those institutions in order to guarantee the acquiscence of Palestinians to the Zionist society whose raison d'être excludes them (as Arabs) from its polity. But coercion as Lustick (1980) has convincingly argued has, since the abolition of the military government in 1961, been a secondary mechanism of political control. In the West Bank and Gaza, by contrast, mediation of Israeli rule has proceeded primarily through the machinery of the military government. The use of systematic physical coercion to maintain Israeli hegemony has been far in excess of what has been used among Israeli Arabs during the formative years of the Jewish State when the military government ruled supreme in the Galilee (1948-1961).[1] Despite the presence of similar structural trends of integration at the economic level between the two regions of Israeli control the difference cannot be attributed simply to the missing constitutional factor; i.e. the enfranchisement of Israeli Arabs, and its absence among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

I propose that the crucial explanation for this difference in colonial mediation lies in the divergent evolution of the two social structures we outlined above. While the West Bank has maintained its rural and urban hierarchies, albeit in a modified form, Galilean rural society had lost its original landed elites and intelligentsia and had, therefore, to fend on its

own against overwhelming odds. The continued links between West Bank Palestinians, and the Arab world, through Jordan, provided that society with a network of commercial, political, and cultural ties which were denied to Israeli Arabs and which drastically curtailed their political options.

A vivid indicator of this important difference in colonial mediation is the absence, in the occupied territories, of any significant institutional base for Israeli rule. In the cities of the West Bank one observes Palestinian (i.e. PLO) and Jordanian (i.e. pro-Hashimite) pockets of organized politics (Lesch, 1980:82-95; Abboushi, 1980:6-14), but not of advocates of coexistence with Israeli rule. Those views are confined to individual merchants, lawyers, contractors and minor political figures and journalists.

In the rural sector the picture is slightly different. Here the military government did make a successful bid for the enlistment and limited collaboration by a number of village mukhtars (headmen) and councils of village elders, but only at the cost of enforcing a trend, which was already in process during Jordanian rule, of reducing the status of the mukhtar from village representative, to an appointed governmental functionary--and even informer (Migdal, 1980:50ff.; Baer, 1980:123).

The Village Leagues

At the institutional level the Israelis made further inroads through the formation of the openly collaborative movement known as the Association of Village Leagues. The Leagues were initially established in the district of Hebron, the most conservative and retrogressive region of the West Bank. There, the Association of Southern Villages, appeared in 1977 under the patronage of former Jordanian minister and Hebron clan leader Mustafa Dudeen. By 1981, and under open encouragement of the Israeli Military Government, it became openly pro-Israeli and made several attempts (some successful) to

establish branches in Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarem, and Jenin villages.

The ostensible aim of the Village League Movement was to finance rural development projects in member villages, dwelling at length--in the speeches of its leaders and articles appearing in its newspaper, al-Mir'aa--on the years of neglect suffered by rural Palestine at the hands of the urban-based national leadership. In practice, however, it set itself to compete with the Amman-based Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Committee which has been financing similar development projects since 1977, when the PLO succeeded in gaining full ascendency in West Bank national politics (Sus, 1981:5-6).

The ideology of the Leagues was based on the notion of storming the urban political base of the PLO by mobilizing the allegedly conservative peasantry around issues of village-centered development (Tamari, 1983:4-6). Its mode of operation, however, was based on cultivating village potentates whose services and patronage rested directly on power delegated by the Israeli Civil Administration. Simultaneously the Civil Administration began to disband and punish local councils and mukhtarships that were seen as pro-PLO or uncooperative (ibid.:12).

By 1982 the Village Leagues were transformed, under the direction of former Defense Minister and his protége, Civil Administrator Menahem Milson, into an armed militia with a substantial budget running into several million dollars. Its dual function was to help eliminate or neutralize PLO power in the villages, and to create a local pliable leadership which can represent the Palestinians in the anticipated autonomy negotiations along the guidelines of the Camp David accords.

Internal bickering among League chieftens, as well as excesses committed by League militias against their village opponents (including personal opponents) sabotaged their own attempts at expansion. Basically, however,

the Leagues failed because the Israeli Civil Administration imposed on it tasks which, given the increasing claims made for Jewish sovereignty in the West Bank, were mutually exclusive. On the one hand the Leagues were being combed to act as a surrogate for Israeli power and as an alternative "moderate" Palestinian leadership, on the other hand it was to act as a repressive apparatus against the nationalist movement. But since the success of the former task would have required to grant the Palestinians territorial concessions which would lend it a measure of credability as a moderate Palestinian movement, the absence of such concessions brought the Leagues own undoing as a rural political movement and left it naked with its second, repressive, function.[2] As such it can be claimed that Israeli rule in the West Bank (and Gaza) continues to rest on structural foundations of economic integration re-inforced, increasingly, by direct coercive power.

Conclusion

We have traced above the consequences of dislocation of traditional agrarian Palestine and the emergence of three distinct social formations in which the remnants of that society are embedded today. The centrality of the West Bank (and Gaza) in those formations lies in two aspects of this configuration: One, it is the only segment of historic Palestine in which agriculture constitutes a meaningful component of the region's political economy; and two, it is the arena over which Palestinian sovereignty is being contested today, In contrast to the predicament of the Palestinians in the Israeli and neighbouring Arab formations West Bankers were the least subject to the convulsions in social structure that Palestinians underwent elsewhere. They alone have retained a semblence of a social order that bears continuity with the nation's historic past. Only there a Palestinian peasantry, divorced from its coastal landlords and urban elite, is still entrenched in the high-

lands of the West Bank mountains and in the Valleys of the Jordan. But sinc the "divorce" was accompanied by a massive population transfer, re-imposed unto its traditional order, by changes in the nature of its hegemonic elites and by its reintegration into the framework of three radically different state apparatuses (the Jordanian, Egyptian, and Israeli), we cannot treat th remaining society and peasantry as a reduced segment of the original whole. In the next chapter we will examine the nature of that structural re-integra tion and its political consequences.

Notes

1. To substantiate this claim I would suggest comparisons on the number of political prisoners, houses demolished, deportations, towns under and duration of curfew for the periods 1948-1958 (in the Galilee) and 1967-1977 in the West Bank and Gaza.

2. I have discussed at length the roots and current dilemmas of the Village Leagues elsewhere. See Tamari, "In League with Zion", Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1983 (forthcoming).

Chapter Four

The West Bank: Structural Change Under Israeli Rule

(1967 - 1982)

> "The people of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) form the largest bulk of the Palestinians -- numerically, economically, and intellectually -- anywhere in the world. It is a group, to my great regret, . . . whose body is here but whose head is outside . . . ."
>
> General Binyamin Ben-Eliezar
> (Israeli Military Commander
> of the West Bank)
> Jerusalem Post, Sept. 20, 1979

The Demographic-Territorial Dilemma in Israeli Policies

Israeli policies towards the "administered Territories", as they are referred to in official statements, have been from the beginning of the occupation the subject of controversy between contending factions within Labor Zionism, and -- with the coming of the Likud into power -- between those who favour a territorial settlement and those who oppose it. It seems however, that regardless of the political settlement that might be arrived at, the government was determined to hasten the process of merging the Palestinian communities within the boundaries of pre-1967 Israel. If territorial concessions have to be made, there will be an existing single socio-economic entity which is becoming increasingly difficult to divide. This conception is confirmed in a 1970 Ministry of the Interior publication, titled Guidelines for Regional & Physical Planning. In it the plan suggested for the West Bank emphasized "the settlement of the unpopulated Jordan

Valley and Dead Sea area and making it arable, the expansion of agriculture wherever possible, the utilization of available water resources, the clearance of slums and refugee camps, the development of the economic rural functions of the bigger villages, . . . the development of the periphery of Samaria and Judea so that it may become integrated with the rest of the country" (Perara, 1977).

Politically these objectives were translated into a policy of "creeping annexation" guided by the thinking of Moshe Dayan and his supporters under the Rabin government. This policy was based on a three-pronged approach: (1) the transfer of administrative power and social services to local Palestinian institutions (municipal and village councils, and the various bureaus of the Jordanian administration in the West Bank), so that Israeli rule can be "felt but not seen"; (2) the absorption of the surplus labour force into Israeli employment and the gradual elimination of refugee camps with the aid of the local authorities; (3) the maintenance of the "open bridges" policy with Jordan to facilitate the exchanve of goods and population contacts between the occupied territories -- and implicitly Israel -- and the Arab World (Israel Economist 1972, 1973).

The main opposition to this policy of integration came in the early seventies from the "doves" within the Labor Party, and from Mapam. Both found a spokesman for their fears of "demographic encirclement" in Pinhas Sapir, the then Minister of Finance, and ultimately expressed this fear concretely in the Allon Plan, which proposed a territorial division of the West Bank between Jordan and Israel. Sapir argued, quite effectively for a period, that the presence of over a million Palestinians within the bound aries of Israel would dilute the Jewish character of the state, and -- give the substantially higher birth rate in the Arab family -- would eventually threaten the ability of its institutions to govern effectively. However,

both the desire to keep the occupied territories and the needs of Israeli capitalism for Arab labour decided the issue in favour of the integrationists. The argument of the opposition was taken into account by Dayan's suggestion that the areas be incorporated into Israel without the extension of Israeli rule over them. After the 1973 October War this proposal came to be known as the functional division (as opposed to the territorial division) of the terriroties, by means of which Israel would maintain sovereignty over the two regions, ostensibly for security reasons, while Jordan would regain its administrative role of the pre-War period. The employment of Palestinian workers in Israel and the extension of the area's market for Israeli commodities to the rest of the Arab world were seen, in Israeli eyes, as the cementing bond of an eventual settlement.

Begin's 26-point plan concerning the future of the West Bank and Gaza, which was submitted in January 1978 to the Israeli Knesset, attested to the final recognition of the notion of functional division, and to the incorporation of Dayan's proposals into official policy (see especially items 17, 22 and 24 regulating the relationship of Gazans and West Bankers to the Jordanian regime; The Guardian Weekly, 1978).

Simultaneously, an extensive settlement policy was being implemented to forestall the consequences of Israel's having to withdraw from the occupied territories in the eventuality of a settlement. Under the Labour government the declared purpose of these Jewish settlements was defensive; that was the explanation given for the concentration of colonies along the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, the Rafah approaches, and even in the Latrun area. The exceptions to this policy were to be found in Jerusalem, where Judaisation was openly admitted, and in a few formerly Jewish settlements (such as Kfar Etzion, and Kiryat Arba' near Hebron) in which the government submitted to religious-nationalist sentiments. By 1977, approxi

mately 80 Jewish settlements (26 in the Golan, 22 in Gaza and Sinai, and 32 in the West Bank -- excluding the suburban settlements around Arab Jerusalem) were already established (cf. Lesch, 1977; Fershafsky, 1978).

When the Likudists came to power in May 1977, the issue of settlements was primary in their programme. The Allon Plan (which envisaged a territorial settlement with Jordan by which most of the West Bank, minus a strategic belt along the Ghor, would return to Jordan) was scrapped, and the Sharon Plan was adopted. The latter was a comprehensive scheme of rezoning the occupied territories for civilian Jewish settlement. It aimed at the encirclement of the Arab population in the West Bank by civilian-military settlements along its four boundaries, but especially along the Jordan Valley. In its second phase the plan envisaged the segmentation of centres of Arab demographic concentration in the West Bank with a gridlike network of interlinked Jewish colonies (see Map 4:1; Shapira, 1978).

The core of the plan is based on the establishment of five large urban centres in the West Bank (near the present areas of at-Taybeh, Mashah, Beit Sira, Givan and Teqoa) by the early eighties. The several industrial plants which had already been established under the Rabin government in Ma'ale Ha'Adumim, near Jericho, with each employing about 50 workers, had been integrated with the Sharon plan to diversify the economic activity of the settlements. In most cases, however, the urban centres were intended to serve as dormitory communities for Jewish citizens who will commute daily to their work in the Israeli sector.

The Sharon plan envisaged 2,000,000 settlers in the West Bank alone, with a proposed 150,000 settlers designated for the five urban centres mentioned above. Behind the hectic zeal for "redeeming the land" lies the decline in the proportion of the Jewish population in several areas of

Map 4:1.

Settlement "Grid"
According to the Sharon Plan (1978), and the Labour Party



Key:
- Security Belt (Labour Party)
- Security Belt (Likud)
- Roads linking settlement grid

Source: Based on W. Ja'fari, Israeli Colonial Settlement in the Occupied Territories; IPS (Beirut) 1981.

settlement priority inside the pre-1967 boundaries of Israel, most notable in the Galilee and greater Jerusalem. In the Galilee, Jews constitute today 52 percent of the total population, and in some subdistricts Arab majorities have emerged (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981:36). According to a ministerial committee for Jerusalem, the weight of the Jewish population in the city declined from 74 percent in 1968 to 72.6 percent in 1975 (Litani, 1976).

The chief obstacle to Jewish colonisation efforts, besides the scarcity of water resources of the Judean Hills, remained the problem of inducing immigrants and members of Zionist settler movements (such as Gush Emunim) to move to new settlements in the occupied territories. However, a breakthrough in this problem was achieved with the second victory of the annexationists when the Likud coalition was voted to power in June 1981. The adoption of the Drobles Plan signalled a resolve by the Sharon's allies in the government to "seal the fate of the West Bank" against possible territorial deals with Jordan or with the Palestinian National movement. By the end of 1980 the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department had started a nation-wide campaign to facilitate increased movement to the West Bank. Under the program of "Build a Nest in the Jordan Valley" new incentives were given to settlers, including: a minimal financial investment, an air conditioned house, a 20-dunum plot, water quotas, agricultural implements, credit, agricultural instruction and community services (Haaretz December 9, 1980). The success of the program encouraged the Jewish agency, with government backing, to extend the program to the rest of the West Bank highlands -- regions of high Arab population density (Al-Hamishmar January 23, 1981). For the purpose of land acquisitions the Jewish National fund devoted 60 percent of its 1980-1981 budget (some 402 million IL) for the purchase of lands in the occupied territories (Al-Hamishmar April 29, 1981).

By June, 1981 there were over 60 inhabited Jewish settlements in the West Bank with a total population of 25,000 (Benvenisti, 1981:12). New regional councils were established to regulate the affairs of those settlements as a precedent to incorporating them into the Israeli state. By mid-1981 the area of the West Bank subject to Israeli law and municipal regulation was larger than the total municipal area of West Bank cities (ibid.). Nor was this annexation confined to administrative and legislative matters. Yehuda Litani, former Ha'aretz chief correspondent in the West Bank, revealed an extensive scheme for settlement integration into the Israeli army defensive network. Anticipating the Likud's replacement by the Labour bloc in the Summer of 1981 (falsely as it turned out), Settlers Associations, in allianc with segments of the Israeli army, sought to preempt any possible territorial concession by force of arms:

> When Ariel Sharon spoke of a "struggle among brothers and worsening of relations" he knew what he was talking about. The settlers in Judea and Samaria must by now be considered full-fledged military units. They are equipped with weapons and other military equipment in the framework of the army's regional defence system. They have, also under the Likud government which lends them its support, demonstrated their skills -- outside the I.D.F. framework -- by smashing car windows at El-Bira and Halhoul, in what they termed "operations to impose law and order." In the days to come, under what is expected to be an Alignment government which will be of less friendly disposition than the Likud, they will most probably wish to demonstrate their ability to "maintain order" and to prove that "the land of Israel belongs to the people of Israel."
>
> The moment a base has been established on the ground it will play its part in troubled days: it will disrupt every political move tied to any concession to the Arabs whatsoever, even where the realization of autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza -- a Likud sponsored plan -- is concerned.

There can be no doubt that the settlers and their supporters intend to fight these aims by all means at their disposal. The full arms stores at the West Bank settlements will be an important contributive factor in that struggle. Alignment leaders know already that any solution they will propose will be most difficult to realize, mainly because of the settlers' opposition -- not just words but, so they expect, with factual opposition, which may not restrict itself to demonstrations. In private talks, and in broad hints in their public declarations, the settlers are putting the message across that only over their dead bodies will the settlements in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip be evacuated. (Litani, 1981:14)

As events turned out these preparations were premature. The Likud's second victory entrenched those pro-settlement elements even more firmly into state power. The consequences for geopolitical changes in the map of the West Bank are staggering. In April 1981 Ariel Sharon, by then Minister of Defense and the ultimate authority in the occupied territory, showed a map of settlement regions to the international press covering areas which he termed as "vital to Israel's security" constituting 75 percent of the total land area of the West Bank (Jerusalem Post, April 25, 1981 --- see Map 4:2). By 1980, the total area under direct Israeli control, according to classified U.S. State Department documents, cover 30 - 40 percent of the West Bank area, including 70 percent of the Jordan Valley's arable land (Aronson, 1980:21).

The issue of colonial settlement in the occupied territories has been, so far, the most explosive aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, both from the perspective of territorial Zionism and in its association with the imagery of Palestinian dispossession. However, as a prelude to out discussion of economic dependency in the occupied areas, Jewish settlements have had a marginal impact on structural change for two reasons. First, with the exception of Kiryat Arba' and the Rafah settlements, these

Map 4.2: Boundries of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank

The "Drobles' Plan" (World Zionist Organization)



urce: The Christian Science Monitor; based on WZO, Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983 (Jerusalem, 1978).

colonies have not been involved in the exploitation of Arab labour; their emphasis on the employment of Jews exclusively represents a belated attempt at reviving the notion of Hebrew labour which, for all practical purposes, has not been abandoned in Israel. Second, because the settlements, despite full government backing, are facing a serious crisis of viability, in terms of having an independent productive base. The provision of massive subsidies and incentives for settlers by the two Likud governments have not succeeded so far to bring about substantial Jewish immigration to Gaza and the West Bank. The total settler population of these two regions, if we exclude Jerusalem, still (in 1981) constitutes less than 5 percent of the total Jewish population in Israel.

This picture of marginality may yet change with the influx of middle class commutors and land speculators (as opposed to ideologically motivated settlers) to settle in the urban settlements within commuting distance from Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. The easy availability of high standard housing within the reach of a larger Israeli public has pushed the number of settlers in the West Bank alone (Jerusalem excluded) from 16 to 22 thousand in 1982 (Benvenisti, 1982:52), making it possible for one to "be a pioneer without risk and a speculator without embarrassment" (ibid.: 53).

However, the whole nature of Israeli planning in the occupied territories presumes "complete spatial separation between Jewish and Arab areas" (Benvenisti, 1982:54). Thus a totally independent infrastructure for the settlements in terms of roads, telecommunications, industry, agricultural marketing, etc., ensures this spatial insulation of Jews from the Palestinian inhabitants. If we seek the mechanisms of structural integration of the Arabs into Israel, therefore, we have to look beyond the network of settlements.

The Framework of Dependency: Arab Workers and Israeli Commodities

The most salient feature of the structural integration of the occupied territories into the Israeli economy has been, on the one hand, the employment of almost half of the total Palestinian workforce (about 80,000 workers) in Israel and, on the other, the emergence of the two Palestinian regions as the main market for the "export" of its commodities (after the United States).

The outcome of this economic integration has been interpreted differently, depending on the conceptual perspective utilised. One Israeli writer refers to the "tremendous progress" made by the Palestinians under Israeli tutelage, especially in the agricultural sector. "The West Bank," notes this economist, "has been unique among developing areas in that rapid agricultural progress has not been accompanied by the emergence of a surplus rural population -- in spite of lagging urban development -- but by the eradication of unemployment (due to mass work opportunities offered by the Israeli economy)." (Ater, 1975; Israel Economist, 1975).*

Using a more cautious tone, Arie Bregman, from the Bank of Israel, lists some of the major consequences of "the creation of a common market between two economies complementary as regards their factors of production and their structure." Those include: an 11 percent rise in real consumption per capita (for the initial period of 1968-73), 20 percent gross private savings (of disposable income as compared with less than 10 percent before 1968), 6 percent annual increase in employment leading to a negligible rate of unemployment by 1973 (compared with approximately 13 percent unemployment under the Jordanian administration), and an annual increase of daily wages by about 15 percent. However, despite the substantial savings and the increase in labour productivity, there was no noticeable increase in capital stock, investments or changes in the institutional

infrastructure of the economy in the occupied territories (Bregman, 1975:6).

Bregman's optimism about the stimulating impact effected by the Israeli economy was qualified in a follow-up study which took into account the results of the 1975 recession in Israel (Bregman, 1976). GNP growth by then stood at the rate of 8 percent increase annually (for 1974-75) compared with 17 percent for the 1969-73 period. Special emphasis was now placed on the cyclical and unirrigated nature of West Bank agriculture to explain the substantial decline in 1975 output, and the related 7 percent decline in industrial production (ibid.:7-15).[1]

This, generally positive, assessment of the impact of Israeli occupation on the Palestinian economy is not confined to the accounts of Israeli economists and social scientists such as Ater, Bregman, Zarhi and Weigert. In her study of the "viability" of the West Bank as an economic entity, Vivian Bull, an American economist, describes patterns of growth similar to those claimed by Bregman, although her political conclusions woud probably differ from his (Bull, 1975:143-153). The author is particularly impressed with achievements in the agricultural field, where she sees Israel's role as emphasizing productivity increases, creating non-agricultural job opportunities, using the under-employed or unemployed rural labor force in local projects, encouraging capital investment where the marginal productivity of capital is greatest, and emphasizing the returns which can be generated from crops rather than being concerned with institutional arrangements (Bull, 1975:81). Moreover, similar achievements, albeit on a lesser scale, are noted in the industrial sector (ibid.:96-103), the technical infrastructure (roads, communication, extension of the electrical grid, etc., ibid.:105), and in the training of the labour force (ibid.:120-124). The main economic obstacle to the continuation of this positive development is seen in the limitation of the "available market

for both agricultural and industrial commodities produced locally (ibid.: 144). Another British economist, writing two years later, shares Bull's estimates of improvements in the standard of living, but not in the other sectors of the economy (Van Arkadie, 1977:68-69).

The divergent conceptual categories used by dependency theorists, however, produce a radically different view of economic changes in the occupied territories. Jamil Hilal, for instance, in a comprehensive survey of the West Bank under Jordanian and Israeli rule, found that the chief dislocating impact of Israel on the territories was its regressive effect on industrial and agricultural productivity, and the active promotion of the service sector at the expense of those vital sectors of the economy (Hilal, 1975:267). Israeli official datawere used to indicate a decline in the contribution of the agricultural sector (from 34.9 to 28.4 percent for the 1968-72 period), and the manufacturing sector (from 7.9 to 6.2 percent) to the two regions' GNP (Hilal, 1975:252).

Unequal exchange in terms of trade, direct exploitation of Palestinian cheap labour, and the dislocation and subordination of the Palestinian precapitalist economy to the needs of the advanced Israeli economy are the mechanisms by which surplus is transferred from the occupied territories to Israeli capitalism. Unequal exchange is demonstrated in that "while the West Bank and Gaza exported to Israel agricultural products and labour-intensive agricultural products, they imported from Israel capital-intensive industrial products (Hilal, 1976a:10). Although 90 percent of their total imports came from Israel, the two regions exported only two percent of their products to Israel. Hilal calculated a trade surplus of 2,155 million Israeli pounds equivalent to about U.S.$ 513m) in favour of Israel during the first seven years of occupation alone (Hilal, 1976a:ibid.; Hilal, 1975: 207-210).

The transfer of surplus through direct exploitation is seen as working on two levels: the benefits accruing from the employment of cheap Palestinian labour, and returns from direct investments in the territories, especially from subcontracting firms dealing in textiles and construction material (tiles, stone-cutting, etc.). One area of obvious manipulation involves deductions for social service taxes from the income of West Bank and Gaza workers in Israel, without the provision of these services (except for workers residing in the greater Jerusalem area which is officially under Israeli jurisdiction). But more important is the wage differential between Palestinian and Israeli workers -- only part of which is accounted for by differences in training and productivity. In 1975 the average monthly wage for Israeli employees was IL2,466, compared to IL1,085 for Palestinian[2] employees. A labour survey conducted by the Histadrut in 1982 showed that, at least for the construction sector, there are 50-60% differentials in the hourly wage between West Bank and Israeli Jewish workers have the same skills (Ha'aretz, August 17, 1982). A critical Israeli report found that the utilisation of cheaper labour in the territories yielded a net benefit of IL615m in 1974 alone ("Israel and Palestine":1976). Figures on returns from Israeli investments in the territories are not readily available, but Van Arkadie mentions clothing firms (which are largely controlled by Israeli capital) as having one of the highest growth rates in industry, amounting to about 30% annually) (Van Arkadie, 1977:124).

The major dislocating impact of economic annexation has been inflicted on the indigenous organisation of production, both in its pre-capitalist forms (peasant society and urban craft) and in the nascent capitalist sector (containment of manufacturing). As a result of the internal migration of small farmers seeking employment in wage labour, we observe an increase in the total area of neglected farmland (from 238,000

dunums in 1968-69 to 354,000 in 1969-70) (Hilal, 1975:246). In many instances the Israeli government established customs regulations to prevent the entry of perishable food items (dates and fish from Gaza, grapes from Hebron, for example) to the Israeli market (Tzidkoni, 1975:41), without establishing similar tariffs to protect West Bank and Gaza farmers from the considerably more powerful competition of Israeli crops.

Along the same lines, stagnation in the industrial sector has been measured by the declining rate of employment in indigenous manufacturing (from 10,800 employees in 1969 to 9,350 in 1973) (Hilal, 1976b:23), without any noticeable increase in productivity or investments in capital goods (Bregman, 1976:63). However, there is a dispute as to whether this stagnation is also true of the agricultural sector; Israeli official statistics provide data for crop production in money terms, very rarely in terms of actual output (Weigert, 1976). When Hilal talks of stagnation in agriculture, he refers to the decline of total agricultural employment and its stationary share in the GNP (Hilal, 1976b:26). However, unlike the manufacturing sector, these indices are not very meaningful for a sector that is plagued by seasonal fluctuations. Altogether it seems that the major weakness of these discussions on Palestinian agriculture has been the failure to analyse adequately the internal dynamics and processes of the agrarian system and to investigate the differential impact of Israeli technology and marketing procedure on the various strata of Palestinian farmers.

The proletarianisation of Palestinian peasants and refugees, although measurable in terms of the extent of wage labour proliferation, has been one of the least understood aspects of social change under Israeli occupation. Rosenfeld, one of the very few Israelis who has done a systematic study of this process, found that one of the essential features of pre-1948 proletarianisation among Palestinian peasants was that it was accomplished without

any significant urbanisation, so that the peasant-worker remained -- and, in terms of wages and general attitudes -- was treated as a casual labourer "who had a pipeline to a village storehouse"; that is, he had one foot in subsistence farming (Rosenfeld, 1974:480). Nor, he asserts, did the increased entry of the peasant into the wage-labour market have any adverse effect on agricultural productivity, due to the presence of nonproductive surplus labour in rural society (Rosenfeld, ibid.; see also Nakhleh, 1977: 46-47, 51). Zureik, dealing with the post-state period, maintains that this transformation is the most significant single change brought about by the impact of the Israeli economy. Palestinian peasantry are seen as having undergone "marginal proletarianisation" with two socio-economic consequences: the uprootedness of Palestinians from traditional village life by the necessity of having to seek employment in Jewish urban centres, and the transformation of the Arab village into a stagnant non-productive unit (Zureik, 1976 56, 58).

So far, this process of proletarianisation is only in its beginning. As we shall see, it is lacking in the possibilities of trade-union organisation to enhance the peasant-turned-worker's bargaining position (vs. his Jewish co-workers, and Arab and Jewish employers), and limited in terms of upward occupational mobility. Furthermore, proletarianisation has been determined by the imponderables of external demands for temporary labour, accentuating the instability of the Palestinian peasant as a member of a farming community, while negating his self-conception as a worker (Israeli, 1976:232-239). One important result has been to provide Israeli industries with cheap labour-power in times of industrial expansion. This boosted the competitive potential of Israeli capitalism in the European and American markets, without threatening the employment opportunities of Jewish workers since Palestinians occupied low and unskilled positions deemed undesirable

by Jewish workers. This stable situation prevailed as long as expansionist trends in the Israeli economy, triggered by the 1967 War, continued. Simultaneously, Arab industries stagnated; they were unable to compete, or to pay wages equivalent to those paid by Jewish employers, low as they were. Their only chance of survival was in technological improvement and the introduction of labour-substituting machinery, but given their low capital stock and the prevailing insecurity, this chance was more than remote.

A New Stage in Israeli Colonialism ?

It has often been suggested in the literature of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the process of Jewish colonisation in Palestine, in its broad thrust and objectives, had a fixed character, namely that the Jewish impacts on Palestinian society can be reduced to the question of displacement of peasants from their land, and their transformation into a sub-proletariat. This process of displacement has been regarded as a central point differentiating Israeli colonialism from the colonialism of European countries of the old world, which have sought by various means to exploit the resources and populations of the subject territories rather than to destroy them. Thus Nathan Weinstock characterises Jewish settlement prior to the 1948 War in the following manner:

> Zionist colonisation, while unquestionable exerting a favorable effect on the standards of cultivation and health in the country, built a new society in which Hebrew capitalists exploited a Hebrew proletariat by implementing specific segregationist principles -- at the expense of the Palestinians. This aspect of Zionist ideology precluded it from fulfilling the historically progressive function of colonialism -- the generalisation of the capitalist mode of production. Nor were the victims of the Zionist enterprise able to lead a consequent struggle for self-determination, since the underlying principles of Jewish colonisation led to the distortion of the Palestinian social structure and the obstruction of the development of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and the working class (Weinstock, 1973:63).

The danger with this kind of analysis (though perhaps Weinstock himself may have managed to avoid it) is that it overrates Israeli exceptionalism. That is, it extends what may have been true of one epoch of Jewish settlement in Palestine to succeeding periods. The analysis, further, treats Palestinians as the constant objects of a process in which they were mere instruments of a cruel fate. When they react, they do so either in a heroic manner (resistance), or as helpless victims (refugees). There is very little that Palestinians seem to engage themselves in besides these two dramatic modes. Finally, the analysis ignores limits that are objectively inherent in the Zionist enterprise. These limits are related to the discrepancy between the early ideals of the (Labor) Zionist movement and its capacity to accommodate a radically transformed Jewish society which has increasingly come to resemble the social structure of advanced capitalist societies.

Thus, the unique "displacing" feature of Jewish colonisation in Palestine before the establishment of the state of Israel, which continued in good measure during the fifties and sixties (e.g., land confiscation and the prevention of already dispossessed refugees from returning to their land), has taken a dramatic turn three decades later. Today, the settlement policy of the Likud occurs in a radically different context, though the intentions may have remained the same. Following the 1967 War and physical incorporation of the remaining part of Palestine with half of its total population within the boundaries of the Israeli state, objective needs to expand the economy led to the abandonment of the ideology of Hebrew labour, both in theory and practice. In this process, both the Palesttinian "colonial" and the Israeli dominant class structures were transformed.

In the West Bank and Gaza the coming of Israeli rule was superimposed over a complex social structure which was shaped as much by the

heritage of the Jordanian (and Egyptian) administrations (1948-67) as it was by the influx of dispossessed peasants and urban refugees during the war. While the prevailing view of stagnation and regional discrimination under those regimes is basically correct, it nevertheless, disguises a substantial amount of differentiation and mobility that was taking place during the same period. The main factors which accounted for this mobility -- especially in the case of the West Bank -- were the state sector (the army, the civil service and the school system) and the high rate of out-migration, the latter contributing significantly to changes in rural class patterns as a result of stipends sent from abroad and investments in construction and machinery by returning migrants (Lutfiyya, 1966:105-106; Rabie et al., 1973:195-198).

Given the increased demand for a variety of trained personnel in the oil-producing Arab states, and the relative decline in land possession as a source of wealth, these two channels of occupational mobility (the state sector and the educational system) enhanced the position of the professional and -- to the less fortunate masses,of its caricature, the clerk. In contrast to the situation of Palestinians who remained in Israel, where a vigorous capitalist economy had turned the majority of the labour force into potential wage-workers, there was a widespread attitude of contempt towards manual labour in the West Bank and Gaza. This attitude was partly a consequence of the overall stagnation in the economy, characterised by the marginality of the manufacturing sector and the absence of any major trends towards rationalisation or capitalism in agriculture. But it was also a cultural expression of the mannerisms of the old Palestinian elite diffused to the wider public. Only the presence of masses of refugees in the main urban centres (60 percent of the total in Gaza, 20 percent in the West Bank) produced a significant shift in the class structure from the

one prevailing before 1948.

In contrast, Israeli society -- up to the sixties -- provided a model of rapid economic growth and modernisation based on the importation of European skilled immigrants, the mechanisation of agriculture, the development of industries generated with the help of foreign capital and the exclusion -- or near exclusion -- of the indigenous (Palestinian) population from this process. With the 1967 occupation -- or to be more precise, with the integration of the Arab labour force within Israel in the early sixties -- a new pattern of growth replaced the previous one. A new tendency now began to absorb Palestinian productive apparatus in a manner which seems functionally fixed for both the dominant and dominated society.

This process had the further consequence of stimulating upward occupational mobility for certain sections of the Jewish labour force (cf. Ben Porath, 1966:47-62) and the release of another substantial segment of the population for military mobilisation. The increased integration and fixity in the pattern of interaction between the two societies seem to have resisted both the recession of 1975 in the Israeli economy and the counter-demand for labour brought about by the construction and industrial book in neighbouring Jordan. This is confirmed in a study by the Bank of Israel:

> In 1975, 83 percent of the [occupied] areas' total trade (export and import) was with Israel, compared with 73 percent in 1972 and 66 percent in 1968, when this common market came into being. The uptrend was sustained alongside a notable expansion of exports via the Jordan bridges from both the West Bank and Gaza (citrus) to Jordan, other Arab countries, and recently Iran (Bregman, 1976:11).

This trend was further reinforced by a more stable pattern of employment. Thus 75 percent of the Palestinian labour force was reported as being employed for more than two years in Israel, and one-third for more than four years (Bregman:ibid.). Altogether, however, this period is too short for a reliable projection of future trends.

So far the functional integration of the two ethnic national societies suggests a picture that is not dissimilar to the relationship between a metropolitan economy and its colonial satellite. We have emphasised changes in the Palestinian economy (labour organisation and the commodity market) which are oriented towards dependency on and supplement to the needs of Israeli capital. Our observations of structural transformations internal to Palestinian society are restricted by the amount of empirical data available.[3] They are even more restricted due to the rapidly changing pattern of association with Israel, where political factors play a significant, if not decisive, role. However, it is possible to point out three factors which define and delimit the extent of potential structural change within the occupied territories. These are: (1) the limited capacity of the agrarian system to absorb labour; (2) the presence of a substantial unproductive (refugee) population in the urban centres; and (3) the absence of an infrastructure within the occupied territories which prevents the accommodation of the surplus labour generated by the traditional agricultural system and the refugee population. These elements combined explain the massive response by Palestinian workers to Israeli demand, coupled with the sudden restrictions on their movement to the Arab states.

The limited absorptive capacity of the land is related to the seasonal character of agriculture (especially the prevalence of olive crops), and to the fragmentation of land, to the point of inefficient plot size, as a result of the inheritance system. It is also related to ecolo-

gical conditions of the terrain which, apart from citriculture in the Gaza district and the Jordan Valley, and certain areas of grain farming in the northern districts, have not been conducive to mechanisation or capitalisation in agriculture. Similar constraints have been observed among the Arab population of Israel, especially in the Galilee (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:471; Cohen, 1965:34), but we should keep in mind also factors of divergence between the two Palestinian communities. Among those factors are: (1) the role of emigration as a source of income and class differentiation of West Bankers and, to a lesser extent, Gazans; (2) the possibility of seeking short-term employment, partnerships and commercial contacts in neighbouring Arab states -- not available to Israeli Arabs; and (3) divergence in the class composition due to the presence of a higher proportion of professionals and semi-professionals (as well as urban refugees) among West Banker/Gazans than among Israeli Arabs. Among the latter, the predominance of wage labour in general and of the working class in particular is more pronounced, both quantitatively and in organisational ability. In the final analysis, however, there are important contrasts in the internal social structure between the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to homogenising tendencies, resulting from the increased integration with the Israeli economy (see Chapter 3). The longer Israeli occupation continues, the stronger we should expect these tendencies towards homogenisation to become.

The crucial factors as far as the structural transformation of the occupied regions is concerned, therefore, are the continued dependency of one-half of all wage earners in the population on employment in Israel, bringing home with them a sizeable proportion of the region's income (about 30 percent of the GNP), and the inability of local enterprises to create alternative employment opportunities for them.

Nevertheless, in both the West Bank and Gaza a significant amount of wealth was accumulated during the early years of occupation from sub-contracting, labour contracting, trade with Jordan and other business activities.[4] Investment, however, has been most noticeable in nonproductive activities (see Table 4:1).

Table 4:1

Gross Investment in the West Bank & Gaza, 1968-75

(IL millions at 1974 prices)

	1968-69	1973	1974	1975
Public sector investments	75	116	123	159
Private sector investments	85	395	484	510
of which: construction	53	280	364	392
transport vehicles	32	115	130	121
Total gross investments (after changes in inventory)	173	455	733	568

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics/Bregman Table 11-5, p. 20 (partial). The Bank of Israel provides separate figures for Gaza and the West Bank, which are collapsed here. No change of inventory is given for Gaza between 1973 and 1975.

Thus construction has accounted for about 70 percent of all private investment throughout the period 1968-75; the purchase of commercial vehicles (for the transport of workers) adds up to a substantial share of the remaining investmenr. A negligible amount was invested in manufacturing. Furthermore, there are indications that hoarding is widespread, especially among peasants.[5] Not all the blame for this imbalance in the allocation of wealth can be attributed to the heritage of the regional discriminatory policies under Jordanian rule. A major cause is the immense competition the Palestinian investor would have to face from Israeli production and actual admi-

nistrative restrictions which prevent the entry of certain West Bank and Gaza products to Israel, especially in agriculture. The following excerpt (written before the return of al-Arish to Egypt) from an Israeli report is indicative:

> The dates grown in Deir el Balah in the Gaza Strip and in El Arish in Sinai...which support hundreds of families as basic income are perishable goods not suited for storage. At the height of the harvest of about 2000 tons a year, the growers receive a low price of 20 to 30 agorot a kilogram (retail dates average about 50 times that much in the Tel Aviv market). In contrast, there is a large population in Israel which loves the fruit but cannot buy it because of high price, a result of preventing selling Gaza and Sinai dates (Tzidkoni, 1975:41-42).

Tariff barriers, competition and political uncertainty thus contribute decisively to the curtailment of local investment activity. We should not underestimate, however, the inability of the Palestinian bourgeoisie in the West Bank to absorb a significant number of Arab workers in local enterprises. This failure is rooted in its historical character as a landlord-mercantile class which, when defeated as a dominant stratum in pre-1948 Palestine, turned to real estate speculation (in Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank) and to professional occupations and safe careers in public institutions for its sons. Among a small number of more enterprising individuals, members of a new established stratum of professionals and returning emigrants, we see a tendency to invest in light industries (pharmaceuticals, plastics and textiles). Furthermore, some of the traditional industries which flourished in the thirties and forties continue to operate under the patronage of their original founders (e.g., soap in Nablus, wood engraving in Bethlehem and glass in Hebron).

New employment opportunities became available in the occupied territories in a few exceptional situations after the 1973 October War, but it is unjustifiable to regard these opportunities as counter-trends because of the limited period in which they have appeared. After the 1975 recession, for example, there was an absolute decline in the number of workers from the two regions employed in Israel. In Gaza, seasonal agricultural workers (employed mostly in citrus picking and packing) were replaced by Israeli workers (and possibly by volunteer workers from Europe), and a portion of them managed to find employment at home (Bregman, 1976:32; also cf. Table IV-5, p. 45). Similarly, construction workers from the West Bank, made redundant in Israel, were partly absorbed by the increase in local construction, but mainly by the building boom in Trans-Jordan.

There have been some attempts by the military government,especially under the labour governments, to encourage Israeli investments in the occupied territories through credit incentives and the provision of other facilities to Israeli entrepreneurs.[6] Credit has also been made available to some Palestinian capitalists and subcontracting partnerships. One major industrial complex in Erez (near Gaza), exclusively funded by Israeli capital, has in fact been operating for a few years (Bregman, 1975:62-67; Samara, 1975:28-32). Another complex at Ma'aleh Adumim, near Jericho, was opened in 1977, but it seems to be designed for the employment of Jewish workers from settlements in the Judean hills.

In general, Jewish businessmen were reluctant to invest in the occupied territories, with the exception of joint (Arab-Jewish) subcontracting investments in textiles and building material which have shown considerable growth in the period following the October War. Subcontracting would seem to offer an alternative outlet for capitalist expansion in view of the shortcomings of local enterprises and since it has the open

encouragement of the military government. However, there are inherent limitations in this type of investment due to its heavy dependency on women's labour. Van Arkadie summed up the problem of joint investments:

> The subcontracting system is entirely based on the availability of cheap labour. The growth of the system will require an increasing mobilization of female labour, since the alternative employment opportunities make it unlikely that there will be a ready supply of low-wage male industrial labour. It can be argued that subcontracting-related employment provides jobs for the workers who are unlikely to find incomes elsewhere. It can also be argued, however, that it only survives as long as wages are low, and that, because it involves only labour-intensive steps in the industrial process originating and being completed in Israel, its contributions to the industrial development of the territories will be minimal (Van Arkadie, 1977:124-125).

Another main obstacle for industrial expansion is the under-developed state of the infrastructure of the economy, that is, a network of transportation and communication linking the various subdistricts of the occupied territories, a banking and monetary system to facilitate investment and capital accumulation, and a training programme for creating a skilled labour force -- in effect, and indigenous state apparatus whose rationale is the balanced growth of the economy. In this respect, the Israeli military government in the two regions seems to be interested in creating programmes which have catered so far (understandably) to the needs and deficiencies of Israeli industries. Thus vocational training centres have offered short-term courses with the aim of improving the performance of unskilled workers in specific jobs and services (Bull, 1975:123-124).

Stabilisation of the New Structure

To the extent that structural change did occur in the occupied territories, it was the result of the rupture in the basic links connecting the system with Jordan (and Egypt) and the subsequent reintegration of the system in the industrial network of Israeli society. The Palestinian labour force was incorporated into the lower sectors of the Israeli labour force such that both underemployment in agriculture and the disguised and nonproductive employment in the urban sectors were eliminated. This integration fluctuated in response to market forces in the Israeli economy itself -- but always within the context of political-demographic constraints -- as well as to "pull" factors from the Jordanian economy. By 1980, however, the distribution of workers over the various economic sectors, with minor exceptions (such as seasonal agricultural workers from Gaza), had acquired a stable character (see table 4:2).

The relative stability of the employment structure suggested by table 4:2 withstood both the increased demand for labour in Jordan after 1975, as well as a minor boom in private construction in the West Bank (evidenced in the 10 percent decline in building employment between 1972 and 1980; similar tendencies appear in the employment of Palestinians within the West and Gaza (Table 4:3) -- i.e., excluding those who commute for work in Israel. The latter aggregates illustrate the dominance of the nonproductive sectors (construction and services) in the total employment figures within the occupied territories.

Table 4:2

Distribution of Palestinian Workers (West Bank & Gaza)

Employed in Israel by Economic Branch

1972-1980 (percentages)

	From the West Bank				From the Gaza Strip			
	1972	1976	1978	1980	1972	1976	1978	198(
Agriculture	12.3	12.2	11.4	9.4	45.0	19.6	23.2	18.1
Industry	18.6	20.9	23.6	20.6	14.7	18.5	20.4	21.1
Construction	56.8	49.6	46.0	51.3	36.0	51.8	44.3	44.2
Others	12.3	14.3	19.0	18.7	4.3	10.1	12.1	16.6
Totals:	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel (1979) No. 30 C.B.S., Jerusalem - adapted from Table XXVII/22, p. 740. For 1980: Israel Ministry of Defense, A Fourteen Year Survey (Operations in Judea-Samaria, Gaza District, Sinai) 1967-1981, p. 43, (Jerusalem, April, 1982)

Table 4:3

Employment of Palestinians in the West Bank & Gaza

By Economic Branch (1968-1980)

(percent)

Year	Total	Agriculture	Industry	Con-struction	Public Services	Trade Transport Services
1968	100	35	14	10	14	27
1973	100	31	15	7	18	29
1975	100	32	14	7	18	29
1978	100	30	15	10	45.5	
1980	100	28.4	16.4	9.5	47.7	

Source: Arie Bregman, The Economy of the Administered Areas, 1974-1975 (Jerusalem, 1976), Table III-3, p. 26 and Statistical Abstract of Israel (1979:740). For 1980: Israel Ministry of Defense, 1982 (ibid.):42-43

Viewed separately employment figures for Palestinians working in Israel and the occupied territories exhibit minor trends over the last 15 years of Israeli occupation. But when the total employment aggregates are considered for the two regions new patterns begin to emerge. For the period 1968 to 1980 the most noticeable of these patterns is a decline in the figures for agricultural employment, from 35 percent to 28 percent of total employment, together with an increase in the proportion of construction workers, from 11 percent to 21 percent for the same period (Bregman, 1976:28; Israel Statistical Abstract, 1979:738-739; Israel Ministry of Defense, 1982:43). Another noticeable drop in figures for the category of trade and services suggests, possibly, a tendency towards the elimination of small peddlers and artisans.

If one attempts to establish any trends using the year 1968 as a starting point, the evidence is likely to be inconclusive, considering that this was a year of post-war adjustment; this quite apart from the general caution one should adopt when dealing with collected data in "enemy territory." Yet, if we accept these statistics as a basis for establishing medium-range projections, and provided that there are no dramatic changes in the political picture, then it seems inevitable that "the dominant tendency for the territories is to become a dormitory economy" for Israel (Van Arkadie, 1977:74).

This conclusion is further highlighted by certain geographic aspects of commuting to work in Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. Any Palestinian village or town is at most between one hour to ninety minutes in travelling time from the nearest Jewish workplace (without taking into account, of course, availability of transportation). This fact, together with the casual character of employment, ensures that the process of land alienation is not likely to take a drastic turn for the worse since peasant-

workers can always take time off in the harvest season to tend their farms.[7] A contributing factor in the opposite direction, although so far not a decisive one, is that the increase in food prices (and hence the profitability of selling crops) has been lower than the overall increase in the prices of general commodities, so that as the pattern of consumption of the rural population draws closer to that of urbanites, one would expect increased defections from the ranks of small farmers to employment in full-time wage labour. Negligence of small farms, already visible, and increased leasing to less capable peasants are inevitable consequences. An investigation of the effects of wage-labour attraction on different age categories, and on the sexual division of labour in the rural household would further illuminate this issue. In the Galilee, for example, greater involvement in wage labour was observed among the 18-34 age groups, while agricultural work inside the village was left to the 14-17 age categories, and to men over 55 (Israeli, 1976:139). Moreover, in the West Bank there is today a noticeable increase in the participation of women in tasks traditionally assigned to men (e.g., threshing and ploughing).

Consequences of Economic Integration

How stable and fixed is the edifice of economic integration that was imposed by Israel on the occupied territories? And, given a favourable political atmosphere, how reversible are these networks of dependency?

The thrust of Israeli policy towards the territories as discussed above -- to the extent that a conscious policy was formulated -- has centred around the gradual integration of the two regions into Israeli economic life through the creation of an employment market for Palestinian workers, the opening up of the territories as a major market for Israeli commodities, and the elimination of refugee camps through a process of resettlement and

"rehabilitation." This scheme is being implemented in the framework of granting administrative autonomy to the territories, without the extension of Israeli civic rights to the subject population and while keeping them under strict military control.

Despite the strong resistance of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the Israeli presence, this policy has been largely successful. Indeed, one might be deceived by appearances if one seeks to reject this success of annexationism in the failure of relations of "coexistence" between Arabs and Jews. Such indications abound and occasionally reveal surprising aspects about the character of Israeli control. On the tenth anniversary of the annexation of Jerusalem, for example, a symposium was held in the city in which relations between Arabs and Jews were reviewed:

> Jews and Arabs are divided all along the line, and even in mixed and border districts, neighborly relations have not come into existence. At work too, the tendency is to separate between Arabs and Jews. Contacts created at work despite this tendency do not continue because of different social frameworks.
>
> The number of Jewish-Arab partnerships was greater 7-8 years ago than now...there exists a feeling that Jewish-Arab relations in Jerusalem are temporary, that there is no knowing what tomorrow will bring. Even stories of "cooperation" in the underworld between Jews and Arabs have little basis. (Weingrad, 1977:66-67)

These sentiments, which can be felt and seen throughout the occupied territories (and probably with greater intensity among Arabs who have been living in Israel since 1948) tend to mystify rather than illuminate the issue at hand. To place the above illustration in context, perhaps it should be compared with the observations of Sa'id the Ill-Fated, the Galilean anti-hero of Emile Habibi's epic of the Palestinians. Sa'id, while recalling his difficulties in relating to the alien culture which

engulfed the Arabs of Haifa after 1948, discovers to his amazement that the artisans of Nablus in 1967 have learned Hebrew faster than the Israeli tourists can buy their wares! (Habibi, 1974:64).

Changes in the fabric of daily life associated with wage-labour employment away from one's habitat -- and related patterns of consumption and social interaction -- should not be confused with feelings of injustice, antagonism and exploitation that have permeated the particular Israeli imposition of those changes. To be sure, wage-labour proliferation, class and occupational mobility, and urbanisation could have occurred under more "just" conditions, that is,conditions not involving land confiscation from the peasantry and without the current degree of political repression. But the consequences may then be just as irreversible: the land can be restored to the people, so to speak, but the peasants cannot be restored to the land -- for we no longer have a peasant society.

One way of examining the question of reversibility is to evaluate the functional importance of the Arab labour force for Israel itself. It has been suggested by several economists that wage-labour remunerations of Arab workers have been more important to the occupied territories than the contributions of Arab labour to the Israeli economy. Van Arkadie, for instance, cited total Palestinian participation (for the West Bank and Gaza) as constituting only six percent of total employment in the Israeli labour force, and 12 percent of all manual workers (Van Arkadie, 1977:61). Official data, however, show a 270% increase in that proportion over a ten-year period from 2.1 percent in 1970 to 5.7 percent in 1979 (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 1980:24, Table 7). During the same period the proportion of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza working in Israel increased more than threefold, from 11.9 percent to 34.7 percent. In return, these workers earned an amount equivalent to one-

third the gross national product of the two occupied regions, annually, but have had no meaningful alternative source of employment, aside, of course, from emigration.

This argument cannot be reduced to a question of reciprocal benefits and liabilities, however, even if we assess the relationship in strictly economic terms. Remunerations from employment must be considered alongside the increased importance of the occupied territories as a main outlet for Israeli commodities. But, in addition, Arab labour in Israel must be viewed in the context of its critical function in key sectors of the economy where neither replacement by Jewish workers nor mechanisation (optimum allocation of resources have been reached) is possible. Examples of this rigidity in the structure of employment can be found in the building trades and the service sector. Furthermore, official data indicate a considerable increase in the weight of the Arab labour force in those sectors: in construction, from 12.3 percent to 29.7 percent of the total Israeli labour force, including Israeli Arabs, during the period 1970-1980; in agriculture, from 5.6 percent 29.7 percent. In those sectors it will be difficult to coerce Jewish workers to "recede back" into jobs from which they have "escaped" without incurring a high degree of strain within the labour unions and perhaps accentuating ethnic (Oriental-Ashkenazi) tensions (cf. Levavi, 1978:7).

A comparison of the position of migrant workers in Western Europe with that of Palestinian workers in Israel might yield useful theoretical insight to our analysis. The case of Israel, nevertheless, is especially problematic because of the colonial relationship it maintains with the subject population and because Palestinian workers are commuters rather than (temporary) residents.

The framework adopted by Castles and Kosack for five major European recipients of migrant workers is quite relevant here (Castles and Kosack, 1973:6-8). Their conclusions may be summarised in the following points: (1) There, as well as in Israel, immigrant labour has become structurally necessary for the economy of the host (capitalist) country; undesireable jobs deserted by indigenous labour are filled by "guest" workers who are increasingly becoming a subordinate section of the original working class. (2) Division of labour in production (between skilled and unskilled labour) is duplicated in the social sphere, where a split in the class consciousness of the indigenous workers occurs, blurring their solidarity with migrant workers. (3) The presence of migrant labour allows for actual (occupational) and subjective (status) mobility of the dominant section of the working class. A political consequence of this process is the negation of a dichotomous view of class conflict, to one that favours self-conception in terms of individual mobility.

The ethnic heterogeneity of Israeli Jewish society, reinforced by successive waves of migration from diverse cultural backgrounds, has always been a determinant factor in shaping the class structure of Israel. The weak development of class consciousness among Jews should thus be attributed primarily to this ethnic diversity, rather than to Arab-Jewish labour relationships (cf. Machover and Orr, 1972:91-93). In this respect, the hypothesis suggested above by Castles and Kosack concerning the "class blurring" impact of nationally diverse migrant workers should be modified in the Israeli case. Moreover, trade union consciousness (as opposed to class consciousness) is particularly strong, and purely economic demands made by Jewish workers seem to be extended to protect the interests of those Israeli Arab workers who are solidly organised and have stable employment. This situation obviously applies only to a section of the

Arab working class. In the mid-sixties only one-third of the Arab employees were members of the Histadrut (Preuss, 1965:234), and although that proportion has steadily increased since then, there are still substantial numbers of the Palestinian labour force working under non-contractual terms. In the occupied territories, of course, the percentage of organised labour is much lower, probably less than five percent.[8] Here the impact of Israeli occupation has been retrogressive; both the political repression of trade union organising attempts and the predominance of casual labour among Palestinian workers have eroded even the minute gains which workers' unions have achieved under the Jordanian administration.

But erosion of control over the conditions of work by Palestinians need not mean an automatic decline in their bargaining power. Wage differentials between Israeli and Arab workers are more likely to <u>decrease</u> due to efforts aimed at counteracting the depressive effects of cheap Arab labour on Jewish wage scales. Most probably such a protectionist wage policy, if pursued by the Histadrut, will come into conflict with the attempts of Israeli private capital, now given a freer hand by the Likud government, to make the most of the seemingly unlimited supply of unskilled Palestinian labour. Another, more encompassing, source of conflict within Israel will be the continued disenfranchisement of the Palestinians. So far, this issue has not been a bone of contention either by the Israelis or the Palestinians, since the latter do not see themselves as potential subjects of the Israeli state within which they have to fight for their democratic rights. But, as pressures arise for maintaining Jewish hegemony in the political sphere, against the increasing role of Palestinians in its economy, the Israeli state will have to acquire an infinitely more repressive character.

Conclusion: Political Consequences of Economic Dislocation

In Chapter 3 we discussed how the conditions of demographic dispersal of an agrarian society affected its contemporary class structure(s). In Chapter 4, above, we traced the specificity of that dislocation on the West Bank (and Gaza) under Israeli rule. In that discussion we took the position that unlike the situation among the Palestinian population in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza strip have maintained their traditional hierarchies and urban elites. This was primarily related to the fact that the lines of dislocation in Palestine were drawn by the fighting terrain in the 1948 was (in which, according to the partition plan of 1947 the two regions had been allocated to the Arab State). Israeli economic policies further accentuated these results: Israeli capitalism made no attempt to create a satellite capitalist class in the occupied territories, nor did it encourage Israeli businessmen to invest in the territories (except for minor subcontracting ventures). To restate the obvious, it was more interested in the land than in exploiting the people. This is the historic distinguishing mark of the Israeli form of colonialism from its European varieties, and it was only partly reversed by the incorporation of Arab labour into Jewish industries.

In the above analysis we distinguished two types of Palestinian declassment: (1) that which occurred as a result of population dispersal -- involving the adaptation of Palestinians to life in the Arab "host" countries, and (2) that which took the form of dislocation of Palestinian class structure within the boundaries of historic Palestine. In the first case we emphasized the emergence of a lumpen-proletariat, camp refugees who became a marginal and replaceable sector of the native working class. In Israel and in the occupied territories, on the other hand, Palestinian

workers today constitute a semi-proletariat of peasant-workers, a relatively integrated sector of the Israeli labour force that is located at the bottom of the occupational structure, and which is becoming increasingly more difficult, but not impossible, to replace.

Obviously a large number of the Palestinian people belong to neither of those two categories. The big landlords of the Jordan Valley, the career bureaucrats of the Jordanian regime, the traditional working class of Nablus, the professional emigre stratum in Kuwait, the shopkeepers of old Jerusalem, the teachers of Ramallah, and many others, would not be able to find themselves in these ossified categories. But the dichotomy remains crucial, in my view, for the understanding of Palestinian collective self-consciousness today, at the core of which exists what an Arab writer referred to as the "abstention from class politics" (Ja'far, 1978) and what I call declassed politics.

The contemporary Palestinian national movement was given full momentum not in Palestine, but in the post-1967 diasporic community, among the dispossessed segments of the camp refugees. Its articulators and ideologists, however, were not to be found among the refugees but in a Palestinian intelligentsia which was completely uprooted from its productive base. It sought its fighting cadres and party militants in the camps only when its effective integration in the civic polity of the host Arab regimes was thwarted by regional interests of these states, and when their pan-Arabist pretentions were frustrated by the Arab defeat of 1967.

Thus a second generation of Palestinians radically alienated and alien from the experience of factional politics in the 1930's reformulated the tenets of an intensely regional (as opposed to pan-Arab) Palestinian nationalist ideology. The new movement was developed outside its territorial base, and severed from a stable community. Its social base was a

lumpen-proletarian community with a marginal belonging to the "host" social formation. (A marginality, we might add, which is reinforced by a continued threat of physical expulsion from the country, as the recent events in Lebanon have demonstrated).

The quest by the Palestinian national movement for a state of its own through a territorial compromise with Zionism (after the 1974 National Congress in Cairo) involved much more than a concession over matters of basic principles ("liberation of the whole of Palestine", etc.). It heralded an ideological jump in PLO practice from messianic thinking to strategic thinking. This step has been interpreted by some observors as the sign of maturation of a Palestinian "protectionist" bourgeoisie, or perhaps of a potential state capitalist bourgeoisie within the PLO bureaucracy, seeking its own flag and army (e.g., see Agha, 1967:27ff; Ja'far, 1978:122). Such an argument seems to involve an understanding of class politics reflected through simple ideological reductionism (i.e., the state "equals" the presence of a bourgeoisie, therefore the quest for a state involves a bourgeois attempt to institutionalise the "revolution"). But how does this correspond to the reality of the situation? Although the Palestinian bourgeois strata in the West Bank, Gaza and (perhaps) Jordan would probably prefer to have a state of their own, there is no evidence that they are behind the quest for a Palestinian state, or even that they are likely to benefit from it. To the extent that individual capitalist, or even groups of capitalists (such as West Bank chambers of commerce, which include many small merchants) have put forth a coherent political position on this question, they seem to favour a decentralized relationship with Jordan as the "lesser of all evils" (cf. Abboushi, 1980:12). In most occasions, however, they provide a verbal support for the PLO. Within the PLO leadership itself the position for a state (as opposed to the rejectionist

current) clearly emerged from the ranks of the left (the Democratic Front and the communists) after the 1973 war, and was resisted by the centre and rightist tendencies.

The logic of events, however, compelled the PLO centrists under the leadership of Arafat to seek such a compromise solution. The October war had convinced them that the gap between Palestinian national slogans ("secular democratic state") and the actual capacities of the Palestinians can only be bridged by a radical reorientation of their objectives.[9] This realisation was brought home with vengeance by the war of 1973.

> The role of the Palestinian organisations during the October 1973 war was completely marginal. A confusing situation was created in which organisations whose sole and only reason for existence was the liberation of Palestine had achieved on this particular front less than normal bourgeois armies whose reasons for existence was defense of the interests of their respective ruling classes. (Ja'far, 1978:117)

The result was a rethinking of Palestinian strategy towards liberation and a reassessment of the limitations of PLO effectiveness in a situation where the organisational social base of the movement was atomised and declassed. This process of rethinking was shaped by two basic considerations. The first was the failure of the Palestinian resistance to fulfill its revolutionary objectives in Jordan (1970-1971) and in Lebanon (1975-1982) through a pattern of alignments with the left in the latter and a section of the army in the former. The resistance was limited in both cases by its social base to act either as a vanguard of the revolutionary movement -- a kind of a surrogate proletariat -- or as an integral part of the indigenous national movement, to which the PLO would be a subordinate contingent. In Lebanon the PLO was consumed, and often sidetracked unwillingly, by confessional sectarian politics. In Jordan it was crushed by the (under-

estimated) strength of the regime, which lacked neither clarity of objectives nor initiative -- as did the resistance.

The second consideration was a development internal to the occupied territories themselves. Here the militaristic strategy of "armed combat" isolated from a broad-based political movement proved its shortcomings in responding to the daily needs of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants. The PLO had become their saviour in an abstract process of liberation, but not their guide in concrete political struggle.

The transformation of the politics of declassment in PLO strategy towards seeking an organisational base in the occupied territories thus led to the formulation of a transitional program (based on the proposals for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza) and a new strategy of alliances with West Bank and Gaza political forces. But this new strategy was governed by the internal conditions of the occupied territories, whose political fabric and social structure was, and is, radically different from that prevailing in the Palestinian diasporic community. What were the elements in that political fabric?

The withdrawal of the Jordanian regime and its administrative apparatus from the West Bank had created a political vacuum. Municipal councils and professional associations which, before 1967, had simply mediated the rule of the Jordanian bureaucracy were now compelled to fulfill a political function of a much higher level -- that of representation -- acting as organs for the articulation of "the grievances of West Bankers" against Israeli military rule. In addition, they had to fulfill the quasi-governmental functions of coordinating the administration and services of a community in a state of civic rebellion (Nakhleh, 1979:9-24). The two functions were often conflicting, and led municipal councils into alternate positions of collaboration with, or resistance to, the military command

(Black, 1979:5). The degree of vacillation depended largely on the political forces represented in the councils, but also on the issues involved.

The Israelis on their part did not attempt to create a social stratum to mediate their own rule (labour contractors and war profiteers must be seen as new groups incidental to this scheme). Rather they saw the actual process of economic integration of the newly acquired areas as fulfilling such mediation. In several instances they encouraged pro-Jordanian sentiments and groups as an alternative to PLO influences. This was the case in Gaza with the implicit support for the leadership of the al-Shawwa family (Cohen, 1978:5). In the West Bank the Village Leagues were created, with the active support of the military government, to mobilize clan heads and traditional rural sources of authority as a counter-weight to the municipal councils (cf. Chapter 3). It was an attempt, so to speak, to strike the radical nationalist urban centres with the conservative countryside.

Initially, beginning around the mid-seventies, Israeli policy for the West Bank and Gaza was based on political preemption. Anticipating international pressure for withdrawal from the territories, the government formulated its scheme for "administrative self rule" (1977) -- which later became the basis of the autonomy proposal under the Camp David Agreement (1979). Municipal councils and the administrative apparatus of the civil government were to become the effective mediators of Israeli colonial rule, with the presence of the military government gradually thinned out (cf. Wall, 1979:3; Katz, Jerusalem Post, 26.1.1979).

It was at this conjuncture that the Palestinian national movement entered into the political arena for winning the allegiances of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The elections for the 1976 municipal

and village councils in the West Bank ushered the testing ground for the new strategy. The resulting overwhelming victory for pro-PLO forces, and the defeat of the scheme for "administrative self-rule" -- with minor exceptions -- was a vindication for those elements in the PLO who had called for a reorientation of strategy (Lesch, 1980:71-76). The formation of the National Guidance Committee in 1978 as a tight coalition of all pro-PLO forces in the West Bank marked the consolidation of the "internal" base of those elements in the Palestinian leadership who were promoting a territorial settlement with the state of Israel. Simultaneously, the Committee represented an attempt to prevent any vacillating pro-Jordanian or implicitly pro-Israeli forces (such as the Village League) from making political deals with Israel within the framework of the Camp David Agreement.

But political developments within Israel itself were simultaneously moving away from any territorial accommodation. By 1979 the Likud government was already calling for the establishment of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza (Nazzal, 1980:123). The Allon Plan, the Labour Party formulation for a territorial deal with Jordan was annulled, and the Sharon Plan, based on Jewish colonial settlements in the territories, became official policy (Benvenisti, 1981:12). The National Guidance Committee was declared illegal, its members were either arrested, confined to their towns of residence, or (in the case of two mayors) deported from the country. Assassination attempts at the three most radical mayors (of Nablus, Ramallah and al-Bireh) by extremist Jewish nationalists were virtually uninvestigated by the security forces. The culmination of this policy was the abandonment of the earlier attempts to establish a modus vivendi with local nationalist forces, who were previously seen as "moderate" by the Israeli government, and correspondingly the settlers' associations

and councils in the West Bank were gradually seen as the primary, rather than as the ultimate, power base for Israeli rule in the territories. Israeli legislation was extended to cover jurisdiction over the settlements' zones, and they were integrated into the army's "regional defense system" (Litani, 1981:14).

The "Green Line" separating Israel in its pre-1967 boundaries from the occupied territories is thus being blurred structurally (through economic integration), demographically (through a policy of population dispersal and settlement) and jurisdictionally (through extending Israeli sovereignty to settlers' councils). The weakening of any meaningful prospects for a political solution of the Palestine question brings into sharper focus the territorial-demographic dilemma of the Israeli state. The Arabs under Israeli rule constitute today 34 - 40 percent of the total resident population of the country, depending on the population estimate one chooses to believe (for a discussion cf. Rubinsten, 1981). In any case, the claim for Jewish sovereignty over the land can only be sustained by the continued disenfranchisement of the Palestinian inhabitants and the physical expropriation of the land they inhabit. It is perhaps a historic irony that precisely at the moment that the Palestinian leadership had made a radical move towards a political accommodation with the Jewish state, Israel began implementing a policy leading to its own dissolution <u>as</u> a Jewish state.

Notes

1. "Related decline" because olive oil and traditional soap manufacturing (in Nablus) are considered industrial commodities.

2. In this context "Palestinian" refers to workers from the occupied territories, "Israeli" refers to Jewish and Arab workers who are citizens of the State of Israel. See Appendix for Israeli pound and shekel exchange rates against the U.S. dollar.

3. Chapter 7 will deal with data relevant to the rural sector, which is subsumed in this sector in the total aggregates.

4. The Bank of Israel estimated the gross private savings for the year 1974 and 1975 in the West Bank to have been 543 and 446 million lirot respectively (in current prices), and in Gaza 264 and 277 million lirot. See Bregman, The Economy of the Administered Territories, Table II-4, p. 20.

5. One indicator of hoarding is the decline in the amount of deposits in banks (from 29 percent of GNP during Jordanian rule to 4 percent of GNP under Israeli rule), despite substantial increase in disposable income. Some of this wealth, however, was almost certainly deposited in Amman banks. Part of the increase in income was spent in consumer durables. It is questionable, moreover, whether we can consider the purchase of gold, for instance, by and for women as a form of hoarding.

6. The discussion here is centred around investment in the Arab sector and not around Jewish settlements inside the occupied territories. Substantial investment has been made in these colonies, but Arab employment in "colonial" industries has been negligible, although not in construction of these settlements.

7. So far, large-scale confiscation of land and water rights has affected most severely agricultural conditions in the Jordan Valley (see Chapter 10). But the massive land grabs begun under the Likud in 1980-1981 are likely to affect marginal farmers in the highlands as well.

8. A survey of the labour force conducted in the city of Ramallah in 1973 revealed that less than 10 percent of the workers paid dues to the union, or identified with it at all. See S. Tamari, "Notes on the Composition of the Labour Force in the West Bank" (in Arabic), al-Quds (Jerusalem), 4 December 1973. (See also Benvenisti, 1982: 6-7). It should be noted that Ramallah, together with Nablus and Bethlehem, are the centres of an active labour union organisation.

9. This process of political reorientation is discussed systematically by Sameer Abraham in "PLO at the Crossroads", MERIP Reports No. 80 (September, 1979):5-13. See also Awad (1981:12-13).

PART II

THE MECHANISMS OF AGRARIAN TRANSITION

In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I have tried to locate, isolate, and interpret the agrarian component within the general social structure analyzed above. This provides the prelude and the framework for the analysis of the village case studies in Part III of this thesis.

I commence the discussion with an analysis of share-tenancy in Palestinian agriculture. Share-tenancy is seen here as an 'internal mechanism for the productive disposition of the rural surplus population' (Chapter 5), as opposed to wage labour opportunities and migration, which act as 'external outlets for the release of demographic pressures on the land' (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the relationship between the peasant household and wage labour under conditions of marginalized farming, and the current tendencies towards peasant proletarianization.

The significance of share-tenancy in Palestine lies in that it provided a highly adaptive mechanism for the allocation of rural labour in a wide spectrum of agrarian relationships ranging from the semi-feudal cropping of big estates by landless labourers, to partnerships between co-cultivators with each party providing uneven inputs in terms of labour, land, and capital. In West Bank agriculture, this institution played two primary functions: a 'levelling' mechanism akin to that described by Geerz for Java (Geerz, 1973:98-103) by which smallholders augmented their income by cropping the plots of intermediate and rich peasants (as well as the land of migrant farmers); and second, it acted as the means by which refugee (landless) peasants were incorporated into the new agrarian economy, especially in the irrigated farming of the Jordan Valley. I

discussed here and rejected the class reductionist approach which views share-tenancy primarily as an agency for 'siphoning the agrarian surplus' on behalf of absentee landlordism, and suggested a more complex model which traces the evolution and persistence of the institution despite the penetration of capitalist relations in agriculture.

In Chapter 6 I discuss the colonial roots of peasant proletarianization, based as it was on the chronic indebtedness of the farmer and demographic pressures on the land (Warriner, 1948). Landlessness in Mandatory Palestine gave rise neither to agrarian capitalism, nor to substantial differentiation in the countryside. The key to this 'stagnation' lies in the preoccupations of the Arab landed classes - who invested their surplus primarily in merchant capital, and in the maintenance of a backward rentier status - and in the pattern of cyclical involvement of the surplus rural population in urban employment (Rosenfeld and Carmi, 1974). But peasant internal migration had the significant consequence of weakening and de-stabilizing traditional rural structures, and the network of authority they had established with the urban landed-merchant élites. This de-stabilization occurred at the economic level, through the supplementation of agricultural income with wage labour; and at the political level, through the creation of direct networks of involvement in the national labour markets which circumvented the local potentates.

Outmigration of peasants, on the other hand, had a more complex effect on rural households. Viewed internally, it seems to have had initially a differentiating function within village stratification, at least because of the substantial investment it involved on the part of the household. But as patterns of migration stabilized, they appear to have had the opposite effect: homogenizing currents within village strata reinforced by the remittances sent home. Again viewed from a comparative perspective

between villages, emigration generated a dichotomy between villages with high migration rates and those with low migration rates. Finally, I discuss the impact of migration pattern on the internal composition of the rural household as far as the sexual division of labour and the form of families (extended and nucleated) is concerned. The discussion is rounded with a preliminary hypothesis about the relationship between wage labour and migration patterns.

In Chapter 7, the nature of earlier trends in peasant proletarianization is examined in the context of the current Israeli incorporation of the Palestinian labour force. The significance of marginal farming is established in relationship to the peasant household under conditions of unstable work conditions, especially those prevailing in the construction sector - which currently involves a majority of peasant-workers. An explanation is provided, in conjunction with the material analyzed in Chapter 8, as to why the current movement of peasant labour does not constitute actual proletarianization.

Agriculture and Land Use in the West Bank

In the following section, I will outline the evolution of agricultural patterns in the central highlands as a prelude to the discussion of the mechanisms of agrarian transitions. Cropping arrangements and changes in land tenure forms are presented here in a schematic manner so as to confine the analysis to the main variables introduced above.

* * * * * * *

Cultivated areas of the West Bank are dominated by the rugged and dry farmlands that dominate the topography of the Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron mountains, and define the ascetic character of its peasantry. Together with the Galilean hills, those three regions, and not the fertile

coastal plains, historically contained the majority of Palestine's rural population and produced its main staple crops. For in those mountains, up to the middle of the 19th Century, Palestinian peasants sought refuge from foreign invaders and continuous bedouin encroachments and established a relatively autonomous existence from the heavy exactions of regional governors and local potentates.

But the historical dominance of the highlands should not be construed to mean a topographical or social homogeneity of these regions. One of the striking features of Palestinian topography, and one that was clearly visible to its many visitors in the 19th and early 20th Centuries, was the radical variation in its physical landscape not only between highlands and plains, but also within the highlands. This heterogeneous topography, combined with the extensive introduction of cash crops in the latter half of the 19th Century, had a marked impact on the organization of agricultural production.

The impact of topography, however, has given rise to monistic interpretations of the forms of organization of Palestinian peasants, and especially as they relate to the first modern transition in the mode of surplus appropriation. That is, the transition from a mode grounded in village communal lands (musha' organization) through the medium of the multazim (tax farmer), to one based on landlordship proper, operating through the mechanism of land rent and credit arrangements. Y. Firestone, in a recent study (1982), rejects the primacy of the 'security hypothesis' in explaining the prevalence of the musha' system in Palestine (i.e. the equal division of village plots in order to decrease the possibility of loss due to external threats), in favour of an explanation based on a collective village response to the heavy imposition of overlord and state taxes (1981:9-10). Firestone convincingly argues that topography explains the prevalence of the musha' system in the lowlands only, where the peasants

were exposed to 'exactions from all sides'. In the highlands, however, the presence or absence of land-equalizing schemes depended primarily on the political organisation of peasant clans. In areas where a tradition of powerful potentates existed and a rebellious peasantry resisted fiscal impositions by the state, land-equalization was either weak or absent. Musha' villages predominated, on the other hand, in areas with a factionalized peasantry, weak clans, and recently sedentarized farmers (Firestone, 1981:23ff.). Thus, instead of being seen as the residue of an archaic system (e.g. as in Granott, 1952), musha' organization is now viewed as a 'sophisticated set of adjustments evolved by peasant communities in response to the heavy exactions of fiscal feudalism' (Firestone, 1981:27).

With the destruction of the iltizam system, and the prolonged dissolution of musha' organisation in the village, cash crops and regional specialization began to play a more crucial role in Palestinian agriculture. Subsistence crops continued to co-exist with marketed crops, both in marginal lands and in areas of intensive agriculture throughout the period under review. A survey of agriculture in late Ottoman Palestine showed an amazing versatility of subsistence and export crops cultivated. It revealed the dominance of wheat and barley in the Maritime Plain and northern valley of the Jordan, olive orchards in the Nablus and Jerusalem mountains, vineyards in the Hebron mountains, citrus (for export) in the coastal plains, tobacco in the Galilean plains, and vegetables in the Lydda and Ramlah area and in the irrigated valleys in Jebal Nablus (Reilly, 1981:2-3, 5). It was this versatility in the production of cash crops that saved Palestine from substantial peripheralization in the European economy and allowed it to contribute significantly, despite its size, to the region's food supply and to the positive balance of Syrian trade (Scholch, 1982:55).

The loss of the Maritime and northern plains in 1948 deprived the Palestinians from the bulk of their fertile lands and pushed their dispossessed peasants into the arid highlands of the West Bank. Yet even in the confines of that segment of the country is contained all the ecological variations of historic Palestine, though obviously in vastly reduced proportions. This can be illustrated in the following agricultural inventory of the West Bank (based on Sh. Dajani, 1980:4-6) which divides the region into four distinct ecological zones, in descending order of land size:

(a) The highlands: cover about 50% (about 2.7 million dunums) of the total surface area of the West Bank, most of which is sparsely cultivated land. The nature of the terrain and the limited rainfall it receives (c. 300-600mm. per annum) makes this area ideal for arboculture. The main crops here are olives and grapes, and - to a lesser degree - fruit trees such as apples and almonds. A variety of subsistence crops are planted throughout this zone to supplement the farmers' cash income. Winter grains, especially wheat, are cropped in the small valleys and plains of the Nablus district.

(b) The Eastern Slopes: this arid and dry zone occupies about 1.3 million dunums (about one-fourth the total surface area of the West Bank) and receives very little rainfall (c. 250mm. per annum). Because of continual soil erosion and the poor quality of its soil, it can only be used as pastureland, and (potentially) for fodder crops. Limited forestation projects, started during Jordanian rule, have been halted after Israeli occupation.

(c) The Jordan Valley Basin: the ghor farmland, as this area is known, is potentially the richest agricultural area in the West Bank. It constitutes 0.84 million dunums (15% of the surface area) of which

200,000 dunums are cultivable under irrigation. The region is situated under sea level, making it a natural greenhouse suitable for tropical crops and winter vegetables. Extensive drilling of artesian wells since the 1950s led to the transformation of this area from marginal grazing land into the cultivation of cash crops for export. The main crops planted today are citrus, vegetables (about 60% of the total area for vegetable growing) and bananas.

Since 1967, the Military Government has fenced off and confiscated vast areas of the Valley for use by Israeli settlements, confining Arab farmers to one-fifth of the cultivable plots (about 40,000 dunums). Moreover, drilling of artesian wells has been restricted or banned completely. In 1978, 17 Israeli tube wells in the Valley pumped 14.1 million cc. of water, equivalent to 30% of the total West Bank water consumption (Dajani, 1980:6; see also 'The Evolution of Agrarian Relations in the Jordan Valley', in Chapter 10 below).

(d) The Northern Plains: this zone terminates the extension of the Marj Ibn Amer plains at the edges of the Samarian mountains and constitutes the most fertile and agriculturally productive plots in the West Bank. Although it is the smallest of the four zones in size (10% of the total area, or about 0.57 million dunums), it nevertheless contains about 45,000 dunums of irrigated land (artesian wells) and receives, by regional standards, a high amount of rainfall (between 400-600mm. per annum). The Jenin and Tulkarem plains, similar in climate to the Maritime plains of historic Palestine, have a double cropping cycle of vegetables and winter grains, and contain substantial areas of citrus cultivation.

Aside from the few irrigated plains in the north and the Jordan Valley,

altogether occupying 4% of the total cultivated areas, dry farming dominates the agriculture of the West Bank. As with all rain-fed agriculture in dry zones, crops are subject to significant variations in yield. This is especially true of the two most important crops in the West Bank (in terms of acreage tilled), cereals and olive trees, each occupying about 700,000 dunums,[1] out of total cultivated area of 2 million dunums (Kahan, 1983:20). In addition to the impact of precipitation patterns, the olive harvest is also subject to annual fluctuations and a relatively long period of maturation. That makes it an ideal crop for cultivation by peasant households in marginal agriculture since they can seasonally attend to the olive harvest while being involved in an external occupation (see Chapter 8).

Land Tenure

Land categories in the West Bank, as in transJordan, are still based on criteria established by the Ottoman Land Reform Acts, beginning with the Land Law of 1858. Ambiguities inherent in these legislations reflect the juxtaposition of legal categories of private property over a variety of land tenure forms accumulated from previous centuries. Those ranged from the communal form (musha' tenure, formally abolished by the Ottoman codes, but did not effectively disappear until the 1950s), to notions of private property (mulk) in the Western freehold sense of the term (cf. Doukhan, 1938).

One of the main problems in the definition of land categories concerned the so-called public domain, or miri. In effect, cultivated land which fell under the classification of miri increasingly came, by right of usurfact reinforced by successive new legislation, under the private domain. In 1922, the British Mandate government introduced the category of state land (aradi dawla) with the purpose of distinguishing

public land that was subject to state disposition from the much larger realm of *miri*. In the abstract sense, *miri* land continued to designate the patrimony of the community of (Islamic) believers, represented by the seat of the ruler.

The Land Settlement Act of 1932 (*taswiya*), by which plots were privately registered on the basis of accurate cadasteral surveys, represented a turning point in the consolidation of private property rights in Palestine. Its chief consequence, and probably its objective from the British view, was to facilitate the transfer of land transactions from Arab to Jewish control in coastal Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s.

The process of land registration was significant from another perspective. As the commoditization of landed properties proceeded, and disputes over transferred and inherited plots became a major pre-occupation of the courts, it became crucial that a proper system be established for the delineation of land boundaries. During Jordanian rule over the West Bank, land registration settlements were undertaken methodically, so that - by 1967 - about 40% of the total area was surveyed, and another 10% was in progress when the June War took place (cf. Map 9:1, in Chapter 9). One of the main land regulations introduced by Israel after the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, was Military Order 291 by which all Land Settlement surveys in progress were cancelled, including the ratification of title deeds in areas such as Bitunya, where the survey was already completed (Shehadeh, 1981:6). That left about one-fourth of the total land area in the West Bank (1,530,000 dunums) without registration, and therefore without title deeds whatsoever.

Utilizing the ambiguity inherent in the category of *miri* land, and the legal vacuum emanating from the non-registration of village lands, the successive Military Governments of the West Bank (the Civil Administration after 1981), re-interpreted the Land Code for the purpose of expropriating

vast areas of the territories and transferring them to Jewish settlement zones. By the end of 1979, the Ministry of Defense issued the following estimates of land ownership categories for the West Bank:

Table II:1

Land Ownership Categories in the West Bank

Category	Total Area (dunums)	% of Total
Private land	3,200,000	55
State land*	696,000	12
Absentee land**	430,000	7
Non-registered land	1,530,000	26

Source: Ha'aretz, November 1, 1979/Harris, 1980, Appendix.

(*) Includes 80,000 purchased by the Jewish Agency from Arab owners (1.4% of the total land area of the West Bank), but excludes the much larger area of land confiscated and/or fenced off.

(**) This figure refers to 30,000 dunums constituting Jewish land purchases in the West Bank before 1948.

The two problematic categories in Table II:1 are 'state lands' (12% of the total) and 'non-registered land' (26% of the total). The Military Government subsumed, under state land, categories such as mawat and matrukah lands, roughly equivalent to community or public land by traditional standards (Shehadeh, 1981:pt. 5). 'Non-registered land' is officially referred to under the curious title of 'lands with ownership unclear' (Harris, 1980:Appendix). Since these lands include large tracts of cultivated plots, for which holders have tax payment receipts (but not tapu title deeds), acts of requisitioning them in favour of Jewish settlements brought Palestinian farmers into a series of legal battles before military courts. With very few exceptions (such as the Alon Moreh case), these litigations were lost by the villagers. By 1982, an

area ranging between 27% to 64% of the total land area of the West Bank - depending on the criteria and sources used - was expropriated by the Israelis (Sahliyeh, 1982:64; Benvenisti, 1982:24).

Despite large-scale confiscation of land by the Israelis, actual agricultural production has not declined. In the case of certain major crops, like olives, there has been a steady decline in output which can be seen despite the cyclical movements of the harvest (28,000 tons in 1967/68 to 8,900 in 1976/77 - Muslih, 1980:21). In most export crops, however, like citrus, vegetables and grapes, significant output gains have been made (Muslih, ibid.). Moreover, total area under cultivation has been maintained, recording relatively minor losses (Kahan, 1983:21-22; Muslih, 1980:17-18). The reason for this unanticipated continuity in levels of agricultural production lies in two main reasons: (1) Israeli settlements in the occupied territories have, in the main, been residential and not agricultural communities. The pattern of land confiscation, consequently, concentrated on areas which were seen either as strategically important, or suitable for commuting residential communities. In addition, agricultural areas with established title deeds were usually not included in order to avoid court litigation (Benvenisti, 1982:43-54; see also, Map p. ix). The main exceptions to this pattern were the major appropriation of agricultural land in the Jordan Valley and the Gush Etzion area during the early years of Labour Party rule. (2) Significant capitalization of agricultural inputs, especially the use of tractors, chemical fertilizers, and hot-houses in the northern districts and the Jordan Valley, more than offset the decline in the marginalized crops of the highlands.

Similarly an examination of changes in the distribution of holdings size reveals a certain continuity between the pre-1967 period and after Israeli occupation (Table II:2).

Table II:2

Distribution of Farm Size in the West Bank, 1953-1969

Area (dunums)	1953	1968/69
Up to 50	68.2%	71.5%
50-100	15.8	17.2
100+	16.0	11.3
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Kahan (1983:12, Table 3).

The slight increase of small and intermediate holdings observed between 1953 to 1968/69 (Table II:2) can be attributed to the incidence of partible inheritance countervailed by the tendency of smallholders to crop inherited fragments jointly after the death of the patriarch (see Chapter 7 below). While the 5% increase in large-sized farms noted here are probably the result of the acquisition and consolidation of irrigated farmland in the Jordan Valley after 1961 (Chapter 10).

Still, the above table signifies a certain amount of differentiation in land holdings which exaggerates the magnitude of disparities among West Bank farmers today. The first agricultural survey carried out in the region after Israeli occupation (1969-1970), listed the number of farm households as 58,000. Of those, the vast majority (84.6% of the total, or 49,500 farms) consisted of plots more than 5 dunums in size, that is, non-marginal plots (CBS, MSOAT, 1971:Appendix XIV). Although the statistics do not distinguish between landlords, sharetenants and cash tenants in the farm surveys,[2] it is known that cultivation by owner-; occupiers constitute more than 91.5% of the total cultivated area (Kahan, 1983:14; Lipshitz, 1976:37). These smallholders are concentrated, as might be expected, in the central highlands and decrease in number in the irrigated plains of the north and in the Jordan Valley (e.g. 98.5% of the

cultivated area of Bethlehem district is tilled by owner-cultivators, as opposed to 79.3% in the Jenin district - Kahan, ibid.). The highest incidence of both sharetenancy and large (absentee) landholdings occurs in the southern and northern Ghors.

To conclude this brief introduction, we can establish that the first 15 years of Israeli rule over the West Bank produced little change in land tenure relations, but had a considerable impact on other variables in the agricultural sector. This impact can be summarized in the following trends: a drastic decline in the volume of the labour force involved in agriculture, and shifts to other sectors of the economy, most notably in Israeli construction; decline in the production of traditional crops, most notably olives, in favour of other cash and export crops in response to closer integration with Israeli market demands, and the contraction of the transJordanian and Arab markets; a substantial increase of neglected farmland in the highlands associated with the higher remuneration from wage-labour outside the village; and finally, widespread introduction of new agricultural techniques in irrigated farming, and capitalization of agricultural inputs.

Footnotes

1. Estimates for cultivated areas vary considerably. Van Arkadie (1977: 129) cites 610,000 dunums for cereals, and 580,000 for olives (for the year 1973); Artzi (Department of Agriculture, 1980:9-11) suggests 437,000 dunums for cereals and 875,000 for orchards (1978 - no breakdown for olives is given); Dajani (Department of Agriculture, 1980:2) gives 700,000 dunums for cereals and 700,000 for olives; Bull (1975: 67) gives 600,000 dunums for olives, and no figures for cereals.

2. Farm surveys carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics merely ask the respondents about "the area at their disposal and its utilization, orchards by number of trees and year of planting, the use of labour force, selected employment inputs and various demographic data" (CBS-MSOAT, 1971:XVI).

Chapter Five

The Persistence of Sharetenancy in the Palestinian Agrarian Economy

> When I first saw the share-rent levied -- the fat smiling Lebanese landowner collecting his half of the heap of grain from the kneeling cultivator -- I remembered that it was this very thing that the peasants of the Balkans had fought to abolish for over a century, from 1803 to 1918... it seemed high time that this system should be abolished in the Middle East.
>
> Doreen Warriner
> Economics of Peasant Farming (1964) xxxii

> The system of cultivation by metayers... contributes, more than anything else, to diffuse happiness among the lower classes to raise land to a high state of culture, and accumulate a great quantity of wealth upon it...Under this system, the peasant has an interest in the property, as if it were his own...
>
> The accumulation of immense capital upon the soil, the invention of many judicious rotations, and industrious processes... the collection of a numerous population upon a space very limited and naturally barren, shows plainly enough that this mode of cultivation is as profitable to the land itself as to the peasant.
>
> J.C.L. Sismonde de Sismondi
> Political Economy (1814)

Sharecropping, the mode of agricultural tenancy by which the tiller is remunerated for his labour by a share of the yield, has been one of the most enigmatic features of agrarian studies. It has been variably characterized by its observers as semi-feudal (Bhaduri, 1973), feudal ('Ashour, 1948), peasant serfdom (Warriner, 1964), pre-capitalist (Wolf, 1966), and partnership in cultivation (Firestone, 1975b). This chapter aims at explaining the persistence of sharecropping arrangements in Palestinian agriculture over the last half century, through a number of agrarian regimes.

In order to place this discussion in its proper theoretical context, we will attempt to relate it to structural issues raised in the recent debate on the nature of sharetenancy in Asian agriculture. In particular,

we will examine its relevance to three such problems: the nature of the relationship between the cropper and the landlord; obstacles posed by sharecropping arrangements to agricultural development; and the place of the sharecropper as a social category within peasant classes.

Sharetenancy and 'semi-feudalism'

The controversy around the nature of sharecropping contracts was revived in the recent literature interpreting data collected from village studies in India. In his well-known study of 26 villages in West Bengal during the early seventies, Bhaduri used the term 'semi-feudalism' to designate the condition of the Bengali kishan (landless sharecroppers), who constitute today between 40-50% of the peasantry in the region (Bhaduri, 1973). According to the author, sharetenancy arrangements between the kishan and his Bengali landlord reduce the former to conditions of semi-serfdom. This subjugation is achieved through a combination of perpetual indebtedness of the kishan to the landlord, who supplies him with consumption loans at usurious rates, and through the kishan's inaccessibility to the capital market. Although the kishan is "free to move," his mobility is hampered by the lack of any credit-worthiness among other landlords with whom no filial relations exist (Bhaduri, 1973:122-123).

This model of semi-feudal sharetenancy rests on the operation of two modes of exploitation simultaneously: one based on the landlord's property rights to the land, and another on his monopoly of lending privileges to the kishan (ibid.:135). Through the former mode, the landlord secures the sharecropper's continued landlessness or near landlessness, while through the latter, he maintains the kishan's relative immobility on the land.

More recent empirical studies, however, raised serious questions as to the applicability of Bhaduri's model to sharecropping arrangements in general, or even to the contemporary conditions in northern India itself. One of the assumptions on which the above analysis rests is the double role played by the landlord as a supplier of both land and credit. Mabro and Griffin (1979) -- and to a certain extent Bhaduri himself -- point out that this is a feature of agrarian relations peculiar to West Bengal, but not to most Asian agriculture. Furthermore, due to state intervention and land reform in the last two decades, the credit market has become much more varied and accessible to the peasant (Mabro and Griffin, 1979:90).

The same issue was investigated in a survey covering 334 villages in northern and eastern India (including West Bengal) where the authors find no evidence of usury, or even money lending, being the main source of income for landlords (Bardhan and Rudra, 1980:291). The authors reject also the equation of sharetenancy with 'semi-feudalism,' in both its European and Japanese varieties, on the basis of two crucial variables: one is the ability, in their contention, of the sharetenant to freely change his landlord from one agricultural season to another (the rate of 'lease-bondage,' so to speak, did not exceed 8% of the cases in the most extreme example -- that prevailing in Uttar Prandash -- ibid.:290). The second condition of semi-feudalism rejected was the amount of "unpaid and obligatory services (provided) by the tenant to the landlord." Bardhan and Rudra found that in the majority of cases examined the tenants provided no labour services to their landlords whatsoever, while in those cases where such services were rendered, only a portion (between 2% in Orissa and 23% in the state of Uttar Pradash) of unpaid or underpaid services to the landlord existed (ibid.:291).

While these two writers seem to have uncovered a major flaw in Bhaduri's semi-feudalism thesis, their treatment of the sharecropper's market dependence is far from satisfactory. Bardhan and Rudra simply dispose of the issue by pointing to the evidence showing that only a minority of the tenants in their survey (less than 5%) sell their produce to the landlord. But, as we hope to show in the analysis below, there is much more to market dependence than the landlor's control of the peasant surplus. It is impossible, as Keith Griffin has pointed out (Griffin, 1979) to see market relations of sharecropping in isolation from the general agrarian system under analysis. Thus, when a landlord leases his land on a sharecropping basis, with credit advances, etc., "wages, rental and interest rates, and even the price paid to the tenant for his marketed surplus, cannot be understood unless the entire relationship between the transactions is taken into account." (ibid.:xiv-xv).

Sharetenancy and agricultural development

A more serious but related problem of sharecropping arrangements is their perceived role in blocking agricultural growth -- in particular, their function in discouraging landlords from introducing new technology in agriculture. This is how Bhaduri expresses the problem:

> ...technological improvements, which raise the productivity level of the kishan, become undesirable to the landowner to the extent that they increase the kishan's available balance of paddy in relation to his consumption level so as to reduce his requirements for consumption loans. For it weakens the system of semi-feudalism, where economic and political power of the landowner is largely based on his being able to keep the kishan constantly indebted to him (Bhaduri:135).

Furthermore, the landlord:

> ...will be discouraged from introducing any technological improvement so long as his gain in income from increased productivity brought about by technological change falls short of his loss in income from usury due to a reduction (or complete elimination) in the level of consumption-loan required by the kishan (ibid.).

In Bhaduri's conception, the landlord who enters into sharecropping arrangements is predisposed against both short and long-term improvement of the land. The former because it reduces his income (expressed in terms of a lower rent share), while maintaining the peasant's indebtedness to him; the latter because it creates the conditions for the sharecropper's emancipation from dependence on the landlord -- even though it may be economically advantageous to the landlord. Thus, the sharecropping system fulfills a circular reinforcement of the conditions of agricultural backwardness. In a similar fashion, Ashour's survey of muraba'a (meteyage) contracts in Syria, Palestine and Lebanon sees sharetenancy not only as the cornerstone of 'feudal relations in land' ('Ashour, 1948a:47-48; c. 61-64), but also as a chief impediment to the rationalization and mechanization of agriculture (ibid.b:59) and even, surprisingly, to the production of cash crops (ibid.b:60).

Yet as in the question of 'feudalism', those positions have been seriously challenged in recent examination of the evidence. In the two cases of West Bengal and Syria/Palestine, discussed above, we are fortunate to have studies which re-examined the data for the same period (1970s for northern India; 1940s for Palestine). In the case of Palestine, the work of Firestone (1975), which we will discuss later in greater detail, shows that cropsharing arrangements achieved an increased integration of the agrarian economy into market relations and a general expansion of cultivated land which would otherwise have remained idle. Similarly, in the case of northern India, Bardhan and Rudra (1980) found that

there is no fixed pattern for cropsharing arrangements over time, or within the same region, a point confirmed by Ashour for Syria and Palestine (Ashour, 1948a:37-44). They also found a positive association between the landlord's share of the crop and his participation in production costs (Bardhan and Rudra, 1980:289), and conversely, between the introduction of high-yielding varieties of grains and increased tenants' share (ibid.). Both correlations indicate a significant flexibility for the development of agricultural technology within the sharecropping framework.

In the final analysis, however, the issue amounts to how much attribution must be made to the sharecropping component within traditional agrarian institutions as the decisive factor in agricultural backwardness. Perhaps the most far-reaching critique of Bhaduri's position in this regard has been made by Griffin (1979) who reviewed the impact of the Green Revolution in Indian agriculture on the relationship between landlord and tenant. The exceptional technological backwardness of the situation in West Bengal is seen by Griffin as due not to the landlord's fear of investment in his land which might incur his loss of political and economic control (as Bhaduri implies), but because of the landlord's own surplus and the physical dispersal of tenants (Griffin, 1979:91-92). On the other hand, under altered conditions, when a larger pool of tenants is available, and higher initial capital is invested, we find that "... large farmers have ejected their tenants and begun farming with wage labour. In other cases, the landowners have retained the sharecropping system and have simply reduced the share received by the tenant." (ibid.:93).

In short, it is argued that the introduction of agricultural technology has not been hampered in most of Asia by sharecropping arrangements; on the contrary, sharetenancy is seen as having strengthened the political and economic hand of landlords in relation to their tenants as

a class. Especially with the advent of the Green Revolution, share-tenancy is being absorbed into capitalist relations in agriculture, and sharecroppers transformed into wage workers (cf. Bardhan and Rudra:189).

Sharecroppers as a category within the peasantry

It is a popular theme in the literature, but one not usually backed by evidence, to treat sharecroppers as the lowest section of the peasantry, exchangeable with the rural proletariat. Perhaps one source of this assumption is the (mistaken) notion that sharecroppers in general offer only their labour power, while the landlord provides the land and all other factors of production. But this is the case only in one extreme form of cropping arrangements -- for example the 'pure' harrath in the muraba'a system which prevailed in the Levant at the turn of the century (see Grannot, 1952:301). Yet even here the harrath (the ploughman-tiller) usually, though not in all cases, provided his own plough and work animals, the access to which was not within the reach of most landless peasants, who had to sell their own and their family's labour on a daily basis.

The view of the sharecropper as the 'bottom of the heap' is rejected in a recent work by Bell and Zusman (also on India) who, in discussing land leasing arrangements, note that "household operational holdings that are partly owned and partly leased greatly outnumber those which are wholly leased in, ...and the former (accounting) for the lion's share of all land leased in." (Bell and Zusman, 1976:579). They further note that share-cropping tenants are mainly drawn "not from the mass of landless labourers, but from the ranks of the small peasantry possessing land of their own as well as skills and capital (or access to capital), all of which are traded (if, indeed, they are tradable at all) in imperfect market." (ibid., emphasis added).

Clifford Geertz goes further in his study of Indonesian agriculture under Dutch colonial rule and treats sharecropping as a levelling mechanism (for both work and wealth) among the Javanese peasantry (Geertz, 1963). Although later criticized for not taking sufficient account of internal differentiation among cultivators (Stoler, 1977), and for what may be termed 'ecological functionalism' (see Kanō, 1980:11-13; also ibid.:14-21 for an alternative interpretation) Geertz nevertheless seems to have illuminated an aspect of sharecropping that until then was ignored in the economic literature on the subject; namely the manner by which peasant traditional tenures devise methods of reducing the impact of peasant differentiation resulting from the uneven sizes of the holdings. "In share tenancy," he wrote then, "...the ever-driven wet rice village found the means by which to divide its growing economic pie into a greater number of traditionally fixed pieces and so to hold an enormous population on the land at a comparatively very homogeneous, if grim, level of living." (Geertz, 1963:100).

Geertz pointed out that the different statuses of "share tenant," "wage worker," and "landholding peasant," often portray different facets of labour allocation within the same peasant stratum. Moreover, the term "landlord" and "share-tenant" may be misleading, at least in the Javanese context, since the sharecropper might often by the stronger party (ibid.: 99 and note 24).

Similar patterns of overlapping categories can be observed historically in Palestine. There also the little differentiation that existed between cropper and hired worker during the mandate period has been attributed to seasonal factors (such as the fluctuations of crop yield in dry farming), and to the relations of patronage which the peasant may have enjoyed. The fact that the rural worker received a fixed wage (whether

in cash or in kind) and the tenant a share in the crop, was not significant (except in years of plenty) since, according to Firestone, "(the tenant's) actual take was geared to his subsistence and a fluctuating debt accommodated the difference between that and his contractual share year after year." (1975a:10, emphasis added) Furthermore, the sharecropper enjoyed a higher measure of security in tenure which reflected itself in the landlord's delegation of higher status tasks to him, such as ploughing (ibid.:11). In practice, however, such expressions of filial bonds meant very little in terms of differential monetary rewards.

Thus, a consequence of these perspectives (if we allow for some simplification) is that Granott saw a hierarchy of peasant strata in which tenants and sharecroppers constitute the middle segment (with hired tillers at the bottom); Carmi and Rosenfeld (1974), in contrast, portray a fluid 'bottom' composed of smallholders, tenants, sharecroppers, and even wage workers continuously exchanging positions. Both perspectives, nevertheless, seem to collapse all gradations of sharecroppers within the generic category of 'tenant' and view it (at any point in time during the period considered) as secondary to the greater distinction between smallholder and landless peasant. Given the problematic nature of the notion of smallholder in Palestine at the period (since a substantial segment of the peasantry did not have title deeds to their land), and given the fact that, as we shall see, many peasant proprietors were also tenants and sharecroppers, such a view draws the 'class' lines at the wrong edge. Basically, in our view, it underestimates crucial functional differentiation within the tenant peasantry - some of whom occupied positions superior to the peasant smallholder, and some were simple croppers.

Reviewing the evidence for a number of cases in Asian sharetenancy (Cheung, 1969; Bell and Zusman, 1976; Bardhan and Rudra, 1980), one finds a disproportionate number of landless peasants among sharecroppers and also a substantial proportion of smallholders and even middle peasants who chose to supplement their income by leasing-in additional plots. What is common to all those categories is access to a minimal amount of capital stock (work animals, seeds, and ability to hire extra labour in peak periods) and - in most cases - a certain degree of patrimonial bonds to local landlords. And it is these bonds, rather than nominal title deeds, which restrict access to profitable utilization of land to only a portion of the peasantry in Asia and Latin America today, as demographic pressures and poverty pushes masses of their kin and neighbors to search for employment outside the village economy. (C. Keyder makes the important observation, in the context of modern Turkey, that only those sharecroppers who were embedded in semi-feudal relations become permanently proletarianized in agriculture; that is, within the village economy; Keyder, 1980:26).

We arrive to two tentative conclusions from the above. One, that sharecroppers as a group cannot be considered a stratum within the peasantry, but one that cuts across several peasant fractions, depending on the cropping arrangement that they enter with the landlord.[1] Second, that sharetenancy as an institution is more properly understood as a highly adaptive mechanism of allocating rural labour in a variety of transitional agrarian forms, rather than as an agency of siphoning the surplus of landless peasants by landlords in traditional agriculture. That aspect of sharetenancy may be true, but it is a truth that is rendered superfluous by its application to tenancy in general, and - in effect - characterizes relations of expropriation between landlords and peasants historically.

While Geertz may have misjudged the egalitarian character of the institution - "the ancient weapon of the poor," and even exaggerated the degree of exchangeability in the positions of share-tenant and landholder, he nevertheless has properly guided us to seek the manner in which share-tenancy is embedded in the network of agrarian institutions through the particular historical linkages that wed the peasant to his village economy and beyond. What is needed then is a periodization and taxonomy of the various forms of sharecropping arrangements that prevailed in a particular region. With this in mind, we will now examine how and why the system continued to persist in Palestine as the agrarian regime moved from bid landlordism to medium and small peasant holdings; from subsistence agriculture to capitalist relations.

The Forms of Sharetenancy in Palestinian Agriculture

The generic name for share-cropping among Palestinian peasants is muzara'a (co-cultivation), or muhasasa (from hissa - "share"), or sharakah (partnership), and is generally distinguished from daman[2] (cash tenancy). The sharecropper himself is known as qatruz or harrath er-rub' (ploughman of the fourth) in simple cropping, referring to the share of the yield that goes to the cultivator; or shareek (partner), and muzari' (co-cultivator) in the case of joint farming. (The term muhasis used by agronomists and social scientists is never used, to my knowledge, by the peasants themselves).

The status of the cropper varies from the humblest qatruz, basically a rural proletarian, who used to crop during the harvest for one-sixteenth of the yield (against 3/4 to the farmer-landowner, and 3/16 for the work of his family), to the full partnership exemplified in sharikat mugharasa (joint farming compact) in which a contract is drawn transferring

part of the land to the cropper who rejuvenates it.

From the cultivator's point of view, there are three important determinants of the form of sharetenancy: (1) the nature of the crop, most particularly whether his work involves the cropping of trees, vegetables, or cereals; (2) whether the land is dry-farmed (ba'liyya) or irrigated (marwiyya)--as it involves different contractual arrangements; and (3) the degree of investment in the stock and labour provided by each party: landlord, cropper, and (today) the commission agent. The classic pattern of simple cropping, as distinguished from joint farming, until WWII, was the muraba'a system, in which the cropper was also the landless, or near landless, ploughman. Each village would have a number of specialized ploughmen whose land was hardly sufficient for their family's subsistence. Against the provision of land and the seed stock, the ploughman would provide the ploughing (usually using his own utensils and ploughing animals) and the work of his family and a hired tiller (bahhash)--the latter probably recruited from the absolutely destitute among the village population. The harrath's duties included three ploughings (before the winter rains, turning the weeds over, and immediately before sowing - known respectively as krab, thnayeh, and tathleeth).

In addition, the harrath was also expected to plough the landlord's orchards (for which he did not receive any share of the crop -- Aranki, 1980), and the provision of his family's labour during the harvest season. His share for all this amounted to 1/4 the yield allotted at the threshing floor after deductions for tithe, etc., were made. Today, this practice has all but disappeared and ploughmen are paid in cash for the provision of their animals and labour. Croppers are hired directly and separately by the farmer.

Of the many forms of sharecropping contracts that prevailed in Palestine during the Mandatory period and subsequent Jordanian rule, two broad arrangements continue to operate today: (1) crop-leasing against a share of the yield; and (2) joint-farming partnerships. The first compact is known as daman mahsul (leasing the crop) and is referred to by most peasants as 'ala hissa ("on a share basis"), in the case of olives, and 'ala qism ("on a part basis") for most fruits and vegetables (rarely in grains).

In both cases, the sharetenant actually leases crops, but not the land, during harvest time, and only after the fruits are ripe. In the case if vineyards and fruit trees, the leasee estimates the potential yield after the blossoming of the fruits and negotiates a cash deal with the peasant owner. The leasee (tenant) is bound by the terms of the contract and is responsible for all losses due to bad harvests and high yield estimates that he may have mistakingly made. In some areas, as in the Hebron mountains, the sharecropper is usually a rural-based merchant who hires his own croppers (or occasionally uses his family labour) and pays the peasant owners in advance (Jaradat, 1980).

In olive 'ala hissa compacts, the sharetenant and his hired cropper (in case they are not members of his household) pick and press the harvest into oil after the orchard has been ploughed by the owner, the latter getting 50% of the net yield. Olive-cropping is unique in that it is the only crop where the share is still paid in kind, in terms of a portion of the fruit pressed into oil -- although cash transactions are not rare. (This practice is probably due to the nature of olive oil which has an enduring consistency, thus constituting an excellent safeguard against high inflation of currency).

The second compact, known as sharikat muzar'a (joint-farming partnership), usually consists of a shared investment by the landlord and tenant farmer in which the former acts, mainly, as a passive partner. The landlord receives half the net marketed yield against the provision of land and half of all inputs. In the case of irrigated farming, water is pumped from artesian wells at the expense of the landlord. Additional labour costs (for harvest, weeding, etc.) are usually born by the tenant. This is the system of sharetenancy predominant in the Jordan Valley today, especially in vegetable cultivation. Similar patterns prevail in the irrigated plains of Jenin and Tulkarem although (as we shall see below) demographic pressures and patronage alter the share division.

Since the mid-sixties, the export market in vegetable and citrus has generated an increased involvement of landlords and urban financiers (commission-agents) in the introduction of capital-intensive agricultural technology (chemicals, plastic sheaths, etc., -- and since the mid-seventies - drip irrigation; Dajani, 1979:15-16; Sharab, 1975). Unlike the mechanization of agricultural production in cereal cultivation, such intensification brought about labour shortages rather than labour displacement. Extensive areas in the Jordan Valley, as a result, were brought under cultivation by sharetenants, especially during the period preceding Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

The trend seems to have accentuated the differentiation between tenants who had access to some capital, thereby enhancing their partnership status with the landlords in the tenancy compact, and those with no access to such capital. So far there is little empirical data in support of this interpretation for Palestinian agriculture (cf. Tamari, 1980:47-48).

Of the sharecropping compacts that prevailed in Palestine over the last century, only a few survive today. Those tend to retain the form of earlier compacts but, in substance, operate in the context of a transformed agrarian economy. It is necessary therefore, to examine the history of these transactions as their function changed within each set of agrarian relations in which they were embedded.

Three functions of share-cropping arrangements in Palestine

There seems to be a consensus that during the first half of this century, sharetenancy in Greater Syria involved primarily the cropping of the big estates of absentee landlords ('Ashour, 1948a:32-33; Warriner, 1966:77; Granott, 1952:286). It seems also that the dismemberment of the big estates during the Mandatory period was accompanied by the decline of sharetenancy itself (Granott, 1952:302). At its peak, Tannous estimated that "not less than 50% of all cultivated land in the Middle East, including Iraq, was worked out by tenants or _metayers_ (Tannous: cited by Granott, _ibid_.).

The increasing spread of sharetenancy during the first decades of the twentieth century in Palestine (and perhaps even more so in Syria and Iraq) has been attributed to the peasants' perpetual indebtedness to landlords-financiers; a phenomenon which is rooted in turn in the uncertainty of grain yields in arid agriculture (Warriner, 2948:22; 1966: _ibid_.). This is a process in which peasants, compelled to borrow at cumulatively higher rates of interest, eventually become tenants on their alienated land (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:475).

Both the French and British colonial land policies, despite their serious attempts at stabilizing the land tenure system and securing the peasants title deeds, reinforced this pattern of indebtedness-borrowing-

alienation-tenancy by their reliance on the landlords as their political base within the nationalist movement. Only the steep increases of food prices during WWII seemed to have finally broken this cycle of indebtedness (Warriner, 1948:62).

The complexity of sharecropping arrangements, however, appears immediately when one attempts to discover what kinds of land tenure patterns and ecological systems tend to favour the presence of sharetenancy, as opposed to owner-operated farms and wage labour. A recent village study suggests that, during the Mandate, cash rentals prevailed in the coastal terrain where the monetarization of the economy had advanced rapidly, while sharecropping was dominant in the hilly region (Ammons, 1978: 116-117). However, Granott cites the Valley of Esdraelon, the Maritime Plains, as well as the Coastal Plain as locations for metayage (sharetenancy) during the same period (Granott, 1952:294ff.; 302). In fact, one of the earlier sources of clashes between Palestinians and Zionists involved the eviction of thousands of share-tenants from the Marj Ibn Amer, (one of the major plains), after the sale of vast tracts by absentee Arab landlords to the Jewish National Fund (Ruedy, 1971:131). Rather than attempting to establish a regional distribution of sharetenancies, it might be more useful to examine how land tenure systems accommodated different forms of labour arrangements in response to particular economic demands.

In order to establish a secure tenure on the land during both the late Ottoman period and the Mandate, it was not sufficient for the peasant to establish legal ownership on the land, or even de facto possession (in the case of communal (musha') lands), but he also needed access to credit. Since the peasant small holder was almost invariably indebted

to the landlord or urban financier for both his consumption needs and operating budget, with his land tied up as security for his debts, many of the peasants became -- as we have noted above -- sharecroppers on their own alienated land, or at least some of it, in this process. A counter-vailing trend was the acquisition of land by landless or small-holding peasants through the process known as mugharasa, primarily in groves and orchards. This involved the rejuvenation of the landlord's uncultivated land by the provision of labour and the sharing of stocks on the part of the peasant. In return, the landlord would transfer a part of the orchards to his active partner (i.e. the landless tiller) (Ashour, 1948a:42-43).

In the preceding decades, sharetenancy had the dual function of providing political protection from the authorities tied into the credit provided by the resident village potentates (mashayekh). These local landlords eventually become the peasants' last resort against the state's tax farmers (multazimun). In exchange for the potentate's mediation and supply of seeds, the peasants were obliged to supply a share of the harvest on the threshing floor (Granott, 1952:296), and provide free labour for the ploughing (and sometimes harvesting) of the sheik's land, in a system known as awneh (Ashour, 1948b:50). This practice, prevalent in central Palestine up to the forties, comes closest to the notion of corvée labour in Middle Eastern agriculture. However, the replacement of wergo and the tithe by the flat Rural Property Tax during the 1930s (cf. Doukhan, 1938: 99) helped, along with factors completely external to the village economy -- such as the urban pull of wage labour -- to reduce the peasant's dependence on the local potentates.

We can now conceptualize in three broad categories the central features performed by the institution of share-tenancy in mid-century agrarian Palestine:

a) It was the mechanism by which an undercapitalized pesantry acquired credit and stock from local landlords and urban financiers, often losing title deeds in the process of accumulated debts and low productivity.

b) Sharetenancy performed the reverse of this process also. It provided a mechanism for the acquisition of land by the land-hungry peasantry through the rejuvenation of "dead" lands. The peasant here becomes a proprietor, or expands his holdings by becoming an active partner to the "passive" landlord. (This process contributed no doubt to rectifying the impact of land fragmentation due to the prevalence of an egalitarian inheritance system -- and acted in general as a safety valve for relieving the demographic pressure on the land).

c) A "feudal" function of sharetenancy involved the combined intercession of local potentates on behalf of the peasants to reduce or alleviate the impact of state taxes (tithe, wergo, etc.), as well as advance credit for stock and other items in return for a share of the crop and compulsory labour in the landlord's holdings (awneh). This third feature of sharetenancy lost its "feudal" (i.e. both the intercessionary and corvée aspects) towards the end of British colonial rule, while retaining its patronage dimension.

Firestone's conception of sharetenancy as a devolutionary mechanism

Ya'cov Firestone's two essays on the agrarian economy of Mandatory Palestine constitute a significant theoretical contribution on the regulatory nature of the sharecropping contract in the relationship between

peasant and landlord (Firestone, 1975a; 1975b). Basically, Firestone constructs a schema to illustrate the progressive devolution of the landlord's control over his land in favour of the cropper, resulting from the intrusion of market forces into the peasant's subsistence economy. The form that this devolution took was partnership and "quasi-partnership" compacts in land, based on share-tenancy arrangements between peasant smallholders (and occasionally landless tillers) and landlords in the Jenin and Nablus districts.

The progression from full landlord's control over crop production to the ascendancy of the sharecroppers to the status of smallholders corresponded to the physical movement of rural potentates from their villages of residence to regional urban centres. Although this process did not quite constitute a linear progression over time -- with many absentee landlords retaining direct control over the land through resident relatives -- it did evolve historically in such a way that the big landlords gradually were divested from their estates in favour of local peasant "partners." This progression can be broken down into stages of cropping arrangements illustrated below:

Diagram 1

Firestone's Conception of Sharetenancy as a "Devolutionary" Mechanism

Cropping Arrangement	Landlord's Role	Peasant's Role
1. Direct Cropping	Direct supervision of own (wage) workers on own land	hired tiller (*qatruz*?)
2. Joint Farming	Delegation of super vision to an agent (*wakil*) who provides a share in the stock, and acquires a share in the yield. Landlord still a resident	*harrath* (ploughman-sharecropper) providing a minor share in the stock and all labour
3. Share-rent Farming	Provision of land only; landlord becomes an absentee	supply of seed stock and capital; hiring of additional croppers
4. Tenancy	Absentee. Periodic leasing of land to croppers, directly or through an agent	tenant farmer; full provision of capital stock

(Derived from Firestone, 1975a:6-7, 175).

Within this schema, the cutting edge in agrarian evolution occurs when the share-rent is transformed into cash tenancy, indicating both the landlord's physical alienation from the land (usually associated by moving his residency to the district centres), and by the termination of his filial connection with the patronized cropper and his family. But in the transitional stages, the role of the cropper also undergoes an important qualitative transformation. Thus, while "a share-rent farmer who sub-farmed out to others some of his land remitted to the landowners the whole of the rent share he had collected for it, making him the landowner's trustee rather than a middleman," by contrast, a peasant tenant under a lease is allowed to sublet for a profit (Firestone, 1975a:183). When this happens, full market relations run their due course.

While economists have traditionally stressed the stagnating influence of share-cropping arrangements, Firestone treats share-rents of both the joint-farming and the co-cultivation varieties as being fairer from the point of view of the peasant since they "reflect the considerable fluctuations that take place in crop yields" (ibid.). This, in part, is the same position held by James Scott in discussing risks in tenancy systems in Southeast Asian agriculture (Scott, 1976:44-52). The crucial element in Palestine is not parity, however, (or even "claims to subsistence" as in the case of Philipino and Vietnamese peasants discussed by Scott), but the availability of surplus which the peasant can invest in cropping additional land. This is why the share-rent as a form of cropping was confined to very big landlords in Palestine who were able to make such provisions, while "joint-farming" (that is, delegated sub-farming) spread among the middle and small farmers who took croppers on to compensate for the loss of family members who flocked to work in the main cities during the high employment seasons of the 1930s and 40s.

Labour mobility and full employment also generated both labour shortages in the agrarian sector as well as a historic decline in joint (share) farming in favour of cash rents, a trend which was not reversed until the Second World War when prices of food began to soar. (cf. Firestone, 1975b: footnote 44). However, even today (1981), under conditions of intermediate and high technology in agriculture and with the availability of relatively easy credit arrangements, sharecropping compacts have not declined, and in some regions (such as Tulkarem and the northern valley) continue to spread.

The picture that emerges from Firestone's analysis is thus one that attributes to the institution of sharetenancy and the intrusion of

market relations in agriculture, not polarization between wage and capital, and not the emergence of rural capitalism, but an actual ascendancy of the small holding peasantry, and the demise of big landlordism by the middle of this century. Such a demise has led, at least as far as the Nablus district is concerned, to the increased homogeneity of the peasant strata, in a context in which the differentiation between rural wage workers (harateen and ujara') became synonymous with the small holding fellahin.

Peasant ascendancy or subjugation?

How are we to reconcile this view with Granott's proposition that "tenancy in all its forms brought with its spread the enslavement of the fellah in the countries of the East?" (Granott, 1952:291; emphasis added) and with his claim that, in Palestine, "the position of the fellahin who owned holdings of their own was incomparably superior to that of tenants. Even in its outward appearance a village inhabited by landowning fellahin differed from those belonging to tenants" -- the former being distinguished by the presence of gardens and orchards in its immediate vicinity (ibid.: 292).

At one level, the answer lies in Firestone's restriction of his analysis to one area of central Palestine, beyond which he hesitates to generalize (except in a cursory fashion, cf. Firestone, 1975a:184), while Granott establishes his position on the basis of cases derived from several regions. Nevertheless, Firestone discusses an area which includes hilly and plains terrain (the Nablus mountains and stretches from the Marj Ibn Amer plateau bordering Jenin -- the latter also examined by Granott). However, significant divergence between the two writers lies, in our view, in the conceptual and ideological underpinnings which govern the perspective of each author.

Ideologically, Granott has established himself as a Zionist authority on land relations in Palestine, and sought -- on a number of occasions -- to rebutt criticisms of the political consequences of land transfers from Arab absentee landlords to the Jewish National Fund. Together with several Labour-Zionist historians, he saw this process as an act of deliverance of the fellahin from their feudal lords (Granott, 1956:251-252; and Granott, 1952:302-303; see also Sereni, 1936:17, 83-88).[3] Other writers, it must be added, who did not share Granott's ideological predispositions, such as 'Ashour and Warriner, also saw in sharetenancy contracts instruments of oppression for the small holding peasant.

Conceptually, therefore, Firestone was confronted with the dilemma that, in its main thrust, his thesis ran counter to the empirical findings established by several authorities on Middle Eastern regimes. At one point, he himself refers to the works of Milliot, Pesle, Berque (in North Africa), and Lampton (in Persia) where:

> Instead of accession to capital ownership, or at least of contractual equality of some sort, there had been dire exploitation of labour; and instead of compatibility between religious law and actual practice, a clear dualism perpetuated by obscurantist jurists... (addressing) themselves primarily to the agricultural institutions dictated almost by definition by dependence and patronage (Firestone, 1975b:322)

The prevalence in Palestine of patterns of "mutual benefit and solidarity" over patterns of direct exploitation is seen by Firestone as the product of a transitional peasant economy where market relations hastened a greater accession to capital ownership (including in land) by small landholders. It also reflected a coincidence of compatibility between normative principles of the Islamic shari'a and agrarian practices, rather than an expression of Palestinian exceptionalism (in the Middle Eastern context).

The zenith of this "compatibility" is observed in the bond of association between peasants and landlord in the institution known as the mugharasa contract -- a form of co-cultivation predominant in orchards and groves -- in which the cropper acquires accession to ownership of part of the orchard after contributing his labour for a specified number of years. 'Ashour defined mugharasa as a "long-term contract by which the landlord leases-out a designated portion of land to a tenant stipulating the planting of trees in it, with the provision of all expenses. At the termination of the contract period, the tenant peasant acquires title deed to a proportion of trees (only) or to both land and trees." ('Ashour, 1949a:42). The period of accession differs depending on the variety of arbor: three to five years for mulberry trees (tut), 4-6 years for vineyards, 7-8 years for olives (but 30 years in Lebanon, indicating regional variations), 10 years for orange groves, etc. ('Ashour, ibid.:43).

Unlike Firestone, however, 'Ashour does not compare mugharasa favorably with other forms of sharecropping. The crucial variable he considers in this context is the density of the rural population. The latter is seen to be associated, rather mechanically, inversely with the size of the peasant's share of the yield ('Ashour, ibid.:47). But even when rural density is low, the peasant is still enslaved by his dependency on long-term loans from the landlord; in the case of mugharasa, by the unfavourable conditions of the contract (ibid.:48).

In contrast, Firestone sees mugharasa as a form of partnership or quasi-partnership in which the active partner (the peasant-worker) takes advantage of an expanding market by providing him and his family's labour to acquire land, while the passive partner (the landlord) makes available his capital stock as a form of investment.

Firestone's original insight lies in his re-interpretation of the nature of sharetenancy, under transformed economic conditions, in what most observors took to be the same immutable agrarian institution. In a classic case of old forms camouflaging new relationships, we obtain here a historical synchronism among the components of a triad: (1) the demands of new investment opportunities in land; (2) religious regulation of partnership contracts, which so far have been circumvented to legitimize a stagnant and exploitative relationship (i.e. Warriner's and 'Ashour's notion of sharetenancy); and (3) a "socially approved" customary form of association -- muraba'a and mugharasa: the "primitive" and "advanced" forms of sharecropping.

Firestone's insight, however, becomes limited in illuminating the nature of the Palestinian agrarian regime in a variety of ecological terrains, and in subsequent periods of change. Initially, he confines his interpretation to the Jenin area ('Arrabeh and Zar'een). Then he decides to expand it to incorporate the hilly regions of Nablus (Samaria), then to the mountainous regions of Palestine in general, and finally to "the agrarian economy of the Levant in periods of transition (Firestone, 1975a:3-4, 179, 186; 1975b:311, 316, 322, 324).

But how do we explain the completely different agrarian development which occurred in the big estates of Gaza, Jaffa, Lydda, Jericho and elsewhere in Palestine where -- from the beginning of the century and up to the forties -- wage labour and investment of surplus by resident and absentee landlords were wedded to create the opposite of a smallholder's regime: the form of capitalist citrus plantation known as the bayyara? All three components of the triad (sharetenancy, Islamic law and market expansion -- in the form of exports) existed here; but two additional ingredients led to a radically different outcome. Those were the

substantial presence of indigenous and migrant workers (from Syria and Egypt) seeking work opportunities in the coastal areas, and the relative absence in those plantations of bonds of patronage.

Patronage goes a long way (when set in the context of stable and relatively immobile peasantry) on the other hand, to explain the peculiar role of sharetenancy (especially in its mughârasa form) in the central and plains regions of Palestine. It will be recalled here that feudal relations had an exceptionally strong hold in the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarem region throughout the 19th century and during most of the mandatory period in Palestine. Unlike coastal Palestine or the Jerusalem area, we observe there a resident landlord class with strong patrimonial relations to its peasant base. Factional alignments divided central (and later on, most of the hilly regions) of Palestine along vertical coalitions in the course of 19th century peasant wars, in which major landlords mobilized whole villages which were tied to them by bonds of reciprocity. Such bonds, included, during various intervals: intercession on behalf of the village to alleviate the tax burden to the state; provision of corvé labour to the landlord (ʿawné); provision of stock, land and consumption loans by the landlord; extension of protection to the village holdings from beduin raids, etc.

The objectives of these alignments differed with the transformation of agrarian Palestine through its increasing incorporation into the world market economy. Initially, the competition for tax farming posts gave way to the scramble over the more influential regional administrative offices, judgeships and other official posts, and then to the utilization of peasant factions for augmentation of the landlord's holdings. At a later stage, these alignments became crucial in the mobilization of peasant factions for and against the Palestine Revolt in its later years (1938-39)

(cf. Hoexter, 1973; Porath, 1975; Tamari, 1981).

With the gradual institutionalization of private property in land under British rule (the Land Settlement), two aspects of the natural economy of Palestine became the plagues of peasant tenure in the hilly region. These were parcellization of land, resulting from the archaic system of plot rotation prevelant in the musha' (communal) mode, and fragmentation, resulting from the partible system of inheritance. Parcellization and fragmentation amounted to the same thing in posing obstacles to the effective use of limited land holdings by the peasant household. Population increase in rural areas created new pressures, and opportunities, for landlords to utilize their estates more effectively. Wage labour in the cities, when available, was the external outlet for these pressures. Mughârasa share-contracts were an "internal" form of accommodation which utilized, profitably, the established procedures of an old traditional institution, based on patronage.

Firestone is cognisant of the centrality of patronage in the widespread attraction of cropsharing contracts during a period of risk and uncertainty in farming investment. The problem is that his schema does not allow for the explanation of sharecropping arrangements outside of patronage. The emphasis in his analysis is on how, to many landlords, and from a purely financial perspective, the losses far outweigh the gains involved in share farming ventures. They often lose by tying their capital to low-return investments in the form of consumption and loans to the cropper, or as capital loans to joint-farmers (Firestone, 1975a:178), and even by collection lower rent-shares than those called for by the prevalent market rates (ibid.:185). Yet they continue in doing just that with the conscious aim of consolidating their political base.

In tracing the fortunes of the Abdul Hadi clan, he further notes how the joint-farm, under sharetenancy arrangements, provided a "perfect opportunity for a patron-client relationship, (and) assumed pivotal importance as a lever of influence in such circumstances (i.e. the rebellion of 1936). Its establishment was, indeed, a crucial stage in the evolution of a sheikly family into an absentee class exercising its economic and political control of the home village in new ways." (Firestone, 1975a:182).

Firestone overvalues the exchange of political gains made by landlords in return for material losses precisely because he was dealing with a period of political uncertainty. This situation need not, and could not, have existed over an extended period. But we can still conclude that patronage (or feudal relations, if we use the term generously) under conditions similar to those prevalent in Mandatory Palestine, was an essential pre-requisite for the mediation of sharetenancy in the consolidation of the landless and smallholding peasantry to a situation of ascendancy and relative security in their land tenure. Despite the paradoxical marginalization of peasant holdings and increased proletarianization, all the evidence we have seems to support this assumption. For, in those regions with weak patronage relations -- such as the coastal areas -- the advance of market relations gave rise to rural capitalism or alternatively to widespread speculation in land and the emergence of a pure <u>rentier</u> class of absentee landlords. (The process towards agrarian capitalism was facilitated no doubt by the abundance of migrant labour supply -- but that in our view is not the critical factor).

Under those conditions, no political base existed for <u>rentiers</u> among the peasantry. Where, by contrast, patrimonial bonds were strong and fulfilled functional needs -- as was the case in the central mountains and the northern plains of the West Bank -- a regime of smallholding

peasantry prevailed and persisted to this day.[4] That Firestone does not come to this conclusion is related to the limitations of the historical period to which he confines his analysis, and to his preoccupation, in his essay on sharika contracts (1975b), with problems of correspondence between juridicial forms and economic practice.

We must now re-examine problems of sharetenancy when market relations prevailed over patrimonial bonds.

Sharetenancy persists with the decline of patronage

The dissolution of Arab landed classes during the 1948 war led to the dispersal of hundreds of thousands of peasants, who flocked to the West Bank, Gaza and Transjordan, and to the shattering of the system of patronage that existed until then. Nevertheless, the system of sharetenancy persisted. This phenomenon may be attributed to two main features of the new (dislocated) agrarian regime. One was the acquisicion of vast tracts of irrigated land in the Jordan Valley (on both sides of the river basin) during the early sixties by resident and absentee landlords. In this endeavor, the landlords utilized the presence of refugee camps in the vacinity as recruiting ground for agricultural workers.

A second factor was the migration of young members of peasant households to the Gulf, and (during the seventies) to Israeli construction sites. The two population trends thinned out the surplus rural population and induced new sharecropping arrangements devoid of the traditional relations of patronage.

In this context, we may speak of countervailing trends in sharetenancy. The commoditization of land and most other factors of agricultural production was facilitated by the availability of cheap and landless refugee labour, creating ideal conditions for plantation agriculture

(in the Gaza, district, Jericho and the lower part of the Jordan Valley). It also created tenuous conditions of sharetenancy highly unfavourable to the cropper (in the upper Jordan Valley, and the East Ghor basin).

On the other hand, the considerable migration of peasant-workers from the hilly regions seeking work opportunities in Israel or abroad did not result in any significant degree of land transfers or consolidations, aside from the areas referred to in the Jordan Valley, (Sa'ati, 1980). Here we observe the migrant peasants, or rather the remaining members of their households, maintaining legal control over their lands, and farming them out to sharecroppers under favourable terms to the latter.

The fact that each of these trends corresponded ecologically to the plain and mountanous terrains respectively was not, of course, an accident. The seasonal character of olive (and olive oil) production, and its bi-annual yield cycles, created a continual surplus labour force which was, and is, highly responsive to wage labour attraction external to the village, while the irrigated vegetable crops of the Jordan Valley provided for year-round intensive farming, with double-(and sometimes triple-) cropping seasons that required a stable agricultural force. In the Jenin-Tulkarem region, where the tail-end of the fertile Marj Inb Amer plains intrude into the olive orchards of the Nablus mountains, we witness a combination of several forms of sharetenancy (simple cropping, joint farming, partnership compacts, etc.). Only the mugharasa compacts seem to be on the decline, probably due to the depletion of surplus cultivable plots and the rise in the real estate value of land.

The increased demand for food items (especially in vegetables and fruits) in the Gulf states, and the improvement of marketing procedures, have enhanced the role of the landlord-financiers in sharetenancy contracts.

Quite often the role of the financier has become separate from that of the landlord who now provides the land itself and only occasionally the seed stock. The following description of sharetenancy contracts in the Southern Ghor of the Jordan Valley applies equally to the upper valley where thousands of refugee families sharecrop for absentee landlords who reside in mountain towns:

> "A typical share-cropping family enters into an annual contract with the land-owner. The contract stipulates that the land-owner or his agent will provide the farmer with a subsistence loan of advance of between JD 200-500, which will be repaid with interest, at the end of the cropping season. The interest is usually in the order of 10% for a six to nine month period. The whole operation is either financed by the owner or by a separate investor. The farmer provides all the labour necessary, while the owner or his agent provides plowing machinery, seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, crates, transportation and marketing. For these services the owner or his agent sets the price, and the farmer cannot seek alternative services in the open market. All revenues and costs are split between the farmer and the owner on a 1:2 basis, i.e. the farmer gets one-third of the net revenues of the farm, after all expenses, as calculated by the owner or his agent. In cases where the owner is different from the financier-investor, the net revenues are split equally among the owner, financier and farmer. The contract is typically signed with two witnesses and a guarantor. It stipulates that if the subsistence advance is not repaid by the end of the season, the owner will confiscate any other property which the farmer has, unless the farmer renews the contract for another year. Should the farmer default on the provision of labour, the owner will farm the land at the farmer's expense. The farmer will also have to pay for any labour which he may have to hire at harvesting time." (Dajani, 1979:16).

Dajani's claim (based on fieldwork in the Southern Ghor region) that most farmers "will have no choice but to continue to work the land at subsistence levels, and to accept whatever terms are dictated upon them" (1979:ibid.) cannot be extended to the prevailing conditions in the western Jordan Valley today. A recent examination of sharecropping arrangements conducted by this writer in the West Ghor found a much higher

incidence of sharing in capital investment by the farmer than in the Eastern or Southern Valley regions. The division of net marketed yield on the basis of 50:50 between peasant and landlord seems to be the prevailing ratio in the Western Valley. In the northern West Bank (the Jenin-Tulkarem region), the peasant sharecropper receives only one-third of the net yield for irrigated plots (Tamari and Giacaman, 1980:11).

The higher rate of return for sharecroppers in the valley as opposed to those in the northern plains can be related to several factors: (1) the traditionally settled and stable agricultural communities in Jenin and Tulkarem, with an equally higher number of owner-operated farms, has worked to the disadvantage of sharetenants, who had to compete over scarcer land resources; (2) the harsh climatic conditions in the valley compelled absentee landlords to offer better conditions in order to attract a settled agricultural workforce; (3) the historical presence of tribal landlords (such as the Masa'eed) in the Jordan Valley, and their patronage of refugee tenants since the early 1950s, seems to have set the pace for subsequent contracts between the new (urban-based) landowners and their tenants in the valley (Tamari and Giacaman, 1980:11-13).

Thus, rural class relations in the Jordan Valley cannot be reduced to a formula of "demographic pressures" as suggested by 'Ashour above: i.e. the more pressing the ratio of potential tenants on scarce land resources, the more unfavourable tenancy contracts are obtained. The exceptionally high ratio of landless refugees to settled peasants in the Jordan Valley has worked in such a way as to create significant differentiation within the landless rural community, more favourable terms for share-tenants, and lower wages for agricultural workers with no access to leasehoods. In this context, previous agricultural skills and personal bonds to absentee landlords and their agents (wukala') (usually enhanced by proximity of living

next to their holdings), have been major advantages to those landless peasants in acquiring tenancy contracts and raising their standards of living.

By contrast, no such visible differentiation is obtained in the mountain regions. The status of both small peasants and big landlords has been substantially transformed by large-scale internal migration from the village to Israeli industries and construction sites. Muhasasa cropping is widely practiced in the harvesting of olives (Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem districts) and grapes (Hebron district), but not in cereals and vegetables, which are predominantly cultivated for subsistence in those areas.

In the hilly areas, large-scale migration had a different impact on cropping arrangements. The landlord no longer leases the land to a ploughman-tiller (harrath), but has to hire one himself, at a substantial expense due to the rise in wages of agricultural workers. Those farmers whose family members are unable to help them with the harvest, farm-out the trees during the picking seasons, receiving only one-half the yield. Until the early seventies, i.e. before the major movement towards employment in Israel, the landlord used to receive the same half of the yield (in olive oil) by farming-out the urchard to the ploughman-tiller, or to another farmer, who undertook the whole operation himself, all expenses being born by the leasee (Aranki, 1980). Because of the current scarcity of labour and the unprofitability of such arrangements, we witness today widespread negligence of olive orchards among small farmers (Farhat-Nasir, 1980:13-17), who prefer to release the labour of the household members for wage work outside the village.

A final distinction should be made between the situation of share-tenants in the mountain villages and those in the Jordan Valley. The latter, by virtue of their refugee (and therefore landless) status, work

predominantly on leased land, while highlands dry farming -- by contrast -- has a preponderance of owner-cultivators leasing-in additional land to supplement their income. Since valley farming, both in the citrus plantations in the Southern Valley and in the Northern Ghor, is almost exclusively intensive farming based on irrigation, it is possible to speak of a stratum of sharecropping peasants. This is not the situation in the hills where sharecropping arrangements are embedded in the structure of seasonal labour allocation in a manner to that described by Geertz for Java. Here, social cleavages in the countryside are brought about by dynamics completely external to agriculture.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have taken the position that sharetenancy is a highly adaptive mechanism for the allocation of rural labour in a variety of agricultural regimes, rather than viewing it primarily, or merely, as "an agency for the siphoning of agrarian surplus" generated by landless peasants in traditional agriculture.

In the Middle East, in common with many Asian countries, sharetenancy has historically been associated with cropping arrangements in the large estates of absentee landlords. The stabilization of land titles in private hands, given the communal usufruct in villages and the relations of patronage in land, led to the alienation of the peasant's access to his land and the flourishing of an intricate network of tenancy compacts throughout the first half of this century, mostly to the advantage of landlords.

But this aspect of sharecropping has camouflaged a more complex reality of agrarian relations. In Palestine, particularly, absentee and big landlordism were a relatively minor phenomenon and landlordship --

as Doreen Warriner has noted -- was a credit operation. In addition to providing a system for the cropping of big estates, sharetenancy performed several other important functions. Those include the acquisition of consumption loans and stock by an undercapitalized peasantry; the rejuvenation of abandoned land and the consolidation of a middle stratum among the peasantry through mughârasa contracts and similar partnership arrangements; the alleviation of the impact of state-imposed taxes, etc., through patronage bonds which often worked to the economic disadvantage of landlords (Firestone); and the accession of landless refugees to a position of stable land tenure in a rural economy which -- due to excessive outmigration and shortage of labour -- began to favour the tenant.

Methodologically, the detailed study of sharetenancy arrangements helps us to dispel the misleading, and prevalent, use of the criterion of land possession as an empirical index for the examination of class differentiation among the peasantry. Since access to land, under conditions of scarce land resources, and the quality of land are frequently more important indicators of differentiation than the size of the holding or the legal title to the plot, the terms of tenancy become a crucial determinant of those criteria. The continued significance of the "land factor" in the identification of sources of status and power among peasants suggest that the proper demarcation of cutting edges within peasant strata should utilize a combined index of "land possession" and "access to land," (sharecropped, rented, co-cultivated, etc.). The weight of the share-rent component of this index is dependent, obviously, on the nature of the share-contract and on extra-economic factors, such as patronage relations and state intervention in the regulation of agricultural prices.

Moreover, control of the marketing outlets by landlords and over disposition of the yield by urban financiers today, is a decisive factor in defining the content of the sharecontract to the extent that agricultural production has become export-oriented.

The persistence of sharetenancy in Palestinian agriculture is explained here negatively by the failure of capitalist relations in agriculture to take hold in mountainous (dry farming) areas, and, with few exceptions, in irrigated farming. It is explained positively by the continued injection of landless peasant refugees into the network of tenancy and sharecropping compacts with both big landlords and smallholders.

The magnitude of internal migration (peasant-workers seeking work in Israel) and emigration among rural households have sustained a strong demand for tenancy among all categories of farmers, including smallholders. The high risk factor involved in dry farming continues to favour share-rent contracts as opposed to cash rents. In the midst of a stagnant urban economy under Israeli rule today, the adaptive flexibility of such share-contracts are responsible, to a considerable extent, for the continued survival and resilience of the agricultural sector among Palestinians.

Notes

1. There are exceptions of course. Many of the share-tenants in the Jordan Valley, for example, are almost exclusively landless refugees, (ex-) peasants who crop the lands of absentee landlords from the hilly areas. Their status is only an inch above those rural proletarians whom they hire in harvest periods as day labourers (Government of Jordan, 1961:164ff).

2. In regions where cash rentals of land are almost absent, as in the Ramallah District today, the term daman is often used in share-cropping, especially in the leasing of the olive harvest to croppers on a share basis.

3. Granott sought also to minimize the number of tenants displaced. Thus, "according to a list made in 193, the Jews had acquired from large landowners 261, 388 dunums in fifteen place; and of this area 140,650 dunums were worked by 688 tenants" (Granott, The Land System in Palestine, p. 303 -- the 'source' cited for this data is Granovsky's (i.e. Granott himself before he Hebraized his name) Land and Jewish Reconstruction in Palestine, p. 87). According to these figures each tenant sub-leased 204 dunums from the landlords (!), a "plot" the size of which was never attained by tenants anywhere in the Middle East, including holdings cited in official figures for Palestine itself.

4. Is it by chance that peasant displacement resulting from land transfers to Zionists during the Mandate occurred as it did, where landlords had weak or virtually no links with their peasants (i.e. in the Maritime Plains), and where absentee rentier landlords abounded?

Chapter Six

Wage Labour, Landlessness, and Migration as Factors in Rural Transformation

While sharetenancy can be seen as constituting the main internal (i.e. agrarian) mechanism for the productive disposition of the rural surplus population, wage labour opportunities and migration present the external outlets for the release of demographic pressures on the land. The supplementation of cash income from non-agricultural sources (such as village crafts, seasonal cropping arrangements, transport, etc.), is of course, a common feature of traditional village employment. But the foundation of a peasant economy is not challenged until employment chances outside the village, especially those related to the penetration of capitalist manufacturing and market, are introduced to village life (Franklin, 1969:55-56). An alternative threat to the rationale of a peasant economy is the substantial supplementation of farm income with remittances sent by migrant members abroad, to the extent that marginal agriculture, as defined above, becomes redundant. We shall deal here with both of these problems, migration and wage labour, as they relate to each other, and to the peasant farm as a unit of production.

In Ottoman Palestine the monetization of the rural economy and pressures to pay taxes and debts in cash compelled many peasants to seek employment in commercial agriculture in the estates of absentee landlords, as well as in the farms of middle peasants, in the central and Maritime plains. The growth of citrus plantations in the coastal plains and Gaza by WWI created new demands, also within agriculture, for wage

employment (for figures see Brown, 1938:137-139). Until then it seems, however, that payment for wages in kind was prevelant. Wilson describes how, in 1905, farmers from the central hills taking advantage of the early wheat and barley harvest in the plains were paid their wages in corn (Wilson, 1905:208; cited by Reilly, 1981:8). Wage labour did not become a factor in rural transformation, however, until the colonial administration of the British Mandate (1919-1948) created the conditions for substantial employment of peasants outside their villages.

Although formally Palestine was a mandated territory, and thus subjecting British rule to certain international restrictions, in practice the British established an administration which -- as in the other colonies -- relied on financing the colonial apparatus from internal revenues, especially the external tariff; "... like any formal colony, Palestine was expected to pay its own way financially as well as to support the cost of the local British garrison" (Owen, 1982:4).

Compared with most British colonies in South Asia and Africa, Palestine however, had little to offer in terms of economic exploitation by colonial investments. It was relatively poor in natural resources, trade possibilities, and (except for its modest citrus exports) agricultural produce (Asad, 1976:4 (note 4); but see also Scholch, 1982:12-18). Its main significance for the British was a strategic geographic location between Africa and the Middle East and as a supply and service centre for the British armed forces during the war years. This 'function' of the Palestine colony must be modified by the complexity of the tasks involved in carrying the terms of the Jewish National Home -- embedded in the Mandate -- while at the same time pacifying a native population provoked by that very policy.

Whatever economic developments did occur (aside from the activities of Jewish-Zionist enterprises - which for ideological reasons had minimal impact on the Arab sector) they were generated primarily by the colonial administration, through the Department of Public Works, the police, and civil service, and jobs created to service the army's logistic infrastructure. Jewish industries and the Arab urban economy were secondary in absorbing Arab labour (Taqqu, 1977:42-51; Migdal, 1980: 22-24).

The Colonial Roots of Proletarianization

Many of the features of peasant-proletarianization which were crystallized later in the period under study were shaped by the patterns of employment that emerged under British rule. The source of this transformation must be sought in the deteriorating level of subsistence led by the Palestinian peasant and the colonial policy of employment favouring village workers. The policy was instituted by the Mandate either because of the low wages peasant-workers were ready to accept, or as an intentional design to relieve rural unemployment (Taqqu, 1980:261, 269). Uppermost in the mind of the Mandate government was the fear of rural political unrest that might be engendered by landlessness caused by land sales to the Jewish Agency and the resulting evictions of tenant farmers. A High Commissioner report in 1932 stresses that "a continued increase in the class of landless Arabs was a social peril against which steps should be taken without delay, in spite of the practical difficulties and political objections and the certainty of resentment on the part of the Jew ... there was a risk of the landless Arab class producing economic results which would serve as a focus for discontent and might even result in serious disorders." (Sire A. Wanchope, quoted by Graham-Brown, 1977:47).

Landlessness and rural unemployment were the subject of several official studies carried by the Mandate in the 1930's and 1940's (Johnson and Crosbie, 1930; Hope Simpson, 1931; Survey of Arab Villages, 1944; Survey of Palestine, 1946; etc.) usually corresponding to periods of intensified nationalist agitation. Already in 1930 the Johnson-Crosbie report found that the small size of average holdings and peasant indebtedness drove a substantial number of peasants and tenanst to seek employment outside the village. The report, which included a survey of 104 villages, concluded that:

> to provide the minimum cost of living for a family, a holding of 75 dunums seems to be necessary for an owner cultivator, while a tenant requires 130 dunums. The small holder or tenant who has not the necessary minimum holding must supplement his income either by hiring himself out as a labourer inside or outside the village or by engaging in transport work, in charcoal or lime-kiln burning or some such occupation (Johnson-Crosbie, 1930:22).

The survey revealed that a majority of the villagers resorted to wage work at least seasonally. The following table gives a breakdown of peasant households by size of holdings and ownership status:

Table 1

Village Households by Size of Holdings and Ownership Status
104 Villages, 1930

	No. of Households	%
1. Owner-occupiers living exclusively on their holding:		23.2
a. Over two faddans*	3,873	16.4
b. Between 1 & 2 faddans	1,604	6.8
2. Owner-occupiers who also work as labourers:		76.3
a. Between 1 & 2 faddans	1,657	7.0
b. Under one faddan	8,396	35.6
c. Trees only	1,103	4.7
3. Labourers Only	6,940	29.5
Total	23,573	100.0

Source: Government of Palestine, Report of a Committee on the Economic Conditions of Agriculturalists in Palestine and the Fiscal Measures of Government in Relation thereto (Johnson-Crosbie), Jerusalem (1930); p. 21. *A faddan, on the average, equals 120 dunums (30 acres).

Of the total holdings referred to in Table 1 above, 68% (about 797,529 dunums) were owned directly by the villagers, 21% were leased or share cropped from absentee landlords, and 11% were leased from other (presumably neighbouring) villagers (Johnson-Crosbie, 1930:20). Thus although a majority of the villagers were owner-occupiers, to use the current term, less than a quarter of the households (categories 1a and 1b) gained exclusive subsistance from the land, including tenant farmers and share croppers, while almost half the households (45.3%) fell into what we might call today peasant workers; a considerable third (29.4%) constituted full time workers.

Since the tabulation system used by Johnson and Crosbie divides households into exclusive categories, based on farm, non-farm, and "mixed" (the latter amounting to 76.3% of total households) income sources, the process of work outside the village cannot be captured to the extent that it relates to the breakdown of household membership. That is, as it related to the demographic composition of the peasant household. A more sophisticated survey conducted in five "representative" villages fifteen years later (in 1944) does provide an enumeration of peasant households by categories of earners, but unfortunately fails to relate earning categories to occupations or to employment on the land. (Government of Palestine 1945: table 14-15, see also tables 50 and 54). Nor is the incidence of wage labour isolated for purposes of comparison. A basic assumption in most of those official studies, has been the research for a self-sustaining peasantry ("an eternal peasantry" as expressed by

Carmi and Rosenfeld (1974:473) and the preservation of the peasant household as a unit of production in an idealized form (Graham-Brown, 1977:47). That ideal form was expressed in the notion of the "lot viable"; the acreage necessary of an average peasant family subsistence, the calculation of which consumed a substantial proportion of official village studies (for a summary cf. Government of Palestine, 1946:272-289).

An alternative to this search for peasant viability (or perhaps, from the point of view of its proponents, the method to sustain it) was government interference in the regulation of land tenure system, of rural credit arrangements and basic investment in an agrarian infrastructure that would, it was hoped, improve the standards of living of the peasantry. Aside from altering the rural tax system (basically abolition of the Ottoman tithe and institution of the rural property tax) the successive Mandate administration did very little on this front (Migdal, 1980:22-23). Their conservative attitude towards the peasantry was rooted in their firm political alliance with absentee urban landlords and village notables, whose power they needed to maintain security in the countryside, and an undefined - but solid - commitment towards the establishment of a Jewish National Home (Graham-Brown, 1977:48-51; Migdal, 1980:20-22). Thus any attempt to tamper with the land tenure system, with the principle of collective land sales to Jewish and the status of tenant farmers, and with the conditions of rural credit arrangements, would have threatened the precarious agrarian power base held by the colonial regime.

Hence, while the search for the lot viable and the preservation of the small holders domain was the guiding principle of the Mandate, in practice they gave in to the obvious and acceeded to the massive thirst of rural workers for wage labour employment.

"The Non-viability of Peasant Existence"

The process of peasant proletarianization in Palestine has been treated in a theoretical contribution by the anthropologists Carmi and Rosenfeld (1974). According to the authors the nature of the agrarian regime in Mandatory Palestine was such that all peasants, including a substantial section of the upper peasantry were "imminent proletarians" (475). The dynamic of this process was rooted in the nature of the dry farming system, in the chronic indebtedness of the peasantry to absentee landlords and urban merchants, and, according to the authors, in the absence of meaningful differentiation among the peasantry which could have given rise to rural capitalism (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:472-473; 483). Furthermore, demographic pressures on the land tended to increase the non-viability of the peasant's farm given the prevailing system of partible inheritence which divided the father's estate equally to all his male heirs.

The landless peasantry, already 22% of all agricultural households in 1931 (Warriner, 1948:63), were neither pushed out of the village in favour of intensive farming, nor became wage workers since the Arab aristocracy was basically a rentier-merchant class which did not invest in manufacturing. Moreover, Zionist enterprises were keen to exclude Arab labour from competing with the Jewish proletariat. The only exception to this condition, intensive agriculture in citrus, was developed in so-far marginal land which did not involve peasant displacement (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:474). Surplus rural labour augmented an already stagnant agrarian regime increasing its rate of self-exploitation; or to use Carmi's expression, landless and marginal peasants were re-cycled and "reabsorbed into the backward system" (475).

Peasant proletarianization in Palestine was not, according to Carmi and Rosenfeld, a phenomenon emerging from landlessness ("it was often the man with land who was the first to seek outside employment"), but one that was determined by the demands for wage labour outside the agrarian system. These demands corresponded to the cyclical booms and recessions in the market (1924-27 Arab and Jewish urban construction boom; 1926-27 citrus plantations; 1933-36 road construction, railroad etc.; 1940-1948 army installations and public works).

Similarly, tenancy and sharecropping are treated not as signs of incipient proletarianization - but as a process of cyclical movement of the lower peasantry in and out of ownership status without it leading to alienation from land since the categories of petty ownership and tenancy were exchangeable.

(While the authors are correct in our view in disregarding land alienation as a factor in proletarianization, they are mistaken, (as we suggested in chapter 5, above), in their assessment of sharetenancy. For lack of proletarianization at the village level need not mean lack of differentiation; and minor differentiation, given chances for rural investment, can, and did lead to significant changes in the peasant's status).

Peasant proletarianization thus remained a protracted process. Since urban sources of employment where contingent on the public (colonial) sector and not on indigenous economic growth the statuses of peasant and worker became interchangeable (478). Since the farmer had a holding ("a pipeline to the village storehouse") he was able to receive below subsistence wages and was so treated by his employer, thus depressing the wages of the urban proletariat with no access to land.

Although all strata of the peasantry participated in the search for urban employment, what we might refer to as the "middle peasantry" had a relative advantage over others in that they could prolong the search for jobs beyond the savings capacity of the lower peasants, and because they were better connected with urban contacts (ibid.), but even this advantage was periodically wiped out by the iron law of partible inheritance and the decreasing size of the average plot.

If we assume both an absence of a land market and a relative homogeneity of holdings, however, the demographic size of the peasant household must have played a more important role than the amount of holdings, since in dry farming land the peasant patriarch can release more sons and relatives for wage labour employment once he secures the minimum number of croppers he needs on the farm. This assumption is borne out,at least, by the behaviour of peasant households in the Bani Zeid area which is examined in chapter eight, below. The Carmi/Rosenfeld thesis rests, in short, on a number of assumptions which they perceive to have dominated Palestinian social structure up to 1948, and perhaps later. These features include a stagnant (dry farming) agrarian regime, a parasitic absentee landlord class whose fortunes were derived from land rent and interest on loans, and absence of an indigenous urban manufacturing sector which could have absorbed the "surplus" labour force. The major consequence of this "non-viable peasant existence" has been a process of proletarianization without urbanization (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:480). The emergence of casual peasant-labour, whose status is defined by urban labour needs, in turn defines(actually debases)the condition of the urban landless proletariat by reducing him to the status of a migrant villager in terms of his replacement potential. Casual labourers, thus defined, "were no longer dependent solely on land for subsistence, neither were they alienated from the land"

(483). Nor, we should add, did they become rural proletarians. They were - and to a great extent are - in large part, a suspended peasantry!

We have dwelled at some length on the Carmi/Rosenfeld thesis because it illuminates the historical roots of the present conditions of Palestinian peasant-workers more recently under Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. It also provides some sharp contours which will help us to compare and contrast the way in which the fate of the peasantry in the West Bank today diverges from the formative conditions which typified the peasant-workers of Mandatory Palestine.

But what does this analysis tell us about the impact of peasant-proletarianization on the social fabric of the Palestinian village, and rural society in general? Rosenfeld and Carmi seems to define these changes by an absent condition, namely non-capitalization of agriculture and the absence of meaningful differentiation among the peasant classes, rather than by describing what actually happened or is happening in the Palestinian village. This definition by negation becomes clear when a concrete emperical examination of occupational change in one village was undertaken by one of the two authors elsewhere (Rosenfeld, 1970). The unproductive agriculture system is seen here as giving rise, when exposed to the demands for wage labour from outside, to a "residual peasantry" whose source of livelihood lies outside the village but whose traditional outlook and peasant consciousness is reinforced by continued state intervention on the side of an eroding and disintegrating village leadership (Rosenfeld, 1970:167-168).

This conception of a peasantry whose "transformations" are anchored in the externally-based (urban) labour market, has been criticized for its excessive emphasis on the pull factor of wage labour to the absence

of assessing internal, i.e. village based, options open to the peasants (Ammons, 1979:242-243). I have also criticized Rosenfeld for considering social differentiation among peasants as a negligible factor in explaining rural social change, especially when he undertook to explain the meaning of sharetenancy in Palestine (Rosenfeld, 1970:154; Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:475). But the author can hardly be faulted, as Ammons seems to be suggesting, for not explaining the changed circumstances of contemporary Palestinian peasants in a thesis whose generality was clearly confined to Mandatory Palestine, (but cf. Rosenfeld, 1979). Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the notion of a "non-viable peasantry" does begin to meet its limitations when one of its main assumptions, absence of meaningful investment in agriculture is challenged by the evidence. This happened in the emergence of share-cropping contracts among landless peasantry and small holders who, in part, re-cycled their wage income during the thirties and forties to acquire vine-yards and orange groves in central Palestine (Firestone, 1975b; see also chapter 5 on sharetenancy).

The Political (Colonial) Dimension of Peasant-Proletarianization

Since the impact of the manufacturing sector and agricultural capitalism was minimal in the occupational transformation of Palestinian peasants into workers, the explanation of the phenomenon may be better sought in its political setting (that is, the administrative employment policies of the state). Such policies were crucial during both peaks of peasant employment during the British Mandate and currently under Israeli rule - but with different consequences.

In a comprehensive study of labour recruitment patterns under the British Mandate in Palestine Taqqu distinguished two distinct modes of such rectuitment (Taqqu, 1977 and 1980). In the first mode, characteris-

tic of the period before WWII, the Department of Public Works (DPW) played a central role in rural employment. Emphasis was on the recruitment of villagers to undertake work, such as the building of roads within the vicinity of their village, and on the use of village notables, especially the Mukhtar, as the main agents of recruitment. The DPW fought against the centralization of workers recruitment through labour exchanges as it was opposed to the creation of a permanent village labour force dependent on the state for its livelihood (Taqqu, 1980:269). A major consequence of giving preference to the employment of villagers within the area of residence was to reinforce "the fusion of seasonal wage labor and traditional village organization" (ibid.). That is, it strengthened the internal solidarity of the village unit even when the external sources of differentiation were implanted in it. Even when villagers were employed in the cities, the mediation of village traditional heads in recruitment functioned to cement old kinship loyalties originating in the village. Such loyalties persisted when peasant-workers joined urban trade unions or political parties, even to the point of subjecting them to "the dissonant claims of factional rivalries without granting them the advantages of either material gain or social accommodation" (ibid.:271). The political expression of those factional claims reached their height during the Revolt of 1936-1938, which - Taqqu claims - "stemmed fundamentally from a real sense of collective oppression ... rooted in an active identification with village culture and with the lower peasantry in particular" (272).

The second mode of recruitment, typical of the WWII period, created a major dislocation in the Palestinian countryside which challenged, in contrast to the 1930's, the ability of the traditional leadership to maintain the internal solidarity of the village. The main features of occu-

pational mobility in this period were the increased volume of demand for cheap Arab labour needed in military installations; the rationalization and centralization of recruitment, regardless of village origin; the higher availability of alternative employment possibilities; and the physical separation of the workers from the village (in labour encampments near military bases).

The effects of the new influx of migrant workers on village stratification set the stage for later developments under Jordanian and Israeli rule. The rise in the prices of food during the war contributed to a rise in village standards of living. It also raised the demand for, and cost of, agricultural wage workers. In general, greater inequalities in wealth emerged as some farmers were capable of investing their cash flows in further land consolidation, while others - the landless and those badly affected by price inflation, went under (Taqqu, 1980:274-275). But the evidence is not entirely consistent with this conclusion, since "many labourers could return with relative ease and regularity to seasonal work in their villages [which] placed limits on the differentiation of the rural wage force" (ibid.:273), and the fact that most peasants - having now access to money wages - were able to relieve themselves from the burden of debts to village notables.

The most dramatic change in this second cycle of labour migration was its impact on local political structures. Taqqu proposes that the main impact of peasant migration was a weakening of the traditional elite and the emergence of new alternative "transient stratum" of labour contractors (ibid.:279). The traditional elders were challenged not only because of the loss of their mediatory role in labour recruitment, but also due to the decline of their status in their capacity as landowners, relative to the advantages obtained from wage remuneration. The impact

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of this decline was only modified by the consolidation of holdings by middle peasants who were keen on investing their savings in land (Firestone, 1975b:316; Taqqu, 1977:184).

It was in this period also that the Mukhtar's role demoted (or perhaps if we want to compare it to its Ottoman origins, reverted) to that of a governmental functionary and lost his representative character (Taqqu, 1980:275; Baer, 1980:109-114). But we suspect that this trend was tied to the general integration of village politics into the national administration dictated primarily by security needs (cf. Baer, 1980:110, 123) and only secondarily by the mechanisms of market interaction and labour migration.

What does one conclude from the pre-war (1948) trends in peasant-proletarianization? And how do they relate to the second major wave of internal labour migration which was generated by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza?

First we must stress the obvious, but necessary, observation that both the Mandatory labour mobility and those taking place under Israeli rule were internal migrations, as distinguished from the outmigration of Palestinian population to the Gulf and the Americas in the sixties and the 1970's. The social implications for this distinction on the rural household will be discussed below.

A second observation, made by Taqqu, introduces a critical turning point during the war years, when the patterns of employment began to disregard the regional boundries of village and traditional loyalties of the peasant-workers within the village (Taqqu, 1980:276). This gives the appearance of imminant proletarianization and the emergence of class consciousness among peasant-workers, but the main impact of the new recruitment patterns has been the disruption of traditional political authority

within the village. It had become more difficult for the colonial authorities to depend on their class allies among the urban landlords and rural potentates. But contrary to the dichotomy made by Taqqu, this trend was already taking form by the mid-thirties, as evidenced by the 1936 rebellion.

Another dislocating influence of this early proletarianization was its downward impact on the standard of living and organizing capacities of bona fide urban workers (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:478; Taqqu, 1980: 281). Nevertheless, a thin crust of urban skilled workers managed to maintain its privileges and relative isolation from the flood of Egyptian (mostly from al-'Areish region) and Syrian (mostly from Hauran) migrant labourers who combined with the native peasant migrant workers in establishing their temporary residence in the coastal cities and army camps. Thus this newly formed stratum remained transient and their links with the urban proletariat insecure.

Landlessness and Emigration

While wage labour opportunities supplemented the marginality of peasant cultivation under conditions of dry farming, outmigration was occasional in Palestine with the total alienation of land following the 1948 war. However, it is not our contention here to imply that marginal farming is causally related to internal (peasant-worker) migration in the same way that land alienation is related to outmigration. In both cases the availability of, and access to, alternative work opportunity both at home and abroad have been crucial determinants of the peasant's relations to his village (and in the case of the peasant refugee, to his camp).

The war of 1948 stripped the Palestinians not only from the bulk of their land (20,850 sq. km. or 77.4 percent of Mandated Palestine) but also from the best agricultural areas. The area that fell to Israeli control after the armistice agreement (1949) included 95% of the "good" soil, 64% of the "medium" soil, and 39% of the "poor" soil (Ruedy, 1971:135). Ruedy, on the basis of calculations made by the Conciliation Commission for Palestine established that 80% of that territory, and 72% of all cultivable land was held by Palestinians who became refugees as a result of the war (ibid.).

Moreover, the loss of land in 1948, and the Palestinian exodus to the West Bank, Gaza, and the neighbouring Arab states, coincided with the dearth of local employment possibilities in Jordan (East and West Bank) during the fifties and sixties - as well as the major pull for skilled and unskilled workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. But it must be noted also that the demographic pressures on the land elicited two other responses to the availability of cheap (refugee camp) labour within the agrarian regime: one was the intensification of share-tenancy contracts among the land hungry former peasants and the depreciation in the cost of agricultural labour during harvest periods. Another was the rejuvenation of uncultivated land in the Jordan Valley. Our hypothesis in this study is that only in intensive farming areas (primarily in irrigated farming) were Palestinian peasants in a position to resist the pull of both wage labour opportunities internally, and alternative employment abroad.

Loss of land, nevertheless, was a major factor in the occupational transformation of village structure on both sides of the armistice lines separating Israel from Jordan after the War (of 1948). The strains of de-peasantisation were particularly severe in the so-called frontier villages whose land was separated from the village residential quarters

(to the village) by the arbitrary drawing of the armistice lines. This occurred in both the Israeli side of the border (particularly in the Triangle region where land was confiscated for Jewish settlements) and in the Jenin and Tulkarem districts of the West Bank, where most fertile plains land fell into Israeli hands (cf. Yacoub, 1976; Cohen, 1965).

Peasant responses to landlessness differed, however, on each side of the new border. On the Israeli side the loss intensified the search for wage labour within the Jewish sector (Cohen, 1965:20-25), especially after the relaxation of military rule in the early sixties. On the Jordanian side, by contrast, outmigration was the natural response to a stagnant economy and differential regional unemployment. In the Nablus district, for example, which had the most significant agricultural sector, unemployment amounted to 23.2% of the civilian labour force (15-24 age categories) in 1961, compared to 17.3% in the Amman district (Hilal, 1975:141). Between 1949 and May 1967 (i.e. before the war) it is estimated that 200,000 people emigrated from the West Bank alone (Löfgren, 1982:11). Of those slightly over 50% went to the East Bank, 40% to other Arab countries (mainly the Gulf states), and less than 10% to non-Arab countries (ibid.).

A study of social change in the border village of Bodros (Ramallah district) carried out on the eve of Israeli occupation shows the dramatic effect of landlessness on occupational structure (Yacoub, 1967). Out of a village total population of 1,250 (1966) about a third (401) had migrated and established residence outside the village (Yacoub, 1967:29-30). But more than half of those migrated to the capital, Amman, in a pattern not typical of the West Bank as a whole, and is related in this case to the high rate of employment in the Jordanian armed forces (army, police and National Guards). Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and South America received the highest rate of migrants from the village (ibid.:30).

Three observations on the changes in the occupational structure in Bodros are relevant here: (1) Migration of younger sons for the purpose of receiving higher education abroad has become a major form of investment by the parents, (2) the two highest branches of external employment were the armed forces (30% of total) and unskilled workers 25%), (3) the village did not seem to support one single family from full time involvement in the family farm (Yacoub, 1967:31-32).

Of equal importance to the loss of land in triggering emigration has been the loss of agricultural markets and employment opportunities in the coastal regions (Lutfiyyeh, 1966:124). But beyond these above observations it seems difficult to generalize on the causes and impact of emigration for the West Bank as a whole without considering inter-regional differences. Here it is important to consider the general wealth of the community (and the ability of its migrant members to sustain extended searches for work abroad; its connections abroad (the ability to receive emigrants and accommodate their needs during periods of search); the local viability of agriculture (thus we note lower rates of migration in the Nablus district with its richer agriculture, than in Ramallah and Hebron districts); and even the religion of the village (Christians, possibly due to their earlier exposure to secular education by missionary school, have had higher rates of migration). Equally important to <u>regional</u> differentiation are various responses to migration patterns <u>within</u> village households.

<u>Migration and Household Status</u>

Lutfiyyeh's claim that the earliest migrations took place among the poorest households and the landless (1965:122) is not supported by the evidence. It is more likely that lower status households with some

land and sufficient number of sons sought to improve their status by sending the younger sons for education and the older to send remittances. Farsoun's observation, for Lebanon, that a considerable investment in migration is necessary for the family applies equally well for the Palestinian village migrant peasant (Farsoun, 1970:270-271).

The crucial questions to ask in determining the form of migration patterns in the West Bank from our perspective are the following: (1) Are there already members of the village community in the prospective host country with which the emigrant can establish links? (2) Does the emigrant have immediate kin members who can extend to him credit and facilities to establish himself in the new environment? (3) Are the employment opportunities at home, given the potential migrants' skills, provide considerably lower incentives than similar opportunities abroad? (4) Does the family have sufficient immediate members to stay at home and take care of the land and older relatives who remain in the village?

Aside from the controversy as to which status households are likely to initiate the emigration steps it seems that there are definite ecological determinants of migration. The highly arid and marginalized lands in the Ramallah and Bethlehem regions has given rise to earlier, and more intensive emigration than, for example, in Nablus (Migdal, 1980:58). Incentives for education and professional advancement are tied to the general standard of living and earlier exposure to secular education at home. In general, however, the pattern described for the Muslim village of Baytin seems to apply for the West Bank as a whole: men migrate alone in search of employment or business ventures; they periodically return and invest their acquired savings in building new homes and consolidating their landed property. On rare occasions they invest in small enterprises in the village (such as a shop, an olive press, or a flour mill) in preparation

for retirement (Lutfiyyeh, 1965:122-123).

The rural class structure, with its relative homogeneity, has been significantly affected by emigration patterns, most particularly during the period of Jordanian rule (1948-1967). In this respect Migdal's definition of lower status in the village to encompass "those who neither owned land, nor had relatives abroad" holds (Migdal, 1980:64). Furthermore, landlessness, resulting from war dispossession, affected the collective perception of villages who became the recipients of refugees, and compelled many peasants, including those who still have some land, to seek alternative possibilities for their livelihood. Thus, in the border village of Bodros, which lost 3,250 acres of its cultivable land in the war, agriculture ceased to be an option:

> With the loss of more than 3/4 of the land acreage which they owned, the villagers' perception of the land as ability to support themselves was changed. They no longer considered the small acreage left as the important ability element for making a decent living. This new situation created pressures on the system to look for new opportunities as alternative solutions since the villagers perceived regaining the land which was lost beyond their ability. (Yacoub, 1967:27)

Returning emigrants, especially those who have acquired sufficient capital, often emerge as a new force in the village. At the early stages of migration the money acquired was used by relatives to "pay their debts, reclaim the lands they had mortgaged in order to raise money for the fares of the emigrants ... and to build new homes." (Lutfiyyeh, 1966:124). But at a later stage enough money was accumulated in the hands of migrants to set themselves as a distinct stratum, often threatening the position of the traditional leadership. Perhaps we can distinguish here three types of consequences of migration on social structure.

One, in which the emigrants and their relatives at home originate from the lowest segment of the peasantry, and those sections of the medium-sized holders who eventually accumulate enough wealth to challenge the position, life-style and hegemony of the traditional potentates in the village. In Baytin, which seems to fit into this pattern, the returning emigrants even physically moved into a separate quarter (Lutfiyyeh, 1966: 20, 27). Similar situations occur in Birzeit, Taybeh and Bituniah villages - all in the Ramallah district.

A second type occurs when the earlier migrations occur among the wealthier peasants, those with connections in the urban centres and with enough money to support the initial settlement and search for employment abroad. This seems to be the case among the Bani Zeid villages discussed below. In those cases the upper stratum peasant families, particularly during Jordanian rule, were able to reinforce their hegemony and even extend their landholdings through the remittances sent to their relatives from abroad.

A third type of migration is one not associated with any differentiation among peasant classes but is relevant to the household composition within the family itself: that is the number of sons and relative that can be 'spared' by the household. Since this feature of migration applies to the first two types discussed as well, its distinguishing feature is the destination to which migrants head to. The high migration rates to the Gulf states which took place in the 1960s and 1970s, fall within this category. In contrast to the Americas, the short distance and relatively modest savings required for migration to the Gulf, made it possible for poorer migrants, but also for professionals and skilled workers, to establish themselves temporarily in the Gulf and return to the village periodically.

Diagram 1 provides a summary of those 3 categories:

Diagram 1

A Typology of Migration Patterns and

Its Social Consequences

	Village Stratum	Destiny	Consequences for Village Class Structure
Type 1	Upper Peasantry	US-Latin America	Reinforce hegemony of landed elites
Type 2	Middle and lower peasantry	Latin America	Challenges to traditional Elites
Type 3	All Stratum	Gulf and Arab world	Homogeneity in Village Class Structure

Migration for work and migration for the education of family members are not, of course, unrelated. It had become the pattern, in those peasant households that can afford it, to squeeze their initial savings from their own income and from their family's. This pattern of long-term "investment in education" can explain the fact that Palestinians, who constitute about 2% of the Arab population in the Middle East, constitute no less than 10% of the professionals and skilled high level manpower in the region (Zahlan and Zahlan, 1977:104).

Only with the appearance of alternative income sources on a large scale, after the Israeli occupation of 1967, did the impact of emigration begin to subside as the main factor affecting social differentiation. But this change had a significant effect on the composition of the rural household. In her study on the village of Ballata (Nablus district) during the 1970's Ammons found that while internal migration (for wage labour in the

West Bank and Israel) was a force towards nucleization and fission of the extended family, outmigration resulted by contrast in strengthening the extended family (Ammons, 1979:213). Emigrants tended to leave their wives and children in charge of their parents (wife's in-laws) for extended periods of time, and whatever remittances they sent contributed to the preservation and strengthening the patriarchal household. By contrast peasant-workers, by residing in the village and commuting daily to their work, established an independent income base which relatively freed them from dependence on the extended household. The result was a process of "screening" by which the more skilled and professional members of the community migrated abroad and were cut-off from the village after the 1967 war, while the less skilled members became workers in Israel. The loss of skilled migrants had a conservative effect on the village as a whole since it removed those educated and innovative segments in the community who may have been a force of change under occupation (Ammons, 1979:224). It also led to a "radical re-assessment of occupational priorities" because of the risks involved in emigration and in investing the family's savings in the education of their sons (ibid.). The implications of Ammons' analysis is quite serious for the present adaptation strategy to dislocation among West Bank villagers. Since the possibilities of providing a professional training for their sons (and daughters) is outside the scope and abilities of most peasant families and since the remuneration from whitecollar jobs is no longer (even marginally) competitive with that obtained from unskilled wage labour, then why bother to invest in higher education at all?

The drain on skilled and educated cadres, with its conservative consequences for West Bank villages,has been compounded by what seems to be a willful policy on the part of the Israeli military government to block the return of landowners' sons and other family members in order to forestall the emergence of a rural oppositional leadership (Migdal, 1980: 67). In fact, the policy of selective admission of Palestinians abroad under the Family Reunion Scheme has been implemented by the military government in the West Bank with the aim of strengthening and obtaining reciprocal favours from those very traditional elements in rural Palestinian society whose authority was being eroded by the repercussions of migration and wage labour discussed above.

Outmigration in most likelihood will continue to play a major role in transforming the lives of Palestinian villagers in the West Bank. But while its form and destination has been erratic, responding to the general decline in the labour market abroad, internal migration (to Israel) has had a steady pull over peasants and a much more homogeneizing consequences on village social structure over the last 15 years. To these patterns we shall now turn.

Chapter Seven

The Peasant Household and Wage Labour in Israel

> It is clearly to the advantage of the mines that native labourers should be encouraged to return to their homes after the completion of the ordinary period of service. The maintenance of the system under which the mines are able to obtain unskilled labour at a rate less than ordinarily paid in industry depends upon this, for otherwise the subsidiary means of subsistence would disappear and the labourer would tend to become a permanent resident upon the Witwatersrand, with increased requirements...
>
> Evidence to the Witwatersrand Native Mine Wage Commission (21/1944)/Wolpe (1972:434).

> 'I remained in the village [his own village] for about 15 days when a person from Kalkilia, Husein Abu Aba, a contractor, came and engaged 20 persons and me among them, to work in stone cutting near Kalkilia. I worked there for 20 days. On finishing the work I returned to Silet el Dahr. I stayed three days in the village when Amin Umrad of my family received a letter from Dib el Kaled of Tyre, a contractor, living in Haifa, asking him to come with 2 workmen to work in Haifa. I proceeded to Haifa where I worked for the said contractor in the drainage (sic) for about a month. I left then in order to return to my village and buy corn for the family.'
>
> Abdul Rahim Abu Diyyak; Police Interrogation Record concerning involvement in Guerrilla activities, May 2, 1938; Tegart Papers/Graham-Brown (1980:80).

Changes in the character of the Palestinian village resulting from external work opportunities (in Israel, the Gulf, the Americas, and urban centres within the occupied territories) has been the subject of several recent studies.

The dominant theme of those studies has been to demonstrate the growth of a new rural-based proletariat as a result of Israel's economic annexation of the West Bank and Gaza; or its opposite, a process of declassment (Hilal, 1975; Zureik, 1976, 1979; Graham-Brown, 1979; Samara, 1979). Unlike earlier studies dealing with the formation of a rural proletariat in mandatory Palestine (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974; Taqqu, 1980) or in the Galilee under Israeli rule (Cohen, 1965) those present works focus primarily on the colonial aspect of this class relationship. Moreover, the controversy of the policy implication of employing Arabs within the Israeli economy consider its effects on Israeli social structure as well (Hilal, 1975:255-258; Farjoun, 1975; Bregman, 1976; Van Arkadie, 1977). Farjoun, for example, sees the Palestinian labour force as performing two important functions for the Israeli economy today:

1. As a non-organized sector of the work force it grants the Israeli economy a significant range of flexibility during periods of crises, allowing it to lay off surplus labour during recessions, and to recruit workers at will -- during economic booms -- without being hampered by trade union restrictions.

2. The Arab labour force contributed to the strengthening of the Jewish private bourgeoisie in its conflict with the Histadrut-controlled industries and with the state bureaucracy, without the latter being able to mobilize the Jewish work force against the effects of unorganized Arab labour since their own industries (i.e. the public sector's) will be affected as well (Farjoun, 1979:3).

Unfortunately, although we have a substantial amount of data on the aggregate number of Arab workers in the Israeli economy, and its role in the structure of the Jewish sector, very little is known on the process of "internal migration" and its impact on the rural household and village society (cf. Migdal, 1980:54-77). One significant exception is the work of Linda Ammons on social change in the village of Ballata (Nablus District) during the early seventies (Ammons,1978). Her study assesses the influence of several factors -- including wage-labour, pressures on land and water resources, migration, and the policies of the Military Government -- on changes in the village occupational-class structure.

A key factor affecting those occupational changes in Ammons' work is the availability of new employment patterns and land leasing possibilities as alternatives to income from agriculture (only 6% of Ballata's labour force was employed in agriculture in 1974). These new patterns and possibilities were generated by the village's integration into the periphery of Nablus and its attachment to the Ballata refugee camp built on nearby village land (Ammons, 1978:105-157; 236-239).

Those conclusions, however, have their limitations for understanding rural change in the West Bank as a whole. Land in Ballata, being in the commercial suburbs of Nablus, has become important as real estate than for agriculture, and has led to the emergence of a new stratum of land speculators and rentiers (who lease land to refugee farmers), a phenomenon which applies only to the rural periphery of the big towns. Such a situation, although relevant to a substantial area in the region, still leaves unexamined the type of relationship which obtains in over 70% of villages in the West Bank which do not constitute the immediate hinterland of the urban centres.

Peculiarities of "Internal Migration" in the West Bank

Work opportunities outside the village are, of course, not new to the Palestinian village. There were two other important "pull" periods when peasants, in tens of thousands, left their homes in search of employment. One was the demand in the public sector (railroads, public construction and army camps) during the British Mandate, especially during the early years of World War II (Taqqu, 1980:266-275); the other was during the sixties, under Jordanian rule, when both the state sector, the army, and work opportunities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States again uprooted Palestinian villagers from their land (Hilal, 1975:90-106; Yacoub, 1967: 29-30). This was also the period of the great movement of migrant-labour in the Third World towards metropolitan centres both in their own countries and to Western Europe and Australia.

There are several features which distinguish the situation of West Bank rural migrants (and to a lesser extent those in the Gaza district and the Galilee) from that of rural migrants to Europe, and from a majority of peasant-workers in the metropoles of the Third World (Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta, Cairo, Tehran, etc.). Most significant among those features are:

1. The physical proximity of Palestinian peasants to Israeli work centres which allow them to continue their relationship (albeit an alternative one) to their land, and in village social life. In effect they are commuting workers rather than migrants.

2. The class-, or potential class-, identity of Palestinian workers in Israel is constantly being modified by their ethnic identity; by the daily confrontation with Jewish contractors, bosses, workers and Israeli culture in general - much more than would be the impact in the case of Turkish peasant-workers in Germany, for example.

3. This class factor, as we shall see, is complicated by the preponderance of Palestinian village workers in one particular branch of Israeli employment, construction, which imposes certain work processes, modes of promotion and mobility, and general work instability.

4. The mode of recruitment of Arab labour in Israeli enterprises is much less institutionalized, and therefore, much more subject to purely market forces and hence exploitation by labour contractors - both Arab and Jewish - and Israeli bosses than is the case with European migrant workers. This is especially the case in the construction sector where the fragmentary nature of the work force, and the presence of "illegal workers" (i.e. circumventing labour exchanges) prevail. Some control over these factors of manipulation (market forces and contractors) seem to come only from the efforts of organized Jewish labour to project itself from the wage-depressant impact of unorganized Arab labour over its standard of living.[1] Arab self-organization has so far played little or no role in this regard.

Palestinian Rural Workers in Israel: an Overview

A considerable body of data on Palestinian wage-workers has been accumulated in the last ten years by official Israeli sources. Although some of this data, especially that involving employment outside labour exchanges, is of questionable value, there is no alternative source of information for the area as a whole.

The most useful and detailed source of statistics for our subject is derived from the household surveys which are carried out periodically by the Central Bureau of Statistics, monitoring changes in employment patterns, family composition, household items, agricultural production, etc.

One of the most problematic aspects of rural labour in the West Bank concerns the increased marginalization of the family farm associated with work opportunities outside the village. By "marginalization" we refer to the manner in which the income of rural household from agriculture and agriculture-related activities have been superceded by other sources of income. We may mention here, in addition to wage-labour, five other factors acting as determinants of land marginalization: (a) the productive capacity of the land (primarily whether it involves irrigated or dry farming, and the possibilities for mechanization); (b) the fragmentation of land due to demographic pressures (partible inheritance, etc...); (c) increased remunerations from family members abroad; (d) the number of household members who can be "spared" for work in the family form, especially women and children; (e) the stability of the peasant's tenure and potential exposure to land confiscation by the military authorities.

The search for a "plot viable" during the British Mandate in which a hypothetical average peasant household could find self-sufficiency in agriculture proved to be illusory in the years preceding the war of 1948 (Hope Simpson, 1930:60-67; Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974:473). It is even more illusory today when only a minority of rural households, and only 24.1% of the total population in 1979, live on income derived from agriculture (State of Israel, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 1980: 21). This is not to say, however, as we shall argue below, that the family farm has become insignificant; merely that it has acquired a new and subsidiary dimension in the peasant's life.

In this context it seems that the overriding variable in the marginalization of land, aside from plot fragmentation, is the pull of wage labour. In the West Bank today only peasants in irrigated farming (which constitutes about 4% of the total cultivable land) seem to have resisted the pull of opportunities of employment outside the villages (Tamari, 1980: 31-34).

Official statistics show (Table 7:1) that about a third of the total rural population (36.5%) as having no "external" basis of support (i.e. remittances from abroad, welfare payment, etc...) aside from their farm income and family wage labour. Out of 66 thousand families in the rural sector (about 64% of the total population) 12.9 thousand families (12% of the population) have no members of the households as income earners - that is, belonging to the labour force. From the data we also note that slightly <u>over half the total rural families</u> as not having any agricultural land or access to land, whatsoever.

Table 7:1

Rural Families in the West Bank, by Number of Earners, Cultivation of an Agricultural Farm, and Receiving External Support, 1973-1974

	Rural Population				Total Population			
	No. of village families				Total families			
	No. of earners				No. of earners			
	0	1	2+	Total	0	1	2+	Tot
Total (000)	12.9	33.2	19.7	65.7	17.6	53.7	30.4	101
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
A farm and support	8.7	8.7	12.2	11.9	14.8	6.1	9.2	8
Support only	13.3	13.3	10.2	21.0	63.6	23.8	19.7	29
A farm only	32.8	32.8	58.4	36.5	9.7	21.4	40.1	25
Neither farm nor support	54.2	45.2	19.3	30.7	11.9	48.6	30.9	37

Source: "Families in the Administered Territories," Central Bureau of Statistics, ATSQ, vol. VI:1, May 1976.

Such a high figure, in a region where landlessness among peasants is not acute, is explained by the fact that the refugee population living in encampments outside urban municipalities is subsumed under "rural" population. Of the total rural population that do have land, or access to land (i.e. 48.4% of total rural families in Table 7:1), about 5,400 families do not have any income other than family labour in their own farms. Thus about 5% of rural households in the West Bank, and about 8% of the total families (urban, rural and refugees) -- if we are to trust the above figures -- derive their livelihood from family farms.[2]

Although distinction must be made between those households deriving their livelihood from family farms and between wage labour involved in agriculture most official data, to the extent that they count small holders within the civilian labour force do not make such distinction and collapse both categories under the "agricultural sector." Table 7:1 is an exception but does not reveal much about the number of wage workers within the agricultural system.[3] All the trends however, show a decline in the number of both agricultural workers and household members involved in their family farms. This is caused by two opposite features of contemporary Palestinian agriculture: increased productivity in some lands due to the introduction of technology, and marginalization of hilly lands due to negligence. As a consequence the most dramatic changes in the West Bank labour force has taken place in the agriculture sector. Between the years 1968-1976 the region witnessed a drop of 10,600 workers employed in agriculture: thus while in 1968 half the total labour force was involved in agriculture, in 1976 it constituted only 26.1%, a decline of 28.9% (Awartani, 1978:6).

Out of a total of 213,000 employed from the occupied territories in 1978, about 143,000 -- roughly two-thirds of the labour force -- worked inside the territories (Gaza and the West Bank) and 68,000 (about one-third) worked inside Israel. Table BII(appendix) shows the distribution of those employed by economic branch. The main difference in the distribution of the labour force between those working "at home" and the internal migrants working in Israel is reflected in the exceptionally large figure for those working in Israeli construction (46% from the West Bank, and 44.3% from Gaza) compared to only 15.2% of the labour force in the West Bank and Gaza employed in local construction (SLFAT, 1979). Despite a slight decline in the percentage of workers employed in construction their aggregate number

more than trippled between 1970 and 1979, from 11,200 to 34,400 workers (FSAA:23, Table 6).

The Peasant's Household

A clarification is necessary here on the use of the term "peasant's household" as a unit of analysis. The Israeli census data defines a household simply as "persons who live together in the same dwelling and take meals together" (Israel CBS, 1967:XXXIII). This is in line with the concept of a peasant's household developed by the famous Survey of Arab Villages in 1944 conducted by the Mandatory regime where the household was defined as "a family or group of people living together in the same quarters and having the same cooking arrangements" (Government of Palestine, 1945:9). Besides the core group that definition included "relatives, permanent agriculturer labourers and servants living and eating with the family." In the actual count however, non-blood relatives (including resident workers) were excluded (ibid.).

The decline of the average peasant household from 6.1 members in 1944 to 5.0 in the 1967 census (Government of Palestine, 1945:9; Israel CBS, 1967:37, Table 1) reflects the nucleisation of the residential unit rather than a decline in fertility, since net growth in rural population has actually increased, given the lower infant mortality rates. However, these averages are of little help for the purposes of this study since what we are concerned with is the continued functioning of the extended peasant family as a unit even after it becomes residentially nucliated. Cohen (1965), Rosenfeld (1972), and Nakhleh (1975) have shown, using different interpretations, how the Palestinian extended family in the Galilee (Israel) have been reinforced as a result of political manipulation by the regime of traditional hamula alliances. The situation in

the West Bank is somewhat different to the extent the structure of the peasant household has been dismembered by large scale migration abroad. Ammons (1978) has shown how the differential impact of emigration and internal community of peasant workers has had unanticipated, and contradictory, consequences for the peasant household. While the former, migration abroad, contributed to the strengthening of the extended unit and a conservative social outlook among the remaining family members; the latter (internal commuting) hastened the process of breakup and nucleization, in part because younger bread winners in the family established an independent source of earning from their fathers (Ammons, 1978:213, 219).

The adaptation of the peasant household to land marginalization and to the loss of family members to work opportunities abroad as we shall see below in the case of Ras el-Tin, has been variable and dependent often on the initiative of the head of household to maintain his sons involvement in agriculture. The size of the plot in hilly dry farming seems immaterial to this continued cohesion of the extended family since beyond a certain limit the land is usually farmed out on a share-cropping basis. We will suggest here three factors that continue to bind residentially nucleiated extended households: (1) the ability of the patriarch to reconcile his married sons' urges (and now ability) to break away from their parental bonds with his appeal for their help in working the land during periods of heavy demand for agricultural work; (2) the degree to which remuneration from wage labour and remittances leads the whole family to neglect the land and live as <u>rentiers</u>. In this case, as Ammons has noted for Ballata, the extended family is augmented by wives and children of emigrants' abroad and the traditional authority of the patriarch is strengthened regardless of his relationship to the land; (3) the ability of the head of the household to harness the labour of

the wives and children of migrant household members to work on the family farm or in related family enterprises. It should be noted that the term "head of household" no longer applies exclusively to the patriarch, or even to the male head, since extended absences by husbands, brothers and fathers frequently leave women in command of household affairs.[4]

We leave aside here the impact of women seeking work outside the village (and the family farm) on the structure of the rural household, since the aggregate number of rural women involved in wage labour is too small to warrant generalization (less than 5% of the total - Israel Ministry of Labour, 1980:26, Table 12), while where there is an increase in female employment it seems to occur in the vicinity of refugee camps - that is, in areas of least access to family farms.

Rural Labour and Work in Israel

Arab workers from the occupied territories working in Israel are still, after almost 15 years of occupation, in their overwhelming majority unskilled (performing menial labour in construction, industry and the services, unorganized, and are therefore, unstable in their work tenure. Furthermore, considerable wage disparities continue to exist between Arab and Jewish workers within the same sectors amounting to 40% on the average (Farjoun, 1978:21).

Recent surveys of the Arab labour force in Israel show an uneven distribution of the work force by sector as well as by region. Over 40% of the labour force continues to work in construction, as against 25% in industry and 15% in services. There is an increasing tendency for young West Bank workers to take their first employment in Israel (55% of all workers in 1978). In the last few years there has been also a tendency of workers to stay longer in their jobs compared with the first decade of

occupation. For example, 40% of all workers spent more than two years in their jobs, and 28% for more than three years. Moreover, corresponding to the concentration of Arab workers in construction and industry, we find the largest proportion of workers employed in Tel Aviv and its suburbs (about 50%), (QSAT 1978, viii:2).

How do rural workers figure in those aggregates? Table 7:2 gives us an indication of the weight and distribution of Palestinian workers in Israel originating from villages, compared to those coming from towns and refugee camps.

Table 7:2

West Bank Workers Employed in Israel by Type of Settlement and Economic Sector, 1978

Sector	Total (000)	Percentages				Total (000)	Cities	Villages	Camp
		Total	From cities	From villages	From camps				
Total (000)	36.8	X	X	X	X	36.8	4.4	28.5	3.9
Percentages	X	100.0	12.1	77.3	10.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	4.1	100.0	(4.7)	83.3	(12.0)	11.4	(4.5)	12.3	(12.8)
Industry	8.7	100.0	(19.5)	70.2	(10.3)	23.6	(38.7)	21.5	(23.1)
Construction	16.7	100.0	(7.2)	82.0	(10.8)	46.0	(27.3)	48.2	(46.2)
Other	7.3	100.0	(18.8)	70.6	(10.6)	19.0	(29.5)	18.0	(17.9)

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, QSAT, vol. IX:2, November 1979, Table 17. Figures in brackets refer to projections from small samples.

The patterns that emerge here show significant differences between urban and rural workers. While rural workers constitute 77.9% of the total labour force working in Israel, they still constitute a higher portion of those workers in construction (82%) or agriculture (83.3%). Conversely, out of the 28,500 workers from villages who work in Israel, about half (48.2%) work in construction, contrasted with their employment in industry (21.5%) or agriculture (12.3%). Industry, on the other hand is the main occupation of urban-based workers (38.7%), while only about a quarter (27.3%) work in construction. Only workers originating from refugee camps show similar patterns to those of village workers.

How does this sectoral distribution of employment in Israel compare with employment inside the West Bank? Unfortunately, in the data that are available, refugee camps are statistically collapsed within the two population groups within which they live. But since employment patterns of refugees in Israel correspond roughly to villagers employed in Israel, the distortion is likely to appear in urban figures only, if at all. Table B (appendix) shows significantly different patterns of sectoral distribution of employment inside the West Bank for both urban and rural workers. In the cities the three primary branches of employment are industry (27.2%), commerce, and public services (each 20.6%). In the rural sector agriculture, as expected, occupies 40% of total employment, followed by construction (24%) and industry (12.9%) (QSAT, IX:2 1979, Table 12, 130). Thus we find that industry (for urban-based workers), and construction (for villagers) are respectively the main areas of common employment for those working on both sides of the Green Line.

What makes employment in construction the mainstay of village workers and in such a manner that it has kept a consistent pace over the

last 15 years of occupation? Traditionally, Arab construction, which constituted a job with an elaborate hierarchy of skills and stages of initiation, has been transformed by Israeli building firms into a relatively mechanized industry with a tremendous thirst for unskilled labour. This development took place at an especially rapid pace after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza when an economic boom coincided with high demand for immigrant housing (for Jews) and the influx of tens of thousands of unskilled, cheap and politically powerless labourers. This demand for building workers withstood the economic recession during the years 1974-1978 (including the recession in the building sector), and, it seems, the more recent slowdown of economic activities beginning in 1980. (Jerusalem Post, January 31, 1979; Al-Quds March 26, 1980).

The Significance of "Marginal Farming"

But the Israeli demand for building workers is not sufficient to explain the uneven distribution of rural workers in construction. As will be seen in the case of Ras el-Tin village, there is a definite relationship between the nature of construction work in Israel and the demands for marginal farming in the Palestinian village. If we collapse those households whose earners depend on their farm only with those dependent on "farm and support" (Table 7:1, above) we obtain a total of 41.5% of total households whose income is supplemented by farming (albeit in declining proportions) - a sizeable proportion of the West Bank rural population by any standard. For those households it is important to have their breadwinners employed in jobs from which they can be released periodically when agricultural work in the family farm demands it. The building trades in their modes of recruitment (reliance on family connections, short-term employment, lack of basic skills, etc...), and the preponderance

of small and medium-sized sites, are quite suitable for the village worker who insists on maintaining his links with the land.

Land to the peasant -- even to the "proletarianized peasants" of the West Bank -- is not primarily real estate (although, as Linda Ammons has shown, it has become so in the peripheries of the main towns) but as security. Security in this context has three meanings:

First, it supplements his cash earnings from wage labour with both as means of subsistence, and extra cash crops by which he improves his standard of living.

Second, "the land is always there," in case he is laid off from work or is compelled to remain unemployed for a long period in search of work. In this sense the worker's land, like his family, is his last resort.

Third, the family farm constitutes the worker's physical and symbolic link with his immediate community, and hence with peasant culture in general. The common saying that "he who has no land, has no honour" (illi ma 'ilu ard, ma ilu ^{c}ard) is thus not merely an expression of patriotic attachment, but reflects in the peasant's mind the central axis around which the village work cycle, his relationship with his brothers, sisters, parents and cousins, as well as his family's visible source of livelihood, revolve.

However, the security generated by the peasant-worker's possession of land or access to land (in case members of his family are share-croppers) should not disguise the declining role of the family farm in the worker's life, at least as long as levels of high employment in Israel persist. One would expect thus that long-term dependence by the farmer's family on income from wage-labour and from stipends sent by emigrants

abroad would create new consumption patterns, new life-styles, etc., which would weaken his direct involvement with cultivation. The empirical data that we have on this subject is far from conclusive, but after more than a decade of occupation some trends have begun to appear. Table 7:3 indicates correlations between the length of employment in Israel, the field of employment, and the extent of cultivation of family land.

Table 7:3

West Bank Workers in Israel who are Heads of Households, According to the Cultivation of Land and Seniority of Work in Israel, 1977

	Cultivation of Land				Percentages		
	Total	Land cultivated	Land not cultivated	Total (000)	Total	Land cultivated	Land not cultivated
		(thousands)					
tal	20.7	6.2	14.5	20.7	X	X	X
esent Economic inch		(percentages)					
otal	100.0	100.9	100.0	X	100.0	30.0	70.0
griculture	(9.2)	(14.3)	(7.0)	(1.9)	100.0	(46.8)	(53.2)
ndustry	22.7	(19.1)	24.4	4.7	100.0	(25.1)	74.9
onstruction	48.0	50.6	46.7	9.9	100.0	31.7	68.3
ther	20.1	16.0	21.9	4.1	100.0	(23.9)	76.1
iority in k							
otal	100.0	100.0	100.0	20.7	100.0	30.0	70.0
) - 2	(3.9)	(4.9)	(3.5)	(0.8)	100.0	(37.6)	(62.4)
- 4	22.5	(25.4)	21.3	4.6	100.0	33.6	66.2
4+	73.6	69.7	75.2	15.1	100.0	28.4	71.6

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, QSAT, vol. VIII:2, page 113, Table 8.

The rural West Bank, it must be remembered, has a preponderance of owner-cultivators and almost an absence of an agricultural proletariat. It is striking, therefore, to find that among heads of households employed in Israel, 70% do not cultivate a piece of land.[5] Furthermore, among those presently employed in construction -- who are in the majority -- there seems to be a higher tendency (31.7%) to cultivate a family plot (the only exception being in the case of those currently employed in agriculture, but the size of the sample here is not big enough to warrant comparisons).

Perhaps the most significant correlation in table 7:3 is between work seniority and the tendency to cultivate land. The longer the years the worker spends employed in Israel, the less likely he is to cultivate his plot; and conversely, among those who have spent less than two years employed in Israel we find the highest rate of land cultivation (37.6%). This is the first concrete evidence obtained linking length of wage-labour employment in Israel with increased negligence of the family farm in the West Bank. Thus although we will be demonstrating in the case of Ras el-Tin the continued importance of marginal land for those workers who have been employed for years outside their village, it is important to note that, for the West Bank as a whole, land has a declining role for rural wage-earners. This condition is likely to continue as long as high levels of employment in Israel are available for Palestinian workers, and as long as there is a pull for migrant labour in Jordan and the neighbouring Arab countries.

Notes

1. Within the construction sector, however, Israeli workers have been demanding Histadrut and government intervention against the employment of workers from the West Bank and Gaza. In a convention of Israeli construction workers held in June 1980, delegates held that the cheapness of Arab labour created a situation whereby "Israelis who do not hold permanent jobs with construction companies would find themselves in the streets while West Bank and Gaza Strip workers are retained." ("Building Workers Demand End to Cheap Arab Labour," Jerusalem Post, June 17, 1980).

2. The basis of calculation for those figures is as follows: those households listed as having "farm and support" and "farm only" amount together to 48.4% of the total rural household. Within those two categories 41.5% (i.e. 8.7% + 32.8%) or 5.400 households are listed as having no ("0") earners. From this I deduce subsistence on farm income. The paradox of 8% urban families living from farm income can be explained by the fact that many urban localities in the West Bank have garden plots in their periphery. Hebron is an outstanding example.

3. Similarly the work of women and children is not counted as productive labour and therefore, is left out of data on the civilian labour force.

4. In the 1967 census "small villages" in the West Bank had 723 males for every 1000 females present in the 15-44 age category, and 820 males for every 1000 females for "large villages" (CBS, 1967:37, Table 1).

5. The data does not actually clarify whether the land cultivated is owned by the earner or not, but it seems to be an assumption on the part of the tabulators that owner-cultivators are involved.

PART III

VILLAGE CASE STUDIES

In this part of the thesis (Chapters 8 to 12), I will discuss the concrete manifestations of elements of the agrarian transition discussed above in village studies conducted in the central highlands and the Jordan Valley in the mid-seventies and in 1980. Of the four villages examined here, in only two (Zbeidat and Natufa) were data obtained on the basis of full household surveys. Administrative problems, including the need for military permits, prevented me from extending the survey to the other two villages. In those, I relied on interviews, informants, and - in the case of Ras el-Tin - extensive structured interviews with commuting peasant-workers which were crucial in explaining the phenomenon of peasant-proletarianization in this study. I was especially fortunate in obtaining cadasteral land surveys for the villages of Marj Na'je and Zbeidat since, as any student of agrarian conditions knows, information obtained exclusively from farmers pertaining to land ownership and use tends to be of dubious reliability if not checked against accurate land records.

The most pressing methodological problem emerged in the choice of the villages selected. This occurred at two levels. There is, on the one hand, the broader conceptual problem involved in locating variables of agrarian change at the level of the village as a unit of analysis, as opposed to inter-village formations, or smaller units such as the farm-stead or the peasant household. At the second level, there is the problem of representation, and the whole constellation of methodological issues connected with 'typicality' in village taxonomies.

The first, conceptual, problem was resolved by first introducing and

analysing the broad structural dimensions of agrarian change. Intra-village variables and trends such as 'class', 'faction', wage labour, migration patterns, and other demographic variables were discussed at the level of the social formation - stressing emergent features of rural change as they are exemplified in their aggregate quantitative dimension. Here, breakdowns were made at the regional, ecological, administrative, and even village level, but only - at least in the village cases - for purposes of illustration. Village case studies could then be introduced after the contextual framework has been established.

It was suggested in Chapter 1 (p.) that the village unit constitutes the most appropriate unit for examining variables of change in the rural sector. There are practical and theoretical justifications for this assumption. The practical aspect relates to the fact that the village is the basic unit of administrative and statistical data. Official population figures, cadasteral land surveys, periodic household surveys, and a host of other demographic data most frequently are broken down only up to the village level, but very rarely go beyond it. It follows from the administrative definition of the village area that a number of organizational contingencies impose themselves in reality, such as transport routes, local budgets, marketing networks, and the regional allocation of resources.

Conceptually, the village is a 'bounded unit' in the eyes of its inhabitants, as well as in the eyes of the outsiders. To use the language of classical sociology, it is the arena of 'aggregates.... united by a cluster of intensive, multifunctional, exclusive, and persistent face to face relations' (Shanin, 1972b:357). One of the most compelling reasons for this 'boundedness' of the village community lies in the persistence, in most third world rural communities, of kinship units as a basic organizational principle, and the almost infinite

adaptability of the family farm to various forms of re-structuration of agrarian relations (cf. e.g. Stavenhagen, 1975:149-150). In Palestinian peasant communities, village-bounded kinship networks are crucial in identifying patterns of internal differentiation (as in the case of Ras el-Tin, in this case putative lineage), or homogeneity (as in the case of Zbeidat). Even when kinship patterns cut across a number of village communities and relate them to each other, lineage organisation internal to the peasant community acts as the more decisive variable in such basic mechanisms of agrarian transition as recruitment of village labour by urban contractors (Chapter 7), and landlord-peasant share compacts (Chapter 11).

The second level of methodological problematic raises the issue of the representative character of the village chosen. A village ethnograph, written in the framework of traditional social anthropology, pauses its own rationale. Its main concern usually is to interpret the cultural attributes of broader society embedded in the village at the micro-level. Its main concern lies in choosing a community that is not seen as excessively 'deviant' in its socio-economic structure. On the other extreme of the disciplinary spectrum we have rural studies of the agronomic and 'developmental' nature, where statistical representation and problems of 'typicality' become primary. The solution in such studies is to establish an elaborate taxonomy on the basis of a weighted complex of socio-economic indices reflecting the components of variables to be analyzed, and then proceed to locate a number of rural communities which constitute the randomly selected 'types' within a classification system thus established (cf. e.g. Rudra et al., 1978:1-36).

But this study is neither ethnographic nor agronomic in its approach. Its disciplinary perspective is, broadly speaking, that of rural sociology. While it shares with the above disciplines a methodological

concern for representation, it is not pre-occupied with the issue of 'typicality' in the choice of sample villages. In their study of village survey methodologies, Lipton and Moore (1972) identify two general objections to surveys based on village types. One has to do with the village as being a proper 'behavioural unit'; the other is related to village types ignoring the 'external environment' of village society, that is, the contextual aspects of internal village changes (Lipton and Moore, 1972:9-10). By 'appropriate behaviour unit' is meant that villagers' behaviour may not often be determined by factors solely bounded by the village system. To that extent, this issue is related to the second, contextual objection. To the extent that there is an issue as to the appropriateness of attributing villagers' behaviour to a particular type of village system and our ability to generalize from it to other units within the same taxonomy, the matter becomes subject to empirical investigation. In that case, the problem has a distinct circular angle to it.

As far as the contextual environment is concerned, this study has attempted to avoid the opposite problem: an <u>excess</u> of contextualization. In particular, I have tried not to replicate and subsume at the village level, structural features of the rural sector that I have described and analyzed from the general statistical data. The village unit cannot be treated as the reduced, micro-organism of aggregate rural society. Rather, it is seen here as the crucible which, in the words of Keydar, mediates and articulates the linkages of the agrarian structure to that of the peasant household, and other village inhabitants.

In discussing the choice of Zbeidat for conducting a household survey (Introduction to Chapter 11), I mention another sense in which the notion of 'typicality' appears, sociologically speaking, as a false issue. If we are referring to a proper quantitative taxonomy of village

types, then 'typicality refers to the statistical averaging of disparate aspects of agrarian structure which can nowhere be seen in a concrete representative village'. Furthermore, once we go beyond representation in the sense of population size, land area, and age-sex composition, regional and historical specificites begin to impose a virtually limitless criteria of choice on the researcher.

In what sense, then, is this study concerned with the issue of representation in the choice of village cases? There is, firstly, the negative anthropological concern, referred to above, of avoiding 'freak' cases. Villages that were statistically too large and too small (hamlet size) were avoided. So were settlements whose composition was ethnically marginal, or were incorporated in larger townships, or as a result of bordering the suburban regions of cities, their agricultural land has been transformed into real estate property.

In the more positive sense, however, the theoretical problems raised in this thesis determined the choice of villages studied. Here I was guided by two main considerations:

(1) That the villages chosen corresponded to the zones of rain-fed agriculture, and irrigated agriculture respectively. These ecological conditions have historically, as I have established, evolved contrasting forms of peasant communities. In the case of rain-fed agriculture (which prevails in the highlands of the West Bank) it generated a substantial rural surplus, and marginalized farmsteads. Irrigated agriculture, on the other hand, evolved into intensive farming communities which lent itself to considerable mechanization since the 1960s. The processes of 'peasantisation' and'de-peasantisation' capsulize these major developments.

(2) That the villages selected offer a suitable arena for the location and grounding of the mechanisms of agrarian transition delineated

in this thesis (Chapters 5, 6, 7). In particular, those villages were ones in which the hypothetical and projected patterns of agrarian transition could be subjected to verification, analysis, and interpretation. The patterns sought were: degrees of marginalisation in agriculture; patterns of dependence on sources of income external to the village, wage labour in particular, and the manner of this dependence; patterns of migration and the relations between migrants and their households in the village; patterns of increased integration with the national economy, including integration with the Israeli economy; (in the case of intensive agriculture) patterns of adaptation to the introduction of capital intensive technology; and forms of division of labour within the peasant household in response to those changes.

It should be obvious that the search for averages in the manifestations of those patterns is not only futile, but counterproductive. Since we are looking for prototypes of agrarian development, our purposes are better served by the selection of villages in which those patterns appear in accentuated form, provided - of course - that the accentuation reflects a general trend rather than an exceptional circumstance.

Once I confined the selection of the case studies within those stated considerations, I was further restricted by practical matters. Here I refer to areas to which there was a reasonable access to the data sought. This included cooperation with village elders for the administration of the household survey, availability (whenever possible) of cadasteral land surveys, and availability of pre-1967 records for the village. It was particularly difficult (in fact impossible) to acquire military permits to conduct fieldwork, so that had to be given up in favour of 'illicit' surveys. That decision was not always convenient. Fieldwork had to be given up in the Nablus district when the whole team

of interviewers, including the present writer, were arrested by IDF soldiers on two successive occasions (once with all the completed questionnaires confiscated). Surprisingly, the smoothest survey was carried out in Zbeidat, in an area with one of the highest security restrictions in the West Bank. In both cases, the failure and success of the survey depended overwhelmingly on the degree of cooperation received from the mukhtar and village residents, especially the elders.

Finally, the choice of villages was determined by the peculiar history of this study. In 1974, I began a household survey in the village of Natufa. My objective was to examine the process of rural proletarianization in a peasant community which has reached the nadir in the peripheralization of its agriculture, and to examine the factors involved in that peripheralization. Consequently, I decided to incorporate the material obtained from that survey in a broader study of agrarian transition. Ras el-Tin was added (1979) because patterns of proletarianization which were detectable for the West Bank rural sector as a whole were not verified in Natufa. The fieldwork in the Jordan Valley (the villages of Zbeidat and Marj Na'je) was conducted in the spring and summer of 1980 to supplement the survey on dry farming areas with material on a community characterized by intensive (irrigated) agriculture. This necessitated the modification of the agricultural section in the questionnaire to incorporate the more complex details of Valley farming (see Appendix A). However, quantitative data aside, the richest and most reliable material derived from those surveys was acquired through intensive and highly spontaneous interviews that I was fortunate to have with remarkable residents (farmers, landlords and elders) of those four villages.

As it transpired, the four villages selected displayed a wide range of socio-economics attributed within each ecological zone enabling us to

examine the impact of structural features of the agrarian transition in a variety of hypothetical conditions that can be projected from each case. Figure III:1 summarizes basic data for each village to establish a convenient referal source. Structural features of agrarian transition are summarized in Figure III:2 to facilitate comparison.

Analysis of these trends appears in Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and in the concluding chapter.

Figure III:1

Basic Data on the Four Case Studies

Data for	Ras el-Tin	Natufa	Marj Na'je	Zbeidat
Topography	highland	highland	valley	valley
Agriculture	rain-fed	rain-fed	irrigated	irrigated
Population	1,400	2,800	250	620
Total cult. area	6,395d	6,335d	437d	688d
- of which irrig.	20d	35d	all	all
Dominant crops	olive, figs	olive, figs, wheat	vegetables	vegetables
Average plot	c20d	c22d	14.1d	5.2 + 7.1d (incl. lease)
Land survey?	no	yes	yes	yes
Land owned?	yes	yes	de facto	de facto
Tenancy	negligible	frequent	negligible	prevalent
Dominant tenure	owner-cult.	owner-cult.	owner-cult.	'mixed'
Agricult. techn.	fert., sprayers, tractors		drip. irrigation, tunnels, tractors, fert., sprayers	
Peasant indebtness	low	negligible	high	high
Emigration	high	very high	none	seasonal
Wage labour	very high	high	very low	seasonal
Standard of life	'poor'	'rich'	'poor'	'poor'
Source of data for case studies	SI,RI,MS, JS,IS,BZ.	HS,RI,MS, JS,IS,BZ, LR.	RI,JS,IS, UNS, MAg, CS.	HS,SI,RI, JS,IS,UNS, MAg,CS.

Key for abbreviations:

HS	:	Household survey conducted by the author
SI & RI	:	Structured and regular interviews
MS	:	Official Statistics from the British Mandate
JS	:	Official Statistics from the Jordanian period
IS	:	Official Statistics from Israeli sources
UNS	:	Data gathered by UNRWA (Beirut and Jerusalem)
BZ	:	Birzeit University Village Data Bank
MAg	:	Ministry of Agriculture data (Jericho Bureau)
LR	:	Land Registry data (Ramallah Office)
CS	:	Cadasteral surveys

FIGURE III:2

Structural Features of the Case Studies

Feature	Ras el-Tin	Natufa	Marj Na'je	Zbeidat
Process examined	de-peasantisation		re-peasantisation	
Dominant kinship unit	Joint household	Nuclear household	Joint household	sub-clan
Degree of internal polarization	moderate	substantial	moderate?	minimal
Fationalism	high	low	high	none
Religious homogeneity	high	low	high	high
Agricultural trends	marginalization	negligence	intensification	intensification
Proletarianization	substantial	high	low	low
Class composition	low diversification	high diversification	low diversification	homogeneous
Integration within national market	high	high	high	high
Integration into Israeli labour market	high	low	low	medium

Chapter Eight

De-peasantisation I: The Case of Ras el-Tin

We will examine here two concrete cases in which the peasants were marginalized by the impact of migration, but with considerably different consequences. By "marginalized" we refer to their decreased role in agricultural production - both as a share in the national economy and as a chief source of income in their livelihood (Shanin, 1978:17). In both cases however, marginalization did not lead either to the strengthening of capitalist relations in agriculture, nor to the disintegration of the villages evidenced in the Turkish cases discussed by Keydar.

We have chosen here two villages (both in the district of Ramallah) whose agrarian economics based similarly on dry farming, primarily olive cultivation. Both villages have today an equal area of cultivated land (Ras el-Tin: 6,395; Natufa: 6,355 dunums - about 1,600 acreas each), although this was not the case of few decades ago when Natufa had considerably more land. The distribution of crops indicate a similar ecology as evidenced by the following table:

Table 8:1

Crop Allocation in Ras el-Tin and Natufa (in dunums)

1980

	Ras el-Tin		Natufa	
Olives	5,000		4,500	
(of which)...fruit-bearing	-----	4,500	-----	4,000 (approx.)
Figs	1,000		1,000	
Grapes	60		20	
Almonds	15		10	
Other orchards (apricots, etc.)	10		100	
Wheat	150		500	
Barley	50		100	
Other grain	50		35	
Onions	10		60	
Tomatoes	30		60	
Other vegetables	20		15	
Total Cultivated	6,395		6,355	
Uncultivated	4,500		2,000	

Source: Village Data Bank: Birzeit University (1980).

Despite similar ecologies, virtual lack of irrigated land (20 dunums in Ras el-Tin, 35 in Natufa) and kinds of crops, the two villages are worlds apart. While Ras el-Tin is a "poor" village by Palestinian standards, Natufa is "rich", by local and Middle Eastern criteria. In both case poverty and wealth, as we shall see, are related to the relations village had developed with the external world and their inabilities to transcend the limitations of their natural economy. In each case migration was a central key determining changes in social structure: internal (to Israel) in the case of Ras el-Tin, and external (abroad) in the case of Natufa.

Ras el-Tin: A Village of Peasant-workers

Ras el-Tin is typical of these hilly West Bank villages where the majority of peasants were, until recently, owner-cultivators. The village

Map 8:1 Ras et-Tin: Distribution of Cultivated Plots


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DEIR EL JUWWAINID
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EDH DHAHRAT
ABU SUWWAN
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ES SAFHA EL QIBLIYA
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EL ZAIN
KAUBA
UMM EL BIRAK
Ras et-Tin
Tell Ras et-Tin
Khirbet Ras et-Tin
Ras et-Tin Shrine
Ras et-Tin Spring
Ras et-Tin Cemetery
Ras et-Tin Mosque
Ras et-Tin Well
Ras et-Tin Threshing Floor
Ras et-Tin Olive Press
Ras et-Tin Cistern
Ras et-Tin Tomb
Ras et-Tin Quarry
Ras et-Tin Cave
Ras et-Tin Ruins
Ras et-Tin Terrace
Ras et-Tin Path
Ras et-Tin Road
Ras et-Tin Boundary
Ras et-Tin Survey Point
Ras et-Tin Benchmark
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(about 1,400 inhabitants, of whom about 300 are migrants abroad) shares several features, both social and ecological, with villages of the Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and Bethlehem mountains, and with the Judean hills in particular. Its main crop, olives, occupies village labour totally for two to three months every two years, during the picking and olive-pressing season. (Olives have a bi-annual cycle).

A substantial proportion of the village work force is employed in Israel (between 120-140 workers), and, like many Ramallah district villages a considerable number of men (but not their families) are migrant workers in the Gulf, South America, and West Germany.

Ras el-Tin, in common with several villages in the Bani Zeid region, is divided into two peasant factions: Baraghteh and Fallahin. The former were, until the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine, big landlords and tax-farmers, but have gradually lost their political influence and prestige. Their former status is still reflected today in the distribution of land parcels and in housing patterns. Although there is hardly any difference, for average households, in the size of agricultural plots between the two factions, the Baraghteh (who constitute about 25% of village households) still own the most fertile land in the valley which they seized, according to a story prevalent in the village, 80 years ago from the Fallahin after a faction of the Barghuti clan from Deir Ghassaneh sought "refugee" in Ras el-Tin following a blood feud. The dwellings of the Fallahin were also concentrated in two separate areas of the village, divided from their former landlords by a paved road in one case and agricultural plots in the other. Only at the entrance of the village do we observe newly established dwellings where the houses of the two factions intermingle. Those units, unlike the stone houses of the rest of the village, were built in the late sixties and early seventies

with German and American wages sent home, and to a lesser extent with Israeli money converted into dinars.

Historically, of course, land was both a source of wealth and status (wajaha). Rich peasants were those who were either big landlords and tax-farmers (as was the case with the heads of the Baraghteh clans in neighbouring Bani Zeid), or their agents (wukala^{c}). In either case these patriarchal lords commanded both authority and a considerably higher amount of wealth then their fellow-villagers. Their authority was based on their ability to mobilize their clan members and dependents on the side of their urban notable allies in times of factional conflicts, while their wealth was based on the returns of the land in addition to the high rates of interest they charged on money lent.

Until the end of British rule, one of the main sources of internal differentiation in the Palestinian village was peasant indebtedness to wealthy landlords. In years of bad crops, the landlord would extend credit to the poor farmer as an advance for buying seeds and paying the ploughman. Against this credit, the farmer would sign portions of his land as security, and eventually -- especially in the event of the occurrence of successive bad yields -- he would lose his best land to village notables. According to this pattern in the Ramallah district, many peasants in Ras el-Tin lost their lands to Birzeit and Burham landlords; those in Abu Shkheidam to Birzeit landlords; and those in Mizra'a to the landlords of Deir Ghassaneh and Beit Rima. Thus the process of differentiation was not only internal to the same village, but also divided regions into "poor" and "wealthy" villages. The crucial determinant of this latter process of land transfer was the presence or absence within the village of notables with strong links to the government, and before that, to the tax-farmers.

In Ras el-Tin the only variation on this pattern was the alienation of the best village lands (including a substantial plain surrounding the village built-up area) to the Barghuti clan in the last decade of the 19th century. The Barghuti clan was also the first in the village to send migrants abroad. In the fifties, members of the clan migrated to Lebanon, where many of them became building workers and hotel and restaurant attendants in the city of Beirut. This was followed by larger waves of migration in the sixties and seventies to the Gulf, Latin America, and Germany, this time including both Barghutis and Fallahin. Migration created a new source of wealth in the village which radically changed the importance of land ownership as a source of social differentiation -- given the meagre yields of the reduced plot holdings by the middle of this century.

Today Ras el-Tin is a "poor" village compared with the surrounding towns in the Ramallah district, but not untypical of the average village in the hilly regions of the West Bank. It has several natural springs but no waterpipe and no irrigated agriculture. Of the 5,000 dunums of cultivated land under village control, 4,500 dunums are planted with olive trees (of those only 3,500 dunums are productive), the remaining 500 dunums are planted with fig trees, almonds, grape vines, wheat and barley, lentils and fave beans. All yields, aside from olives and olive oil, are subsistence crops. There are at the moment three old olive presses, one of which is also used as a grain mill. Electricity is supplied for a few hours in the evening from privately-owned generators which are shared between several families.

Aside from the olive presses, the only form of productive investment in Ras el-Tin is a chicken farm which markets its produce in Ramallah and four all-purpose village stores whose owners make credit arrangements (including loans with high interest terms) with their clients.

Before 1967 some Ras el-Tin farmers used to be sharecroppers in the lands of neighbouring villages, but the opportunities for work in Israel and emigration has ended that. Today all farmers in the village are owner-cultivators, while some of their household members, including those who work in Israel, hire themselves as agricultural labourers during the olive-picking season.

Becoming a Worker in Israel

Official statistics show that more than 70% of West Bank workers are registered through labour exchange bureaus. However, all workers from Ras el-Tin are "illegal" workers; that is, they find employment through local contractors or on their own -- through contacts with work mates or relatives. In all the cases interviewed work was obtained in construction sites in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv through a brother or a cousin who was already employed by a Jewish boss. Husam, one of my informants, has a typical work history. Today at 24 he is barely literate, having left school in the sixth grade. He started work in Israel in 1968 as an apprentice painter and whitewasher, assisting his brother, who was a mu'allem (master craftsmen) in the trade.[1] He worked for three years with his brother until he "mastered the trade" and made all the necessary connections to work on his own. Now he is a mu'allem[2] in his own right and has a team of four workers (two cousins, a younger brother and a distant relative) working with him. His chief employer, off and on, was Solel Boneh -- the major Israeli construction company ("the biggest company in Israel", according to Husam), but he also works for a variety of small and medium-sized construction firms, as well as for private home owners. He establishes his contacts by leaving his name with a Jewish work mate in Tel Aviv who has a telephone, and who arranges new assignments for him

as each job is finished. As it stands, he currently has 13 regular customers.

Bosses and Contractors

Unlike the industrial sector and agribusiness in Israel, where a semi-proletariat is emerging among village migrant workers, the nature of work in the construction sector lends itself to a hierarchy of bosses and contractors. Such a heirarchy is implicit in the mode of recruitment of Arab workers: an Israeli firm would contract an Israeli businessman to recruit the necessary number of workers to finish the job. He in turn would hire a number of Arab sub-contractors (their number depending on the size and complexity of the project) who undertake the recruitment directly. Among the sub-contractors one observes an overlap in the identity of boss, mu'allem, and worker, since most sub-contractors work with their team of recruits. Normally, those are composed of family members, relatives and other mates. Almost always they come from the same village, and rarely do Jewish and Arab workers work together on the same assignment. Ahmad, 23, describes this process thus:

> "The company gives the assignment to a Jewish contractor, he hands it over to an Arab (sub)-contractor, (my brother Sa'id), who in turn employs seven Arab workers. The Jewish contractor has no contact with us. He deals only with my brother, while we work with Sa'id."

Although at work there are some differences between such sub-contractors and workers in the degree of skill, age, their ability to make contacts and their command of the Hebrew language, these differences are not crucial since they can be acquired by many workers in a relatively short time, and -- as we shall see -- there is a continuous mobility of workers into the position of sub-contractors, and vice versa. The

mu'allem (in this case, meaning the sub-contractor) works the same hours, at the same site with his mates. He eats, drinks, sleeps, and plays cards with them. Two village workers explain how they became mu'allemeen:

> (Husam): In the beginning (1968) I worked on a daily basis for my brother -- always in construction sites, I never worked in a factory. He used to give me 20 pounds daily but it was never enough. One day a Jewish boss came and gave me 40 pounds, so I left my brother to work for him. Since then I changed many bosses, and with each increasing my knowledge of the craft (san'a), and familiarity with the paints. Now I am a mu'allem.
>
> (Mustafa; as told by his cousin Samih): When Mustafa worked with me in his first year, he didn't know a thing. He worked with me for a month and a half until I handed him over (sic) to a Jewish contractor. He assigned him a job without supervision, so I used to leave my work and teach him. Often he would mess up the work and I had to fix things up after him. To the boss he would claim that it was his own work. The Jewish contractor would give him 400 pounds from which I deducted 150 pounds for myself. Thus I made Mustafa become a mu'allem in spite of himself.

Although the degree of skills involved in becoming a mu'allem today require little training beyond that of an unskilled worker (which is due in the main to the technological transformation of the building sector), the label of mu'allem is not used indiscriminately. In the above case, for example, Husam explained that Mustafa is still an unskilled worker (shagheel) despite his new designation. His problem, apparently, is that he cannot assess in advance what an assignment will cost and therefore, is liable to end up losing money for the work done. This in fact is a crucial difference between a mu'allem and shagheel (using them as designations of status) in the work process. In most projects the Jewish contractor provides the equipment, the materials, and -- where necessary -- the police permit for sleeping on the site. The Arab mu'allem (in this case the sub-contractor) has to calculate beforehand, the aggregate sum

it will cost him to pay for his workers' wages, his own labour and profit, and the time needed to finish the job. In commuting, he also has to add transport costs. In most medium-sized and small projects the deal is made over the cost of the assignment while the time needed to finish it (within a certain range) is not relevant to the Israeli contractor. But it is crucial from the point of view of the Arab mu'allem.

A mu'allem thus has to be very careful in calculating his expenses to ensure a reasonable income for himself. Here is how Hussein, 29, calculated his expenses for a Tel Aviv assignment which required three months work (February 1979):

> Transport from Ras el-Tin to Tel Aviv and return for 7 workers: 750 pounds per week (since they sleep on the site during working days). Of the seven passengers, his cousin and member of his clan (hamula). He pays them an average of 180 pounds each per day (200 for "seasoned workers"; 150-160 for"beginners"). From this amount he deducts 80 pounds each (per week) for transport, and all food expenses, including tea -- which are included in the team expenses. The four of them take turns in preparing meals, using firewood.

Thus while the workers receive daily wages from Hussain, he works by commission and it is in his interest to finish the assignment as quickly as possible. The usual working day is 10 to 12 hours long, with liberal breaks for tea and coffee. Hussain's net income during an average month amounts to 12,000 to 14,000 pounds (1979); workers in his team net an average monthly wage of 5,000 I.L., from which nothing is deducted since they are not registered workers. This should be compared to the salary of a school teacher in the West Bank holding a B.A. degree which amounted during the same period to 4,000-5,000 pounds per month.

Jewish Bosses and Arab Employers

Why do the workers from Ras el-Tin prefer to work "illegally", through sub-contractors, than through labour exchanges? And why do they prefer to work in Israel, and face a daily routine of national humiliation than to work for an Arab employer in the West Bank, when such work is available for equal wages?

There are a number of advantages involved in being a registered worker, including health insurance and work compensation for accidents and lay-off periods. Against this, an average of 30% of the worker's salary is deducted by his employer as social tax, of which only about one half is paid as social benefits.[3] However, these benefits are not always accessible to the worker and many have to go to great lengths to claim them. Hussein explained that only totally unskilled workers go through labour exchanges. Workers in Ras el-Tin, together with an estimated one-third of all workers from the occupied territories and perhaps more, prefer to forego these privileges and work illegally. The following reasons are given: (1) work with sub-contractors is arranged informally and through relatives. It assures quick assignments, no redtape, and almost no waiting periods between one assignment and another; (2) considerable saving is assured by not paying the social benefits tax amounting, on average, to 30% of one's income; (3) work accidents are covered by the Israeli employer who, although not obliged by contract to do this, is already violating the law by not paying his share of the social tax.

When Hussein broke his hand while on an assignment in 1977, his Tel Aviv boss refused to pay the I.L. 500 bill for his hospital treatment until Hussein threatened to take him to labour court, after which the man yielded. However, Hussein was laid-off at home for 3 months without any compensation. Still, Hussein is willing to take the risks

and continues to work "illegally." It should be pointed out that hardly any attempts are made by the government to control "illegal" work, either through employers or by curtailing the flow of workers.

Farmers from Ras el-Tin are aware of the resentment against their work in Israel among nationalist circles in the West Bank and abroad, but they view it disdainfully. "Before 1967", says Ahmad, "my elder brothers used to work for a landlord in neighbouring Burham for 30 piastres (about 40 pence) a day, and we had nowhere else to go." All of the workers interviewed had had jobs in the West Bank, mostly in building sites in Ramallah and East Jerusalem, but they prefer to work in Israel.

Preference for work in Israel as opposed to the West Bank is dictated by factors other than the availability and diversity of jobs in the Jewish sector. West Bank businessmen and building contractors often complain about the difficulties confronting them in recruiting workers, even when they offer the same salaries as Israelis (thus saving their workers the added costs of transportation). At the heart of this preference are the conditions of work. Jewish contractors work mainly for big construction firms and they have to maintain a steady and reliable supply of labour. Payment for jobs takes place promptly and according to the conditions stipulated in the written contract. Against this, most Arab construction sites are small-scale family concerns; agreements are made orally, and payment for finished assignments are often delayed.

"With Arab contractors", says Husam, "I have to remind them four or five times to pay me, and by the time they do, I lose a good part of my money because of inflation. The Jewish (boss) cannot afford to cheat you since he (usually) has four or five sites to finish, and he wants to get his work done."

Equally important from the point of view of the Arab worker, is the more relaxed atmosphere at work in Israeli sites. Although in the subcontracting system described above, the number of working hours per day in Israel are not shorter, daily supervision over the workers is in the hands of the Arab mu'allem, who is mostly one of their work mates; while in the West Bank, workers are subjected to the continued scrutiny of the owner of property or, in the case of bigger enterprises, of the building contractor himself. In addition, work in major cities like Tel Aviv has the added benefit of providing access to a variety of entertainment facilities which do not exist in the West Bank, including the availability of Jewish prostitutes.

While Arab workers in the construction sector have numerous contacts with Jewish contractors, they rarely work with Jewish workers on the same site. In fact most of their contacts, both in going to work and in the construction site, happen to be with people from their own village, and often from their own clan. In villages around Ras el-Tin (e.g. Deir es-Sudani, Beitillo, Deir Ghassaneh, Deir 'Ammar, 'Abud), buses transport villagers to their work site in Israel and bring them back in the evening, thus reinforcing this village identity. When they do have contacts with Jewish workers, politics are rarely discussed; social interaction is amiable but is kept at a minimum. On the Israeli side the villager's contact is mostly with the contractor, the boss, the police, the prostitutes and the border guard. Despite his deep penetration into the Israeli economy and his workable command of Hebrew, the Arab peasant-worker's conception of Jewish society remains that of a closed and undifferentiated mass.

Farm Labour and Wage Labour

Everybody in Ras el-Tin owns land. A majority of those farmers who work in Israel spend one to two months every year away from their work to pick their olives. Some take a few extra weeks to work for big landlords in neighbouring villages (Mizra'a, Burham, Deir Ghassaneh).

In the hilly regions of the West Bank very few households live exclusively from their family farm. In Ras el-Tin, there are about eight families (less than 5% of the total households) whose members work a substantial portion of the year in their family land. (Husam's father-in-law is one of those. Relying on his sons' and on hired labour during the picking season, he makes 120 cannisters (2,400 litres) of olive oil during good years. This amount yields him enough income to make him independent, if he so chooses, of having to send his sons to work outside the village).

The economics of olive farming in the West Bank make it worthwhile only for a limited number of peasant families to devote their households' labour to the orchard. A survey of 840 farms conducted in 1974 revealed a net return of I.L. 724* per dunum of Roman olives against an investment of I.L. 425 per dunum, and that during "good" (masiah) years -- i.e. every two years.[4] For regular trees the net yield was I.L. 338 per dunum in good years and I.L. 80 during "bad" (shalatuneh) years (Farhat-Nasir, 1980:59), hardly an inviting prospect during periods of high demand for wage labour in Israel.

However, the choice facing the Palestinian peasant is not simply between working in Israel and working on his farm, but rather that of the

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* The exchange rate of the Israeli pound for 1974 was I.L. 17.2 per Jordanian Dinar (about I.L. 14 per 1 sterling); see also appendix C.

proper utilization of his household member's labour (including the labour of his womenfolk and children) throughout the year so that he can derive optimum benefits from the opportunities for wage labour without, at the same time, neglecting his farm totally. Since there are a certain number of constraints limiting the participation of women (modesty code, etc.) and children (education) in wage labour outside the village, it is the household's elder sons who are the first subjects for release in response to wage labour opportunities. Subsequently the 16 years' Israeli occupation of the West Bank have seen increased participation by women and children in certain aspects of the agricultural process which have been previously the domain of the men; for instance the shaking of branches and picking from the tree top (jadd), as opposed to collecting the olives from the ground, is now often performed by women and older people. Women are also increasingly observed handling the plough -- previously a man's preserve.[5]

On the other hand, the size of the family farm may encourage the head of the peasant household to keep one or more of his sons to work on the farm. The process of agricultural production in olive orchards, and, more important, its bi-annual cycle, lends itself conveniently to the demand for casual labour outside the village. However, there are basic tasks which have to be done if the orchard is to maintain reasonable productivity. These are ploughing (at least twice a year -- March and April); weeding (April, May); pruning (September); and fertilization.[6] The picking season begins in September and continues throughout October and November. During these months also household members participate in taking the olives to the press and in marketing the oil.

Sumayyah Farhat-Nasir has estimated in her study that an average farmer needs to work, on average, six days per dunum of olives throughout the year -- picking of olives excluded.[7] Picking requires an additional amount of labour-time ranging from 20% to double that needed for general care of the field, depending on the size of the tree, its kind (Roman or regular), and the cycle (masieh or shalatuneh) (Farhat-Nasir, 1980:48). Wage labour outside the village as well as migration of young men to the Gulf and the Americas, however, have led to widespread neglect of the olive crop. In 1974 most West Bank olive farmers spent between 15 to 29 percent of the needed days tending their farms; only ten percent of the farmers spent more than half the needed days (ibid.:49). Farmers in the Ramallah district, which has the highest rate of migration in the West Bank, exhibited a higher degree of olive negligence than all the other districts; their trees were in the worst condition and they used the most damaging techniques for picking olives (89% of olive farmers in Ramallah used the labour-saving method of beating the branches with a stick, as opposed to 33% in Nablus, 2% in Jenin, and 39% in Tulkarem--Farhat-Nasir, 1980:47, Table 13; 50, Table 16).

In Ras el-Tin only the better-off families who own more than 40 dunums can keep some of their older sons at any length of time on the family farm to take care of the fields, and unless they receive regular stipends from their immediate kin abroad only those families can afford to send their sons (and occasionally their daughters) to school beyond the ninth grade.[8] It is usually only those families who pay the necessary extra attention to the land. This includes ploughing the orchards at least twice a year (and until recently three times a year, the third being in the spring, called tathleeth), weeding, fertilizing, and supplementing the olive crops with vegetables. Almost every household in Ras el-Tin is

dependent on the family farm to create some savings; the olives are pressed and the oil is sold in Jordan dinars only, which is "hard" currency in Israel. In addition, the supply of the annual household provision of olives, olive oil and other basic staples is assured.

Under Jordanian rule, many farmers in Ras el-Tin used to hire themselves as field workers to the big landlords of neighbouring Burham. Husam's father, for example, worked for 10 piastres a day in the fifties as a hoe tiller (bahhash). His elder brother earned sixty piastres a day working in a nearby quarry. Work chances in wage labour outside the village were then limited, unless one had the initial investment (and contacts) to enable him to migrate to the Gulf.

With the opening of employment opportunities in Israel after occupation, many family farms were marginalized and increasingly neglected. Several workers from Ras el-Tin claimed that they can make more money working one week in construction than their farm income in olives for a whole season. Not only the pull factor of wage labour must be considered in this context, but also an ecological factor, that is, whether the olive year is fertile (masiah) or infertile (shalatuneh). To illustrate the wide fluctuations in production implied by this factor, we cite the results of the survey referred to above:

Table 8:2

Differential Income from Marketing of Olive Oil Caused by the Annual Fluctuation of the Olive Cycle: West Bank, 1973/4 (I.L./dunum)

Net Income per dunum of olive trees	"Roman" trees		Regular trees	
	Fertile year	Infertile year	Fertile year	Infertile year
1. Local marketing	724.3	337.0	337.9	80.5
2. Export to Jordan[9]	493.9	70.8	124.5	60.7

Source: S. Farhat-Nasir, The Olives of Palestine and Their Problems, adapted from Tables 22 and 23, pp. 59 and 61.

Bearing in mind that 80% of the produce has to be exported, due to the limitations of the local market (ibid.:62), the profit margin in fertile years varies from twice to as much as seven times the income from infertile years. In 1978 Mustafa's family produced 60 cannisters of oil; in 1977 only 3 ruttles (9 kg.) During shalatuneh seasons workers make little effort to absent themselves from their work sites in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and leave the whole crop for their womenfolk and children to pick.

Another crucial determinant of involvement in the family farm is the decreasing size of agricultural land resulting from partible inheritance. (In the region of Ras el-Tin, and in the Ramallah district in general, unlike Nablus and the Jordan Valley, there have been only a few cases of confiscation of agricultural land for Jewish settlements). Here is how Husam describes this process:

> If our family plot produces 30 jarras of oil a year and it supports four sons, each son's portion becomes 6 or 7 jarras. For example, I currently make 50 cannisters a year (when it is masiah), and I have a son and a daughter. In the future each one of my sons (sic) will have a share of 20 or 10 cannisters.

Thus the release of household labour is dependent on the relationship between five crucial variables: the size of the land; the number of adult sons in the household; the annual cycle of olives (masiah/shalatuneh) and the degree of attraction of wage labour outside the village. To this we must add, for medium and big landlords, the cost of hiring labour during the picking and pressing period. It is obvious by now that with the (relatively) high wages paid to workers in Israel (and Jordan since 1974) the last variable has become the decisive factor determining allocation of household labour, while land fragmentation (due to inheritance) and negative attitudes to agricultural work (all workers interviewed, without exception, expressed disdain towards work on the land) have become contributing factors to the marginalization and neglect of the family farm.

Although we subsumed migration (above) under work opportunities outside the village, it should be treated in fact as a separate factor affecting the allocation of household labour. Migration involves the physical absence of able-bodied sons, and, unlike work in Israel, it cannot be tapped occasionally for periodical help in the family farm. Moreover, money sent from abroad often becomes the most crucial variable in alienating family members from their agricultural land, since the sums sent allow the remaining members to become village entrepreneurs, or in some cases, to engage in businesses in the district centre.[10]

Nevertheless, when all those factors are considered, individual initiative plays an important role in improving the family land. To illustrate this, we will cite the example of Husam and Mustafa. Their fathers were brothers who inherited 20 dunums from their father during Jordanian rule. The two brothers worked their land jointly, and continued to work in neighbouring fields as well as in Ramallah as hired labourers (ujara). When Mustafa and his brothers grew up enough to help, their

father decided to devote himself entirely to his portion of the inheritance -- so the two brothers divided the lot between them.[11] Husam's father, now 90 years old and sick, had neglected the land and all his sons work outside the village, one of them in Germany. Mustafa's father, on the other hand, increased the land's yield by planting a vineyard and fig trees. One of his brothers now works mainly on the land. Not only does the family get a richer harvest, but also it has accumulated some savings from the land, in contrast to Husam's family plot which can barely meet household needs.

Thus while extended family land is often held and worked jointly by brothers in the hilly areas of the West Bank, the pressures created by wage labour outside the village often lead to different consequences for segments of the same family. Brothers are compelled to work their inherited portions of land separately, so that the labour contributed by members of one household may not be affected by the negligence of the other household. To what extent this further fragmentation of land is affecting overall productivity has yet to be examined, although there is no doubt about its prevalence today.

Work Outside the Village and Peasant Differentiation

One of the most important changes in village stratification has been the decline in the value of unirrigated land as a source of village wealth. This decline has been accompanied by the emergence of new sources of income: wage labour; income from migrant relatives abroad; salaries of educated sons; investment in building equipment (compressors, cement mixers, etc.); and -- in some regions -- investment for leasing purposes in agricultural machinery (tractors, harvesters, sprayers).

Since the turn of the century, the great 'rural divide' separating the mass of Palestinian peasantry tilling the land within the confines of the village musha' (communal) land tenure system from their landlords and tax-farmers (multazimun), has been modified, supplemented, and transformed. This transformation took place gradually through a combined process of increased monetarization in the agrarian economy; through the dismantling of the musha' system accompanied by land registration and the emergence of the big estates; and by the introduction of a new set of relationships with the urban-based merchants, absentee-landlords, and government officials. By the middle of this century, the destruction of the Palestinian landed elite through the creation of the State of Israel led to dramatic demographic changes in the character of the agrarian regime. Thousands of landless refugees were re-settled inside or near scores of West Bank villages and towns, and a second wave of out-migration -- from both the refugee and non-refugee population -- was triggered off. The differences between the two waves is that while the former was a collective, politically induced exodus, the latter wave was individual, generated by the declining economic fortunes in village and town and by the attraction of work opportunities abroad.

The village economy remains today poor and underdeveloped -- lacking in basic infrastructures for growth. But its occupational-social structure has been visibly transformed. These occupational changes are based today on work opportunities in Israel and the West Bank district centres (construction, industry, and the services, for men; textiles and fruit picking/packing, for women); on salaried positions in the civil service and in private firms; on semi-professional jobs produced by the massive influx of university graduates; and on local investment generated by income sent from abroad.

Standards of living in the Palestinian village today -- measured by food consumption levels, housing density, household items, and health standards -- have definitely improved over standards during the forties, fifties, and sixties.[12] That is, they have improved for those Palestinians who remained in the West Bank, since the improvement, in part, has affected only a portion of the original population a majority of whom were transferred out of the country. But the village economy, in terms of local investment, has remained as stagnant as ever and the conditions of the rural population are even more integrated with and dependent on - an urban sector which has ceased to develop meaningfully after 1948. Today, in Ras el-Tin, as in most West Bank villages, one of the highest ambitions for the better-off peasants is to own a block of flats or commercial space in the regional town and to lease it out, living off its returns for the rest of his life.

In Ras el-Tin there are btween eight to twelve peasants who are seen by their fellow-villagers as "wealthy." Those include the two mukhtars (one for the Fallahin, the other for the Barghutis); owners of the three olive presses; owners of electric generators; one owner of a commercial shop in Ramallah; and one owner of an apartment building also in Ramallah. In addition, there are four shop owners in the village who extend credit to villagers, both in commodities purchased and in cash. The rest of the village resident population displays substantial occupational homogeneity. Aside from two proprietors of small chicken farms (one of them a widow), four school teachers, one civil servant, and one employee of the religious endowments (awqaf), the rest are peasant-workers. Almost every household has at least one member who commutes to work in Israel or the West Bank.

Significantly, none of the "wealthy" peasants is a big landowner -- even by West Bank standards. Moreover, land is no longer a criterion of

wealth. The wealthiest, a son of one of the two mukhtars, has only five dunums to his name, and the highest holding amongst those considered rich does not exceed a hundred dunums. Indeed, there does not seem to be a correlation in dry farming areas today between a peasant's wealth and the cultivable area he owns. Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 was a landmark in further re-ordering the occupational structure among peasants by opening up employment opportunities outside the village on a scale unprecedented before, but without forcing the peasant out of the country. The consequences of the new political situation in creating a new stratum of peasant wage-workers can be better observed by contrasting the ramifications of the two periods in Ras el-Tin:

Before 1967: Both the increase in surplus labour and the scarcity of outside employment in the fifties encouraged many farmers to plant new olive seedlings and to pay extra attention to the existing groves. The result was an increased yield of olive oil per dunum of olive trees by the early sixties. By then the first emigrants to Lebanon, Colombia, and the Gulf States began to send money to their immediate relatives who had stayed in the village. Divisions between Baraghteh and Fallahin clans were still important, since the former families controlled the best lands and they had better connections with government circles and urban merchants. The Baraghteh also constituted the bulk of the small professional intelligentsia of the village, whose members -- upon receiving a university education -- had moved to Jerusalem, Amman, and Ramallah. However, new lines of differentiation emerged, separating those who received income from brothers and sons abroad from those who depended exclusively on local employment and/or their farm income. Village stores became an important instrument for the accumulation of wealth; both by selling items at a considerably higher price than their retail value in neighbouring Ramallah,

and by extending credit to the poorer peasants.

After 1967: The village witnessed an increased wave of migration to the Gulf and the opening of a new wave to West Germany, both involving the "export" of painters and white-washers. The remaining social cleavage between Barghuti and Fallahin families, based, as it were, on the former's wajaha and ownership of more fertile land, has now been virtually eliminated as a result of the influx of peasants from both factions to jobs in Israeli construction. However, horizontal separation between the two factions has persisted in the form of separate residential quarters and marriage endogamy. On the other hand, the gradual neglect of the olive groves, already affected by the absence of migrant sons and their families, has now been reinforced by the absence of peasant-workers from the village during working days. The village has witnessed an increased involvement of women and children in agricultural work since in Ras el-Tin, in contrast to several neighbouring villages, no women were engaged in wage labour outside the village;[13] however, their labour has hardly compensated for the loss of men's work.

Thus the availability of wage labour opportunities in Ras el-Tin on such a scale after 1967 has created the conditions for a new homogeneity in the social structure of the village population which, since 1948, was differentiated along lines of status and wealth based on peasant faction, and reinforced by membership in families with migrant sons, and, to a lesser extent, on the size of family land.

This new situation is reflected in the emergence of new cleavages in the village scene which have very little to do with peasant factions. These cleavages are observed in the attempts by the village Youth Association, in which annual elections take place and various ideological trends vie for leadership, to transcend the influence and authority of the

patriarchal heads of the four main sub-clans (hamayil). These attempts are increasingly successful and revolve around issues which are crucial to village collective life, such as the establishment of an electricity cooperative, the building of a girls' preparatory school, and the exploitation of the village waqf land for development projects.

These activities invariably come into conflict with the narrowly defined familial interests of the village elders and wujaha', whose traditional links with the Jordanian authorities across the river continue to ensure a political base for their authority. The elders also attempt to keep a working relationship with the Israeli military government which views with suspicion the projects adopted by the Youth Association -- the only organized civic institution in the village. A mark of this challenge can be seen in the composition of the executive of the Association in its last election (1977) when it ceased to be a Barghuti dominated structure and become representative of a cross-section of all the village clans (5 seats for the Fallahin, 2 for the Barghutis).

It must be emphasized, however, that the village social structure does not lend itself to class politics. It is perhaps indicative of the extent of the social homogeneity of the local clan structure that Marxist politics, which have a pervasive influence among the youth of Ras el-Tin (as evidenced by the periodic interrogation and imprisonment of members of the Youth Association by the Security Forces for their communist activities), have no class content whatsoever. Their thrust is almost exclusively confined to patriotic activities, or to such general civic projects as described above. The Youth Association, or at least the radical elements within it, view the development of cooperative enterprises which undermine the patriarchal basis of village authority as both its objective and raison d'être.

Nevertheless, these political trends rarely take the path of direct confrontation with the village elders, the two mukhtars, or even the few rich entrepreneurs in the village. For they represent forces who continue to maintain the closest bonds with their patriarchal families through the joint possession and control of the family land. And while the son of a peasant patriarch becomes, as a wage-worker, financially independent of his father, often moving into a separate dwelling and even occasionally dividing the land in his father's own lifetime, he keeps setting aside a portion of his earnings, and -- more important -- days of his labour time, for the benefit of the patriarchal household and its land. In return, his extended family, although no longer joined together in the same physical household, lends him its name and offers him protection in times of crises, thus serving as the mediator of his collective identity in the village.

Notes

1. Before Israeli occupation in 1967 many Ras el-Tin emigrants had worked in the Beirut harbour area as painters and white-washers, and had acquired a reputation in the trade.

2. The word mu'allem is used by workers to designate two different meanings: a boss (or a sub-contractor), and a master-craftsman. Sometimes, the term refers to the two attributes merged in the same person, as the present case demostrates.

3. "Robbing the Arab workers from the territories," Al-Hamishmar, July 13, 1978. Quoted in MERIP, No. 74, January 1979, p. 17.

4. Sumayyah Farhat-Nasir, 1980:59 (Table 22). The net yield for "regular" trees was estimated at 338 I.L. against an investment of 172 I.L. per dunum during good years, and 80-114 I.L. during bad (shalatuneh) years. (See also note 25 below).

5. For a discussion of the sexual division of labour among Palestinian peasants in the hilly regions, see Munir Nasir, 1974:77.

6. S. Farhat-Nasir found, however, that 76% of the farmers in her survey do not believe that fertilization is essential for olive trees, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

7. Farhat-Nasir, op. cit., p. 47. The writer does not clarify, however, if her calculations are based on labour utilization in an average family farm, or on abstract units of labour based on the time needed by one farmer working in one dunum by himself. Moreover, in the calculation of per dunum productivity costs, she established her model estimates on the basis of wage labour costs, and neglects family labour as a variable (see, for example, Table 22, p. 59).

8. For a discussion of the relationship between illiteracy rates and agricultural labour in the area under review, see Rima Abdel-Nour, Illiteracy in the Rural West Bank; A Case Study of Five Villages (Birzeit University Publications, forthcoming, 1981).

9. The considerably lower income derived from the marketing of olives is due to the presence, in good years, of a large surplus of West Bank olives (which constitute 80% of local production, according to Nasir), and to competition from Spanish and Italian imports in the Arab market. The acidity content of olive oil increases with storage, thus preventing farmers from making full use of market demands during infertile years.

10. It should not be assumed, however, that migration is alienating the remaining family members from staying in their villages (as distinguished from their family farms). My observations lead me to believe, to the contrary, that remittances sent from migrant relatives have vitalized the living conditions in many villages, thus helping them to stay on the land, though not necessarily as farmers, when the temptation to leave may otherwise have become more pressing.

11. There was no land settlement in Ras el-Tin under the British Mandate, nor during Jordanian rule. Title deeds, therefore, are not registered in the Tapu, and villagers rely on land-tax receipts to establish their right of possession. In practice, however, there are few cases of disputes over individual plot boundaries. "Division of the lot" in this context remains a formal procedure within the extended household.

12. In Ras el-Tin, for example, an average peasant family used to eat meat once a month in the sixties; today, once or twice a week. An average worker used to buy a new pair of trousers every year; today each worker has between five and eight pairs. There has also been a substantial increase in the number of durable goods in peasant households (in 1979, 30% of all Ras el-Tin households had TV sets, run on small generators and on batteries). For comparative data on the growth of rural standards of living in the West Bank, see "Survey of Household Equipment in the Administered Territories, 1978," supplement to Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories, viii:4 (Hebrew), pp. 59-68.

13. Why do we observe a preponderance of women in some villages engaged in wage labour, and a scarcity in others? This is a problem requiring further inquiry. From the available data there does not seem to be a relationship between the amount of poverty in the village and the number of women engaged in wage labour. In Ras el-Tin the social conservatism of the Baraghteh clan (i.e. their status claims) may have been a trend-setting example against the employment of village women in Israel or even the neighbouring towns.

Chapter Nine

Depeasantization II: The Case of Natufa

The common ecological features of Natufa and Ras el-Tin, and the similar area and kinds of cultivated crops in their plots convey a false notion of homogeneity in their social structure. For, in the historical evolution of their social structure, the two villages are worlds apart. Even by the turn of the last century Natufa's relative prosperity was visible to a visiting traveller, who noted the presence of a boarding school for girls -- a unique phenomenon for a Palestinian village at the time (Grant, 1907:223). The heavy Christian presence in the village was responsible for inviting the establishment of several missionary schools, including a protestant, catholic and finally a local secular high school established in 1924. The Christian presence was also probably the stimulant for one of the earliest village migrations to America in Palestine. A village survey conducted in 1930 revealed that migrant remittances constituted the main source of livelihood for a number of village households (Hope-Simpson, 1930:63).

But Natufa's relative wealth, compared to the neighbouring villages, was occasioned by the very sources of poverty that inflicted Ras el-Tin and the rural dry farming highlands in Judea. Fifteen years after the British Mandate in Palestine, only 65 households out of the total 118 (i.e., 36%) were found to possess sufficient land to ensure subsistence (Government of Palestine 1946:274), half of which was based on cereals. The Hope-Simpson Report found the total village debt (for 1930) to be 7,000 sterling, an average of 39 sterling per family, which was 12 sterling higher than the

average debt for all Palestine calculated for the same period in the Johnson and Crosbie Report (Government of Palestine, 1930:20). Thus, of the total households in Natufa, 115 families (63% of the total) were found to own less than the 112 dunums then seen as the minimum holding for "viability" (Hope-Simpson, 1930:ibid.). Unlike Ras el-Tin, however, Natufa was situated within a short distance of the Nablus-Jerusalem highway and was within direct transport reach to the district centre and marketing town of Ramallah. With a considerable number of its villagers educated (i.e., literate), Natufa's sons had access to urban jobs, further education, and -- most important -- migration to the Americas. Emigration in turn enhanced the financial position of several rich peasants in the village and Natufa became a lending centre for peasants in the local villages. A substantial proportion of Ras el-Tin's own holdings were eventually alienated, through pawning, to Natufa's landlords (Husam, 1979:inter.).

The war of 1948 had two dramatic consequences for Natufa. It brought a large number of refugees from the coastal areas, many of whom settled within the village, in an area which later came to be known as Saqayef ("The Shacks"). Today, fully one-fourth of the total village population (25.1%), or 64 households, are refugees households. The war also brought to an end the employment of Natufa villagers in the Jaffa and Ramleh citrus plantations. The chief response to this loss was the beginning of a new wave of emigration to the Arab world (especially the Gulf) in search of new jobs and the augmenting of the earlier emigrations to the Americas. The presence of the Saqayef refugees, and the nearby refugee camp of Jalazun (Population, 1967:5,013; 1968:3,071 -- Ben Porath and Marx, 1971: 75), permitted the migrant families to lease their land to refugee share tenants under the supervision of their remaining relatives, and, often, wives.

By the war of 1967 wage labour and clerical employment as well as migration contributed to the marginalization of farming land in Natufa. The war itself compelled many families, already dependent on remittances from abroad for their livelihood, to join their male breadwinners and resettle permanently outside the village. Thus, while Ras el-Tin barely maintained its head count (934 in 1961, 950 in 1967), Natufa lost 942 residents during the same period -- almost one-third of its population (Village Data Bank, BZU). That loss did not affect the village adversely, however, Natufa today has the features of a wealthy suburb of Ramallah, with pockets of poor dwellings confined to hidden segments of the town (the Saqayef area, and the "old village").

While Ras el-Tin continues to be administered by the two appointed Mukhtars, Natufa was elevated during the Jordanian regime to a township, with a municipal council elected by popular (until recently, male) vote once every four years. The village boasts one high school (serving five local villages), two girls' intermediate schools, one junior college, a clinic, a bus service, two olive presses, a pharmaceutical plant employing 20 workers, a flour mill, and a telephone exchange. In addition, Natufa has an active women's society and two youth clubs.

Natufa has a long history of political involvement in the Palestinian nationalist movement. In the thirties, several leaders of the anti-British rebellion, including Abdul-Kader al-Husseini, used the village as temporary headquarters for their militias. In the fifties and sixties, during Jordanian rule of the West Bank, village intellectuals were active in the Ba'ath party, the Communist party, and the Movement of Arab Nationalists. A local clan head became foreign minister in the Jordanian government in the early sixties, and two top leaders of the PLO since the early seventies come from the village. Nationalist and resistance activity

under Israeli rule has made the village subject to continued harassment by the security forces who, on several occasions, applied measures of collective punishment to Natufa, including curfews, house demolitions and closure of its schools and two youth clubs.

The olives and olive oil of Natufa and its region are famous in the West Bank for their quality -- but this is more of a past reputation than an indicator of present production. Widespread negligence of olive trees can be noted today throughout village fields, and many of them are being uprooted to make space for the expanding residential quarters of newly married couples. Perhaps the ultimate mark of depeasantization in Natufa was the establishment, in 1974, of a local ethnographic museum displaying the artifacts of a typical peasant household at the turn of the century.

Population: Residents and Migrants

The main divisions in Natufa exist between the "native" six clans, who claim to have migrated from al-Karak region in Transjordan in the 16th Century, and the coastal refugees, from the Lydda and Ramleh region, who took refuge in Natufa after the war of 1948. The 1967 census conducted by the Military Government after occupation shows the refugees to be one-fourth (26%) of the total population of 2,311 (Israel Defence Forces 1967, I:88). Among the "native" population further distinctions are made between Christians and Muslims, with the latter constituting less than half (42%) of the total population (IDF 1967, I:118, Table 3). But since the majority of refugees were Muslims, the village continues to have the reputation of being a Christian town, with a Muslim minority.[1] My own survey of the village, conducted in 1974, shows the continued numerical preponderance of Orthodox Christians, the main Christian sect in Palestine, but with signi-

ficant gains made by Catholic and Protestant missionary activity (see Table 9:1).

Table 9:1

Religious Sects in Natufa by Household, 1974

Religion or Sect	Number of Households	% Households
Muslims	114	38.4
Orthodox	99	33.9
Catholic	67	22.9
Protestant	9	3.1
Total Christian	175	60.9
Not Known	16	4.3

Source: Author's Household Survey of Natufa, NHS, 1974:9
(N=305 households)

Another significant distinction is one, not reflected in the census data, between the resident population and the migrant population. Natufa municipal records for 1980 indicate a total estimate of 5,000 population divided into:[2]

3,750 residents	(Muqimeen)	75%
1,500 refugees	(Naziheen)	15%
250 emigrants	(Mughtaribeen)	10%

Since the distinction between a 'resident' and an 'emigrant' is established rather subjectively in the municipal tax records, and the former category includes a substantial number of the population who are "temporarily" abroad (e.g. college students), the actual number of village permanent residents (first two categories) are considerably less -- as I

have established in my household survey below. There is no doubt, moreover, that the war of 1967 affected the village residents much more drastically than other neighbouring settlements precisely because of its heavy dependence on emigrant remittances. The population decline from 3,253 (1961 Jordanian Census) to 2,311 (1967 Israeli Census) -- a 29 percent loss in six years, is one of the most severe in the West Bank for a non-refugee settlement.

The pace of migration increased considerably since 1967 as evidenced by the decline of total households from 516 (IDF Census) to 305 households (1974 Survey).[3] The main difference between the early (i.e., pre-1967) and later migration is the increased tendency on the part of whole families to move out of Natufa en masse, as opposed to individual migrations by male sons before that. This phenomenon is related to two factors: one is the opening up of Australia and the U.S. as new areas for potential immigration. Table 9:2 shows that as three or more emigrants leave the household, the likelihood of settling in the U.S. or Australia is higher than that for the Arab World or Jordan (39 percent vs. 28 percent and 26 percent) given the difficulty of keeping contact with the family at such a distance. Individual migrants tend, by contrast, to settle heavily in the Arab World (44 percent vs. 30 percent in the U.S./Australia and 25 percent in Jordan). The second factor is an outcome of the first: the longer the period of migration, and especially settlement in the U.S. or Australia, the more savings are accumulated by the migrant family, and consequently the likelihood of more upward mobility in the family. In the thirties and forties the major migration from Natufa was internal; to Ramleh, Lydda and the coastal area of Palestine where a majority of migrants worked in the citrus plantations. In the fifties and sixties, with the rise of educational background in the village, many single men migrated to the Gulf and found jobs as

clerics, teachers, or bureaucrats in the civil service of the Jordanian government (Aranki, 1980:inter.). The present employment of emigrants abroad reflects a considerably more sophisticated social composition. In 1974, households with at least one emigrant claimed that 28.1 percent of their relatives (53 households) were salaried employees, 24.1 percent (45 households) were wage workers, 11.2 percent (21 cases) were merchants and shopkeepers, and 7.4 percent (14 cases) were professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers). About one-third of the total households (29.2 percent) claimed their emigrant relative to be a university student (Natufa Household Survey, 1974:84--hereafter NHS).

Table 9:2

Areas of Emigration from Natufa, 1974

MAIN AREA OF EMIGRATION	Households With at Least:*					
	One Emigrant		Two Emigrants		3 or More Emigrants	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
East Bank	53	24.5	49	31.4	25	26.3
Arab World	94	43.5	51	32.6	27	28.4
US/Australia	64	29.6	48	30.8	37	38.9
Other and Unknown	5	2.4	8	5.2	6	6.4
TOTALS	216	100.0	156	100.0	95	100.0

Source: Author's Natufa Household Survey, NHS, 1974:84 (N=305).
*Immediate kin only

Besides the change in the social composition of migrants, the post-1967 migration wave had significant demographic consequences for the village. It modified the age-sex imbalance inherent in the earlier migrations which

left many households with only the older members and women remaining. This modification occurred, however, at the expense of removing whole families, or nuclear units of extended families, permanently from the village.

Table 9:3

Age-Sex Composition of Resident Households in Natufa, 1967

Sex	Total	0-14	15-29	30-44	45-64	65 +
Total	2,311	990	489	290	323	210
Males	1,112	525	241	108	189	103
Females	1,189	465	248	182	184	107
Female %	51.4	46.9	50.7	62.7	56.9	50.9

Source: Adapted from IDF, Census of Population 1967 Publication No. 1, p. 88, Table 2 (Jerusalem 1967).

Thus, in Table 9:3 while the male-female ratios for all age categories appear to be even (females constituting only 51.4 percent of the total), the gap increases as the age categories get older, reaching their zenith in the group most likely to have emigrants (30-44 years), where females constitute 62.7 percent of that category. Because of the tendency after 1967 for whole families from Natufa to migrate, this ratio is lower than that for Ramallah District rural settlements, which has a tradition of high emigration. There the ratio for the same age grouping is 65.5 percent, reflecting individual male emigration, and for Ras el-Tin 59 percent (IDF, Population Census, 1967, I:86,89).

The Disappearing Peasants of Natufa

Demographic changes exemplified by high emigration and serious disparities in age-sex grouping composition have had a major impact on the social structure of the agrarian regime in Natufa. When Eliahu Grant visited the village during Ottoman rule (c. 1905) it was a predominantly agricultural community with rich olive groves and abundant fields (Grant, 1907, 1921:223ff.). Today, this is no longer the case. In 1974 only 27 households (i.e., less than 10.5% of the total population) claimed agriculture to be a main source of livelihood for the family (Table 9:4, below).

About half the households in Natufa (50.4 percent) acquire their livelihood mainly from wages and salaries of locally employed members, including those working in Israel, followed by emigrant remittances (14.5 percent of the households). Since over two-thirds of the village households have emigrant relatives the supplementation of local income by money sent from abroad is most likely to be much higher than what appears in Table 9:4. Some of this money is responsible for the increased building activities, mostly residential -- but also commercial -- which appeared in Natufa since the mid-seventies.

Table 9:4

Main Source of Income for Natufa Households

1974

Source of Income	No. of Households	% of Households
Wages & Salaries	129	50.4*
Emigrant Remittances	37	14.5
Family Enterprises	31	12.1
Agriculture	27	10.5
Rents & Return on Property	11	4.3
Other (Charities, etc.)	21	8.2
Unknown	49	-
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS	305	100.0

Source: NHS, 1974:31. Valid Cases=256. *Known cases only

Conversely, dependence on agricultural income is probably overrated. According to a respected land expert from the village, only two families actually have enough land to generate sufficient income from their crops. Both have slightly over 100 dunums of prime olive groves each, producing 150 and 120 jarrahs of olive oil respectively in good years (Aranki, 1980: inter.) -- but even they have sons in the U.S. who send back money every year. In total, there are nine indigenous families (non-refugees) who work exclusively on their land, three Christian and six Muslim (ibid.). During the Mandate period, only 40 years ago by comparison, 50 percent of the households (vs. 9 percent today) owned their work animals, and over one-third (65 out of 118) had the means of surviving as well-off peasants (NHS, 1974:30; Aranki, 1980:ibid.; Hope-Simpson, 1930:63). What is the explanation for this change?

Basically, the same process of fragmentation and land alienation that operated in Ras el-Tin applies here, but with important modifications.

Natufa differs from Ras el-Tin, despite their adjacent location, in that its land was surveyed, parcelled, and registered in the Land Registry (Tapu) during the years 1952-1956 (see Map 9:1). It thus falls into those categories of West Bank lands where title deeds are recorded into the names of individual owners. Until then, Natufa had patterns of cropping and plot distribution similar to its sister village. A comparison of two estimates undertaken by the Palestine Land Survey Department prior to the actual settlement show the distribution seen in Table 9:5.

Land categories appearing in Table 9:5, are classified for tax purposes. The highest category, unit one -- which does not exist in Natufa, is irrigated land planted with citrus trees and pays 400 fils (c. 60 pence) per dunum. Cultivable land categorized 5 - 8 (50 percent of Natufa's

Map 9:1

Stages of Land Registration in The West Bank 1967



Source: Land Survey Department, Ramallah.

Table 9:5

Land Categories in Natufa

Land Category	First Estimate (1935)		Second Estimate (1945)	
	dunums	% of Land	dunums	% of Land
4 (built-up areas)	411	2.93	391	2.79
5-8 (good arable land)	6,937	49.37	6,879	49.00
9-13 (inferior arable land)	1,787	12.72	1,838	13.09
14-15 (poor quality land)	626	4.46	576	4.12
16 (forests & non-cultivable land	4,289	30.52	4,351	31.00
TOTALS	14,050	100.00	14,036	100.00

Source: Palestine Government Land Survey Department; from the records of R. Aranki (1980:inter.).

land) includes the few patches of irrigated Valley land and most of the fertile plain at the entrance of the village, paying between 40 and 25 fils (6 or 3 pence) per dunum. Category 16 (which includes 31 percent of Natufa's land) is uncultivable and is relieved from taxation (Ramallah Land Registry; Land Tax Classification 1954; Revised 1958). While these categories give us an idea about the agricultural terrain in the village, they do not reflect the distribution of holdings. According to the 1974 Household Survey, 68.2 percent of Natufa's families (208 households) possessed land. Only 187 households revealed their holdings, constituting 61 percent of total respondents. The results appear in Table 9:6 below.

Table 9:6

Distribution of Land Holdings in Natufa by Household, 1974

Holdings (in dunums)	# of Households	% of Total	% of Landowners
None	43	22.8	-
Less than 10	81	43.1	56.0
11 - 50	49	26.1	34.0
51 - 100	7	3.2	4.0
101 - 150	3	1.6	2.0
More than 150	6	3.2	4.0
Unknown	118	-	-
TOTALS	305	100.0	100.0

Source: NHS, 1974:22; valid cases = 187; N = 305

If we exclude the 43 households who are landless (mostly refugees) in Table 9:6, then these holdings reveal the land distribution scheme for 70 percent of all households claiming land possession (144 out of 208), which seems a fair proportion to generalize from. Those who own less than 50 dunums thus constitute the overwhelming majority of Natufa's households (69.2 percent of the total and more than 90 percent of land owners). Most of those have small parcels of olive groves which are cropped biannually using family labour or refugee hired hands. Eighty eight percent of the cultivated holdings are arbored with olive, fig, or almond trees, and only 15.3 percent of the area is allotted to field crops and vegetables (NHS, 1974:21). Forty-three households (18.2 percent) of those with cultivable land claimed to have neglected their plots entirely because they are too small and yield too little to warrant their attention (NHS, 1974:21). Our

estimate is that the number is considerably higher than that.

The basic problem in Natufa is not only the small size of holdings per household, but the fragmentation of parcels common to all the West Bank highlands, and reinforced by partible inheritance. The registration of plots under individual title deeds, which took place over a four-year period between 1952 and 1956, had the further impact of establishing women's right to the inherited parcels. Until 1956, female inheritance in land was circumvented by peasant traditional custom which preempted the alienation of family property in cases where marriage occurs outside the patrilineal line. In 1974, 43 percent of heads of households in Natufa (123 cases) were married to non-relative spouses, and 12 percent (34 cases) were married to spouses related to them on the matrilineal side (NHS, 1974:6).

Since 1964 the fragmentation of individual plots has reached such a proportion that only a minority of holders continued to register the inherited deeds (Sa'ati, 1980:inter.). A typical landholding seen in table 9:7 below illustrates this fragmentation in Natufa today.

The immediate family holdings of landowner J.H.M. in this case (Table 9:7) is just over 61 dunums, of which he personally owns 32 dunums. His actual holding is distributed into 16 fragments spread over seven parcels. If we view these fragments visually (in Map 9:2) we observe that only six of those fragments are adjacent to each other; the rest are dispersed over an area of 5-1/2 kilometers of rugged hilly terrain. Thus, J.H.M. owns fragments of land ranging from 51 square meters to 13 dunums in size, with roughly two dunums on the average. In area his landholding is typical of 34 percent of village holdings (Table 9:6) placing him an inch above the smallest, and most numerous, holders. But since his property is mostly inferior dry farming land (Category 3B) it is not worth his while to consolidate his holdings into a single unit which can be farmed profitably.

Table 9:7

A Typical Landholding in Natufa,

Illustrating Fragmentation of Parcels, 1980

(Property of J.H.M.)

Parcel #	Fragment #	Quality of Land*	Area (dunums)	Share of Holder	Actual Holding
2	117	3B	0.749	Complete	0.749
2	117	6	0.404	Complete	0.404
4	10	3B	26.000	3/6	13.000
4	10	11	4.607	3/6	2.303
4	154	7	4.000	2/5	1.600
4	154	11	0.343	2/5	0.137
6	92	7	5.263	3/9	1.737
6	92	11	2.257	3/9	0.745
8	199	3B	6.470	4/10	2.588
8	220	3B	0.822	Complete	0.822
10	21	3B	3.200	3/6	1.600
10	21	7	1.721	3/6	0.861
13	227	3B	3.497	Complete	3.497
14	56	3B	1.276	Complete	1.276
14	67	3B	1.000	Complete	1.000
14	67	7	0.051	Complete	0.051
7	16	-	61.660	-	32.370

Source: Ramallah Land Registry; Land Records for Natufa, Vol. 3; Property of J.H.M.; *Tax Category (See above) -- table adapted.

Map 9:2 Natufa: Distribution of Parcelled Plots in the Villag

KEY: Parcel (Bloc)= ③
Fragment = ⁴₁
J.H.M. Property=

נפת ראמאללה
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This map shows the distribution of the family plots of JHM in 1964, amount to 61.6 dunums in total. His ow share was 32.3 dunums, distributed i 7 parcels and 16 fragments.

At any rate the possibility of finding landholders willing to sell, or exchange, their fragments for that purpose is remote -- given their number and legal procedures involved. At best J.H.M. can only hope that the residential built-up area of the village will extend in the direction of his own property, driving its real estate value upwards.

What do we conclude from this? The degree of plot fragmentation in Natufa has reached an extent where, for the absolute majority of its landowners, effective land utilization for agricultural purposes is futile, given the size of fragments, the terrain, and the limited possibilities inherent in mechanizing dry farm-land. Whatever yields are extracted from rugged soil is done through related households joining together and leasing their plots to hired croppers, or through the marginal and seasonal use of their family labour. In 1974, 57 percent of landowning households in Natufa (99 households) claimed they crop their land in this joint manner (NHS, 1974:23).

These limitations in land utilization are rooted as much in the juridical form of ownership as they are in demography and ecology. Thus, a radical introduction of land reform measures is unlikely, in my opinion, to ameliorate the condition of Natufa farmers or to reverse the process of depeasantisation. The land settlement of 1952-1956 did enhance the rights of female household members, but only at the cost of furthering the trend towards fragmentation and commoditization of land as property.

Fathers & Sons: Changes in Village Occupational Structure

The decline of involvement in agriculture has given rise to a new diversified social structure which has undergone crucial changes during the last few decades. The magnitude of this change can be seen in the occupational changes in the life of three generations of Natufa residents.

Each head of household was asked to indicate his father's main occupation (even if deceased), his own, and his eldest child's. Although a certain degree of ambiguity may have existed concerning certain fixed categories (e.g., "farmer") and transitional ones ("peasant-worker"), the results (Table 9:8) show clear-cut trends have been projected in Diagram 12:1 for easy illustration. Most noticeable is the sharp decline in the proportion of farmers in the labour force, from 65.6 percent of the total to 4.8 percent in the third generation. A corresponding increase occurred among salaried employees (from 5.2 percent to 36.8 percent) and, more significantly, wage workers (from 11.8 percent to 50 percent). Only the category of shopkeepers and artisans maintained its weight. In the latter case, our data shows that a much higher proportion of households have

Table 9:8

Occupational Distribution in Natufa: Three Generations

	Father of Head of Household		Present Head of Household		Eldest Child	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Farmer	139	65.6	36	17.1	5	4.8
Wage Worker	25	11.8	95	45.0	53	50.0
Salaried Employee	11	5.2	50	23.7	39	36.8
Shopkeeper/Artisan	18	8.5	19	9.0	6	5.6
Other	19	8.9	6	2.8	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	5	2.4	3	2.8
TOTAL	212	100.0	211	100.0	106	100.0
Retired & Handicapped	8	-	32	-	7	-
Student	-	-	-	-	129	-
Housewife	-	-	-	-	17	-
Unknown	85	-	62	-	46	-

Source: NHS, 1974: Tables 14, 12, 30; no sexual breakdown available for eldest child; valid cases: Table 14=220; Table 12=243; Table 30=259 cases. N = 305.

additional entrepreneurial sources of income than is reflected in the occupational categories. Fully 78 households (32 percent of the valid cases) indicated that they engaged in commercial enterprises of various categories (shops, retail, services) at least by one member of the household (NHS, 1979: 109).

Those activities have contributed to raise the standards of living in the village substantially above 90 percent of all West Bank rural settlements. Natufa today boasts a permanent medical clinic, one resident and one part-time physician, one pharmacy, a family planning centre,[4] and a dental clinic open two days a week. In 1974, 60 percent of the households were linked to the regional electric grid, 68 percent had running water in

Diagram 9:1

Occupational Change in Natufa, 1900-1980



Source: Table 9:8

in their homes, 52 percent had internal toilets, 24 percent had television sets, 36 percent refrigerators, 12 percent washing machines, 49 percent sewing machines, and 6 percent had private cars (NHS, 1974:116-118; 122-125).

If we take the changes in the occupational distribution as indicators of shifts in the social class map then several important trends emerge. Natufa has been transformed over the last 100 years from a village of small and medium-sized peasant holdings to a community of resident and commuting workers and a sizeable stratum of salaried clerks and professionals. Village social structure has undergone a considerable degree of proletarianization engulfing half the labour force, but also general upward mobility. In the process, a substantial degree of income polarization occurred.

Table 9:9

Income Differentials in Natufa, 1974

Annual Income (Dinars)	No. of Households	% of Households
Less than 500 J.D.	107	42.6
500 - 750 J.D.	63	24.6
750 - 1,000 J.D.	35	13.7
1,000 - 1,500 J.D.	31	12.1
More than 1,500 J.D.	18	7.0
Unknown	49	-

Source: NHS, 1974:32; valid cases 256; N = 305.

Although Table 9:9 is unsatisfactory as an indicator of class polarity in that, aside from the unreliability of income data gathered in village surveys, it does not incorporate "hidden income" (i.e., land rent, remittances, etc.), we use it here, nevertheless, to illustrate the significant disparities that exist, at least in self-estimation of material wealth, between households.

Natufa differs in this respect from Ras el-Tin and neighbouring poorer villages in that the category of peasant-worker has been a minor phenomenon, and employment in Israel, by wage workers, has been secondary. Among heads of households, currently employed, the majority (49 percent) work inside Natufa, while 37 percent work in other areas of the West Bank, and only 10 percent in Israel (NHS, 1974:13). But as in Ras el-Tin, both cultivation and landholding have constituted a limited, and probably declining, source of this class mobility. What is peculiar to Natufa, so far, is the selective impact of emigration and the transformation of occupational structure brought about by educational attainment.

So far, emigration has had the expected consequence of creating limited polarization between those residents with richer relatives abroad sending money back, and those who do not have emigrant kin. But with the tendency of migrants, since 1967, to move out of the village with their nuclear households entirely, the significance of remittances as a decisive factor in indigenous mobility has declined. Unfortunately, we cannot verify this position empirically since responses to questions concerning changing sources of family income, even indirect ones in this case, tend to be highly unreliable. Furthermore, there is the category of returning emigrants, especially those who chose to retire in Natufa, about which we know very little.

Although emigration has not ceased to be a decisive factor in social structural transformation, it did stabilize into a new threshhold. Fewer families send their male sons alone to emigrate. Resident relatives have become more distant kin and, therefore, less likely to receive substantial aid from the emigrants. The vagaries of the occupation have made it more difficult for those who accumulated capital to invest in businesses whose future, under Israeli rule, is uncertain. In two areas, however, emigration and indigenous investment in Natufa continue to strengthen each other: residential construction, and the higher education of children. There is no doubt that higher education in Natufa, including female education, has been responsible for the dramatic enhancement of the upward mobility of whole families. Our data indicate that the village has surpassed both urban and rural averages for the West in those standards, with literacy levels including 82 percent of all male breadwinners (NHS, 1974:11).

A crucial indicator of intergenerational mobility is the differences in educational attainment between heads of households and their eldest children. Although illiteracy declined by a small measure only (from 18 to 15 percent) we find that 62 percent of the eldest children have finished at least nine years of schooling (as opposed to 37.6 percent for their fathers); 44 percent finished 12 years of schooling (compared to 26 percent); and -- most significantly -- 12 percent hold university degrees, compared to 2.3 percent in the father's generation (NHS, 1974:11;29).[5] It is in this latter category, which marks a five-fold increase in one generation, that is responsible for the significant increase in professional and semi-professional occupational categories in the village, subsumed in Table 9:8 under salaried employment. Paradoxically, it is this category which continues to carry the highest inducement for individual migration since

openings for professional and academic employment in the West Bank are most limited.

Conclusion

The turning point in the transformation of Natufa from a peasant community to a diversified rural settlement seeking its livelihood outside the agricultural realm occurred several decades ago, probably around World War I. The constellation of demographic and ecological factors, operating in the West Bank highlands, have led to the disintegration of the peasant communities in both Natufa and Ras el-Tin. But depeasantisation has had different outcomes in each village. Instead of the resident peasant-worker and the homogeneous social structure generated by the proletarianization of Ras el-Tin, Natufa produced a highly diversified, and mobile, social occupational structure. The impact of outmigration and educational attainment has been to create simultaneously significant class polarization and general prosperity in the village.

Notes

1. If we assume all present refugees in the village to be Muslim, then Christians would constitute 1,351 out of a total "native" population of 1,714, or 79% of the total.

2. Natufa Municipal Records, 1980. In my view this is an exaggerated rough estimate, based on local tax records, and has considerable overlapping, especially in the categories "resident" and "emigrant."

3. Allowance must be made here for a different definitions of households and undercounting in the 1974 Survey.

4. 144 households (47.2 percent of the total) indicated that at least one unit in the household has practiced family planning (NHS, 1974).

5. Since, in many cases, first children are still attending school (30.2 percent of them are below the age of 15 -- NHS:28) the difference in educational attainment is likely to be greater than what appears in our data.

Chapter Ten

Re-Peasantisation: Refugees, Share-Croppers and Absentee Landlords in the Jordan Valley

> "...under some conditions peasants do not dissolve and differentiate into capitalist entrepreneurs and wage labourers, nor are they simply pauperised. They persist, while gradually transforming and linking into the encapsulating capitalist economy, which pierces through their lives."
>
> T. Shanin, "Defining Peasants" (1978)

The reconstitution of Palestinian peasantry, after their initial dispersal in the War of 1948, and in their second exodus in 1967, took its most dramatic form in their re-settlement in the Jordan Valley. Because of its irrigation potential the region, which until the 1950's was undeveloped and sparsely populated, became the only part of Arab Palestine (aside from a few hundred dunums in the Jenin and Tulkarem districts) which was capable of absorbing large numbers of farmers under conditions of intensive farming.

A survey conducted by a United Nations team a few years after the War of 1948 estimated the total Valley area under Arab control to be slightly more than a million dunums, of which 648,987 dunums were cultivatable (334,962 dunums in the East Ghor, and 314,025 dunums in the West Ghor regions) (UNRWA, 1954:6). On the eve of the influx of Palestinian peasant refugees only a fraction of that area was subject to cultivation, as evidenced from Table 10:1 below:

Table 10:1

Jordan Valley Cultivation, by Land Category at the Beginning of Refugee Resettlement (Dunums)

	East Ghor	West Ghor	Total
Dry farming	24,133	3,974	28,107
Partial irrigation	21,502	30,110	51,612
Full irrigation	167,247	43,249	210,496
a. crops	157,377	37,665	195,041
b. fruit plantations	9,870	5,585	15,455
Total Gross Cultivated Area	212,882	77,333	290,215
Total Net Cultivated Area*	191,786	69,669	261,455

Source: UNRWA: Jordan Valley Agricultural Economic Survey (Amman, 1954:9).

*Calculated on the basis of double cropping at 11% of area.

Ecology and demography were the key factors in the late development of the Jordan Valley as an agricultural area. The harsh climatic conditions, the high salinity in the soil, and the control of the area by tribal settlements hostile to outside intrusions made it difficult for sedentary peasants from the highlands to cultivate the region, except for the fruit plantations around the urban centers of Jericho and Shuneh. In addition, the clearly political aims of the Jordan government, backed by U.S. funds, in settling dispossessed Palestinian refugees permanently in the Valley, made the latter resist land distribution schemes which they saw, at the time, as a meager compensation for their lost lands occupied by Israel. Their options for sources of livelihood, however, were extremely limited, and thousands of landless peasants who found themselves settled in camps in the proximity of the Valley became sharecroppers and agricultural workers

in the farms and orchards of Wadi Far'a, al-Auja, Jericho, etc. Other refugees, who had more funds and skills, eventually acquired title deeds and became small holders. Even fewer succeeded in becoming landlords, leasing tracts of their land on a share basis to less fortunate refugees.

The Evolution of Agrarian Relations in the Jordan Valley

Although one of the first areas of sedentary agricultural activity in antiquity, the Jordan Valley became the domain of semi-nomadic tribes for most of its recent history.[1] In the late Ottoman period an attempt was made, both for reasons of political stabilization and to increase state revenue, to delineate areas of tribal boundaries and the establishment of a series of irrigation canals -- on both sides of the River Jordan. Water rights were a main source of conflict between tribes, and agriculture until the 1930's was predominantly based on grazing. Wheat (the chief crop) was grown for subsistence and a limited amount of vegetables, mostly in the Wadi al-Zarqa region was marketed through the trading center at Salt (Government of Jordan, 1961:135).

Most lands at the turn of the century were either Waqf (whose revenue went to religious foundations) or state domain. But between 1925 - 1930 large tracts of these two categories were redistributed to the settled tribes on the basis of musha' (communal) tenure (ibid.:136). By that period, successive waves of tribal migration began to give the Valley a sedentary agricultural character. The Ottomans had settled Bahai's from Iran (at 'Adasiyyeh), Shishans from the Caucas regions (at Wadi al-Zarqa), and Zeinatis from Bisan, who had been displaced by Zionist land purchases in the north.

In the Ghor al-Far'a region, in which my village survey took place (Chapter 11), the main tribal gathering was the Masa'eed tribe, originally from the Arabian Peninsula. When the Land Settlement began to take place the tribe succeeded, in 1932, in registering 15,000 dunums to their name as private property (al-Damin, 1980). Much of this land was later sold to Nablus merchants during the 1932 - 1948 period. The remaining part, about 8,000 dunums, were exploited directly by owner-cultivators from the tribe, or leased on a share-cropping basis to farmers from Beit Foreek and Beit Dajan (Nablus District).

Until World War II tenancy was a minor phenomenon in the Valley. The relative scarcity of the population and the political dominance of semi-nomadic tribes resulted in methods of farming which were extensive and based, mainly, on family labour and the retainers of the big tribal landlords. Due to the lack of irrigation, considerable tracts of land were uncultivated and continued to be so until the fifties, as evidenced from Table 10:1, above. Cultivated land was left fallow for three or 4 years after each cropping year (Government of Jordan, 1961:137).

The influx of Palestinian refugees after the war radically transformed land tenure relations in the Valley. In the southern valley, around Jericho and the Auja areas, capitalist relations in agriculture became prevalent in citrus plantations, with the refugee camps of Ain al-Sultan and Aqbat Jaber acting as a reservoir source of cheap labour. The proximity of the city of Jericho facilitated the development of citrus cultivation by providing an infrastructure for irrigation, marketing, and acting as a center for labour recruitment. The availability of an abundant supply of skilled agricultural labour spurred a wave of land purchases among rich peasants and landlords from the highlands (especially from the Nablus and Irbid regions). Many of those farmers, living in close proximity to their

plots would commute with their families, retainers, and hired workers in the winter cycle on a daily basis. Few highland farmers eventually moved and settled in the Valley, but the overwhelming majority of Valley inhabitants were dispossessed peasants from Palestine. This can be seen from the UNRWA census conducted in 1953 (Table 10:2).

Table 10:2

Western Ghor Population, by Refugee Status

	Refugees	Non-Refugees	Total	% Refugees
Number	59,290	25,316	84,606	70
Families	11,661	3,778	15,439	75.5

Source: Adapted from Jordan Valley Agricultural Economic Survey (UNRWA, 1954), p. 17.

Thus, while 20% of the total population of Jordan at the time was made up of refugees (i.e., refugees registered as destitute), 70% of the Western Valley population, and 84.4% of the East Valley population were refugees. Many of the tribal hamlets in the Valley mushroomed in a matter of a few months into full-fledged villages. Those included Marj Na'je, Jiftlek, El-Auja, Nwei'meh, and Zbeidat.

The population of these villages varied from summer to winter as their refugee-sharecropper inhabitants tended to hire themselves, and their families' labour, to farmers in the highlands during the summer season. In many cases (such as in the Makhrouq and Jiftlek villages) the housing units and amenities in the village belonged to the landlord so that no distinct feeling of rootedness in the village community existed (UNRWA, 1954:15-17).

The presence of refugee peasants completely transformed the agrarian ecology of the region. Virtually all cultivable land was brought under production, including tens of thousands of dunums along the zour, the river basin of the Jordan -- until then remaining uncultivated (Government of Jordan, 1961:139). Hundreds of artesian wells were drilled by UNRWA and the Jordanian government, and later by private landlords. Methods of cultivation shifted towards intensive farming; fallowing was vastly reduced and double-cropping became widely practiced.

Intensive farming accompanied, as would be expected, the integration of Jordan Valley agriculture into the export market and the decline of subsistence crops. In 1954, when the first general agricultural survey was carried in the Valley, wheat and barley dominated other crops in dry farming land (on both sides of the Valley). In irrigated plots, however, the refugees made their impact by the introduction of vegetables, especially tomatoes, eggplants and watermelon -- crops which required a range of farming skills not available at the time to Valley farmers. Fruit plantations, then as today, occupied only a miniscule portion of irrigated land (6% in the East Ghor and 15% in the Western Ghor -- see Table 10:1, above), but were much more significant as a source of cash crops and as a basis for the expansion of capitalist relations in agriculture.

The diffusion of agricultural skills brought about by refugee farmers revolutionized, as noted, farming practices. An average crop-rotation scheme for a 20 dunum farm (Diagram 10:1), constructed by the Jordan Valley Agricultural Economic Survey (1954) indicates the primary importance of cereals, with wheat occupying 48 percent of the total acreage in the Jordan Valley then. Both wheat and barley were marketed internally, with a substantial proportion used to supplement the Palestinian farmer's

Example of an average crop-rotation scheme for a 20 dunums farm — Central Ghor: 1954

tilling & sowing

resting

N.B. On the farm-area, not allocated to fruittrees and foddercrop, this crop-rotation includes 50 % doubble-cropping.



Source: Jordan Valley Agricultural Economic Survey (UNRWA, Beirut: Oct 1954), Appendix C

starchy diet. Diagram 10:1 shows, however, the significant introduction of cash crops which reflect the influence of coastal farmers and the increased demand for vegetables in the burgeoning cities of Amman and Irbid. Industrial crops such as sugarbeets and sesame began to replace acreage previously devoted to cereals (UNRWA, 1954:20-21).

The ecology of the Jordan Valley with its water potential and warm winters allowed for extensive use of double-cropping schemes. Diagram 10:1 shows that 50 percent of the 20-dunum farms were thus cropped, over the 36 month crop-rotation period. Perennial crops included potatoes, wheat, barley and sugarbeets, while the main summer crops were durra (sorghum), maize and sesame. The diagram shows considerable portions of the plot, in areas allocated for field crops and vegetables (but not fruits and fodder crop), left to fallow in every cycle.

Despite considerable fallowing, double-, and later triple-cropping schemes in the Jordan Valley required basic adjustments for the peasant refugees in the allocation of their household labour. The high diversity of crops introduced meant that both men and women (as well as children) were more intensively involved in the new agricultural tasks. Since mechanization in the fifties was still incipient men spent a substantial part of their time clearing and digging water canals (furrows) and flushing saline soil. Women's and children's labour was much more in demand now during the perennial harvest periods. During July and August, when the Valley summer heat becomes unbearable for humans and plants, sharetenants and agricultural workers moved to the slopes of eastern and western hills where they worked on summer grain crops.

The Changing Land Tenure System

The rise of tenancy, especially sharecropping, was the main aspect of change in land tenure accompanying the influx of refugee farmers. Although land was relatively available for purchase, the scarcity of money and water resources forced many refugees to enter into unfavourable compacts with absentee and resident landlords in the Valley.

Discussion of the various forms of land tenure and terms of tenancy in the Jordan Valley has to take into account both regional differences and the consequences of governmental land reform. Unfortunately, most of the empirical data available applies only to the Eastern Valley where irrigation schemes and land development has been pursued by the Jordanian Government since the early sixties. Our case study of Ghor al-Far'a region (next chapter) attempts to rectify part of this imbalance in the existing literature.

In the period following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and up to the early sixties certain generalizations can be extended to the Valley as a whole, with important differences cutting the North-Central-South Ghor continuum on both sides of the river. Thereafter, the major irrigation and redistribution schemes were confined to the East Ghor region with important differentiating consequences for Palestinian farmers in the Western Valley.

But even before the redistribution schemes patterns of absentee landlorship and ecology configurated in different directions as can be seen in Table 10:3.

Length of occupation of land was found to be significantly longer in the Western Valley than in the Eastern Valley and, on the average (7 years vs. 3 years), with a higher turnover of sharecroppers in the Eastern Ghor, and a much lower number of mixed tenure (i.e., peasant owners) who

Table 10:3

Jordan Valley Holdings by Form of Tenure

East Bank and West Bank, 1954

	Owners		Tenants		Owners/Tenants		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
East Bank	1,245	54	716	31	350	15	2,311	100
West Bank	598	39	449	30	467	31	1,514	100
TOTALS:	1,843	48	1,165	31	817	21	3,825	100

Source: UNRWA, Jordan Valley Agricultural Economic Survey, Amman, 1954 (p. 12).

were also tenants. The Jordan Valley Survey (1954:15-16) provided the following explanations for the differences:

a. Absentee landlordship is much higher in the Western Valley, whereas the higher incidence of resident landlords in the Eastern Valley led to frequent friction with their tenants, and, hence, higher turnover.

b. Land scarcity was less of a factor in the changing of holdings among East Ghor landlords than in the West, where the majority of refugees established their residence. The proportion of fallow areas, consequently, were higher in the East Ghor.

c. Prevalence of private property in land in the East Bank, as opposed to state domain and waqf categories (which prevailed in the Western Valley) tempted landlords in the Eastern Ghor to change their tenants much more frequently for fear of tenants establishing their squatter's rights. There the law

Table 10:4

Ownership, Rent, Type of Rent & Length of Occupation

In The Western Valley, By Subdistrict, 1954

Village & Subdistrict	Total # of Holdings (a)	Totally Owned (b)	Totally Rented (c)	% Rent of Total (d)	Partly Rented /Owned (e)	Total (c+e)	Cash Rent (f)	Share-Cropping (g)	% Share Cropping of Total --	Other Rent (h)	Total (f+g+h)	Average Length of Occupation Yr. / Mo.
Jericho Subdistrict	799	403	305	38	91	396	47	306	38	43	396	5 8
1. Jericho	359	266	79	30	14	93	33	52	14	8	93	3 8
2. Nuweimeh	69	23	31	45	15	46	1	37	54	8	46	2 6
3. Dyouk	106	77	11	10	18	29	3	25	24	1	29	3 7
4. Nabi Monsa	97	4	93	96	--	93	8	85	88	--	93	10 -
5. Auja	168	33	91	54	44	135	2	107	64	26	135	5 7
Nablus Subdistrict	715	195	144	20	376	520	12	166	23	342	520	8 7
1. Tubas	527	161	3	0.6	363	366	8	41	8	317	366	10 11
2. Fasayel	9	2	7	78	--	7	--	7	78	--	7	3 9
3. Faz'a	179	32	134	75	13	147	4	118	66	25	147	3 1
JORDAN VALLEY TOTAL:	3,825	1,843	1,165	30	817	1,882	99	1,285	70	598	1,982	5 1

Source: Adapted from Jordan Valley Agricultural Economy Survey (1954) Appendix "B", Table 4, p. 6.

made it very difficult for the landlord to evict tenants on private land (mulk) after 15 years of continued occupation.

d. Agricultural communities in the Western Ghor were already established by the turn of the century (Government of Jordan, 1961:134-135), lending a more stable pattern of relationship between peasants and landlords, whereas large scale agriculture did not develop in the East until the influx of Palestinian refugees in the early 50's.

Within the Western Valley the main distinction in tenancy relationships existed between north and south. That is, between the areas characterized by citrus plantations and fruit trees (Jericho subdistrict) and those characterized by field crops and vegetables (Nablus subdistrict). Table 10:4 summarizes these characteristics.

It will be seen from Table 10:4 that some of the distinguishing features of the Eastern and Western Valley apply also to the northern and southern sectors of the Western Valley (i.e., to the Nablus and Jericho subdistricts, see map on page ( )). In the Nablus subdistrict, wealthy peasants from highland villages (notably Tubas and Beit Dajan) as well as from the city of Nablus itself acquired vast tracts of land in corresponding areas of the Valley which they leased on a share basis to refugee farmers. Lesser peasants augmented their small plots by establishing partnership compacts with co-villagers and refugee farmers. The result was a longer duration of compacts and a higher incidence of mixed tenancy (owner-cultivation and share-tenancy) than in the southern Valley. Thus, while the duration of tenancy in the Valley as a whole was 5 years and one month, and for the Jericho subdistrict, it was 8 years and seven months (almost

eleven years for the Tubas holdings), where patronage relations are strongest.

Mixed tenancies, similarly, constituted 73 percent of holdings in the Nablus subdistrict, as opposed to only 11 percent of holdings in the Jericho subdistrict, indicating a more solid peasant proprietorship. The two areas of Jericho and Tubas stand in the sharpest contrast to the Jericho and Tubas stand in the sharpest contrast to the others. Jericho, an agricultural city of banana and citrus plantations, had 74 percent of its holdings totally owned, while only 31 percent of the Tubas were owner-cultivated holdings. Significantly, share tenancy was low in both areas (8 percent in Jericho and in Tubas 14 percent -- compared to 70% of holdings in the Jordan Valley). This reflected the predominance of wage labour in Jericho and partnership compacts in Tubas, listed under "other" form of tenancy in Table 10:4 (60 percent of the total).

By the 1960's the expansion of cultivable land and the regulation of water works, especially in the East Ghor project, significantly expanded the land under control by absentee landlords and, hence, those leased under share-cropping arrangements to refugees. This expansion occurred at the expense of mixed tenancies and the reduction of holdings in the owner cultivation category. Diagram 10:2 illustrates these tendencies.

The 1973 survey of the Jordan Valley, carried out by The Jordanian Department of Statistics, showed a further increase in owner-operated farm tenure (from 32.5% to 35.9%) and in sharecropped plots (from 39.0% to 47.2%) but a reduction in areas operated under mixed tenancies (Government of Jordan, 1973:144). It was in this period that serious governmental attention was directed towards land reform.

Diagram 10:2

Land Tenure in The Jordan Valley 1959-1960



Source: The East Jordan Valley: A Social & Economic Survey, Amman 1961, Figure 10, p. 166.

The main impetus for redistribution schemes was generated by the loss of the West Bank as an agricultural base for Jordan in the War of 1967. In 1965 West Bank agriculture contributed $43 million to Jordan's GNP, or 45% of the total national agricultural income (Ward, 1970:3). Although the cultivated area in the West Bank constituted less than one-third of the total for pre-1967 Jordan (about 1.5 million dunums), nevertheless, it included 18.6% of all plots cultivated by field crops, 36.8% vegetables, and significantly 77.0% fruit trees (Haddad, 1975:11). The

latter constituted a substantial portion of Jordan's agricultural export income from the marketing of citrus and olive oil. Land reform was thus necessitated by the loss incurred from agricultural income, by the inefficiency in existing land tenure systems, and by the social tensions originating in the existence of large unused lands in absentee hands.

The ideology behind the land reform utilized similar concepts to those prevailing in mandatory Palestine, especially that of the "plot viable", discussed in chapter 6, but with heavy emphasis on productivity. Thus,

> "The minimum size unit was stipulated (by the land reform) to be large enough to ensure a decent standard of living for a farm family averaging six persons, to support livestock, and to assure efficient production, but to also be small enough to ensure that the managerial ability of the average farmer would not be taxed." (Dajani et al., 1980: 41).

A 1980 study commissioned to assess the past performance of government schemes in the Valley listed the following as the objectives of the various development laws, carried in 1959, 1962, 1968, 1973 and 1978:

1. Reduction in the size of holdings on irrigated lands in the East Ghor area.

2. The creation of a modest number of new holdings, giving ownership or irrigated land to previously landless farmers. And,

3. "A reduction in the degree of fragmentation of holdings, i.e., consolidation of previously dispersed holdings into a single contiguous holding." (Dajani, 1980:49).

Although the main impact of redistribution did not appear until the period between 1975 to 1978 -- when the laws acquired more muscles, there was a wide divergence between the intention of the law and its actual implementation. The 1978 agricultural census did show an increase in the proportion of owner-operated holdings for the year 1975 (from 37.1% in 1975 to 40.4% in 1978) and in share-cropped areas (from 22.0% to 26.9%) both at the expense of cash rentals (ibid.:52, 54). But the proportion of big landlords, those owning more than 200 dunums, remained virtually the same (about 2 percent of holders), and, significantly, those owning less than 10 dunums; that is, the destitute peasantry increased from 14.6% of total holdings in 1975 to 18.3% in 1978 (derived from Table 2-4, ibid.:50). Thus, while the data on the form of holdings tend to support the objectives of land reform aimed at creating a viable middle peasantry, figures on the distribution of the size of holdings indicate increased differentiation.

One major source of the increased differentiation has been the loopholes built into the land reform law. The original land redistribution law (of 1959) aimed at creating manageable farm units for holders with the minimum size of 30 dunums (to prevent fragmentation); however, a 1960 amendment to the law redefined the word "holder" as to include individual members of a single landlord family, thus allowing many landlords to retain holdings which would have been expropriated, and others to amass holdings in the name of various household members exceeding the maximum allowed by the law (Hazleton, 1974; Dajani, 1980:43).

However, neither the size of holdings nor the form of tenure help us in understanding the nature of class relations in the Valley, a point which requires a more detailed examination of the terms of tenancy relations. (Corresponding data for the Western Valley is not available for the 1970's or the present -- however, the situation there is compounded

by two additional factors: (1) upper ceiling on holdings is not regulated by law since the redistribution acts initiated in the East Bank were not applied until after 1967; and, (2) the decisive factor affecting land (and water) use in the Western Valley has been the confiscation of land in the Valley for the benefit of civilian Jewish settlements. That subject will be treated later in this chapter and, in the case study of Zbeidat, the next chapter.

The Conditions of Tenancy: Landlords, Tenants & Sharecroppers

The intensification of capitalist relations in agriculture in the Jordan Valley retained many traditional forms of tenancy, but transformed the content of that relationship due to the uneven roles of peasants and landlord in the introduction of intermediate and high level technology which was beyond the investment capacity of most farmers.

In the Central and Northern Valley sharecropping contracts of the muhasasa variety were dominant, on both sides of the river. The most common form of muhasasa was the practice of leasing land and water by the landlord to the peasant, while the latter provided his household labour and any extra hired labour needed during the harvest. All expenses used (ploughing, fertilizers, etc.) were shared, and the landlord would receive one-half of the net marketed yield. This is the pattern known as the fifty: fifty share system, which prevails today.

Landlord-peasant relationships and the share of the latter in the muhasasa contract varied greatly, and continue to vary depending on the availability of labour, scarcity of land, and amount of investment required by the crop. Immediately following the 1948 war, for example, the landlord's share in the Valley was 18 percent of the crop. But as the competition for land grew more intense and capital investment in irrigated agri-

culture grew beyond the ability of most refugee farmers, the landlord's share increased (in relative and absolute terms) in a range amounting between 30-66 percent of the crop value (Government of Jordan, 1961:140). By the mid-sixties sharetenancy in the Valley became the prevalent form of tenure. A survey conducted by the Royal Scientific Society in the mid-seventies revealed that 85.5 percent of sharecroppers in the East Ghor Valley had entered into compacts with their landlords on that basis (97 percent in the Middle Ghor, 62 percent in the Northern Ghor, and the vast majority in the Southern Ghor) (Sharab, 1975:37). My own investigation in the Ghor el-Far'a region (Western Valley) in 1980 revealed that all muhasasa contracts in that area conformed to the fifty:fifty system. In the northern plains (Jenin-Tulkarem), by contrast, peasant sharecroppers had to surrender two-thirds of the net yield to the landlord in irrigated land (al-Damin, 1980:inter.).

Higher returns for sharecroppers in the Valley than for those in the northern plains were discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. There we explained the differences in terms of stable agricultural communities in the north (as opposed to lack of settlement in the Valley), and to the presence of tribal landlords in the Valley who set the pace for later compacts with their tenants.

The presence of refugee peasants also had a different impact on agriculture in the northern Valley, where citrus cultivation was scarce, than on the south. Instead of creating a rural proletariat, it merely reduced the average size of sharecropped land, from 50 dunums to 20 dunums per household (Abdel-'Ali, 1980:inter.).

One crucial aspect of defining the class character of agrarian relations in the Jordan Valley lies in the proper assessment of the consequences of absenteeism. Sharab (1975) has thrown new light on the

nature of that relationship in his Agro-Economic Aspects of Tenancy in the East Jordan Valley. A survey of landlords in the Eastern Valley revealed that 37.3 percent of them resided outside the Valley (the highest being in the northern Ghors - that is, the area where land reform was carried most intensely) (Sharab, 1975:16-17). Characteristically, those were the landlords with bigger size farms (those in excess of 50 dunums). In addition, Sharab found a significant proportion of rentier landlordism (15 percent of total). Those were mainly merchants, government bureaucrats and women landlords, who had acquired the plots through inheritance. Among tenants the study revealed that two-thirds were refugees originating from Palestine with the vast majority of them (88 percent) being otherwise landless (ibid.: 22).

The most striking aspect about landlordism in the Valley is not the prevalence of absenteeism but the relative insignificance absentee landlordism. This judgement is not based on the small proportion of parasitic landlords (i.e., rentiers), but on a certain understanding of the term "absentee". A majority of landlords in the Valley live in the immediate vicinity of their farms or in the nearby highland towns. Most of them are in a commuting distance from their plots. Furthermore, a majority play an active role in basic decisions determining the choice of crops, use of fertilizers, date of harvesting and sales of yields. Sharab reported, in his sample, that 50.8 percent of the landlords visit their sharecropped farms on a daily basis, and a further 22.2 percent on a weekly basis (Sharab, 1975:53, Table II-22). That is, about three-quarter of the landlords, who appear in the statistical data as absentee, exercise direct supervision of their farms. This is a situation qualitatively different from the semifeudal and parasitic agrarian relations prevalent in coastal

Palestine during the mandate period, and in pre-republican Syria, Iraq and Egypt.

Dajani suggests a typology of classification for landlords, based on their degree of involvement in the farm operation, which possibly provides a better model for differentiation of peasant-landlord relationships than the absentee/owner-operator dichotomy (Dajani et al., 1980:55-57). This typology is based on the functional categories of: (a) the absentee landlord who delegates to the tenant total responsibility of cultivation, usually on a cash-rental basis; (b) the "commuting landlord" who manages his farm through an agent (wakil). The latter, in turn, will cultivate it on a share basis, lease it to a sharecropper, or to wage workers (Dajani calls these "nonresident owner-operators"); (c) sharecropping compacts involving a range of involvements by a nonresident and resident landlord with his lessee-sharecropper; (d) "resident owner-operation" involving primarily household members' work and occasional hired labour during peak seasons. Thus between the two extremes of "absentee landlords" in the classical sense (a) and peasant owner-operators (b) we have a whole complex network of compacts in which the landlord relationship constitutes degrees of partnership with his tenant. A significant number of these compacts involve what is known as mixed tenancy (farmers who are owners and lease, on a sharecropping basis, surplus land from "absentee" landlords). In the Eastern Valley the proportion of these compacts has been on the decline, from 26.7 percent in 1961, to 14.2 percent in 1973 and only 11.6 percent in 1978 (Sharab, 1975:3, Dajani, 1980:54). But in the Western Valley, in the absence of redistributive schemes it continues to be a major form of tenure. In Zbeidat, for example, about one-third of the total farming households (31.3 percent) were owner-sharecroppers in 1980 (see next chapter).

The form of tenancy compact is crucial in determining not only the return on investment by the landlord, but also the character of class relationship between owners, tenants and wage workers. Diagram 10:3 suggests a schema of involvement, return on investment and degree of risk involved for the landlord corresponding to the form of tenancy.

Diagram 10:3

Typology of Tenancy Forms & Corresponding Options for Landlords

Type of Farm Operation	Degree of Involvement of the Owner	Potential Returns to Owner	Degree of Risk Assumed by the Owner
1. Resident Owner-Operation	High	High	High
2. Nonresident Owner-Operation ("Commuting Landlord")	Substantial	High	Highest
3. Sharecropping Arrangement	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
4. Fixed Fee Rental Contract	Minimal	Low	None

Source: An Interim Evaluation of the Jordan Valley Development Effort 1973-1980 (Amman, 1980): Fig. 2-1, 58.

Diagram 10:3 has one serious omission. It excludes the important category of plantation owners in the citrus and banana groves one finds in the southern regions of the Valley (Shuneh, al-Auja, and Jericho). At the formal level it is possible to subsume those plantations under category 2 (although a number of their owners in the Jericho region, at least, are resident farmers). But their peculiarity is that they, unlike the other

forms of tenancy, involve primarily wage-workers hired either directly by the landlord or his manager, or by the share-tenant. Wage labour, of course, exists at all levels of tenancy forms discussed above, including among resident farmers who utilize their household labour, but it finds its most acute expression in plantation agriculture.

A significant aspect of tenancy forms in the Jordan Valley is the fluidity of class relations among intermediate peasants, especially among share-tenants. By "fluidity" I refer to the manner in which small holders and share-tenants periodically 'expand' and 'contract' their cropping plots, and hire their own, and their family's labour to other farmers and landlords. Unlike dry farming in the highlands, this fluidity is not primarily the product of work opportunity outside agriculture, involving industrial migrant peasant-workers who continue to maintain a marginal relationship to the land, but exists <u>within</u> agriculture. It is the product of a number of contingencies, including (1) the chronic shortage of agricultural labour resulting from migration; (2) redistributive land schemes initiated by the government (in the East Ghor); and, (3) the relatively short duration (Sharab, 1975: 30) of the share-contracts, giving tenants the option of seeking better tenancy leases without compromising their access to the land.

With the large-scale introduction of agricultural technology into irrigated agriculture in the last ten years, however, a new element of differentiation entered into defining the relationship between peasants and landlords. The magnitude of capital investment required to keep an average farm in operation, access to credit, access to markets, control over marketing outlets, and (in the case of West Bankers) control over the land, became the crucial determinants of the farmers' standard of living and his tenancy status. For many West Bank farmers it also challenged their ability to survive as peasants on the land.

Commission Agents and the New Technology in Agriculture

Commission agents are big merchants who advance credit to small farmers and sharecroppers in the Jordan Valley at the beginning of the season for the purchase of seed stock and other cultivation expenses in return for a "commission" on the net yield of marketed produce. This commission varies from region to region but tends to fluctuate between 5-7 percent of the net value of the yield. In addition, they collect 2-3 percent of the value for municipal taxes and transport. Commission agents usually control sections of the central vegetable market (hisbeh) and have a monopoly over marketing the produce of farmers who are indebted to them.

Quite often the commission agent is himself the absentee landlord, as is the case with several landlords in the Ghor al-Far'a region which we will discuss below -- but this need not be the case.

In the Jordan Valley commission agents perform several important functions: (a) they provide the farmer with advance credit in the form of seed stock, seedlings, chemical fertilizers and insecticides and other cultivation needs; (b) they provide the farmers with cash loans, including consumption loans, when his money supply at the end of the summer season is low, and he has no savings to start the new season; (c) they supply the farmer with the standard (18 kgs) boxes which are needed to transport and market the produce; and, finally, (d) they act as an intermediary between the farmer and the retail merchant in the hisbeh by auctioneering the produce to the highest bidder.

Since the commission agent acquires 7 percent of the net marketed price, he has an interest in getting the best price for the farmer., Unlike the absentee landlord (in case he is a separate person) agreements between the commission agent and the farmer are recorded in detail stipulating the duties and responsibilities of each person. However, despite the "services"

provided by the commission agent to the credit hungry peasant, the structure of their relationship is essentially exploitative. Against the provision of supplies and credit the commission agent: (1) sets his own, usually inflated, prices for seeds and fertilizers, and (2) controls the marketing avenues for the peasants. Currently in the Western Valley this means that sharecroppers and most owner-cultivators cannot make full use of Jordanian market demands for winter vegetables when prices across the river are higher than those prevalent in the Israeli and West Bank markets.

In the Southern Ghors, with different ecological conditions, share-tenants are similarly disadvantaged, especially when the commission agent is himself the landlord. There, failure to repay the subsistence advance by the end of the season usually ends in compelling the peasant to sign a second year's contract which carries within its terms the cumulative debts, including interest (Dajani, 1979:16). In cases where the landowner and the commission agent are not the same person, the net yield in the Southern Ghors region is divided into three equal shares between owner, commission agent and the tenant. This is not the case in Zbeidat where the commission agent receives only his 7 percent, plus whatever interest is due on delinquent payment. The latter could amount to as much as 30 percent on the principal loan per annum.[2]

In both cases the consequences for the peasant and share-tenant is similar. Their dependence on the landlord/commission agent for the supply of equipment and for the marketing of produce increases considerably. Farmers owning plots less than 30 dunums per household (these constitute the majority in the Western Valley and 78 percent of the holdings in the East Jordan Valley)[3] and using traditional furrow irrigation, could hardly break even at the end of the season. Dajani, for example, calculated that for farmers in the Southern Ghors with holdings of less than 40 dunums,

and producing less than one ton of vegetables (e.g., tomatoes, cucumbers), the net income would be 400 JDs per annum (about $1,300), which is the bare subsistence level for an average family of eight (1979:16-17).

In the marketing of produce and provision of credit commission agents were, since the fifties, and continue to be, the main link between the peasant and the market. Other forms of marketing such as direct sales to retailers, and sales to processors (especially in the case of grain and poultry), involve only a minor number of farmers.

The arrival of the technological revolution in agriculture accentuated many of these uneven relations. First, the introduction of fertilizers and insecticides in the early fifties, then the introduction of plastic tunnels and high-yielding variety seeds in the late sixties, and, finally, the diffusion of drip irrigation methods and hothouses since the mid-seventies, radically transformed agricultural techniques, without -- at the same time -- altering the social relations of agricultural production.

An evaluation of the impact of drip irrigation and plastic tunnels for the period 1973-1980 found that:

> "Where the landlord bears the entire cost of the new technology, the sharecropper pays for the use of this technology by making a fixed cash payment per dunum. Where the sharecropper bears a portion of the cost of the new technology, the sharecropper and the landlord also share the costs of all other inputs, including labour, and the returns in small proportion." (Interim Evaluation, Dajani et al., 1980:65).

The evaluation concluded that while the system of share-tenancy prevalent in the Valley adapted itself efficiently (in terms of productivity) to the new technology the under-capitalized tenant has suffered badly. Despite the presumed archaicness of the share system (cf. Sharab, 1975:4-9) many landless refugee farmers seemed to adapt themselves success-

fully to sharetenancy by utilizing capital resources forwarded to them in the form of stipends sent by relatives abroad. However, those constituted only a minority of tenants with access to credit. Sharab's study of tenancy in the Valley points out that slightly over half the tenants surveyed (56 percent) received credit. Of those, 43 percent acquired credit from commission agents, 26 percent from their landlords, 26 percent from "relatives and friends," and only 7 percent from governmental credit cooperatives (Sharab, 1975:50, Table II-19).

The main impact of the new capital intensive agriculture has been to reinforce the differentiation between two categories of farmers: those sharetenants and "middle peasants" who are capable of going into partnerships over the considerable capital investment needed on the one hand, and those tenants and small peasants who could contribute only marginally to these inputs. As long as the new investments involved relatively low amount of capital (e.g. for insecticides and fertilizers), there was a considerable amount of circulation of peasant households between the two categories. However, ever since the return on such investment increased substantially with the newer methods of irrigation and cropping (six to ten times the crop yield under traditional cultivation techniques) both the big landlords and the wealthier sharetenants benefited cumulatively from this limited Green Revolution, while the lesser peasantry -- including those with title deeds to their plots -- became increasingly tied to their commission agents. Meanwhile, the only source of credit which is capable of breaking this deadlock -- low interest government loans -- has in fact been working in favour of the landlords since real estate collateral is needed for the approval of these loans (Sharab, 1975:49). The alternative requirement for these loans is a written lease from the landlord "certifying that they have the farm management responsibility on the farm." (Dajani et al.,

1980:68) -- an undertaking which most landlords refuse to extend to their tenants for fear it might be used to further the latter's claims to the land, in case of future redistribution schemes.

In the Western Valley several agricultural cooperatives have been established with the aim of helping members in the acquisition of capital loans and securing marketing outlets, including "certificates of origin" for exporting crops to Jordan. But the membership of these cooperatives has been heavily weighed in favour of landlords (see next chapter). More significantly, the Israeli military government in the West Bank has refused to grant permission for the release of $7.13 million allocated as loans for agricultural development through the Jordan Cooperative Organization in 1979 (Khraisheh and Ebersole, 1980:31) thus stifling their growth.

As in South Asia, the introduction of technical innovations in the Jordan Valley has benefited the big landlords and helped in the emergence of a new kulak class among the wealthier sharetenants. Here, too, as in India, the sharecropping system has adapted itself efficiently to the new methods of production and marketing (see Chapter 5, above). Because of labour shortages, however, we do not witness sharpening class antagonism in the agrarian system. In particular, the pattern of large farmers evicting tenants and replacing them with wage workers does not obtain here (Griffin, 1979:93). This is partly due to the inability of large landowners to supervise their farmsteads directly in an efficient way, and partly to the lack of demographic pressure by tenants equivalent to the situation in South Asia. In the Western Valley, however, the main "demographic" pressure has resulted from land confiscation by Jewish settlements rather than by the pressing competition of landless peasants.

Israeli Settlements in the Valley

Because of its strategic location (separating the pre-1967 boundaries of Israel from the Arab world by the River Jordan and the arid highlands of central Palestine) and its great agricultural potential as "the natural hot house of the Middle East," the Western Valley region became the favoured area for Jewish colonization efforts since the first years of Israel occupation. During the 1967 war and estimated 75,000 out of 84,779 of the region's residents (88 percent of the total -- Harris, 1980:16) escaped, thus creating a "demographic vacuum" for the Israeli military and later, civilian outposts to fill. Although many thousands of the area's inhabitants later filtered back, the Israeli military government made full use of the category of "absentee land" holders to confiscate thousands of dunums in favour of agricultural colonies.

Significantly, the Jordan Valley constituted the one area of consensus in the divergent settlement policies of the Labour and Likud wings of Israeli policy as expressed in the Allon Plan (1967, modified 1975). Although Likud and Gush Emunim maximalists objected to the territorial compromises implicit in the Allon Plan, especially the component allowing for the restoration of Arab sovereignty in the "Jericho Corridor" (see Map 10:1), nevertheless, both maximalists and minimalists agreed on the non-negotiability of the Jordan Rift in future peace settlements.

The expansion of Israeli presence went through several phases which can be summarized as follows:[4]

1. Nahal (military) settlements aimed at guerrilla intrusions, especially in the Ghor el-Far'a region (1968-1971). Moshav (then Nahal) Argaman (see appendix F) was established in this period. During the 1971-1975 period a second line of out-

posts, built on the eastern ridge of the Samarian highlands reinforced the presence of the Valley bed settlements.

2. Reorientation of settlement's character from semi-military outposts to permanent civilian villages, based on water-intensive agriculture (after 1974). This was accompanied by a shift from the collective form of agricultural production (moshav shiftui) to cooperative farming (simple moshav) to allow for an independent small holding agriculture oriented towards the export of winter vegetables.

3. Urban network (1975-1977): creation of regional urban centres in Ma'aleh Efraim, Ma'aleh Adumim, and Kiryat Arba' (Hebron). The aim of these centres were (a) to buttress the scanty demographic presence of agricultural settlements with an industrially based Jewish population in the rift; (b) to create a network of Jewish urban population linking central Israel to the rift and separating the highland Palestinian population from the Arab world (i.e. from geographical continuity with Jordan); (c) to create an urban-regional infrastructure to provide services and light industries for the agrarian-based villages (Harris, 1970:114-115).

4. Demographic breakthrough (1978-present): the publication of the Drobbles Plan (World Zionist Organization) in 1978 calling for settlements not only "around the settlements of minorities (sic), but also in between them" (Drobbles, 1978:1) marked a turning point towards the physical annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. In the Jordan Valley the

plan called for "beefing up" existing settlements and strengthening regional councils within it.

The Likud coming to power in 1977 paved the way for the final departure from the "territorial" conception of settlement as developed by Allon, which confined colonization to strategic "security" belts and to areas of minor Arab demographic presence (Jerusalem and Gush Etzion areas excepted). The ideological precepts of this expansion were already expressed by the World Zionist Organization Master Plan (1979-1983) in which settlement was declared essential for the State of Israel not only for security but "by right" (Drobbles, 1978:ibid.). But the logistical aspects of the plan's implementation were most sharply expressed in Arik Sharon's (then Minister of Agriculture) so-called Secret Map. The plan's main thrust was the building of longitudinal belts of Jewish settlements in a grid-like fashion which would criss-cross the lengths and widths of the West Bank's populated centres:

> In Sharon's view, the growth of the Arab population cannot be restricted by administrative means -- including expropriation -- and therefore, the correct solution is to neutralize the physical development by shifting the border to the very doorstep of the Arabs, through an Israeli foothold in the empty expanses and the formation of a physical link between the Israeli outposts. (Shapira, 1978:1)

In the Jordan Valley the plan called for the establishment of a triangular series of settlements around Jericho intended to seal off the "Allon Corridor" linking Jordan to the West Bank and thus prempting any political solution within the Camp David framework (Shapira, 1978:ibid.). It is paradoxical that the implementation of th is plan was carried while the autonomy negotiations were carried with Egypt during the 1978-1981 period. Actual construction of the first six settlements in the Jericho

corridor had already begun in April, 1980 (Harris, 1980:215).

By June of 1981 there were already more than 25 Israeli settlements in the Valley (out of sixty settlements in the West Bank), but its total population remained small. This compares with the beginning of 1978 when there were only 2,000 settlers in the whole rift (Harris, 1980:113). Projections for the northern rift envisioned an increase to 3,300 by 1980 and 8,000 by 1995 (ibid.:122).

The fear that the 1981 elections could have brought the Labour Party to power propelled the Jewish Agency Settlement Department to start a nationwide campaign for settlement in the Jordan Valley. Its slogan was "Build your nest in the Jordan Valley." Settlers were offered an introductory working capital, an air conditioned house, a 20-dunum plot, water quotas, credit, agricultural instruction and community services (Ha'aretz, December 12, 1980). In December, also induced by possible loss of power, Sharon's Agriculture Ministry published a Five-Year Plan, 1980-1985, which called for the total cultivation of 300,000 dunums in all occupied territories and the creation of 48 new settlements during the period (Yediot Ahranot, December 22, 1980).

A major problem facing the Jordan Valley Jewish settlements, however, is physical viability and their inability, despite material inducements to attract new members. Part of this failure can be attributed to the sheer environmental harshness of the Valley to which many of the new settlers, despite their zeal, are not accustomed to. But economic miscalculation by the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department also had its share. The early push for creating an agrarian economy almost exclusively based on winter vegetables in order to benefit from the early ripening of fruits backfired when even earlier vegetables from the Arava Valley and Rafah Approaches flooded the market (Goell, 1980:12). A sudden shift,

in the 1979-1980 period, to growing flowers under plastic hot houses for export to Europe involved unexpected competition within the EEC which forced several settlements to liquidate their assets.

But not all the settlers' problems are economic in nature. There are certain ideological-organizational dilemmas which face Jewish settlers which even the massive injection of subsidies (declared by the Jewish National Fund in 1980-1981) (al-Hamishmar, 29.3.1981) were unlikely to solve. Those problems can be summarized as follows:

a. The political heterogeneity of Israeli movements sponsoring Jewish colonies in the Valley made it difficult for the various blocs of settlements to coordinate their demands to the government in a way, for example, that Gush Emunim has done in the West Bank highlands. (Only Mapam's Kibbutz Artzi has abstained from creating settlements in the Valley).

b. Since most Valley settlements are made of moshavim and moshavim shiftui (fifteen out of 21 in 1978 -- Morgenstern, 1978:9) rather kibbutzim, their capacity to draw internally cohesive plans and to articulate these plans effectively at the national level have been weakened by the personal interests of individualized farming. This also posed an economic problem reflected in the inability of the settlements to properly utilize capital intensive mechanization in a manner that communal farms have done elsewhere.

c. Dependence on Arab labour in both the initial construction of housing for the settlements and in agricultural production has been a continued source of embarrassments for the settlers'

organization, ever calling for "Jewish redemption of the land." In the case of Moshav Argaman a major scandal ensued in 1978 when the Jewish Agency discovered that several Jewish farmers subleased their land (already confiscated from its Arab owners) to Palestinian farmers from the Galilee (Litani, 1980). An indication of this dependence on Arab labour was the boast made by the farm manager of Phasael, in the Central Valley, that his settlement is distinguished from all other Valley settlements by restricting each family's hiring quota to a maximum of two Arab workers for each harvesting season (Goell, 1980:ibid.).

d. The Jordan Valley settlements could not be considered "commuter" settlements, in the same way as the highland settlements, given their agrarian base and distance from Israeli urban centres. With the abandonment of the Allon plan and the introduction of Likud's autonomy scheme for the West Bank, many Valley settlers became uneasy about their future prospects. In the transitional period between Likud's coming to power and the final scrapping of the Jericho corridor plan (as part of the "Jordanian Option") in 1981 there was strong pressure by Valley settlers' associations on the government for formal annexation of the Rift, along with the Golan and Jerusalem (Goell, 1980:ibid.). Harris quoted a leader of the Jordan Rift Settlements Committee declaring:

"Here in the Rift we work thousands of dunums -- which, why is the truth not said? -- are Arab lands. What Arabs? Above all absentees, inhabitants of Nablus and Toubas who fled to the East Bank in the Six Day War. These people cannot return to Judea and Samaria because a list of their names is kept at the bridges. Now there will be autonomy.

> What if these absentees will return? They will go in a procession to the courts. (Ha'aretz, 20.10.1978/Harris, 1980:116).

At the centre of the conflict between Jewish settlers and Palestinian farmers in the Valley lies the future control of the Valley's cultivable land and sources of water. The low ratio of Israeli settlers to the Valley's Arab population (10 to 13 percent, depending on the estimate) should not disguise the enormous uneveness in power and access to resources in the hands of the settlers. By 1980, 70 percent of the total Valley arable lands were under Israeli control -- 40 percent of which belonged to absentee owners who were denied access to the West Bank (Aronson, 1980: 21).

Three main forms have been used for the seizure of land in the Valley. One was the usual sequestering of holdings of residents who fled to the East Bank in the War of 1967 (hence called "absentee property"); the second was the seizure of communal and unregistered land under the rubric of state domain; the third -- a major form in the Jordan Valley -- has been the sealing off of "security zones" for military use. Subsequently many of those "security zones" were transferred to civilian Jewish settlements for agricultural use. Almost the whole Western strip of the Jordan basin, including all the fertile Zor areas, are today declared military areas, off limit to their Arab owners. A fourth, but secondary, procedure of seizure involves transfer of private Arab land to Jewish ownership in return for state or "absentee property" in areas adjacent to the villages from whom the land was taken. This form of seizure is called "land concentration" (Harris, 1980:116-117). Under Labour rule, when most of the Valley settlements were established, about 9,000 dunums were thus "concentrated" (Harris, ibid.:118). Map 10:1 shows the extent of Arab

land seized for Jewish settlements during Labour rule under these various categories.

Perhaps even more crucial than land transfers to the future of Palestinian farming in the Valley is the diversion of scarce water resources for use by Israeli settlements. Nominally, the military government has estimated the availability of 98 million cubic meters per annum (mempa) for total Valley exploitation; 56 million for the Arab sector and 42 million for the Jewish sector (Harris, 1980:119). However, these estimates were soon found to be exaggerated, partly because of the increased salinity in underground water tables. In any case, all further Arab drilling was halted and few wells were forced shut. New ceilings were imposed for usage of existing wells. Nevertheless, pumping of water of Jewish settlements continued at an alarming rate. In the agricultural season 1977-1978, for example, seventeen Israeli wells in the Valley produced 14.1 million cubic meters of water, compared to 33.0 mempa for all West Bank Arab use (Awartani, 1980:17). That is 30 percent of all West Bank artesian water resources.

The consequences of these drillings have been disastrous for Palestinian agriculture in the Valley. In two cases, widely reported by the international press, local springs used by Arab villages were completely dried up as a result of diversion to neighbouring Jewish settlements. The first case involved the village of Bardala in the Upper Valley. When Moshav Mahola increased its water pumping in 1974 the local springs at Tel el Baida completely dried up ruining two agricultural seasons for Bardala after which fruit trees had to be uprooted and drinking water had to be imported from outside (Harris, 1980:120). In the second case the waters of al-Auja -- the largest Arab village in the Jordan Valley (2,000 inhabitants) lost 90 percent of its 375 acres of banana trees and all of 100 acres of citrus groves as a result of water pumping at nearby Israeli

Map 10:4

Land Conflict in the Jordan Valley



This map summarizes the conflict over cultivated land by 1975. Source: W. Harris, Taking Roots 1980: 117, map 24.

settlements in April of 1979 (Claiborne, 1979). Israeli officials claimed the drying of the spring was due to natural drought, yet the nearby settlements in the Fasayel Valley were thriving. Similar cases were reported in Jiftlik and Makhrouq (Zananiri, 1980).

The decreased water resources at the disposal of Arab farmers has been a primary motivation for the switch to more water conserving technology: from the primitive system of furrow irrigation to sprinklers and drip irrigation. Paradoxically, the new irrigation technology has been responsible for both increased productivity in agriculture and a radical reorganization in labour use. But since the installation of these capital-intensive techniques required a substantial investment in capital, their introduction also meant an alteration in the traditional relationship between small peasants, tenants, landlords and commission agents. This transformation is the subject of the case study in Chapter 11.

Responses to Landlessness: West Valley and East Valley

The centrality of the Jordan Valley in Palestinian agriculture lies in its providing a vast area suitable for the reconstitution of landless refugee peasants under conditions of intensive irrigated farming. Clearly, dry farming in the West Bank Highlands could have neither absorbed these refugees as peasants nor generated a surplus for their subsistence. It could only accommodate them as seasonal wage workers and sharetenants to compensate for the loss of migrant (male) household members under condition of wage labour attraction both internally and abroad.

This situation is reversed in the Jordan Valley, where full time farming prevails. Sharab's survey found that 54 percent of all tenants in the East Jordan Valley were Palestinian refugees (Sharab, 1975:23). Our estimate for the Western Valley is about 80 percent of all full-time

farmers and, if we exclude the city of Jericho, perhaps 95 percent. Landlessness, and the influx of refugees to the Valley camps gave rise to a complexity of tenure relationships ranging from absentee holdings to agricultural wage labour. In between exists the myriad of sharecropping compacts which gives Jordan Valley agriculture its unique features.

One of those distinguishing features of Valley farming has been the relative absence of rentier landlords and the predominance of "absentee" landlords who supervise their own farms under share-contracts with refugee tenants. The recent introduction of irrigation technology and plastic tunnels to the Valley has further increased the significance and political weight of landlords and commission agents at the expense of tenants who were incapable of investing in the new capital-intensive agriculture. Access to credit became crucial for those sharetenants who wanted to continue their status as "partners" to their landlords. Many submerged to the status of simple croppers.

While similar conditions of tenancy prevailed on both sides of the River, it is important to distinguish variations between the Eastern and Western Valley since their political separation in 1967:

First, access to land in the Eastern Valley is restricted only by the availability of working capital and water resources (within the boundary of maximum landholding regulated by law), hence cash rentals are on the rise at the expense of share-rentals and "mixed" farming. In the Western Valley availability of land to Palestinian farmers is restricted by military seizure of plots and transfer of water resources to Jewish settlements. Here cash rentals is almost absent and sharetenancy is the predominant mode of cropping.

Secondly, wage labour in the Eastern Valley is increasingly being conquered by imported foreign (mostly Egyptian and Southeast Asian) workers, as resident peasant households sub-farm from leaseholders. Female household members tend to take over male tasks as male members of the peasant farm seek work outside the land. In the Western Valley full-time wage work is concentrated in citrus plantations in the lower Valley, while seasonal wage workers (especially females) are recruited from the highlands during the harvest. In contrast, these workers are indigenous Palestinians.

Finally, shortage of agricultural labour prevails on both sides of the Valley and has tended to favour the tenant, especially tenants with access to credit. However, while government land reforms have secured the tenure of small farmers and tenants in the Eastern Ghors, continued land confiscation and land transfers in the Western Valley has made it increasingly difficult for both landlords and tenants to invest in the permanent improvement of their farms.

Notes

1. For an excellent survey of this recent history, from which this section is derived, see The East Jordan Valley: A Social and Economic Survey (Jordan Department of Statistics, Amman, 1961). See also Frederick G. Peake, The History and Tribes of Jordan, (Miami, 1954).

2. The 7% commission is calculated in Israeli shekels, while interest on delinquent payments in Jordanian dinars, since the latter currency does not depreciate to the same extent as the Israeli shekel.

3. In the latter case, less than 40 dunums, since only increments of 20 dunums are provided in the date for 1975 and 1978 Agricultural Census (Dajani et al., 1980:50).

4. This overview is based, largely, on Wm. Harris' comprehensive study of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories: Taking Roots, especially pp. 105-123, (Chichester, 1980).

Chapter Eleven

Re-peasantization and Agricultural Technology:

The Case of Zbeidat

The process of peasantization in the Jordan Valley has been uneven, exhibiting a number of regional variations and a sharp diversion in the paths of agricultural development between the Western and Eastern Valleys after 1967. The village of Zbeidat, which we are examining here, is "untypical" of the Jordan Valley rural settlements in several respects: its population is semi-nomadic in origin unlike the sedentary peasantry of Central and Northern Palestine who took refuge in the Valley after 1948; its location in the Central Valley isolates the inhabitants from two major urban centres catering to the social and economic needs of the Valley villages, Nablus in the Northern highlands and Jericho in the south; finally, the manner in which agricultural technology, in the form of drip irrigation, arrived to the village through the communal participation of its farmers -- sets it aside from many Ghor settlements, where landlords and rich peasants were the pioneers in the introduction of agricultural technology.

Yet in the sense we discuss it in this analysis, no village in the Jordan Valley is "average". In the spatial distribution of its inhabitants, degrees of social differentiation, penetration of capitalist relations in agriculture, magnitude of migration and wage labour, crop variety, amount of land confiscation and security in tenure -- in all of those variables typicality refers to the statistical averaging of disperate aspects of agrarian structure which can nowhere be seen in a concrete "representative" village. This variability is especially true of the Western Valley where

the sudden movement of population and the more recent physical dismemberment of village holdings, subject to the strategic and demographic plans of Israeli settlements has reigned havoc on any standard features which those villages may have had in common.

Yet Zbeidat exhibits most of the crucial trends which have characterized the recent history of rural life in the Western Valley:

1. It is a village where "peasantization" has run its full cycle, in the double sense that a semi-nomadic tribe has transformed its material base of subsistence from seasonal migration to permanent settlement, and in the sense that a dispossessed community of refugee agriculturalists have become full time farmers.

2. The relations of agricultural production in the village exhibit virtually all the forms of tenure relations that prevail in the Valley today: owner-cultivation, share-tenancy, cash rentals, and wage labour. Only plantation type agriculture is absent.

3. Zbeidat farmers' relation to absentee landlords of neighbouring holdings, to commission agents and wholesalers in the city of Nablus, is typical of the small farmers' dependence on suppliers of credit and market outlets that characterizes class relations in the whole Valley, East and West.

4. The introduction of drip irrigation methods in Zbeidat reflects a conversion in intensive farming which has been replacing both canal (farrow) and sprinkler irrigation throughout the

region since the early seventies. Its social consequences, however, have not been uniform.

5. The landholdings and water resources of both Zbeidat and Marj Na'je have been subject to extensive seizure and confiscation by Israeli colonial settlements. Although Israeli land encirclement has been more intensive here than elsewhere in the Valley, the pattern of relationship between the Military Government, Jewish settlers and Palestinian farmers has been the same.

In many ways the above features of agrarian change have been displayed in Zbeidat (and in neighbouring Marj Na'je) at their sharpest development. As such, their study may reveal trends that are still in their formative stage elsewhere.

Zbeidat and Marj Na'je: The Growth of Two Refugee Villages

Zbeidat and Marj Na'je constitute two contrasting examples of the reconstitution of refugee farming communities in the Jordan Valley: Zbeidat emerging from a cohesive tribal unit whose kinship network and place of origin (Beersheba) are homogeneous; Marj Na'je from successive waves of agricultural settlements based on a number of dispersed families hailing from the Central plains of Palestine and the Galilee. (Map 11:1 traces the different origins and respective physical movements of the present inhabitants).

The name Zbeidat refers to both the village located 36 kilometers north of Jericho in the Ghor el-Far'a region of the Central Jordan Valley, and the tribal unity inhabiting it. Originally a semi-nomadic clan from the hinterland of Beersheba, in southern Palestine (now Israel), the clan

Map 11:1

The Re-settlement of Peasant Refugees

Marj Na'je and Zbeida 1948-1967



Source: Conversations with Village Elders; Marj Na'je and Zbeidat (summer 1980).

was engaged in seasonal grain farming (wheat and barley) and animal husbandry. As a result of the 1948 war the people of Zbeidat were dispossessed of their land and found refuge in Ghor el-Far'a, in the Western Valley, where climatic conditions were similar to those of southern Palestine. The majority of Zbeidat farmers became sharetenants and croppers in the lands of absentee landlords from Tubas, Tammoun and Nablus. They cropped potatoes, cereals and vegetables in the winter and moved to Irbid (in the Transjordanian highlands) during the hot summer months, where a section of their clan had re-settled. The formation of both Zbeidat and Marj Na'je was tied with the agricultural re-settlement schemes carried jointly by the Jordanian government and UNRWA during the early 1950's.[1] Marj Na'je was the first, and later proved to be the most successful of 5 re-settlement schemes for Palestinian refugees carried between 1951 and 1953 at Jisr el-Majameh, Beit Qad, Hebeileh and Kolonia -- in addition to Marj Na'je (UNRWA, 1956:190).

However, several re-settlement schemes had to be attempted, with three of them failing between 1951 and 1955, before the present inhabitants of the village gained their tenure. The original plan seems to have been based on the creation of "viable lots" of 25 irrigated dunums for each of the 31 peasant families recruited from Lydda area refugees. Houses were constructed by refugee workers (some becoming later their resident farmers) and paid for by UNRWA at the cost of JD 335 each. The houses, made from stone and mud bricks, adapted to Jordan Valley climate were designed by renowned architects, including the Egyptian Hasan Fathy.[2] Each farming household was equipped with working animals, seeds, farming utensils and manure as follows:

> 20 ewes, 1 cow, 1 bullock, seeds in an amount of 625 kg potatoes, 50 kg legumes, 15 kg alfafa, 5 kg sesame, vegetable seeds for 5 dunums, 1 plow, hand tools (hoe, sickle, axe, shovel, rake), fodder for the animals, and manure for the land (UNRWA, 1956:181).

Clearly the conception of the settlement was one based on the notion of self-sufficient peasant farming with the aim of finding alternative mode of life to the crowded,and temporary refugee camps. However, the several failed attempts at community buildings in Marj Na'je (bureaucratically explained as due to the "inexperience of the settlers in irrigated farming") had its roots in three key problems which all those early projects failed to solve: one was the heterogenious origin of the refugees and their inability to form a cohesive cooperative farming unit along the lines conceived by the UNRWA planners. Second, a more serious flaw, was the uncertain conditions of tenure on the basis of which Marj Na'je farmers leased the land. Although state land was leased to members for 33 years for a nominal rent (10 fils per dunum and 50 fils for the house). The status of the farmer after the termination of the lease period was left undetermined. A third problem was the withdrawal of the refugee ration cards which UNRWA demanded as a condition for leasing the land and dwellings. This condition was highly resisted by the refugees, and in several cases led to their withdrawal from the project, in as much as it was symbolic of their forsaking their future rights in what was then seen as an impending settlement of their land rights in Palestine.

The problem of land tenure was rectified in 1955 when the third wave of farmers received leases obliging them to work the land for ten years after which they would receive title deeds and would return their ration cards to UNRWA (ibid.:182). During that period the refugee farmer had to operate the land himself, using his family's labour only and was subject

to eviction upon notice. Despite the abundance of other problems of survival, including high water salinity, and constant breakage of the water irrigation system, the modification of tenure conditions, especially the explicit promise of accession to land, seems to have been the key factor in the eventual success of Marj Na'je as a project. Since 1955, the majority of the 30 families that had resided then remained there until the war of 1967.

As elsewhere in the Valley, however, stabilization of title deed status did not solve the problem of the peasants' operating capital. As might be expected, UNRWA's notion of a self-sufficient peasant household, tilling his 20 dunums with his bullock and plough, milking his cow and selling his surplus tomatoes on the side to supplement the household income did not fit with the radical transformation of market relations actually taking place in the Jordan Valley. Several Marj Na'je farmers unable to raise the sufficient funds to keep up with the increased expenses of cultivation simply quit and requested their return to refugee camps preferring to live on rations. In one illustrative case 5 households chose to leave their plots and become share-croppers to a neighbouring landlord (UNRWA, 1956:187). They farmed 100 dunums in common. They received 75% of the crop against the provision of their labour, seeds, fuel for pumping irrigation water and wages for the mechanic to fix the pump. In return the landlord supplied the land and the pump, receiving 25% of the yield.

Thus, these two alternatives to the cooperative settlements, share-cropping or return to camp ration card subsistence, seemed at the time, for many Marj Na'je farmers, as more viable than the direct cropping of their government leased land -- even at the nominal rent they were paying. Only when the 1955 community was able to establish links with commission agents from Nablus to provide credit and marketing outlets for their crops

(Abu Hilal, 1980:int.), and when UNRWA agreed to establish the peasants' title deeds to the land did the Marj Na'je agricultural project become successful.

This third batch of refugees, which proved to be more stable than previous ones, was surprisingly more heterogeneous in character. In addition to few original recruits hailing from the Lydda villages it included refugees from Ar'ara, Um al-Zeinat, and Bast al-Falidg -- all from the Galilee, the last two villages were subsequently destroyed by the state of Israel.

* * * * * * *

The evolution of Zbeidat, only 3 km. to the south of Marj Na'je took a different direction. Until the end of the 1950's when Marj Na'je was already an established community the Zbeidatis were still share-cropping absentee lands by the Zor (river basin) of the Jordan. In 1961 Zbeidat farmers were given 500 dunums of fertile land in the southern tip of the Marj Na'je plains with the promise that title deeds will be transferred to them upon proof of continued cultivation for 5 years. The people of Zbeidat were to become the legal owners of their land in the summer of 1967, the eve of Israeli occupation!

Initially, each of the four sub-clans from whom the Zbeidat clan was composed (Shahabat, Mahamid, Salaymeh, and Ebeidat -- also known as Abu Sabbah), received an equal fourth of the 500 dunums, their number at the time being approximately equal. Each of the sub-clans then divided their portion into parcels whose size was determined by the number of able bodied males within the sub-clan. In addition, the farmers of Zbeidat continued to share-crop the lands they leased from absentee landlords in the Marj Na'je area. By 1965 their homes, built from mud bricks and straw began to take the form of a permanent village settlement. An artesian

well in the village centre irrigated their small plots by means of the traditional furrow dirt canals (dulab). A daily bus carried them to Nablus, for shopping, medical treatment and marketing their produce.

Like the Marj Na'je farmers, the Zbeidatis acquired their credit from Nablus merchants and commission agents. They shared an elementary school, and a mobile UNRWA clinic, both located in Marj Na'je. However, the relationship between the two communities were correct but not amiable. There was virtually no inter-marriage between them. The Zbeidatis are derisively called "badu" (bedouins) by the people of Marj Na'je, while the latter are referred to as "fellahin" (peasants) by the Zbeidatis. The strained relationship in fact has much more to do with cultural diversity than with conflict of interest. Marj Na'je farmers were and continue to be almost exclusively owner-cultivators; their plots, about 30 irrigated dunums per household on the average, occupied their full household labour capacity throughout the year. In Zbeidat, on the other hand, the size of the average household was considerably higher and owned plots smaller size; most farmers resorted to leasing surplus land from neighbouring landlords. (Maps 11:2 and 11:3 illustrate the distribution of agricultural plots in Marj Na'je and Zbeidat respectively).

The War of 1967

By the mid-sixties the Ghor el-Far'a region, where Zbeidat and Marj Na'je are located became a thriving agricultural area for re-settled peasant refugees. A decisive factor in this land revival was the drilling of numerous artesian wells by local landlords with assistance of government and UNRWA refugees. In Ghor el-Far'a alone 30 wells were under use. irrigating a total cultivated area of 35,000 dunums (al-Damin, 1979:26).

Map 11:2

Distributribution of Holdings: Marj Na'je 1980



Note: Horizental line at the bottom of holdings represents areas below which plots where fenced off by the Military Government (1967). Numbers refer to household plots.

LAND DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS IN ZBEIDAT BY SUB-CLAN

Note: Map does not include cultivated plots held under share-cropping or cash rent arrangements



The 1967 war dealt a devastating blow to the hopes of the Zbeidat community, together with thousands of Valley farmers. Airial bombardments forced many refugees to leave their homes. The two camps of Ain as-Sultan and Aqbat Jaber, in the southern base of the Valley surrounding Jericho, lost their total population (between 50-60 thousand residents). They fled eastward and were re-settled in the Zizya camp in Transjordan. The nearby villages of Jiftlek and Makhrouq, to the immediate south of Zbeidat, were completely demolished by the Israeli army and its residents spirited across the river. In Zbeidat itself about 800 residents left and joined their kin in Irbid (North Jordan); several families later came back and regained control over their land.

Land confiscation, for the purpose of building Jewish settlements and for presumed security reasons, soon followed Israeli occupation. Suleiman al-Salih, the main landlord in the Marj Na'je region, whose land was share-cropped - in part - by Zbeidat and Marj Na'je peasants, lost 5000 dunums of his land to the Israelis (a substantial part of it was fenced-off for "security reasons" along the river Jordan). In 1968 all the dwellings and institutions serving the farmers residing in the lands of Suleiman al-Salih were demolished by Israeli armed forces. Those included 27 artesian water pumps, a school, a clinic, a post office and 600 farmers' dwellings. A hundred dunums of orange groves were defoliated (al-Salih, 1980:Inter.). The purpose apparently was to prevent the Ghor farmers from re-settling in their land and to create a land base for Israeli settlements along the Western Jordan Valley. The scheme was later known as the Allon plan. The incidents described here formed a pattern which recurred in al-Auja, Ghor al-Far'a, Diuk, Fasail, al-Hamra, and within the vicinity of Jericho itself. To the east and south of Zbeidat 2,000 dunums were confiscated for building the settlement of Argaman.[3] Of these 600 dunums belonged to one landlord,

Muhammad Abdullah, from Tubas (al-Salih, 1980:ibid.). The remaining 1,400 dunums belonged to a number of small farmers. The villagers of Zbeidat lost slightly more than half their own (as opposed to share-cropped) plots -- about 260 dunums. About 200 of those, located near the river, were fenced-off and declared a security zone. The remaining 68 were considered "absentee property" and given to three non-resident landowners as compensation for their confiscated land, which had been already seized of use by Argaman settlers (Ibrahim, 1979: Inter.).

The Israeli government refused to recognize the agreement concluded between the Zbeidat community and the Jordan government whereby the 500 dunums were to be registered in the names of Zbeidat farmers in the summer of 1967. However, their de facto possession of the land was granted by the military government against the continued payment of rent for the use of the artesian well, the houses, and the remaining dunums under their control. Since land was considered Miri (i.e. public domain) by the military authorities no new dwellings or even the repair of existing dilapitated structures were allowed. With the increase of population since 1967, newly married couples and their children were accommodated by adding new shacks -- made of bushes, plastic sheaths and wood -- to existing rooms. The result was the undescribable squalor which typifies the present state of Zbeidat village.

In January 1980, the military government reversed the order against the building of new dwellings and the fixing of existing ones. When the field work for the present study was concluded, in June 1980, the people of Zbeidat were preparing to build new brick dwellings to replace their dela-pitated and faltering ones.

* * * * * * *

In Marj Na'je too, the war had a heavy toll on farmers' lives. Ten families, out of thirty-three households, left the village. Their property, amounting collectively to 220 dunums was requisitioned by the Custodian of absentee property and leased, on an annual basis to new tenants. Subsequently, 39 dunums of those were fenced-off as a Security Zone by the army and farmers were prohibited from tilling it. (The Security Zone can be seen in Map 11:2, cutting across the lower quarter of the plots -- from parcel #6 on the right to parcel #31 on the left). Altogether there are 23 households left in Marj Na'je today. They own a total of 437 dunums, 113 dunums of which (i.e. 26% of the area) have been fenced off (UNRWA, 1969:memor.). Of the 23 families currently living in the village, five do not own any land in Marj Na'je; four are tenants who rent their land from the custodian of absentee property, and one is a full time mechanic taking care of the two pumps in the village.

Marj Na'je, the once thriving and dominant senior sister of Zbeidat has now become subordinate -- in current size and economic vitality -- to Zbeidat. The latter's composition, its tribal organization and kinship structure has equipped the village with a renewed strength to withstand the impact of war and land dispossession in a manner the Marj Na'je population could not.

Demography and Social Structure

The secret of Zbeidat's vitality lies in its collective identity rooted in the tribe's common origin and its traditional leadership-by-consensus as an effective mechanism of social organization. An examination of Zbeidat's demographic and occupational composition will clarify this claim. By the end of 1980 there were 55 households living in Zbeidat of which 32 were residentially extended (several married sons and their fami-

lies living within the same physical compound as their father-patriarch). The rest constituted nuclear units. The approximately 400 resident population of Zbeidat is highly skewed in favour of the younger age-groups with those under 15 constituting 51% of the population, while adults between 15 to 60 representing 45% of the total (see Diagram 11:1 below).

Diagram 11:1

Age-Sex Composition in Zbeidat

1980



Source: Based on on a count of household members whose ages were verified; Tamari and Giacaman (1980:2, Figure 1). (N=361)

Although females constitute close to half the total population (49.7%) the proportion of males in the 15-59 age group are significantly lower than females (40.6% vs. 48.6%) due to the practice of single men migrating to Jordan in search of work. As a result there is a surplus of single women of marriageable age in Zbeidat without any eligible suitors in the foreseeable future. This is seen as a serious problem in this bedouin society as Zbeidatis will not give their daughters to "strangers" (i.e. men from outside the four sub-clans), while polygyny -- which is traditionally more accepted among bedouins than among fellahin -- is restricted to only 5 cases.

The majority of marriages in Zbeidat involve the union of first cousins, usually on the patrilineal side. Table 11:1 reveals that of the total known unions 58% were so concluded (two involving matrilineal cousins, the rest patrilineal); an additional 15% were concluded within the same sub-clan (hamula) and an equal number with a different hamula. There were 4 cases (12% of marriages outside the tribe, all involving men marrying "strangers" (i.e. non-Zbeidatis). All "strangers" in this case were refugee women from Marj Na'je.

Table 11:1

Degrees of Endogamy in Zbeidat Marriages

Relation of Wife to Husband

	First Cousin	From same Sub-clan	From a Diff. Sub-clan	"Stranger"	Total Known	Total Marriages
Number of Marriages	19	5	5	4	33	63
% of Marriages	58%	15%	15%	12%	100%	-

Source: Author's 1980 Zbeidat Household Survey

Because of the high demand for female work in the patriarchal household, there is a tendency in Zbeidat for women to marry at a more advanced age, at the average age of 19, than is traditional in rural households in the West Bank. Cousin marriage, in part serves a similar function, since the woman remains within reach of her father's household; (and in reverse, her parental home remains accessible to her in case of dispute with her in-laws).

Another important factor contributing to the high incidence of cousin marriage is the low (or even nominal) sum which is paid as a bride price (mahr). In cases of marriages outside the sub-clan this sum amounts to between 500-1000 Jordanian dinars (about $1500-$3000), with even higher sums paid for "stranger" brides. Zbeidati women, as mentioned, never marry outside the tribe, and the only cases of marriage external to the village involve clan relatives in Transjordan, and (in one case) in Beersheba.

The physical distribution of households, despite the denial of such differentiation on the part of Zbeidat elders, reflect the clustering family dwelling by quarters divided along sub-clan lines. But there are no physical barriers between these "quarters" so that peripheral dwellings of one clan tend to merge at the imaginary "borders" with the neighbouring sub-clan (see Map 11:4). However, the significance of these divisions lie in the proximity of each sub-clan "quarter" to its cultivated plots lying eastwards on both sides of the Jericho-Beisan highway. Since sub-clan divisions relate also to the control over the labour disposition of household members as well as marriage endogamy, there is resistance against the tendency of newly married couples to move away from their sub-clan quarters.

As can be seen from Table 11:2, the sizes of the four sub-clans (with the exception of Al-Mahameed, the majority of whom left the village



Zbeidat and Argaman: Location of residential units and sub clan land holdings (1980)

Source: Author's scheme based on the cadasteral survey and housing map (borrowed from the Mukhtar, Muhammad Ali Silmi).

to Transjordan after the 1967 war) is of relatively similar weight within the total population. None of the four sub-clans controls an amount of land, water resources or commercial assets which can put it in a relation of domination over the others. And although there is, as we shall see, significant differentiation in the amount of wealth between households, this differentiation is not reflected within the sub-clans of the village, as indicated, for example, in the average area of land cropped per household.

Table 11:2

Zbeidat Sub-clans by Household

Sub-clan	Nuclear Households	No. of House-hold members	% of Resident Population	Average Area Cultivated per household
Mahameed	5	38	10%	14.7 dunums
Abu Sabbah	17	115	31%	13.1 dunums
Shahabat	18	120	32%	15.7 dunums
Salaymeh	15	105	27%	14.1 dunums
Total	55	378	100%	

Source: Author's Zbeidat Household Survey (1980), for population with identifiable clan membership.

The homogeneity of social composition among Zbeidatis is largely the function of the preponderance of full time farming as the source of living for the absolute majority of the inhabitants. Only 6 households (4 full time wage workers, one shopkeeper, and one government teacher) derive their livelihood outside agriculture. Among the 32 joint households engaged in farming one can make a distinction on the basic nature of cropping arrangements. Thus, we obtain the following distribution:

11 households who are owner-cultivators
10 households who are owner/sharecroppers
8 households who are sharecroppers (only)
2 households who are owner/tenants
1 household who is a tenant (only)

The complexity of these arrangements, and their consequences for social differentiation require a more comprehensive examination of the land tenure system in the village.

Land Tenure in Zbeidat

Possession without ownership, share-cropping, and land confiscation are the three basic aspects of land tenure in Zbeidat. All of them contribute to the instability of the peasants' relationship to their land. From the government point of view they are seen as tenants on Miri (state) land; from the absentee-landlord point of view, they are share-croppers (shuraka); the Israeli settlers view them with hostility and fear, and - at best - with undisguised paternalism.

The Zbeidat farmers themselves are constantly worried about their shrinking cultivable area (nearly half of which is already fenced-off), and about potential changes in their precarious status on share-cropped land. The dramatic change affecting the cultivated area possessed by each sub-clan before and after the war of 1967 can be observed in Table 11:3 below:

Table 11:3

Cultivated Area Possessed by Zbeidat Farmers, by Sub-Clan, Loss of Land and Number of Households Supported 1962-1980

Name of Sub-Clan	Land Possessed (Dunums) 1962	Land Possessed (Dunums) 1980	Percent Loss	Number of Cultivating Households (1980)
Shahabat	125.00	103.84	17%	15
Salaymeh	125.00	66.69	47%	14
Abu-Sabbah	125.00	64.33	49%	14
Mahameed	125.00	17.76	84%	5
Totals	500.00	251.86	49.6%	48

Sources: (1) Author's 1980 Zbeidat Household Survey, (2) 1978 land survey. Shahabat possessions include 10 dunums which are outside the surveyed areas.

Close to half (49.6%) of the total cultivated area was lost by Zbeidat villages as a result of the June war. Out of the original 500 dunums land-grant 179.31 dunums, composed of rich soil by the river basin, were fenced-off by the army for "security" reasons. The remaining 68.83 dunums were granted to three farmers in compensation for land confiscated for the benefit of Argaman settlers. All three farmers are absentee landlords whose land is currently being share-cropped by Zbeidat peasants.

The fencing-off of border land occasioned a new redistribution of land in Zbeidat and a process of internal differentiation not only between sub-clans but within each sub-clan. Since the lost land affected some farmers and spared others, those families who remained in the Valley cultivated their own land and collectively tilled the parcels of those relatives who migrated across the river, sending them half the cash yield in the usual share-cropping fashion. By the second year after the war (1968-69) it became evident to Zbeidatis that this sacrifice could not go on, especially when the remaining 68 dunums of "absentee" families were also seized. The elders of each hamulah met and decided to redistribute the parcels over the remaining households taking into account the altered membership of the sub-clans. Map 11:3 illustrates the consequences of the redistribution patterns for each sub-clan. Thus, al-Mahameed sub-clan lost 84% of their land (with 5 households only remaining in the village) as opposed to Shahabat who retained most of their land (17% lost). In addition, three factors which had determined the earlier distribution of plots were taken into account this second time: (a) the size of each household; (b) the "social weight" of certain leading families -- e.g. the mukhtar and other sub-clan elders; and

(c) "just distribution" (_'adalat al-tawzi'_). The latter is a process which prevailed in Ottoman Palestine under the _Musha'_ system, by which each cultivator received his alloted property (usually redistributed periodically every few years) in several parcels reflecting the uneven fertility of village land. In Zbeidat this uneveness takes into account the following factors: (1) distance from the main road and the village centre; (2) distance from the pool and motor, hence the time it took water to treckle down the furrows; and (3) presence or absence of patches of accumulated salinity. Map 11:5 shows the pattern of parcel fragmentation resulting from this system for 3 average farmers. The implications of this fragmentation for the inefficient utilization of limited land is and has been discussed at length elsewhere (see, for example, Grannot, 1951). A similar notion of "justice in distribution" took place in Marj Na'je in 1955 (see Map 11:2). Plots Nos. 1-31 in the lower section of the cadastral map represent fragments that are adjacent to the Zor (river basin) which, although richer in soil composition, were subject to occasional flooding during the winter torrents. Each farming household in Marj Na'je, therefore, received a major parcel and a minor one -- by the Zor. Since virtually all of these minor parcels were fenced off in 1967, their owners lost total access to them.

But owner-cultivation constitute only one dimension of the land tenure system in Zbeidat. To understand the actual structure of agrarian relations in the village, we will now examine the condition of tenancy, relations with landlords, commission agents, and water rights, as the other major components of land tenure.

Share-cropping and Cash Rentals

The prevalent system of cultivation in Zbeidat is the shared tillage of land by all members of the extended family under the control and guidance

Map 11:5

FRAGMENTATION OF CULTIVATED PARCELS IN ZBEIDAT



KEY

- Property of Hasan Silmi
- Property of Hasan Ibrahim
- Property of Muhammad Ali Ahmad
- Property of Ibrahim Odeh

share-cropped land

FENCED-OFF AREA

foot path

To the river (½ km

foot path

foot path

Pool

Well

VILLAGE CENTRE

share-cropped land

LEGEND

of their patriarchal head. In cases where the land parcels are too small for shared cultivation, elder brothers enter into share-cropping arrangements with neighbouring landlords and set up their separate and independent households. When the father dies the land is parcellized among the sons, but shared tillage continues between the brothers.

Unlike the situation in Marj Na'je, the average size of owned plot is hardly sufficient for the support of the family (5.2 dunums in Zbeidat vs. 14.1 dunums in Marj Na'je after the fencing off of their land). Of the 32 farming households in Zbeidat 21 are also tenants, 18 of whom are share-croppers to resident and absentee landlords.

A typical share-cropping arrangement is one whereby the landlord provides his land, water and credit advance for the purchase of seeds, seedlings ploughing, fertilizers, and insecticides. In return the farmer provides his household labour and half the net income from the crop yield, after the deduction of expenses -- which are shared between landlord and farmer. All extra labour costs during the harvest season are born by the farmer.

As can be seen in Table 11:4. The extent of share-cropped land varies from one sub-clan to another, but in all cases it exceeds the proportion of owned plots. Cash rentals, on the other hand constitute a negligable component (7%) of the total cultivated area, and are concentrated in one sub-clan only.

Table 11:4

Share-cropped & Rented Land in Zbeidat in Relation to Owned Land, & Average Land Cultivated, by Sub-clan, 1980

Name of Sub-Clan	Area Owned (Dunums)	Area Share-Cropped	Area Rented	Total Culti-vated	Percent Owned	Average Area/Household (Dunums) Owned	Cultivated
Shahabat	103.7	131.1	-	234.8	44%	6.9	15.7
Salaymeh	66.4	131.0	-	197.4	34%	4.7	14.1
Abu Sabbah	64.1	72.0	47.0	183.1	35%	4.6	13.1
Mahameed	17.7	55.7	-	73.4	24%	3.5	14.7
Totals	251.9	389.8	47.0	688.7	37%	5.2	14.3

Sources: Author's 1980 Zbeidat Household Survey and interviews with landlords.

Since the average area under *de facto* possession by an average peasant household in Zbeidat is so small (5.2 dunums), a crucial determinant of the farmer's ability to survive, if he is to remain on his farm, would be his access to surplus land to share-crop. Before the introduction of drip irrigation, a family of eight members would have needed a plot of twelve to fifteen dunums to survive, but this figure presumes control by the cultivator of his total yield, which is obviously not the case with share-croppers. The average figure of 14.3 dunums per Zbeidat household, which appears in table 11:4 above, containes both "owned" and "share-cropped" categories. It would seem,however, that the extra seven dunums which are supplemented by share-cropping is what guaranteed the continued existence of Zbeidat peasants as a farming community -- the alternative being their transformation (or part of them) into wage workers in nearby Jewish settlements.

But not every Zbeidat farmer is a share-cropper. Of those heads of households in our survey that have lands registered to their names eight farmers (or 30% of the total) do not have any access to surplus land which they could share-crop, and it is within this category that we presume alternative source of income (wage labour, leasing of tractors, etc.) to have originated.

In contrast to share-cropping arrangements cash renting of land is infrequent but not uncommon in Zbeidat. In 1980, there were three farmers in Zbeidat (all from the Abu Sabbah sub-clan) who rent land in Marj Na'je, the total area of which is 47 dunums (approximately 10% of all land held under co-cultivation). Cash renting is of course, much more advantageous to the farmer than to the landlord since there is no sharing of the crop involved. However, it entails a substantial investment on the part of the peasant-renter, and any losses are born solely by him. In Marj Na'je Zbeidat farmers pay all the fuel costs of running the water pump, and any expenses incurred in repairing the pump (which is substantial in the isolated conditions of the Ghor) (Ibrahim, 1980:inter.). The landlord provides the land and water only, and the farmer is free to dispose of the crop as he wishes, unless he is under contract to a commission agent, in which case the same conditions as in share-cropping prevail.

Landlords and Commission Agents

The source of co-cultivation under tenancy arrangements in Zbeidat is the presence of surplus land in the hands of six resident and absentee landlords.

Table 11:5

Landlords in Zbeidat: 1980

Name of Landlord	Total Area Owned in Zbeidat	Number of Share-croppers	Origin	Current Status
Suleiman Saleh	284	20	Tubas	Absentee Landlord
Jamil Abdul Fattah and Brother	67	4	Beit Natif	Resident Landlord-Cultivator
Adel Mfadi	34	1	Tubas	Absentee Landlord
Hasan al-Fahd	19	1	Tammoun	Absentee Landlord
Abu Shammat	15	1	Tammoun	Absentee Landlord
Badie Yunis	70	1	Nablus	Absentee Landlord

Source: Interviews with landlords, and the author's Zbeidat Household Survey (1980).

Aside from the resident landlord (Jamil Abdul Fattah) the term "absentee landlord" in Table 11:5 refers to commuting landlords of the variety discussed by Dajani (cf. Chapter 10). Without exception, all six landlords lost substantial amounts of their land to Israeli confiscation and fencing off by the military. The major landlord, Salih Suleiman, alone lost 5000 dunums and millions of dinars in irrigation networks and agricultural machinery. Both, he and Jamil Abdul Fattah owned two local markets (hisbehs); one located on the Zbeidat/Marj Na'je highway, the other (Suleiman's) near Makhrouq -- a village at the southern tip of Ghor el-Far'a which was destroyed by the Israeli army in June 1967 (Abu Hilal, 1980: inter.).

However, even after land confiscation and fencing the first four landlords still continue to own considerable land in the area, which they lease to farmers in Marj Na'je and the village of Jiftlek. Suleiman al-Salih,

in addition, has land north of Marj Na'je which he has difficulty in leasing because of security restrictions placed by the Israeli army on the movement of Arab farmers outside the immediate vicinity of their villages (Al-Salih, 1980:Inter.; see also Zananiri, 1980).

The pattern of share-cropping between Zbeidat farmers and the six landlords follows the same procedure discussed for Ghor el-Far'a in Chapter 10. Contracts between the two parties tend to be, on the whole, oral agreements based on trust. This is not the case with commission agents whose transactions are written in detail and signed in two copies. I do not have figures for Zbeidat on this point but Sharab's study, conducted across the river where similar leasing arrangements prevail, showed that only 17% of the tenants had written leases, while the vast majority (83%) relied on oral agreements with the landlord (Sharab, 1975:29, Table II-8).

One peculiarity of Zbeidat is that the major landlord, al-Salih, controls decisive shares in the main regional market at Nablus and acts himself as a commission agent for his sharetenants. In this case the triple control over land, credit and marketing outlets exercised by the landlord determines the investment alternative for the farmer. However, the fact that 37% of the land cultivated in Zbeidat is owned by the farmers themselves (Table 11:2) and the presence of five other landlords offering 42% of the total land leased (Table 11:3) renders the conditions under which the main landlord determines these options relatively favourable to the tenants.

In our view, however, the crucial factor determining the degree of independence exercised by the village from their biggest landlord was the farmers' control of their main water resources, and their ability to harness external sources of aid in the transfer of their agricultural technology from furrow irrigation to drip irrigation.

Water Resources and Water Rights in Zbeidat

Even more crucial than the struggle for land resources has been disputes over the control of water resources between Israeli settlements and Arab farmers in the Valley. The settlements are served by artesian wells of up to 600 meters in depth; most Arab farmers are allowed to drill no more than 100 meters in depth. Between the Makhrouq area to Zbeidat in the Far'a Valley, a stretch of about 15 kms., the Israelis seized and destroyed 6 wells serving the Arab farmers of Makhrouq, Jiftlek and Zbeidat (Matar, 1980:Inter.). In their place new tube wells were drilled to serve the two settlements of Argaman and Masu'a. The Zbeidat community was forbidden to drill for new water resources and limitations established on the use of their own well, which serves both domestic use and plot irrigation. The current capacity of the Zbeidat well is 200-300,000 cubic meters, serving 311 dunums (Jericho Bureau of Agriculture, 1980:Water Statistics).

Altogether there existed in 1980 seven artesian wells in the Zbeidat/Marj Na'je area distributed as follows:

Table 11:6

Artesian Wells in the Zbeidat/Marj Na'je Area
By Owner and Cultivated Area Covered, 1980

Owner	No. of Wells	Dunums Irrigated	of Which Under Drip	% Under Drip
Suleiman Saleh	1	284	184	65%
Zbeidat Farmers	1	311	295	94%
Jamil Abdul Fattah	1 1/2*	67	50	74%
Badie Yunis	1	60	40	67%
Abu Jarrar	1 1/2*	100	125	60%
Marj Na'je Farmers	2	400	125	31%
Totals	8	1,222 dun.	754 dun.	62%

Sources: (1) Sameer Hleileh, (2) Jericho Bureau of Agriculture, (3) Author's 1980 Zbeidat Survey. *Abdul-Fattah owns a well in partnership with Abu Jarrar.

Until a few years ago the dominant form of irrigation in the Jordan Valley was through the archaic system of furrow canals. Richer farmers to the south used the sprinkler system which, under conditions of limited water resources, could be quite wasteful. This is how the irrigation situation was in Zbeidat in the mid-seventies:

> Water for irrigation is supplied by a commonly-owned well with diesal pump situated in the center of the village. Water is discharged from the well and distributed to the individual plots via unlined dirt canals. Some farmers irrigate their crops with conventional open furrows and others attempt to economize on water by excavating small earthen pools in which they store their weekly allocation of irrigation water. This water is then pumped to their fields with small booster pumps and then distributed to their plants by annually-disposable plastic tubes. (Quiring, 1978:2).

Under canal irrigation -- which prevailed in Marj Na'je and Zbeidat until 1976 -- the distribution of water rights took an intricate form based on the notion of "shares" (ashum, sing., sahm). In cases were the source belongs to the village in common ownership the farmer's share correspond to the amount of dunums owned as a ratio of total land cultivated.

The situation differs however, when the land is share-cropped. If the source of water is a spring or a wadi the landlord, who usually owns the source,usually insisted on enforcing the traditional distribution system based on fasl (unit):

> The fasl entitles each holder of a water right to take the whole flow of the water channel for a certain period of time (normally it is for 12 hours, though sometimes it is for 6 hours or even 3 hours. Incertain cases the whole channel is divided into two main canals...under these circumstances the fasl entitles each holder of a water right to take the whole flow of the one canal for the period agreed upon (UNRWA, 1956:20).

It is clear from this description that water rights and land are divorced from ownership of irrigated plots so that in the sharecropping arrangements water is leased separately as a factor of production.

Water disputes over the allocation of pumping time was a major feature of Zbeidat agriculture under furrow irrigation. Aside from problems of share allocation several technical problems were also embedded in the furrow system. Those included: (a) a substantial wastage of water resources, either through evaporation or through seepage from the dirt canals; (b) low productivity due to inefficient plant exposure to water; (c) uneven distribution of the limited water resources since parcels within the immediate proximity of the pump received their water supply at a faster pace and more generously than distant parcels; (d) inefficient use of labour resources. Years after Zbeidat farmers stopped using furrow irrigation they continued to recall with bitterness the exhausting process of clearing and servicing the primitive canals during irrigation shifts.

Problems of primitive technology were compounded in Zbeidat by two other factors common to the Jordan Valley: limited rainfall (150-200 ml./annum) and a relatively high salinity content in the soil. The latter problem was reinforced through furrow irrigation which led to the accumulation of a saline soil surface around the cultivated area. The proper method of dealing with salinity involved periodic leaching of the surface area through sprinklers--a method too costly for Zbeidat farmers to use.

As we have seen in Chapter 10 furrow irrigation is typified by labour intensive cropping and low productivity. Among its features is the limitation of the farmers ability (compared to other forms of irrigation) to farm surplus land due to the excessive demands it puts on household labour in clearing the canals. In terms of productivity our estimates for Zbeidat; based on farmers' recollections and on the basis of estimates provided

by agricultural experts is, at best, a 1 1/2 ton yield per dunum of vegetables under furrow irrigation. Since the average plot cultivated by a Zbeidat household is less than half the area estimated by Dajani for the southern Ghors, and the average cultivating household is 9.7 members per household, the income of a Zbeidat peasant household would have been substantially lower than 400 JD's per annum had the family relied on its farm income exclusively (cf. Dajani, 1979:16).

In fact, interviews with Zbeidat farmers and landlords show that the incidence of wage labour outside their land has been on the increase since the early 1979's, together with wide-spread negligence of their farms. This trend was confirmed by the secretary of the nearby Jewish settlement of Argaman, which employed Zbeidat workers (Levi, 1980:Inter.). Only the introduction of drip irrigation methods helped to reverse this trend.

Argaman and Zbeidat: Settlers and Peasants

The growth of Argaman as an Israeli settlement adjoining Zbeidat is reviewed in Appendix F. One of the main problems that have plagued Argaman since its establishment in 1968, and one which also determines its relationship to both Zbeidat and Marj Na'je, is labour shortage. In Argaman there are currently thirty couples and fifty children (Jordan Rift S.A., 1980). Utilizing highly capital-intensive cultivation (flowers for export and field crops) a 25-dunum plot appears to be beyond the cropping capacity of the nuclear household during harvest time. There are no sources of Jewish labour supply to tap in the area, except for the occasional European volunteer workers from abroad.

Several Argaman farmers attempted to solve this problem a few years ago by leasing their plots an Arab melon farmers from Nazareth, (a practice prohibited by the Jewish Agency). When the leases became known in the

1977/78 season a scandal ensued after which the Argaman farmers were severely reprimanded (Litani, 1980:Inter.).

While leasing moshav lands to Arabs is prohibited, the hiring of Arab workers, while officially discouraged, is widely practiced in the Jordan Valley. Argaman farmers prefer women workers since they are cheaper to hire (IL.200-220, or $5 - $5½ per day), and recruit most of their labourers from the Far'a Valley and Tammoun village (Levi, 1980:Inter.). A member of the moshav secretariat claimed that they prefer not to hire Zbeidati women because neighbourly relations with the village prevent them from imposing discipline on their work (ibid.). During harvest, however, an average of 12-15 women from Zbeidat work daily in Argaman. Children (12-16 years) are also employed seasonally in the flower hothouses for IL. 60-75 per day's work ($1.5 - $1.8).

Argaman and Zbeidat farmers also exchange produce surpluses, mainly in subsistence crops, and occasionally the moshav sells Zbeidat farmers drip pipes which they (i.e. the moshav) receive at subsidized rates from the Israeli company Netafim. In return Zbeidatis are allowed to use the Argaman garage to fix their electric generators when they fail to get a mechanic's help from Nablus or Jericho, and often buy frozen chicken and milk products from the Argaman general store, products that are not available in the two village shops.

Relations between Argaman and Zbeidat are restrained and "correct" but have their moments of strain. The villagers differentiate between the Israeli army - which has a permanent presence in this border area - and the Jewish farmers. They recall with bitterness, however, that the establishment of Argaman robbed them of 60 dunums of 80 of their unfenced land (20% of the total) - which was taken as compensation for landholders on whose property Argaman was built. The presence of the settlement also

prevented Zbeidat shepherds from grazing their cattle on the hilly grassland where the moshav is now located.

Security alerts, which are not infrequent cause strain between the settlement and the village. When they happen, the gates of the settlement are locked to all outsiders and Zbeidat farmers are often refused entry to their own fields by the army.

It would be difficult to assess the future relationship between Zbeidat and Argaman in isolation from the policies determining the growth of Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley Rift and the West Bank in general. In the 1980/1981 season, Argaman cultivated between 300-500 dunums, but in fact had access to another 1500 dunums allocated to it by the Jewish Agency in 1971 (see Appendix F) which it did not crop for lack of manpower. The Israeli authorities have furthermore, confiscated all the cultivable land between Zbeidat and Makhrouq, an area which includes altogether (aside from the dunums fenced-off by the army of "security" reasons) about 6000 dunums. This area was set aside for the future growth of planned settlements and for the "thickening" of existing settlements (see Map 11:6; Drobles, 1978). That land happens to be the only area of cultivable land also (aside from the fenced-off area) in the direction of which the land-hungry farmers of Zbeidat, Jiftlek and Makhrouq can expand. The resolution of these conflicting calims, however, can only be dealt with politically, in the general determination of the future status of the West Bank.

Having considered the evolution of conditions of tenancy and proprietorship in Zbeidat, we can now examine the impact of the new agricultural technology on production relationships and the internal differentiation of the peasant households.

Map 11:6



Source: Based on WZO, Master Plan for the Development of of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983

Chapter Twelve

The Diffusion of Agricultural Technology:

A New Subjugation for Palestinian Peasants?

Recent assessments of the Green Revolution in third world agriculture indicate that technical innovations have, in the main, been favourable to landlords and rich peasants at the expense of poor farmers. Griffin, in summarizing the conclusions of several of those assessments refers to increased income inequalities in the countryside, and the strengthening of the political hegemony by the landowning classes (Griffin, 1979:92-93). Furthermore, changes in the land tenure system often adapted itself to the new technology with unfavourable consequences:

> The larger farmers -- because of preferential access to the means of production -- have been quicker to innovate than the smaller . . . in some cases the large farmers have ejected their tenants and begun farming with wage labour. In other cases the landowners have retained the sharecropping system and have simply reduced the share received by the tenant. Evidently, either contracts have been revised or the tenure system had been changed whenever landowners found it in their interest to do so (ibid.:93).

There is considerable evidence to support these findings in the recent history of the Jordan Valley (cf. Sharab, 1975:47, 86; Dajani, 1979: 16-17), but the term "preferential access to the means of production" subsumes, rather arbitrarily, a number of variables, including credit and technological initiative on the part of the farmer, which oversimplifies the complexity of agrarian relations under conditions of tenancy. It furthermore assumes, incorrectly as we have argued (Chapter 10), the loca-

tion of share-tenants as a subordinate category among peasant classes. Finally, there is an implicit element of technological determinism in Griffin's assessment which, barring a social revolution in the countryside, tends to reduce the various forms of agricultural technology (HYVs, mechanization, irrigation technology, etc.) to instruments of subjugation for the poor pesantry.

We shall argue in this chapter that this need not be the case. The appropriation of the agricultural surplus value by the "landed classes" in the Jordan Valley is only secondarily a function of their control of agricultural technology; it has much more to do with control of markets and sources of credit. Nor, as we shall see for Zbeidat, do they have a monopoly over the use of technology; for when landlords do have "preferential access" to technology it need not, given the currently prevailing conditions of tenancy, necessarily enhance their domination over their tenants.

The Revolution in Irrigation Technology

The mid-seventies were crucial years for farming in Ghor el Far'a, comparable in their significance to the drilling of artesian wells in the early 1960's. The negligence of farming by peasant households there was rooted <u>not</u> in the pull of higher wages outside the village, as was the case in the highlands, but in the increased salinity of the soil which was widespread throughout the central and northern Valley. In Zbeidat there was a noticeable decline in productivity in plots still under the farmers' control. The movement towards work in neighbouring Jewish settlements was merely a response to this ecological factor.

Israeli settlements in the Valley had overcome salinity by the combined use of sprinkler and drip irrigation. It was not the lack of familiarity with these techniques that prevented their adoption, but the lack

of capital to undertake the necessary investment. It was clear to them, however, that drip irrigation was superior to furrow irrigation. Among these benefits were:

1. Control of soil moisture fluctuations ensuring an early crop and, therefore, higher income at a time of market scarcity;

2. 50 percent water saving compared to furrow irrigation and 80 - 95 percent compared to sprinkler irrigation;

3. Effective leaching of saline soil by continuous emission of water to plant roots;

4. Enhanced use of fertilizers which are fed in soluble form to the plant with the water drip;

5. Significant reduction in the cost of fuel and equipment compared to sprinkler and furrow irrigation (Shoji, 1977:62-68).

All those advantages applied effectively to the conditions of agricultural production in Zbeidat. High salinity, low productivity, scarce water resources, and increasing costs of diesel fuel (for the water pump) and fertilizers were the main problems facing Zbeidat farmers in the seventies. In addition, the declining productivity of their farms did not allow them to avail themselves widely of the opportunities for work in neighbouring Jewish settlements because the maintenance and fixing of furrow canals demanded their attention for most of the year unless, of course, they neglected their land completely -- which some of them had already begun to contemplate.

Throughout the Valley it has been mainly landlords, and not individual owner-cultivators, who have taken the initiative in introducing drip

technology (aside, in few cases, from voluntary agencies who have been subsidizing the small farmers). The reasons for this should be obvious. An integrated system of drip irrigation is uneconomic to introduce on plots smaller than 20 dunums; and the initial capital investment, although not extremely high, is beyond the saving capacity of small farmers. The latter, thus, find themselves initially even more dependent than before in their contractual relationship with their landlords/commission agents. Only the intervention of external crediting institutions could have helped to break this cycle of dependency.

In the absence of any state loans for agricultural developments in the Western Valley, Zbeidat farmers were able to secure a loan from one of three foreign voluntary agencies for the initial investment in drip equipment. But that step was only adopted after two years of reluctance on the part of many farmers who had to give up their shares in the water supply in favour of the centralized "drip" mechanism.

The breakthrough came when two pioneering farmers, convinced of the advantages of the switch, contributed their plots for a pilot experiment in the new technology. In October, 1976 Abdullah Muhammad Hasan, who owned nine and one-half dunums in Zbeidat and sharecropped 20 dunums from the property of Jamil Abdul Fattah (Abu Anwar), installed drip pipelines on three dunums of the land he sharecropped with Abu Anwar on an experimental basis. The Voluntary Agency, the landlord, and Abdullah shared the costs of the pilot project which amounted to IL.18,000 in then current prices ($600, sterling 300).* Another farmer, Salameh Abu Dabbus, volunteered to crop 10 dunums of his 23.6 dunums land under drip irrigation the next year. The result was dramatic: a five-fold increase in yield of tomatoes, from one and one-half tons in open-furrow fields to 8 tons per dunum under drip irrigation (Hasan, 1980:Inter.).

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*1980 exchange rates of pound sterling to the U.S. dollar.

Success of the experimental project encouraged the whole village to adopt the new technology. Since the drip system involves a substantial amount of capital investment it was beyond the financial capacity of the villagers to introduce it on their own. In 1978, the infrastructure of the drip system was introduced to the 311 dunums plots of the Zbeidat community. It involved the construction of a network of pressurized distribution pipes (PVC) equipped with "control heads" and fertilizer tanks (for filtering and carrying the soluble chemicals into the drip lines) together with pressure gauges and timer valves, to ensure the even flow of water to the individual plants. It was left for each individual farmer then to connect the PVC lines with the drip lines. 200 dunums of drip were connected in 1978, and a further 67 dunums were covered in 1979.

The initial cost of the infrastructure was about half a million Israeli pounds ($3,000/Sterling 15,000) in 1978. In addition, the cost of installing individual drip lines came to another million pounds ($60,000/ Sterling 30,000) of which the Zbeidat farmers were subsidized by 30 percent of the cost (during the first year; in 1979 the subsidy was reduced to 25 percent). The Voluntary Agency bore the initial costs, receiving the farmers' contribution in installments due once their yield was marketed. The cost of laying the drip lines amounted, therefore, to an average of $100 (Sterling 50) per dunum. The infrastructure costs would thus total $400 (Sterling 200) per dunum.

The General Impact of the New Irrigation Technology

The switch from furrow irrigation to drip irrigation had drastic consequences for the Zbeidat community, in terms of productivity, distribution of wealth, social organization of the village and their relationship with the outside world. The following is a summary of these consequences

as I observed it during 1980, four years after the switch:

1. A substantial increase in crop yield over that obtained from open furrow irrigation from between five times to 8 times tonnage per dunum.

2. An earlier harvest of vegetables allowing Zbeidat farmers to start marketing such crops as eggplants and squash by December, and cauliflower and tomatoes (their main crop) by January. This means a higher price at a period of limited supply in the vegetable markets of the West Bank, Israel, and East Jordan. This perhaps explains the crucial factor in the increase of income for the Zbeidat community.

3. The increased income allowed Zbeidat farmers for the first time throughout their residence in the Jordan Valley, to confront the exploitative relations they have been compelled to contract with the commission agents and merchants of the Nablus vegetable market. This new flexibility was caused by the creation of a disposable surplus which allowed the small farmers to finance a new agricultural cycle (i.e., double cropping) without resort to high-interest linked credit.

4. Increased productivity per labour unit also contributed to the increase in bargaining power sharecroppers now have in relation to their landlords on their leased plots, especially when -- as the case in Zbeidat -- the farmers contribute to the installation cost of the drip. This trend, however, is only hypothetical and tentative as it is too early to observe.

The introduction of drip irrigation thus was a crucial factor which contributed to the reorganization of the labour process in Zbeidat. Because the drip system is an 'intermediate' technology, it is not labour displacing. Its net effect has been (a) to relieve the work of household members from the heavy work associated with the maintenance and repair of furrow canals, and (b) to increase the work load during the planting season, especially during the picking and harvesting season (January to April). During the peak harvest almost every household in Zbeidat employs external wage labour to help with the picking. One recent alternative to this has been a form of crop leasing (daman mahsul) to Israeli vegetable merchants.

On the negative side from the perspective of farmers, drip irrigation has created conditions of further dependency on Israeli technology, and on a new complex set of marketing arrangements. While the maintenance and replacement of the drip lines is itself not a very complicated process and within the mastery of Zbeidat farmers, their integration into a competitive market compels them to adapt to new varieties of seeds, salinity resistant seedlings, and insecticides, whose prices and development are completely out of reach by the small farmer.

Capital accumulation resulting from increased crop yield under drip irrigation is an uneven process. It is likely to affect medium-sized farms differently from small farms, and farmers with initial capital savings from those who started with borrowing. Little tangible difference can be seen, so far, in the conditions of those Zbeidat farmers who are predominantly sharecroppers and those who are primarily owner-occupiers. It is most likely, however, that in the coming years such issues as fragmentation of plots due to inheritance, plot consolidation, and differences in lifestyles and consumption patterns will create new divisions in the Zbeidat community, which so far have been dormant.

Similarly given the absence of surplus land within the reach of farmers, it is also likely that demographic pressures on the land will compel a stratum of the smallest land holders, or at least members of their households, to seek wage labour opportunities outside the village.

Such a disintegration of the peasant's household is intimately related to three variables which we will now discuss in some detail, to examine how they were affected by the new technology. These are: the work process in agriculture and household division of labour; farm productivity and farm budgets; and finally, income differentiation between village households.

The Agricultural Cycle and the Work Process

The introduction of drip irrigation drastically altered the form of labour allocation in agriculture as well as the division of labour among men, women and children. The change can be summed up in the following points:

a. Drip and its associated technology (plastic sheaths, built-in fertilization, mechanically controlled irrigation) alleviated the farmer's work, men's work in particular, from the burdensome tasks of preparing the field, and clearing the furrow canals before, during and after the planting season. Drip is labour saving during irrigation periods, and the tractor performs the following tasks (in addition to ploughing) which used to be performed by hand: harrowing of earth lumps after ploughing; manuring with organic zibl; and the mixing of manure with the soil before transplanting. All these tasks were performed by men.

b. With the exception of hormones and insecticides, which are sprayed by men using portable sprayers, with women following them with the liquid fillers, fertilization now is a completely mechanized process.

c. Increased productivity led to a higher demand for labour, including hired labour, during the harvest season. Picking of vegetables and harvesting is carried by all family members, but women bear the main brunt of work during the season. Packing vegetables, on the other hand, requires the participation of men, who grade the different qualities of the produce to be marketed, and the carrying of the wooden containers to the trucks.

This division of labour, and changes in the work process in general, are determined by the annual agricultural cycle in the peasant's farm, and the cropping arrangement for any particular year.

As can be seen from Table 12:1, the cropping arrangement occupies most household labour throughout the year, with a brief lull in activity towards the end of June and during July. By early August ground preparation for the autumn cycle begins.

Comparing the present cropping scheme with that prevailing before the introduction of drip and scientific farming (see the 1953 "crop-rotation scheme for 20 dunums farm", Diagram 10:1-Chapter 10, above) one can see a number of important changes: (a) with the substantial increase in cash crops, a much smaller area is devoted towards subsistence crops today than in 1953; (b) fallowing has decreased as an agricultural practice to the point of extinction. In 1953 25-30 percent of the plot was left as fallow over the two-year cycle. The impact of intensive use of chemicals on the soil is beyond the scope of this report, but should be paid attention in

ANNUAL CYCLE OF WORK & REST IN ZBEIDAT

Nature of Activity	8 Aug.	9 Sept.	10 Oct.	11 Nov.	12 Dec.	1 Jan.	2 Feb.	3 Mar.	4 Apr.	5 May	6 June	7 July
Ploughing & Harrowing										X	X	
Furrowing & Manuring	X[2]										X[1]	
Laying of Drip Lines	X[2]										X[1]	X
Spreading of Plastic Sheaths	X											
Sowing & Transplanting		T, Ca E,S,Fa	T, Ca S, Fa	Wh, B P2	Cu Wh	Wh, B Wa	Corn	Corn				
Spraying Insecticides			X	X								
Spraying of Hormones					X							
Weeding	X			X								
Picking & Harvesting				E	E,S	T, Ca Fa,S,P1	T,Cu,Ca Fa,E	T,Cu E,P2	T,Wh B,Wa,E	Wh,B Wa,E	Wh,B Corn	Corn
Hiring Extra Labour				X		X	X	X				
School Vacation	X										X	X
No Crops Available for Home Consumption	X	X	X									X
Rest from Ag.Work											X	X
Visiting Relative in Jordan												X
Cash Available								X	X	X	X	X
Marriages											X	X
Rain				X	X	X	X	X				
Weather	Very Hot-----		Hot	Warm	Mod.	Mod/co	d-----	Mod.	Warm--	-------	Hot	Very Hot
Ramadan Fast (1980-1990)	▒											▒
Peak Work Periods	Men	Men	Men & Women	Men & Women			Men & Women	Men, Women & Children--		Men	Men	

Thus of the 16 main work tasks associated with the agricultural cycle, eight have been substantially altered. Some of the change has been labour displacing, primarily due to the expanded functions of the tractor in harrowing, farrowing and manuring, and the built-in fertilization process in the drip system. Others were labour demanding, especially the extra work during the harvest season and the related tasks of packing, hauling and clearing. The net effect has been:

a. An increased work load for women and children.

b. A decline in heavy toil for men, especially the burdensome activities associated with furrow irrigation. This reprieve was replaced by a corresponding increase in marketing related tasks, and in the technical maintenance of the drip lines.

c. An increased demand for hired labour during the harvest season.

The peak demand for hired labour in Zbeidat takes place during the tomato picking season in March and April. The optimal pattern of hiring takes the form of gangs of women workers (usually a team of four to five women) under supervision by a man. Those women are recruited through a labour contractor (usually a truck owner who provides their transport from and to their homes) who deals directly with the farmer. The contractor charges the farmer for the gang, at the rate of IL.200 ($5) per woman per day, and pays them in turn IL.100 ($2.50) each per day*, pocketing half the money in the process, ostensibly for transport and "protection". The women, however, receive in addition a basket of the pick (amounting to about 20 kgs.) and one meal. The work day is seven hours from 6 a.m. to

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*Rate for the season of Spring 1980.

in forthcoming studies; (c) the area alloted to foddercrop in 1953 was considerably more than today. The reason lies in the decline of cattle raising as a result of the contraction of grazing land (fencing, security zones, etc.) and the reported shooting of cattle by soldiers "target practicing".

The extensive utilization of tractors, plastic coverings, drip, and fertilizers led to the transformation of work tasks associated with each one of these agricultural practices. A summary of the division of labour and related tasks can be seen in Table 12:2.

Table 12:2

Division of Labour & Related Work Tasks, Before & After Drip Irrigation in Zbeidat

WORK TASK	Before Drip Irrigation				After Drip Irrigation				
	Mach.	Men	Wmn	Chld	Mach.	Men	Wmn	Chld	Ch'g
Ploughing	X	X			X				X
Harrowing		X			X				X
Furrowing		X			X				X
Manuring		X			X	X			X
Covering Manure			X		X		X		
Irrigation & Cleaning Furrows		X			X				X
Plastics & Drip Lines	N/A*	N/A			X	X	X		X
Sowing & Transplanting		X	X			X	X		
Weeding			X	X			X	X	
Spraying	X	X	X		X	X	X		
Fertilization		X	X		X				X
Harvesting		X	X	X		X	X	X	
Packing		X	X			X	X		
Hauling		X	X			X	X		
Peddling by Road		?		X				X	
Clearing Driplines & Plastic Sheaths	N/A	N/A	N/A				X	X	X

*N/A=Not applicable

Source: Author's Zbeidat Household Survey (1980) and personal observations.

1 p.m., the sun being too hot for work in the Valley after 1 p.m. Men receive, on the average, IL.250 ($6) net for the same work.

The women of Zbeidat are preferred as hired workers to those recruited gangs, since they can work longer for only a marginally higher wage (from which, of course, no deductions are made) but they happen to be in short supply precisely when the demand for labour is high, since during the harvest they work at their own family farm. During the later periods of harvest, when their own household needs are met, they occasionally hire themselves and their children's work to the Jewish settlements nearby, picking flowers and vegetables at Argaman and Masu'a, the Israeli settlements nearby.

Day labourers are recruited by the contractors from highland villages which are within the transport network of Zbeidat and Marj Na'je. Most of them are female workers brought in trucks by the contractors from Tubas, Tammoun, Rammoun, Kufr Malik, and from the two refugee camps of Ballatah and Askar (Abu Hilal, 1980:Inter.; Nahhas, 1980:inter.). The harvest peak period in the Valley, when the demand for hired labour is highest, corresponds to periods or relative lull in agricultural activities in the highlands. Female workers are generally more available since their participation in the workforce employed in Israel is very low and their own households can afford to release them between November and March, the months of highest labour demand in Zbeidat and Marj Na'je.

During the sowing period the pressure for hired labour is much lower and the custom in Zbeidat (as well as in Marj Na'je) is for farmers to mutually help each other, at no cost, when they finish sowing their own fields.

One major consequence for this increased demand on family labour is the negative impact it has had on the education of male and (especially) female children. While the trend in West Bank rural areas is towards closing

the gap between the education of girls and boys, most Zbeidat women remain illiterate. This is only partly due to the reason given by the villagers themselves, namely, that they have to walk along the major highway all the way to Marj Na'je (2½ km. north) to attend school. It seems that the increased demand for child labour in the family farm has lent a positive incentive for Zbeidat to keep their daughters illiterate, a tendency reinforced by the traditional low status held by females in this formerly bedouin community. Data acquired from 23 households in whose names the land is registered (involving 231 members) show two and one-half times as many illiterate females as males for age groups 15 years and over (Table 12:3).

Table 12:3

Illiteracy & Education Levels in Zbeidat
By Sex for Households Owning Lands

	Illiterate*	Total Schooled	Primary	Inter-mediate	Secondary	Post-Secondary
TOTAL	69	97	57	27	10	3
MALE	20	68	32	24	9	3
FEMALE	49	29	25	3	1	-

*Illiteracy calculated for people over 15 years old.

Source: Author's Zbeidat Household Survey (1980).

Most girls stopped going to school after finishing six years of schooling while a third of those males that have received any education continued to the intermediate level (9 years). Another tendency associated with the increased demand for female labour, but one which we cannot establish empirically, is the postponement of a daughter's marriage to later years, currently at age 18 (cf. Table 11:1, and following discussion in Chapter 11). The reader is cautioned that figures for schooling years

appearing in Table 12:3 tend to slightly distord the level of education in Zbeidat since the households concerned contain a demographically older population than the rest of the village. Hence, both illiteracy numbers and years spent in school would be higher than those for the village as a whole.

Productivity & Farm Budgets

Crop yield in the central Jordan Valley is dependent on a variety of factors including the degree of salinity in the soil, amount of fertilizers and water used, nature of irrigation (sprinkler, furrow, or drip), time of cultivation, use of insecticides and weather. Other relevant factors are plot size, number of parcels per holder, and (in terms of actual yield cropped) market prices.

The peculiarity of Zbeidat is that the nature of the soil and amount of salinity for most of the cultivated parcels is homogeneous. This is due to the fact that all village plots are irrigated from the same well, and that the only land with a substantially different soil structure and mode of irrigation (the Zor area by the river), has been fenced-off by the army. Furthermore, despite the presence of some differential in the size of land owned and sharecropped, the social composition of the village population allows for a uniform cycle of ploughing, cultivation, and cropping - hence, for relatively similar crop yield per unit of cultivation. My investigation shows that the introduction of drip irrigation to most village plots in 1977/78 was followed uniformly by the use of the most sophisticated factors of scientific farming now utilized in Israel. Those factors include: double plastic sheaths (for weed control, frost protection, and preservation of uniform temperature), optimum combination of liquid fertilizers, insecticides, weed killers, and the use of hybrid saline-resistant seeds and seedlings. Among the scientific practices still not performed by Zbeidat

farmers is the periodic leaching of the land surface area to reduce salinity (every 4-5 years), and the sterilization of soil.

Two crucial factors still account, however, for differential yield per unit cultivated in Zbeidat. These are: the use or non-use of "drip", and the combination of crops planted for each agricultural cycle.

Since we are not dealing with subsistence agriculture, net productivity, it should be point out, is based on the calculation of marketed yield, and not on the actual productivity of the holding.[1] Marketed yield is itself subject to fluctuations in market prices (demand) and -- in the case of Zbeidat -- on the export permits they can acquire to send their produce to Jordan.

The following figures indicate crop yield for the main vegetable in Zbeidat, tomato, compared with yields under different forms of irrigation in the region:

Table 12:4

Crop Yield in Zbeidat & Selected Neighbouring Regions By Method of Irrigation (Tomatoes): (1979/1980)

Yield: Tons/Dunum

Cultivated Area	Furrow	Drip**	Hot Houses**
Zbeidat 1977	1.5	8.1	-
Zbeidat 1980	0.5	6.0	-
Central East Ghor 1978	1.52	4.5	10
'Ateel (Tulkarem) 1980	-	1.5 -8*	10-11
Deir al-Ghusun 1980	0.75	7-8½	10-12

Sources: (1) Zbeidat, 1977: Y. Azzeh & I. Matar "Farm Budgets"; (2) Zbeidat 1980: Average of 3 farms surveyed by author; (3) Central East Ghor: A. Steitieh et al., Dirasat (University of Jordan) May 1979, p. 126; (4) 'Ateel and Deir al-Ghusun: data collected from 5 farms by the author. (*) Low yield due to frost conditions in winter of 1979. (**) First cycle only.

It will be noted that yield fluctuations observed in Table 12:4 for drip irrigation does not appear in cultivation under hot houses (hammamot), which so far has not been introduced to Zbeidat because of the high capital expenses involved. These fluctuations are primarily due to the relative susceptability of crops planted under plastics and drip to frost attacks, which were particularly severe in the winter of 1979/1980, even then the increase in productivity under drip irrigation has been six to 10 times what it was under open furrow.

One of the main benefits resulting from the introduction of drip irrigation has been the ability of the Zbeidat farmers to market their produce to West Bank and Jordanian markets three weeks to a month before the winter vegetables in areas outside the Jordan Valley reach the market. In periods where frost damage to vegetables is extensive (such as 1979/1980) shortages hike the wholesale and retail prices considerably, again to the benefit of Zbeidat farmers, even when their own crops are affected by frost.

The net income of Zbeidat farmers, though considerably higher than what it was before 1977, is affected today by (1) capital investment for the installation of drip irrigation and its accessories, (2) the increased costs of fertilizers and insecticides and other farm inputs, and (3) the increased dependence on hybrid seeds and saline-resistant seedlings.

A farm budget prepared in 1978 for a 20 dunums area cultivated under drip irrigation estimated a total net income of $36,244 for owner and cultivators together (Matar and al-Azzeh, 1978). On the assumption that the land has three tenants (sharecroppers), each tenant's share would have been $6,040. Productivity per dunum of tomatoes was 8.1 tons with a productive value of $1,812 per dunum. This should be contrasted with productivity in a 39-dunum farm utilizing open furrow irrigation (1977) which neted $198 per dunum, producing an estimated 1.5 tons/dunum of tomatoes (Matar and

al-Azzeh, 1980:ibid.). Under the two alternative systems of irrigation, furrow in 1977 and drip in 1978, the landholder farmed out to three sharecroppers in each case. The return on their investment, assuming a 50% share with the landowner in expenses and returns, was as follows:

Table 12:5

Sharecropper & Landowner Shares, According to the System of Irrigation, 1977-1978

	Furrow Irrigation (1977)	Drip Irrigation (1978)
Farm Size	35 Dunums	20 Dunums
Number of Sharecroppers	3 (11.7 d. each)	3 (6.7 d. each)
Owner's Share of Income	$3,750	$18,122
Sharecropper's Income	$1,250	$ 6,040

Source: Matar & al-Azzeh "Farm Budgets" (1978) (adapted)

Although one should approach these figures with caution, (since 1978 was an exceptionally good year for Jordan Valley vegetables, and Jordan had followed a liberal policy towards importing West Bank crops) it nevertheless gives us a clear indicator of the substantial increase in income brought about by the introduction of drip. Matar and al-Azzeh report a ten-fold increase in cash productivity of drip-irrigated areas over furrow. This figure ($1,812 vs. $198) does not seem to take into account the capital investments necessary for the installation of drip. It merely assumes a 10 percent depreciation costs after installation.

Since 1978 was the first year of "drip" yields (after the pilot projects of Salameh Abu Dabbus and Abdallah Hassan proved successful) such dramatic results were crucial for the Zbeidat community to gain confidence

in the process of shifting from open canal irrigation to the new system. An important factor in this shift was the presence of peasants willing to invest their total savings in an unfamiliar form of agricultural technology. The example of farmer Salem Abu Dabbus is even more daring than that of farmer Abdallah Hassan since he installed the drip on his own land rather on leased land held in partnership, as is the case with Abdallah. In 1977 Salem installed the new irrigation system on ten dunums of his 23-dunum plot, with the Voluntary Agency subsidizing 30 percent of the initial cost. The difference in crop yield can be seen in Table 12:6.

From his ten-dunum plot alone Salem Abu Dabbus had a gross income of JD.4,000 ($12,000) in 1978. In 1979 his dunums of tomatoes produced eight tons only, a drop of two tons over the previous year, but by then most Zbeidat land was covered by "drip".

Table 12:6

First Crop Yield in Zbeidat

From Drip Irrigation - 10 Dunums Plot (1978)

CROP	No. of Dunums Under Cultivation	Dunum Productivity Under "Drip" (1978) (tons/dunum)	Dunum Productivity Furrow Irrig. (1977) (tons/dunum)
Tomatoes	6	10	1.5
Eggplants	2	1.5	0.5
Pepper	2	1.0	0.25

Source: Interview with Salem Abu Dabbus and Author's Zbeidat Household Survey

One of the important consequences of drip irrigation technology has been the intensification of Zbeidat's integration into the West Bank and export market, and the peasant's increased awareness of his budget calculations. The use of hybrid seeds, expensive fertilizers, and a variety of drip lines entails today a substantial investment of his income, or potential income, and careful calculation of the cropping arrangement during the agricultural cycle. In fact, the only differentiating factor between his and the capitalist farmer's approach to these calculations is his predominant dependence on his household labour for field work, with the exception of the harvesting season - when the Zbeidat peasant is compelled to hire extra help.

The farm budget of Salameh Abu Dabbus (23.6 owned dunums; 17 sharecropped dunums from the landlord Saleh Suleiman) for the year 1979) 1980 (see Appendix D) clearly shows the magnitude of income increase after the introduction of drip irrigation. His net income per dunum of cultivated land (without counting an experimental plot in which he erected a vineyard) was $598. From the 17 dunums he sharecropped from Abu Hashem, he netted $202 per dunum. Abu Dabbus' total income from both farms was $14,583. Thus, access to the new technology moved this farmer from the lower income households in Zbeidat to the top fifth category (see discussion below).

The Marketing Network and the Structure of the Peasant's Dependency

In Zbeidat there are four main systems of marketing the yield, all of which apply to field crops:

Sales to wholesalers via the commission-agent: the dis-

advantageous relationship between the farmer and the intermediary, especially when the latter is himself the landlord, was discussed in some detail in Chapter 10. Crop sales through the commission-agent continue to be the central method of marketing in Zbeidat. Because of the surplus in disposable income after the high yields, farmers are no longer indebted to commission-agents for their credit advances - at least not to the same extent as before and are, therefore, free to sell at the market of their choice. They still need the commission-agent for the transport and auctioneering of produce, and for the provision of packing boxes.

Export to Jordan: representatives of the Jordan Government issue special "certificates of origin" which (in theory) allow farmers to ship up to 50 per cent of their estimated yields to Jordan. Marketing in this system, which is highly advantageous to the farmer because of the (usually) higher prices in Jordan, is also conducted through wholesale merchants and commission-agents. Zbeidat farmers over the last two years exported about 25 percent of their produce to Jordan. The main obstacles facing such export arrangements come from the delay of granting "certificates of origin" to farmers beyond the period during which their vegetables can fetch satisfactory prices. This is caused, apparently, by the pressure exerted on the Jordanian government by the wholesale merchants in the East Bank (who act as agents and commission-agents for the East Ghor big landlords) to prevent lowering their prices through competition with the West Bank crops. The pro-consumer policies of the late Prime Minister Abdul-Hameed Sharaf (died July, 1980), however, began to rectify these practices (Abdul 'Al, 1980:Inter.). Jordanian policies

towards Palestinian farmers nevertheless continued to fluctuate according to political considerations subject to the prevailing attitude towards the West Bank.

But these policies are also determined by considerations of favouratism within the West Bank, with big landlords and vegetable merchants circumventing the small farmer in the process. Many Zbeidat farmers complained at the attempts of big farmers from the Jiftlek area to acquire "certificates of origin" in their (i.e. Zbeidat) name and then using them to market Jiftlek crops. These attempts constituted a main incentive for Zbeidatis to establish a marketing cooperative of their own.

"Crop Leasing" (daman mahsul): this practice flourished after drip irrigation was installed. It is practiced by farmers who need cash in advance and who, otherwise, have problems in recruiting or paying for extra labour. Wholesale merchants make an estimate of the crop yield immediately after the seedlings blossom and make an offer to the farmer. If he agrees, payment is made in advance and all picking, packing and marketing of the vegetables becomes the responsibility of the wholesale merchant. Crop leasing is done only for a portion of the fields, usually one dunum at a time, as the farmer always hopes to get better prices by marketing his crops at the hisbeh. In the spring of 1980, crop leasing of tomatoes to Haifa wholesalers fetched a gross income of IL.40,000 ($1,000) per dunum at Zbeidat.

Direct sales to retailers and the public: this takes the form of peddling by the main highway and is performed by children and old people. Zbeidat fields are well situated along the Jericho-Beisan highway and it

is relatively easy to carry the tomatoes and cauliflower boxes to the road where motorists can stop and bargain for the price. Peddling is done mostly at the very beginning of the harvest (when the vegetables attract an extremely high price) and towards the very end of the season, when the quality of the vegetables become unmarketable. Such direct sales constitute a marginal but important source of marketing in Zbeidat because it eliminates the need for brokers.

Thus the introduction of drip irrigation has ameliorated the position of the Zbeidat farmer and strengthened his bargaining power with the commission agent and the landlord, but the structure of this triadic relationship has not altered because of the farmer's continued dependence on them for his marketing needs. For it is they, (the commission-agent and the landlord) who set the hisbeh prices (within market demand) to the retailers and vegetable wholesalers. It is they who have control over the marketing infrastructures (transport trucks, packing boxes, etc.) and it is they who control the organizations for issuing export certificates.

/ A key factor in explaining the limitations imposed by improved technology on the small farmer of the Jordan Valley is his continued inability to alter his dependence on the marketing network. At best he can circumvent the system by selling directly to the Israeli wholesaler through crop-leasing, when the prices are appropriate, or to strive his best to acquire "certificates of origin" and export his produce to Jordan on his own.

But that is not an easy task. The organizational constraints of small farmers to challenge the alliance of big landlords and commission agents is illustrated in the following account of an attempt to establish a marketing cooperative society in Zbeidat.

A meeting took place in the village on July 7, 1980 and was attended by the West Bank secretary of cooperatives, the mukhtar of Zbeidat, seven leading farmers and heads of hamayel, and by this writer. While the benefits obtainable from the registration of their own cooperative was deeply felt by all those present, it became clear that the organizational power of Zbeidat was not up to par with the connections that neighbouring landlords in Jiftlek and Jericho have versus the Jordanian authorities and West Bank wholesalers. The suggestion by the director of cooperatives that Zbeidat farmers join the already existing Jiftlek marketing cooperative was firmly rejected by the Zbeidatis. In Jiftlek (see Map 11:4), it should be clarified, the control of water resources is firmly in the hands of the absentee landlords from Nablus (average ownership 200 dunums), while small farmers and sharecroppers (average 15-25 dunums) have established two separate, and uneven, cooperative marketing societies (Al-Ansari, 1980:Inter.). It transpired during the meeting that three of Zbeidat's own landlords (including the resident landlord) had discretely signed up their names in the Jiftlek society, an act which reinforced fears among the Zbeidatis that the Jiftlek farmers are out to "swallow" them. At stake in particular were the procurement of "certificates of origin" for the export of West Ghor vegetables to Jordan. Zbeidat farmers feared (on the basis of past experience) that the Jiftlek landowners would manipulate the nominal presence of the Zbeidat farmers in the proposed joint society to the benefit of the big farmers in Jiftlek.

It seems, in conclusion, that there are inherent limitations in the capacity of Zbeidat peasant, regardless how well organized they may become, to transcend the obstacles imposed on them by the alliance of commission agents, landlords, and vegetable wholesalers in the hisbehs of Nablus,

Jericho and Amman. At best they can establish a supplies cooperative which will improve their buying power of agricultural inputs and cancel the projects of intermediate agents. They can also sponsor a maintenance system for their delapidated water pump and for the drip system, thus reducing the magnitude of their "technological dependency". They can even make a deal with the Jiftlek marketing cooperative which might enhance their marketing possibilities by acquiring "certificates of origin" without having to go through a number of brokers. But the system is ultimately rigged against them and the constellation of forces facing them are too powerful to confront without a substantial change in the agrarian regime that has established itself firmly in the Jordan Valley.

Farm Income and Internal Differentiation

Since land is the main source of livelihood for the vast majority of Zbeidat farmers, it is possible to establish a criteria of measuring household income on the basis of estimated cash return from the marketing of crops, while taking into account the additional income from ownership of capital goods (e.g., trucks, tractors), wage labour, and salaries.

The basis of computation used and the appropriate farm budget are outlined in detail in Appendix D at the end of this thesis. The owner-cultivator/share-cropper farm budget utilized there reveals several features of income distribution in Zbeidat. First, the figures confirm our initial hypothesis that there is a higher degree of homogeneity in social conditions than elsewhere in the West Bank. The 3:1 ratio in average household income between the highest and the lowest income group is hardly an indication of extreme distribution of "wealth" (if the word may be used). Furthermore, several disguised sources of additional income have been neglected here because of their marginal nature -- these include wages for seasonal work

by women and children, and income from animal husbandry and carpet weaving. If anything, these items are likely to further decrease the gap between the lower income groups and the higher ones since the small size of the average plot in the lowest group (6.9 dunums) tends to encourage higher wage labour participation.

Table 12:8

Income Groups in Zbeidat: By Per Capita Income, Average Household Income, and Average Cultivated Area 1979/1980

Per Capita Income (Dollars)	Number of Joint Households	Average # Members/ Household	Average Household Income	Average Cultivated Area	Percent of Joint Households
1,000-2,500	5	10.6	$15,161	31.7	17.3
700-999	6	14.7	11,074	31.2	20.7
500-699	8	12.4	7,409	21.4	27.6
300-499	8	12.3	4,387	20.3	27.4
200-299	2	19.0	4,704	6.9	7.0
		Zbeidat Average			
748 (average)	29 (total)	13.0 (average)	8,547 (average)	22.3 (average)	100.0 (total)

Source: Author's Zbeidat Household Survey (1980).

Second, there is a definite relationship between the average area cultivated and the income group. This is not self-evident since the (total) average area cultivated includes a combination of owned, sharecropped and rented land. Since the owned area is fixed, the two variables which determine the farmer's ability to rent/sharecrop are the excess number of household members beyond those needed for work in the possessed land, and the surplus money he can invest in sharecropping/rentals. It is this latter point which may explain the correlation between income and (total) average cultivated area.

Third, there is a striking absence of any significant correlation between income groups -- for all categories -- and membership in any of the four subclans. If we take land ownership alone we do notice such a differentiation based on clan membership. For example, the Shahabat subclan, which constitutes 32 percent of the village population owns 41 percent of all village cultivated land (excluding leased land); while al-Mahameed subclan (10.1 percent of the population) owns only 7 percent of village land. But this categorical differentiation, based on collective differences between subclans (cf. Tables 11:2 and 11:3) begins to disappear when average holdings are compared within each subclan. Furthermore, a hierarchy of households based on income shows clearly that there is no concentration of members of any subclan on either end of the wealth scale.

In the distribution of the upper and lower five households (Table 12:9), we have taken into account income based not only on crop yield, but also the ownership of capital goods and income from salaries and wage work. Yet even then the area of cultivated plots remains crucial in determining the households standing within the village (total cultivated land here refers to combined sharecropped and owned plots, hence the anomalies).

The "levelling effect" observed in the relative lack of significant differentiation between the households despite the disparities in the amount of land owned (Table 11:2) is explained by the farmers' access to sharecropped land of absentee landlords in the area. Sharetenancy thus, is responsible not only for the relative limitations in the range of size in cultivated plots in Zbeidat but acts also as a mechanism for absorbing the demographic uneveness of household composition, with larger households having the ability to farm out additional plots.

Table 12:9

Upper and Lower Income Category Households in Zbeidat
On a Per Capita Basis 1980

Upper 5	Farmer/Clan	Cultivated Land	Gross Income	Per Capita/Annum
1	MHA/Shahabat	44 d.	$18,392	$2,299
2	MSF/Ebeidat	36 d.	20,110	2,010
3	MAS/Salaymeh	25 d.	14,950	1,245
4	SAD/Shahabat	40 d.	14,583	1,042
5	SMS/Salaymeh	13 d.	7,774	864
Lower 5				
6	HI*/Shahabat	1.4 d.	837	405
7	AMHS/Salaymeh	20 d.	4,040	404
8	TMAS/Ebeidat	8 d.	1,616	365
9	IS/Ebeidat	7.7 d.	5,816	253
10	AKMA/Shahabat	6 d.	3,588	239

(*a salaried employee)

Source: Author's Zbeidat Household Survey (1980)

The "levelling effect" should not be stressed, however. By the beginning of the 1980's we begin to see in Zbeidat cleavages which would have been "alien" to this bedouin community ten years ago. There are, on the one hand, peasant capitalists (owners of tractors, hauling trucks and grocery stores) and, on the other hand, households which can hardly get by at the end of the harvest season -- having to increasingly send their sons and daughters to work in Israeli settlements. Furthermore, the surplus cultivable land which previously was available for lease from absentee landlords has come to an end due to extensive confiscation by the military government. Demographic growth has therefore, to find new outlets.

The future of these cleavages in Zbeidat is related, in my opinion, to the manner in which those farmers who benefited most from the new technology are likely to invest their surplus income. A chief impediment to any meaningful investment in Zbeidat (as opposed to hoarding) lies in the precarious relationship the villagers have to their land (nonrecognition of title deeds) and to their dwellings (nonapproval of building permits). This situation, however, has begun to change. In January, 1980, after 13 years of struggle by the villagers, the Jericho Military Governor granted a building permit to the four subclans.

Since investment in private dwellings constitute the first objective for peasants who accumulate money, the denial of building permits (due to the presumed miri status of the land) reinforced the instability of Zbeidat's farmers' relationship to their land and constituted an obstacle for any form of investment aimed at village development. When fieldwork for this village was concluded (summer, 1980) about thirty nuclear and joint households (almost 50 percent of the total) had prepared for building permanent brick houses, at the cost of 800-1,500 dinars ($2,640-$5,000) per unit. For the rest, two more years would be needed before they can lay aside such a sum. The important question here lies not in the potential differentiation between wealthy and poorer peasants, but in whether Zbeidatis are going to invest their newly accumulated surplus in infrastructural projects for the development of the whole village or in the further fostering of peasant individualism. While the seeds of wealth differences among households can be seen in the contrasting indices of consumption items (ownership of refrigerators, TVs, electric generators, etc.), the majority of Zbeidat farmers realize that communal projects (such as piped water) may be a prerequisite for their own individual welfare, as they have seen in adopting the centralized irrigation system.

The success of the Zbeidat project has not been an example of "triumph of the will" but was contingent on two separate forces. One was the availability of capital investment extended, in this case, by the voluntary agency (which subsidized 25 percent of the total expenses), towards the cost of an alternative technological reorganization of agriculture.

The second necessary factor was the presence of a homogeneous community, based on a unified tribal kinship system in this case, which was able to respond collectively to the technological introduction. Had these conditions not been met, the irrigation technology would probably have been introduced anyway (as the case in Jiftlek and the Southern Ghors clearly attest) but by the landlord. In that case, the uneven and exploitative relationship between the absentee owners and peasant-sharecroppers would have been further accentuated, in favour of the former. In all likelihood, Zbeidat disintegration as a peasant community would not have been halted and internal differentiation would have proceeded in the direction of proletarianization.

But the success of Zbeidat farmers in improving their bargaining power should not obscure two long-term obstacles that face them today. First, how are they to invest their surplus disposable income? Second, how are they going to organize themselves in such a way as to overcome the problems of marketing that emerged from the increased (and earlier) harvest?

In a word, both the traditional, consensus-based decision making leadership and the individual peasant household in Zbeidat are now challenged by having to face the demands of the external world under changed circumstances.

Note

1. Quite often when the wholesale market price of the produce falls below the farmer's perceived cost of harvesting, the crop is left to rot in the fields, or -- where applicable -- is cropped as fodder.

Chapter 13

Conclusion: The Demise or Reformulation of a Peasant Society?

In the concluding remarks below I will discuss the essential features of the two processes of transformation in the Palestinian agrarian economy, de-peasantisation and peasantisation, in the context of the current debate about rural change in the third world. I will summate the argument by discussing features in the Palestinian cases that are common to trends that appeared in transitional agrarian forms elsewhere, and those that are specific to Palestine. Within the latter specificity, I will also attempt to distinguish those features of rural transformation that are brought about by mechanisms 'internal' to structure of Palestinian social economy, and those engendered by Israeli occupation.

Throughout the third world, the integration of native agrarian régimes into the network of the world capitalist market has given rise to transitional rural structures which drastically affected the composition of traditional peasant communities. In some cases, like Indonesia in the post-colonial period, the traditional communal organization of the peasantry displayed resilience in the face of capitalist penetration by undergoing a process of 'involution'. This allowed the peasants to sustain their livelihood at a low threshold of survival - involving a complicated re-arrangement of their land and labour resources (Geertz, 1963).

A more familiar pattern, however, especially witnessed among African peasantries, has been the process described as the subjugation and subsumption of peasant household production by capital (Bernstein, 1977). The result has often been thought to reduce the status of peasants to that of 'disguised proletarians' or 'proletarian equivalents'

(Banaji, 1977) whereby the nominal independence of the peasant household - through the retention of its possession over the means of production - disguises the actual control of capital over what is produced and how it is produced. A peasantry persists in this form because it undertakes the costs of its own reproduction and the provision of cheap surplus labour to the capitalist economy./ This view propogated especially by Bernsterin (1977) rejects the notion of a 'peasant mode of production' 'articulated' with the capitalist mode, including the modified models of articulation suggested by Wolpe in Chapter 1, since the conditions of reproduction of the 'pre-capitalist' mode are seen (by Wolpe) as being destroyed by the very capitalist system with which it is articulated.

In yet a third set of conditions, the external intrusion of capital is seen as leading to the disappearance of peasants as an integrated community of agriculturalists, as observed in many paddy cultivation areas of Sri Lanka today (Morrison, Moore and Lebbe, 1977).

What is often missing in these conceptions of transitional forms is the relationship between what is happening in the third world to the actual conditions of a stabilized peasantry that have emerged in Western Europe in the last half-century. Djurfeldt's observation that 'the petty commodity-producing farmer has thus not only survived, but has become typical of Western agriculture' (Djurfeldt, 1982:138) despite the perennial prognosis of proletarianization in capitalist agriculture, compels us to rethink the whole problematic of analyzing agrarian relations within peripheral formations.

In particular, our own findings about the interdependence of marginalized farming and commuting wage labour trends between the West Bank and Israel, may be just as equally illuminated in reference to the European experience as in relationship to 'transitional typologies' in Turkey, or the 'internal colonialism' model of South Africa. In con-

temporary European agriculture, for example, we witness the stabilization of the family farm as the optimal unit of agricultural production was accompanied by a drastic reduction of the agricultural labour force and substantive capitalization of farm inputs. Together with this persistence of the small farmer in the midst of advanced capitalism, we also witness the successful adaptation of the worker-peasant phenomenon to the re-organization of both industrial production and agricultural mechanization. Its future, however, is not so certain. The following example, from Germany, illustrates the conditions of peasant-worker communities in the 1960s:

> The part-time holding provided security. On the basis of its residual function a family income, rather than an individual income, was accumulated from diverse sources. But the disproportion between the contribution from the industrial and agricultural parts has grown so great that a change of disposition has become impossible. The part-time holding provided also a physical base, a shelter, which alleviated the worker-peasant of the costs of re-housing as he became incorporated in the industrial system. Increasingly the farm has been retained not for the security of income it afforded but because modern means of transport have widened extensively the economic area accessible from that base. (Franklin, 1971:101)

The stabilization of the relationship between the family farm and commuting wage-labour in the West Bank is similar in many respects to Franklin's illustration, but it was achieved at a much more precarious balance. Agricultural inputs in the Palestinian case were much less capitalized, and indeed farming conditions in the highlands went through actual regression. On the other hand, the conditions of urban employment provide, as in Europe, the major share in the farm income/wage-labour sources of income to the commuting peasant, but at a much lower rate of remuneration, and certainly at a considerable insecurity in work tenure. In this last respect, the Palestinian peasant-worker has much more in common with the Italian Guestworker than with the native German commuting

peasant.

All the above assumptions of transitional forms in agrarian development have certain implicit assumptions about the relationship between capital and the peasantry that are not always spelt out. In the several paradigms about agrarian change discussed in the introduction, we come across three different conceptions of this relationship.

In the 'dissolution-conservation' model, outlined here by Wolpe, the assumption involves a strained relationship between a pre-capitalist mode (the tribal Reserves) subjugated to, and serving the internal needs of, the capitalist mode. This is a modified model of the two articulated modes discussed above.

In the discussion of transitional forms of Turkish agriculture, a Wallerstenian model is adopted in which the capitalist market, both local and international, and the state are apparently acting as the main agents of rural transformation, and performing the role of catalysts for intra-village differentiation ('aggregate shifts') and class polarization within the peasantry. This model, however, does not see capitalist agriculture as penetrating the rural domain in such a way as to create a capital/wage-labour relationship within agriculture. Rather, the agrarian sector is incorporated and subsumed in the capitalist sector. Peasants are controlled by capital through unequal terms of trade; through credit arrangements with urban financiers and rural usurious capital; and through the fiscal policies of the state.

In the various models generated by the Differentiation Debate discussed here, we encounter two broad notions of peasant economies in relationship to capital. One is an elaboration of the 'subsumption' idea, which sees the peasants as retaining a certain autonomy within the

sphere of capitalist production, but putting restraints on it at the same time. The peasants' identity is defined not only in relationship to capitalist production relations in general, but to the capitalist state in particular; thus, "peasants have to be located in their relations with capital and the state, in other words within capitalist relations of production mediated through forms of household production which are the site of a struggle for effective possession and control between producers and capital/state" (Bernstein, 1982:176). Furthermore, the notion of peasants as 'wage-labour equivalents' is now modified, though not rejected, in that "in a relative sense (it) limits the subjugation and real subsumption of household labour by capital to the extent that the producers are not fully expropriated nor dependent for their reproduction on the sale of labour-power through the wage-form" (ibid., 1982).

The other trend in defining peasant economies in relationship to capital comes from Shanin (1984). In a recent work he, in common with Bernstein, rejects the 'articulation model' and cruder concepts of subsumption of the peasantry (i.e. peasants as 'disguised proletarians'). Shanin's approach stresses the 'economic specificity of peasant production' beginning with the 'units and processes of production' exemplied in the operation of the family farm, and the constellation of factors related to it: division of labour, self-exploitation, 'life/farming rhythms', occupational linkages of household members, etc. (Shanin, 1984:4c4-4c5). The study of the internal dynamics of peasant production is thus seen as the essential beginning for defining its relationship to the broader political economy in which it is located. Shanin, therefore, makes no generalization about the linkages of peasant economy to capitalism, leaving its determination to the historically specific formation within which it is examined.

In my utilization of theoretical models of peasant economies in

this study, a selective use has been made of defining the peasants' relationship to the wider social formation. This 'conceptual ecclecticism', as it may appear to the reader, results from my perception of agrarian devolution in a segmented society exhibiting two distinct developmental trends; in one the exegencies of the external labour market and the internal ecological conditions of dry farming play the decisive force; in the other, it is the injection of merchant capital into the new agricultural technology and capital intensive farming to mediate between absentee landlords and refugee peasants that is seen as primary. The common link integrating these two agrarian forms is the colonial Israeli state and its regulated control over agricultural commodities, but laissez faire attitude to the (Arab) labour market.

Since in none of the agrarian forms identified do we observe the actual domination of capitalist relations in agriculture, the use of uni-linear (or bilinear) models of differentiation has not been appropriate for this study. I have utilized Wolpe's model of internal colonialism to define the relationship between commuting peasant-workers and the demands of the Israeli economy for cheap labour. Despite considerable problems with this paradigm (such as the much criticized 'conservation-dissolution' component), it continues to provide a succinct heuristic device to understand the nature of a colonial relationship as much attracted by subjugated labour as it is repelled by the demographic consequences of integrating that labour.

Similarly, Keydar's typology of transitional forms suffers from extrapolating trends that are either incipient in the peasant economy, or lack an adequate basis for empirical generalization. Still, the taxonomy has been of utility because it focuses on village-wide changes as units of analysis, and locates the 'transitions' in a historical and ecological terrain that is comparable to the conditions of Palestinian

society. The definition of agrarian capitalism in terms of market determination of factors of production has been useful in explaining the transition in the Jordan Valley from patrimonial control over share-cropping compacts ('patron-client' relationships) to one in which contractual forms mediated by commission-agents have become dominant.

Shanin's emphasis on the internal dynamics of the peasant economy has provided this study with a framework that avoided notions of market determinism (as opposed to determination) in examining agrarian changes in the context of increasing capitalization (and mechanization) of the factors of production. I have emphasized, along these lines, the different trends in development that emerged between Marj Na'je and Zbeidat in response to contrasting features of factionalism, kinship-based homogeneity, and subsequence internal differentiation that the two villages were subjected to. In particular, Shanin's conceptualization has lent an operational dimension to the study of 'de-peasantisation' by defining it in relationship to the decline of the family farm as a unit of production, and the 'subversion of its autonomy' (in our case) through the mechanism of the labour market and its impact on the internal division of labour in the peasant household.

If there is a common feature to the majority of agrarian studies of transitional peasant economies today, it will be certain assumptions about the effect of capitalism on agriculture. In distinction to all other modes of production, capitalism is seen by them as having the unique distinction of producing a variety of homologous structural consequences in peasant communities with disparate economic and cultural traditions. This can be verified in the numerous contemporary studies

about the impact of wage labour, out-migration, and technology on the internal structure and consumption patterns of third world rural communities.

Assumptions about the homologous impact of capitalism on peasants should not be overdrawn, however. The initial Leninist conceptions of rural differentiation and the disintegration of the smallholder were challenged by the actual behaviour of a persistent peasantry that refused to behave like a rural proletariat. Current modifications of these teleological notions of differentiation gave rise to more sophisticated theories of transition. Nevertheless, they are seen as forms of transition to capitalism. A new element in these studies is the stress on the protracted character of the 'transitional period'. A good example of such an approach is the schema of 'transition' suggested by Stephan Gudeman in his The Demise of a Rural Economy (1978). The transformation of peasant production from subsistence crops to capitalist agriculture is abstracted here from the generalized forms that Gudeman investigated in rural Panama (1978:147-149).

In the first set of conditions, the external capitalist intrusion into subsistence agriculture leads to the diversion of surplus rural labour into cash crops without undermining the mode of subsistence farming. In many cases, the co-existence of the two modes may supplement the subsistence sector with a cash component that operates in favour of the latter.

In the second 'phase', the diversion of labour resources from the subsistence sector on a seasonal basis, especially as a result of peasant migration, continues while preserving the peasant household in the subsistence sector. In this case, subsistence production supplements and provides the 'infrastructure of the capitalist venture'. The injection of earnings from the capitalist sector into the peasant economy,

however, is predominantly utilized in non-productive (consumer) forms that tend to undermine traditional peasant society.

In the third set of conditions, the external capitalist intrusion diverts both natural resources and labour from the subsistence sector. Peasant household production is drastically undermined and peasants are transformed into rural proletarians - either 'disguised' (as household producers in 'appearance' only), or in the actual form of wage labourers.

Most agrarian studies which have investigated rural change in the concrete would concur that the above schema is far from unilinear or pervasive, not only for the third world but in the current re-interpretations of the 'classical road' to capitalist agriculture (cf. Djurfeldt, 1982). In many cases, the increasing commoditization of the agrarian economy has had a selective impact in undermining some features of traditional economies but not others. In Egypt, for example, land reform measures introduced in the 1950s had the anticipated result of destroying semi-feudal relations in the countryside, and the division of large estates into medium and smaller holdings. But subsequent waves of peasant migrations (both internal and external) in the mid-1970s, unexpectedly re-absorbed the massive surplus of landless labourers primarily into the Arab (oil-rich) labour market and reversed the predicted proletarianization of rural Egypt. Thus, in one decade, the country witnessed strong counter trends in the direction of both intensified capitalist farming, and the reinforcement of peasant household production (Taylor, 1983:5-6). Again, in Turkey, as the cases discussed in Chapter 1 signify, we witness a wide spectrum of agrarian relations of production - but it is suggested that 'kulak-type' villages, relying on the capitalized resources of rich peasants, exhibited the best chances of survival (Keydar, 1980:13-21). Both 'petty commodity production' and capitalist farming are seen here as moving towards disintegration.

Once notions of universal transitional forms of rural transformation are broken down to their constituent 'national' components, the homologous trends discussed by Gudeman above begin to reflect the stubborn impact of local history and structure. The rural sociologist writing in this tradition has thus the problematic task of constantly analyzing the unique attributes of village society under examination while demonstrating its linkages with the world economy on the one hand, and common affinities with other rural formations on the other hand. One task cannot be a substitute for the other, unless we are reduced to the futile exercise of seeking the placement of this or that rural formation into its proscribed compartment of world capitalist development.

In this essay I have examined the process of agrarian transformation in two contrasting ecological zones; one characterized by dry farming and rapid marginalization of agriculture, the other by intensification and successful adapation to mechanized farming. Both regions, the central highlands of Palestine and the Western Valley, were subjected in the last 15 years to a combination of political and economic intrusions which operated to set aside Palestinian village society from the path of rural transformation experienced by neighbouring Levantine peasants in Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. Chief among these factors are the absence of a national state sector, and the spontaneous mechanisms of the labour and commodities markets in the rural sector mediating the control of the Israeli colonial state apparatus.

The resultant consequences of these factors, while specific to the Palestinian case, have not been entirely isolated from similar trends of agrarian change witnessed in other regions of dry farming zones in the third world. Here, too, we witness a clear trend towards the inte-

gration of village social fabric into the regional (i.e. 'national') economy, and a noticeable decline in patrimonial bonds, both within the peasant community, and in the relationship of the village to the external world.

This integration was achieved in the highlands mainly through the mechanisms of the labour market and migration patterns, and through the extension of the 'national' infrastructure (transport routes, electric grids, educational units, and the service sector) to the village community. In the Valley it occurred at the level of reinforcing capitalist relations of production over the agricultural sector through the mechanisms of marketing networks, investments by absentee landlords, credit relationships, and - secondarily - through the labour market.

I referred to the first process of transformation as 'de-peasantisation' which I defined as 'the progressive devolution of peasant existence occasioned by the combination of increasing non-viability of the peasant household (in production terms), expulsion from land, and availability of work opportunities outside the village/camp - without the situation necessarily leading to the proletarianization of the peasantry' (Introduction, Chapter 1). The manifestation of this process under conditions of highland dry farming displayed two different prototypes of de-peasantization. In the case of Natufa, marginal agriculture and early outmigration resulted in substantial differentiation of the village class structure and vitalization of the village economy. But this vitality occurred completely outside the agriculture sector, and Natufa has ceased to be - in any acceptable sense of the term - a peasant society. Contrary to Keydar's projections for similar villages in Turkey, however, the de-peasantisation of Natufa did not lead to its disintegration as a village community. It only succeeded in the weakening of kinship-based solidarity, and re-establishing it on the basis of a

diversified occupational-class basis. In this tendency towards diversification, Natufa presents a rather exceptional case of de-peasantisation in Palestinian society and mainly serves to illustrate the accentuated forms that external intrusions in non-viable agriculture might lead to at the village level.

Ras el-Tin, on the other hand, presents a condition of de-peasantisation from which generalizations can be made, since it exemplifies trends that can be observed in most highland villages.

While the West Bank is no longer a peasant society in the sense that it has ceased to have a majority of owner-cultivators who derive their main livelihood from agriculture (cf. Thorner, 1971:203-206), it would be a mistake to consider the new transformation as constituting the creation of a rural-based proletariat. This 'transitional' status of Palestinian peasants is central to the understanding of their current ambivalent social identity. Having one foot still rooted into the village economy, and another forging towards work opportunity in Israel and abroad, this ambivalence can be illuminated by the following features of this duality in the peasants' identity:

(a) Family and clan connections continue to play a crucial role in the recruitment process and mobility of the peasant-workers within the Israeli economy. More experienced brothers, fathers, and cousins are often the first and last bond in the peasant's introduction to the wage-labour system outside the village. This constant interaction with, and dependence on, his kin, reinforces the migrant peasant's village identity as the central framework within which he obtains a living.

(b) The peasant's proletarian identity, or rather his potential

proletarianization, is continuously obstructed by the instability of his work tenure. In the construction sector, for example (which accounts for over half the rural labour force employed in Israel), the peasant-worker enters into a work process which involves unskilled and de-skilled labour, non-contractual agreements, high turnover, and small aggregates of workers on the work site. The prevalent notion that Palestinian village workers commuting to Israel constitutes a 'proletarianized underclass' (see Chapter 3) misconceives the complex hierarchy of work relationships which the peasant-worker encounters in the construction and service. The analysis of this hierarchy is important for understanding the manner in which Arab village workers are recruited into the Israeli economy. We have illustrated above (Chapter 8) the significance in the distinction between an unskilled labourer and a mu'allim, the manner in which Jewish employers and contractors are distanced from their Arab sub-contractors and employees, and the way village work teams relate to their Kewish and Arab bosses. These hierarchies create not only a sense of protective patrimonial consciousness among rural workers, but also an efficient system of labour management reinforced by the absence of workers' organizations and work stability. To portray this persistent awareness as a form of 'false consciousness' (as is often done) is simply to ignore its functional correspondence to the daily realities encountered by peasant-workers.

(c) While income from wage-labour outside the village has raised the household's standard of living, it does not seem to have contributed significantly to the internal differentiation of the peasantry. On the contrary, it seems that work opportunity outside the village has created a new homogeneity in the rural class structure. Although the evidence is not conclusive on this point and deserves additional case studies from a larger number of case studies, I will stress this conclusion on the

basis of the following logic: wage labour opportunities have contributed to the marginalization of agricultural land and diminishing social differences based on variations in the ownership of family plots. On the other hand, wage-labour has demonstratively not created any significant amount of wealth to generate capitalist investments in the village. Wealth differentials continue to obtain as a result of remittances sent by migrant relatives of the wealthier households to their kin, but here 'internal remittances' from wage labour acted dramatically to offset the earlier impact of outmigration.

(d) To the extent that some wealth has been accumulated in the hands of individual villagers, it has been invested in 'low-risk' enterprises: in olive presses, hauling trucks, electric generators, and real estate in the district centres, all of which generating minor developments in the village economy. The average peasant, after saving some money, tends to invest it into an additional housing unit (or an extension) for members of his nuclear household, and converts the rest into gold jewellery for his womenfolk. Capitalist relations in agriculture have little possibility of development in the central highlands given the nature of the soil (and terrain), and the unchecked process of plot fragmentation. Even where optimal ecological conditions allow for commercial agriculture to develop economic growth in West Bank villages will remain stunted in the absence of infrastructural institutions that provide efficient transport, credit facilities, and electric grids.

(e) Peasant household production continues to play an important, though declining, role in supplementing the income of the rural household. But here it is the structural dimension of peasant production that defines its relationship to wage labour. In common with the earlier relationship between South African industries and surplus labour from the tribal Reserves, the subsistence component of Palestinian agriculture

serves to underwrite the supply of cheap rural labour to Israeli industries. The physical proximity of Israeli work sites to the village ensures that, in contrast to the situation in South Africa, there is no conservation-dissolution process here which threatens the destruction of the agricultural sector by the very system which stands to benefit from the preservation of backward farming. What does threaten the persistence of marginal farming along these lines is negligence generated by increasing migration out of the country altogether.

(f) The family plot remains an important source of security for the peasant-worker, given the instability of work tenure and the determination of employment opportunities by the prevailing ideological trends in Israel.[1] This explains the relative absence of a land market in rural Palestine, and - in part - the lack of any significant trends towards concentrations of fragmented parcels. The continued involvement of the peasant-worker in his farmily farm has adapted itself conveniently to the conditions of wage-labour in the construction and service sectors, both Israeli and Arab, where the seasonal release of the peasant-worker during periods of peak demands for his household agricultural work becomes necessary (in harvesting, pressing of olives, etc.). Conversely, the possibility of such release explains the high involvement of peasants in such 'flexible' sectors as construction and catering services. Simultaneously, we witness a progressive displacement of men's work on the farm by that of women, children, and older men. It is possible to explain, consequently, the low participation of rural women in the labour force by the new contingencies of agricultural demands in the peasant household rather than merely by factors related to social conservatism in the Palestinian village.

I have suggested in this thesis that wage labour involvements in

villages like Natufa and Ras el-Tin have contributed significantly towards bridging internal cleavages in peasant society that, until the recent past, were generated in large part by differences based on the size of the land holdings. This occurred through the reallocation of family labour within and outside the agrarian economy to the optimum benefit of the peasant household under conditions of agricultural decline. But the same homogenizing trends engendered by migration and wage labour also created the conditions for a set of new and unforeseen conflicts. The prolonged absence of young men from the village - whether in commuting to Israel or for work abroad - has had a dramatic impact on village social fabric, whose dimensions we are only beginning to comprehend. Men are increasingly being divorced not only from performing agricultural work on their farms, but also from cultural patterns that go along with it. The assumption of women and elder kinsmen to greater roles in the (reduced) agricultural cycle has challenged and sometimes shattered the traditional sexual division of labour in the village.

The result is not a trend towards greater homogeneity in the worlds of men and women, but its opposite. Men bring in the outlook of the city, of the alien ideas of foreign lands, and Israeli-Jewish society; women become the sole bearers of the remnants of traditional culture and the preservers of peasant lores. To speculate about the consequences of this new schism is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Several questions bearing on the future process of de-peasantisation and new stabilization of the peasant economy, and which call for further research, should be raised here, however. Do the conditions of labour recruitment among peasant-workers, observed in the construction sector, have any parallels in other sectors, such as industry? Through what type of changes in the composition of the rural household and the family farm are we likely to witness a substantial entry of rural women into

the labour market? Are there any tendencies for whole villages, or clusters of regional villages, to 'specialize' in certain forms of unskilled labour? And, finally, what are the likely consequences of a major recession in the Israeli economy, or a closure of the Israeli labour market for Palestinian peasant-workers, for the seemingly stabilized occupational and socio-economy patterns analyzed in this essay?

The concept of 'peasantisation' has been defined in this study to designate 'the process of accession by landless agriculturalists and sharecroppers to the status of smallholders through one of two processes: one was the assumption of landholding status by dispossessed peasants through sharecropping contracts of the mugharasa and musaqah nature; and the second, acquisition of land through the rejuvenation of unexploited land' (p. 15). The two processes find their consumation in my analysis of the adaptation of landless refugee peasants to the conditions of intensive farming in the Jordan Valley.

The genesis and future of the communities of Zbeidat and Marj Na'je (Chapters 11 and 12) is shared in many respects by the majority of Palestinian villages in the upper Valley, such as Jiftlek, Makhrouq, and Auja. The 'revolution of agricultural technology' exemplified in the introduction of commercial farming and drip irrigation in the seventies to the region, has had a drastic effect on reversing patterns of disintegration in these peasant communities. My study of the recent history of Zbeidat and Marj Na'je has led me to conclude that disintegration was imminent as a consequence of the following combined conditions: (a) the integration of the Jordan Valley into the agricultural commodity market resulted in the rapid rise in the cost of agricultural inputs for the

small farmer. Under the emergent conditions of commercial farming, the majority of Valley peasants were being submerged into unbearable debt to their landlord-commission agents; (b) salinity of soil and the primitive techniques of irrigation utilized under furrow canals, reduced the productivity beyond the self-exploitation capacity of the average peasant household; (c) demographic pressures on owned, and the limited access to sharecropped, plots decreased the average cultivated area for each peasant household; and (d) the confiscation and fencing-off of village lands by the Israeli army further reduced the economic viability of the village.

By the mid-seventies, an increasing number of local farmers were beginning to seek work in the neighbouring Israeli settlements of Argaman, Masua' and further south in Pesa'el, and a number of them had neglected their farmland completely. It was at this point that the adaptation of Valley farmers to capital intensive technology - sometimes individually, but mostly in collaboration with absentee landlords - succeeded not only in reversing this trend, but also in creating a new situation of acute shortage of labour, particularly during the harvest period.

Incipient proletarianization and farm negligence was thus halted through a substantial increase in crop yields which used to be obtained from primitive techniques of irrigation. The consequent betterment in the farmers' material conditions (between five to ten times their former income per dunum of cultivation) allowed peasants in the area to accumulate a surplus of disposable income, probably for the first time in their lives.

In villages like Zbeidat, but not in others, the farmer was able to use the disposable income to confront his usurious dependency on commission agents, since he no longer needed them for advanced credit and

was able by then to buy his inputs directly from the market. He continued to be dependent, however, on agricultural merchants for a great portion of his marketing outlets. And bonds with absentee landlords, with whom the farmers entered into sharecropping compacts became even stronger. There is no doubt, however, in that the increased disposable income has improved the farmers' bargaining power with both the commission agent and the landlord.

The new agricultural technology has also altered the nature of the work process by alleviating the heavy burdens associated with furrow agriculture (especially those related to canal clearing during irrigation, which were done mostly by men) and increasing the work tasks demanded from women and children, especially during the harvest. The increased demand for hired labour was conveniently met by the higher returns from crop production.

In villages like Zbeidat, with a cohesive kinship structure, the collective use of water resources, has had the unforeseen political function of compelling the diverse interests of local farmers to unite and work in coordination. Previously, the 'share' system by which each cultivating household was allotted its respective right to water portions from the common village source (in accordance with the size of its plot, etc.), had fostered a vicious form of peasant individualism which had sabotaged several attempts to establish cooperative forms of using the new technology. The 'drip' system, by virtue of its centralized mechanism, superceded the water-sharing system and restored to the community a sense of cohesiveness and unity which was on its way to dissolution in the transition of Zbeidat from a semi-settled tribe to a fully-fledged peasant community.

The new technology also enabled the Valley farmer to sustain the demands of an increased population over the same limited cultivated area.

But this trend has reached its upper limits, in my estimation, since in the prevailing state of agricultural technology in the region, only the switch to more capital intensive technology (such as hothouses) can enhance crop yields beyond their current levels. Such a development would, in all probability, be unlikely and unwelcome. Unlikely because the capital costs required for increased intensification are beyond the existing and potential wealth of the vast majority of Valley farmers, including the wealthy ones. Unwelcome because it is labour displacing, and in the event that it is introduced by absentee landlords, it will invariably create conditions of dislocation that most peasant communities in the Valley will be unable to sustain.

Finally, the emerging patterns of intensive farming created in the Valley has further integrated the refugee peasants into the Jordanian, Israeli, and international marketing networks. Price fluctuations in input costs, and wholesale prices of crops, have compounded the farmers' traditional concern for weather conditions. This situation has created a new dependency among Valley peasants on a whole constellation of forces associated with the new agricultural technology: seedling nurseries, hormone treatments, hybrid seeds, maintenance engineers, long-lasting drip pipes, etc. In a paradoxical way, the new cobweb of intensive farming and its linkages with the urban sources of finance, has replaced the earlier subjugation of the farmers on commission agents.

It would be a mistake, however, to conceptually treat these linkages at the same level. Dependence on, and control by, landlords and commission agents have been associated with the backward conditions of semi-feudal relations in Palestinian agriculture. These relations are likely to survive the introduction of the new technology, but only selectively, with some landlords moving in the direction of capitalist farming and others dropping out - as <u>rentiers</u> or into other forms of

urban investments. In the process, their relations with their peasant tenants will be modified, mostly in favour of the share-cropper/peasant as I have argued in this thesis. Techno-agricultural dependence, on the other hand, is a worldwide consequence resulting from the subordination of a peasant community to capitalist relations in agriculture. In the Jordan Valley, the class of landlords-commission agents have no monopoly over agricultural technology; they merely control the sources of credit that make it accessible to the farmer. Thus, the cooperative organization of peasants and their accumulation of their collective resources can bring about not only the amelioration of the conditions of their material subsistence, but also the circumvention of the landlord's sole control over the new technology.

Those trends can now be recapitulated in order to identify what is specific to the Palestinian agrarian formation, and what is common to other similar paths of rural transformation elsewhere.

(a) The particular combination of outmigration trends and movement of village labour in search of wage-labour outside the village economy is by now a familiar demographic response to regressive conditions of dry farming and plot parcellization. We witness it today in Levantine rural societies with similar agrarian structures, such as Lebanon and Turkey. The specifically Palestinian form of commuting peasant-worker, occasioned by the physical proximity of urban employment to the village, and the stabilization of a situation of interdependence between the marginalized farm labour, and the dominant wage labour form as a source of income, can be compared - paradoxically - not to the Levant but to the consolidation of the peasant-worker phenomenon in the advanced capitalist

countries of Europe, such as Germany and France. As in Europe, the Palestinian peasant-worker household underwrites a substantial portion of the costs of reproducing the labour-force through the secondary contribution of the family farm. It also contributes to the partial resolution of rural poverty by injecting the village economy with an external source of income, while retaining traditional features of peasant social organization. Unlike the situation in Europe, however, the peasant-worker phenomenon exists in a much more precarious balance, given the peasant's insecurity in relationship to his land-title and conditions of urban unemployment.

(b) Another specificity peculiar to the Palestinian highlands (the West Bank) is the absence of urban centres of any considerable size. What exists are a number of large townships which are virtually ruralized concentrations of population dominated by merchant capital. The lack of any large-scale urban investments, manufacturing enterprises, or public sector worthy of the name, means that demographic pressures in the countryside were bound to find their outlet in external migration much earlier than in countries embodied with a similar agrarian régime, while the stark dichotomy between village and city that we observe in Egypt or Brazil is characteristically weak in the West Bank. Rural notables and potentates, except for a few expected cultural obstacles, find it possible and frequently realizable to assume positions of power and high status in the townships.

(c) Finally, Israel's imposition of its colonial rule over the Gaza and the West Bank since 1967 has created new deflections in the path of Palestinian agrarian transformation that further set it apart from earlier trends of development. On the one hand, the opening up of its labour market to the surplus rural force, put an initial brake to the endemic tendencies for rural outmigration and consolidated a peasant-

worker strata encompassing one-third of the total labour force. On the other hand, Israel's continued encroachment over Arab lands, and the physical challenge to the Palestinian's continued survival in their traditional communities, renders the seemingly stabilized relationship between the residual peasant farmstead and the peasant-workers' involvement in the urban sector, into an increasingly insecure proposition. What restrains this insecurity in the peasants' ability to survive is Israel's own dependence on this precarious balance.

Note

1. The possibility of employing Egyptian workers in Israel after the peace treaty between the two countries in 1980, became a source of considerable concern for Palestinian workers in the occupied territories who feared both their displacement by the potentially cheaper Egyptian labour, and the lowering of wages such an influx might entail. See, for example, "Gaza District Workers Unaffected by Unemployment in Israel", in al-Quds, March 26, 1980 (in Arabic).

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Rural Household Questionnaire

"Family and Labour in The Rural Household"

(Translation from Arabic)

1 Card no. (1)

2 3 4 5 No. of Respondent

6 7 District and village

8 Ecological Classification

9 Date of interview

Name of tabulator (interviewer)

A. Basic Information on the Household

10 The Respondent: (1) Male head of the household,
(2) his wife
(3) other members of the household (indicate) ———

11 Relation between head of household with wife before marriage:
(1) Paternal cousins;
(2) maternal cousins;
(3) other relationship
(4) no relationship but from same village;
(5) no relationship but from outside the village;
(6) do not know;
(9) no answer

12 Origin of the family (for three generations)
(1) from present village;
(2) from another village (indicate)———
(3) Refugees (1948 war) from (indicate village)——
(9) no answer.

13 Religion: (1) Muslim
(2) Christian
(3) other
(9) no answer

B. Household Members:

Indicate following information on household members, 14 years and above only, in the house; list them in the order of age; first the older then the younger ones: (look for key below):

Name	Hshld Member	Sex	Age	Yrs. Educ.	Main Profession	Place of work	Dose to family farm?	Contribute	Coments dead	retired
	head of hshld	—	16	17	18	19	20		21	22
	Wife		23	24	25	26	27			
	Son/daughter	26	27	28	29	30	31			
	Son/d	32	33	34	35	36	37			
	Son/d	38	39	40	41	42	43			
	Son/d	44	45	46	47	48	49			
	Son/d	50	51	52	53	54	55			

other sons (males) in household 56 including 57 over 14 years of age.
other daughters (f.) in household 58 including 59 over 14 years of age.
other relatives in house

Name	Relation	sex	age	yrs. Educ.	main work	place of work	Does work in Family farm?	Comments
		60	61	62	63	64	65	
		66	67	68	69	70	71	
		72	73	74	75	76	77	

Key: Age: (1) 14-16, (2) 17-21, (3) 22-29, (4) 30-39, (5) .-49,
(6) 50-59, (7) 60+, (8) not known, (9) no answer.

Year Education: (1) Illiterate, (2) till 4th grade,
(3) 4-12 years, (4) finished Tawjihi,
(5) Teacher training School (6) vocational tr.,
(7) University,
(8) other (9) no answer

Main Work: (1) Farmer, (2) Wage worker, (3) Rentier,
(4) housewife, (5) merchant/shopkeeper, (6) "salariat,"
(7) artisan, (8) student, (9) no answer/unknown

Place of Work: (1) In village
(2) West Bank,
(3) Israel,
(4) other,
(9) no answer/unknown

78 79 total members living in the same household and eating together.

Card no. 2

1 no. of card (2)

2 3 (leave blank)

C. Household members abroad (emigrants)

4 5 total no. of direct members living abroad.

6 including no. males.

7 including no. females.

Name	Relation	Age	Reason for Migration	Place of Migration	Comments
1.			8	9	
2.			10	11	
3.			12	13	
4.			14	15	

D. Occupation of household head (3 generations)

(indicate below the main occupations of head of your family, yourself, your father and grandfather):

Respondent (head)	Father of Respondent	Grandfather of Respondent
16	19	22
17	20	23
18	21	24

KEY: Reasons for migration: (1) work, (2) study,
(3) other, (9) no answer/unknown

Place of Emigration: (1) Jordan, (2) Gulf States/S. Arabia,
(3) other Arab countries (4) North America,
(5) S. America, (6) Europe,
(7) other countries, (9) no answer/unknown.

Occupation: See "main work", above.

E. Agriculture:

Does the family own agricultural land

25 (1) Yes, (2) No (if answer is "no" - move to slot '30')

26 if yes, indicate type of crops:

(1) olives, (2) other arbor, (3) vegetables,
(4) grain, (5) "mix", (6) other,
(9) no answer/unknown

27 Is your land currently: (1) cultivated, (2) neglected.

28 Are the crops: (1) completely consumed by family,
(2) sold, (3) other.

29 Does the family farm produce enough crops to satisfy household needs?:
(1) Yes, (2) No.

30 In what period was your family wholly dependent on returns from agricultural -i.e. without having to rely on work outside farm work?
(1) Presently, (2) Jordanian period, (3) British mandate,
(4) ottoman period, (5) Throughout, (6) 2-4,
(7) 3-4 (8) other, (9) no answer

31 Do most household members work in the family farm?
(1) seasonally, (2) throughout the year, (3) rarely,
(4) other (9) no answer

—— If answer to (31) is (Yes) ask the respondent to specify:

Household Member	Works Exclusinely on family farm	Works occaisionly
Head of hshld		
Wife		
1. Son/daughter		
2. Son/daughter		
3. Son/daughter		
4. Son/daughter		
5. Son/daughter		
6. others (specify)		
7. others		
8. others		

32 total males in household working on family farm.

33 total famales in household working on family farm.

34 Does family employ hired labour on family farm?
(1) Yes, (2) No, (3) does not apply (no land), (9) no land.

35 If answer to (34) was (yes) specify the nature of tasks hired:
(1) ploughman, (2) olive pickers,
(3) harvest workers (other than olives),
(4) other workers (specify) _____
(5) 1,2,or 3, (6) does not apply, (9) no answer

36 How does the household market its agricultural produce?
(1) Sold directly to the hisbeh.
(2) via a commission agent, or other: inter mediate (Arab).
(3) via an Israeli marketing company.
(4) Other methods (specify) _____
(5) does not apply.
(9) no answer.

37 Does the family farm-out some or all of its land to other farmers?
(1) farms-out some of its land (no. of dunums_____)
(2) all land (3) other _____
(4) does not apply (9) no answer.

38 Does the family rent-out some or all of its land to other farmers?
(1) rents-out some of its land (no. of dunums _____),
(2) all the land, (3) other _____ (9) no answer

39 Does the family share-crop plots inside or outside the village?
(1) yes (no. of dunums _____), (2) no,
(9) no answer

40 Does the family rent land from other farmers?
(1) Yes (no. of dunums_____), (2) no, (9) no answer

41 Does any member of the household work for a wage in other farmers' land?
(1) yes (no. of members _____), (2) no,
(9) no answer

(note for tabulator: Check answer with response to no. 31(b), above).

43 Does the household possess any animals (excluding work animals)?
(1) yes (2) no (9) no answer

44 If (yes) then indicate which, and, from 1-3, number of heads:
(1) sheep _____ (2) goats _____
(3) cows _____ (4) any combination of above animals,
(5) poultry, (6) other animals,
(9) no answer,

45 Does the household possess any work animals?
(1) yes, (2) no, (3) no answer

F. Agricultural Technology:

Does the household utilize any of the following tools/instruments in agriculture?

Instrument	Yes	No (4)	Since 1948 (1)	Since Jordan Rule (2)	Since Israeli Rule (3)	Owned	Rented
46 Tractor							
47 Chemical Fertilizers							
48 Plastic Sheaths							
49 Sprinkler Irrigation							
50 Drip Irrigation							

C. Labour and Migration

51 Does any household member work outside the village (W.B., Israel, or abroad)?
(1) Yes, (2) No(move to item 55), (9) no answer

52 If answer to (51) was (yes) indicate place of work and number of members in each case.
(1) West Bank: _____,
(2) Israel _____
(3) Jordan and the Arab World _____
(4) abroad: _____
(9) no answer/unknown

(note: use the following codes for combinations)
(1,2,3,4) as stated

(5) W.B. plus Israel

(6) Jordan plus Israel and/or W.B.

(7) Arab world plus abroad

(8) 4 plus 5.

53 If answer to (51) was (yes), does the household depend primarily in its livlihood on members work in

(1) Israel and W.B.

(2) Emigrants abroad

(3) all cases (1 plus 2).

(4) does not apply

(9) no answer.

54 If family members work in the West Bank or Israel what mode of transport do they use to work outside the village?

(1) local bus, (2) shared taxis,

(3) company provided transport (4) other (indicate) _____

(5) 1 plus 2, (6) 2 plus 3

(7) 1 plus 3, (9) no answer.

H. Investments and Enterprises

Does the family have:

55 a commercial enterprise?

(1) Yes (indicate) _____ (2) No,

(9) no answer

56 Commercial velricle?

(1) Yes, (2) No, (9) no answer

57 Private car?

(1) Yes, (2) No, (9) no answer

58 Do you think the agricultural situation is better or worse than it was during Jordanian rule?

(1) Better, (2) Worse, (3) The Same,

(4) other _____ (9) no answer

59 Do you find your general income to day better or worse than it was during Jordanian rule?

(1) Better, (2) worse, (3) the same,
(4) other _____ (9) no answer,

60 Did the family lose any of its land by confiscation?

(1) Yes (2) No, (9) no answer/unknown
(If yes indicate period(s) _____ and area _____).
(N.B indicate total land possessed from land registry sources _____)

61 Did any household members leave as a result of the 1967 war?

(1) Yes, (2) No.

62 In general do you prefer your children to work in agriculture, in commerce, or in a salaried (wage) job? (to head of household and wife only).

(1) Agriculture, (2) Commerce, (3) salaried/wage work,
(4) Professions, (5) other _____ (9) no answer.

63 Does the household contain any craft implements to manufacture:

(1) carpentry workshop (2) metal workshop
(3) pottery workshop (4) textile
(5) carpet/husur making implements
(6) Embroidery (7) other (indicate)_____
(9) no answer.

Does the house contain any of the following?

	Yes (1)	No (2)	
64			Running water
65			Electricity
66			Radio
67			T.V.
68			Gas/Electric Oven
69			Washingmachine
70			Telephone
71			Electric generator
72			Sewing machine

(end of interview)

Appendix B

Employment Statistics for the West Bank and Gaza, by Economic Branch, Locale, and Urban-rural Residence

1. Gazans and West Bankers Employed, by Economic Branch, District, and Place of Work, 1978

	Total (000)	Total %	Agri-Culture	Indus-try	Construc-tion	Other
Total	211.9	100.0	25.6	17.5	20.9	36.0
1. Working inside Territories	142.7	100.0	29.8	15.2	9.5	45.5
(a) From West Bank	94.0	100.0	34.4	15.2	10.9	39.5
(1) Jenin	14.9	100.0	54.3	5.4	4.7	35.6
(2) Nablus	19.0	100.0	23.2	19.5	9.5	47.8
(3) Tulkarem	11.9	100.0	47.9	6.7	5.9	39.5
(4) Ramallah	18.0	100.0	32.8	17.2	16.1	33.9
(5) Bethlehem & Jericho	11.4	100.0	18.4	21.1	16.7	43.8
(6) Hebron	18.8	100.0	32.4	18.6	11.7	37.3
2. Working in Israel	68.2	100.0	16.8	22.2	44.8	16.2
(a) From West Bank	36.8	100.0	11.4	23.6	46.0	19.0
(1) Jenin	3.7	100.0	16.2	24.3	43.3	16.2
(2) Nablus	3.4	100.0	2.9	38.2	35.4	23.5
(3) Tulkarem	7.1	100.0	19.7	35.2	32.4	12.7
(4) Ramallah	8.6	100.0	8.1	24.4	40.8	26.7
(5) Bethlehem & Jericho	5.1	100.0	2.0	13.7	58.8	25.5
(6) Hebron	8.9	100.0	14.6	13.5	59.5	12.4
(b) From Gaza	31.4	100.0	23.2	20.4	44.3	21.1

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, "Survey of Labour Force in the Administered Territories", QSAT ix:2 (Nov. 1979), Table 2, p. 103; and Table 23, p. 147 (Hebrew).

and Urban-Rural Dwelling, 1975-1978

Branch	Total				Urban Dwelling				Villagers			
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1975	1976	1977	1978	1975	1976	1977	1978
Total (000)	132.3	129.7	127.3	131.5	36.2	35.7	35.4	34.7	84.5	83.1	80.8	85.4
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	27.4	27.7	27.8	27.8	5.5	4.7	5.0	4.6	38.9	39.6	39.7	39.9
Industry	16.6	16.6	17.3	17.6	26.2	25.4	26.9	27.2	12.3	12.6	12.7	12.9
Construction	22.6	21.3	19.7	20.7	13.3	12.0	10.4	11.5	26.3	24.9	23.2	24.0
Commerce	11.8	12.9	13.6	12.5	19.3	20.7	22.4	20.6	8.2	9.3	9.6	8.8
Transport	4.5	4.8	4.6	4.2	6.9	7.5	6.7	6.3	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.1
Public Services	13.3	13.3	13.1	13.0	21.8	22.3	20.2	20.6	9.1	8.8	9.6	9.4
Other	3.7	3.4	3.9	4.2	6.9	7.4	8.4	9.2	1.8	1.3	1.7	1.9

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, "Survey of the Labour Force in the Administered Territories", QSAT ix:2 (Nov. 1979), Table 12, p. 136 (Hebrew).

Appendix C

Exhange Rates for the Israeli Pound (Lira) and Shekel (1971-1981)

Year	Lira per Jordanian Dinar (1)	I.L./U.S. dollar(2)
1971	10.5	3.98
1972	12.6	4.14
1973	13.4	4.50
1974	17.2	5.26
1975	20.5	7.71
1976	29.1	9.79
1977	32.0	15.39
1978	54.8	19.20
1979	83.7	35.35
1980	169.6	75.48
1981 (shekel)	42.68	15.60

Sources: (1) Statistical Bulletin For the West Bank and Gaza Strip Najah University, Research Centre (Nablus, 1980), Table 3.23, p. 72; and newspaper indices.

(2) Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982; Table IX/11, p. 234 (figures provided for fourth quarter).

Appendix D

Calculations for Farm Budgets, Crop Yield, Capital Goods, Wages, and Household Income

In the following, I have outlined the basis for calculating production and income variables which were used for assessing farm income and internal differentiation in the households of Zbeidat (Chapter 12):

a. Yield from marketed crops: the following distribution of cropping for an average farm was based on sample responses from 11 farmers: 71.5 percent tomatoes, 11 percent squash and cauliflower, 7 percent eggplants, 8 percent wheat and barley (for home use and fodder only), 2.5 percent pepper. The return on marketed crop was calculated on the basis of Abu Dabbus farm budget, outlined in the farm budget below. Calculations were made in dollars on the basis of two exchange rates ($1 = IL.25 for the preharvest prices (Autumn 1979) and $1 = IL.40 for the harvest and marketing prices (February 1980). Income from sharecropped land was calculated as a 33.8 percent portion for each dunum of owned land, which is the net income due to the farmer after all expenses are paid to the landlord, etc. Income from rented land was considered the same as owned land minus the cash rental

b. Capital goods: the ownership of tractor (or a truck) was added to the farm income on the assumption that a tractor is used fully for four months a year bringing its owner(s) a net rental of IL.800 a day.

c. Wages: calculated on the basis of 10 months work, setting aside two months for the harvest season, with 21 days for each month of work, and payment at IL.300 a day. The salary of the teacher was assumed to be I.8000 per month. Since almost every household has children and (occasionally) women working at the nearby settlement of Argaman, and it was exceedingly difficult to establish their accurate number, it was felt better to leave their income unaccounted for, especially since children's wages rarely contribute to the household income. It should be assumed, however, that the per capita figure below are slightly underestimated because of this factor.

d. Per capita: per capita figures were used for ranking income groups, rather than household income, because of the wide variation in household size-ranging from three persons to 30, with an average of 13 members per joint household.

Farm Budget for an Owner-Cultivator/Share-Cropper

the Farm of Salameh Abu Dabbus (40.6 dunums)

Zbeidat 1979/1980

	Owned	of which under drip irrigation	Share-Cropped	of which under drip irrigation
Farm Size	23.6 dunums	20 dunums	17 dunums	10 dunums
Crops 1979/80	8 d. tomatoes	8 "	5 tomatoes	5 "
	4.5 pepper	4.5 "	5 cucumbers	5 "
	2.0 eggplants	2.0 "	7 wheat	-
	5.0 grapes	5.0 "	(experimental)	
	4.0 wheat	-		

I. Pre-Harvest Expenditures	Owned Area	Share-Cropped Area (farmer's share only)
1. Drip Depreciation	IL. 45,150	IL. 11,280
2. Ploughing	IL. 22,656	IL. 8,160
3. Plastic Sheaths	IL. 13,340	IL. 4,600
4. Fertilizers	IL. 17,500	IL. 4,500
5. Pesticides	IL. 23,600	IL. 6,000
6. Hormones	IL. 1,750	IL. 450
7. Seeds & Plant Stock (including grape seedlings)	IL. 35,550	IL. 3,263
8. Land Rent (government)	IL. 1,888	-
9. Water (rent share, pump maintenance and fuel)	IL. 2,309	paid by landlord
10. Iron structures for vineyard	IL. 70,000	-
Total costs before harvest	IL.233,743	IL. 38,253
Total costs in dollars (calculated at Autumn rates	$ 9,350	$ 1,530

	Owned Area	Share-Cropped Area	
II. Harvest & Crop Marketing Expenditures			
1. Hired Labour (picking and packing 14.6 dunums)	IL. 25,550*	IL. 17,500*	(10 dunums
2. Transport and crates	IL. 32,704	IL. 22,400	
3. Commission on Sales 10%	IL. 51,000	IL. 49,000	
Total Harvesting & Marketing	IL.109,254	IL. 88,900	
Total in dollars**	$ 2,731	$ 2,223	
III. Gross Income from Crop Sales (Marketable Yield only)			
1. Tomatoes (32 tons)	IL.540,000	IL.337,000	(20 tons)
2. Pepper (6.75 tons)	IL.168,750	-	
3. Cucumbers	-	IL.150,000	(10 tons)
4. Eggplants (11 tons)	IL.220,000	-	
5. Grapes	no yield 1st year	-	
6. Wheat	Subsistence Crop	Subsistence Crop	
Total Gross Sales	IL.928,750	IL.487,000	
Total in dollars**	$ 23,218	$ 12,175	

IV. Income

1. Pre-Harvest Exp.	$ 9,350	1. Gross Sales	$ 12,175
		2. Minus Harvest & Mark. Exp.	$ 2,223
2. Harvest & Marketing	$ 2,731	3. Net Sales Income	$ 9,952
3. Total Expenditure	$12,081	4. Farmer's Share (50%)	$ 4,976
		5. Minus Pre-Harvest Exp.	$ 1,530
4. Net Income	$11,137	6. Farmer's Net Income	$ 3,446
5. Net Income per dunum+	$ 598	$ 202	
6. Total Net Income from Owned & Share-Cropped Land			$ 14,583

* Hired Lands = ¼ of Total Income Costs

** Calculated at February 1980 rates; $1 = IL.40

+ Excluding Vineyard.

Source: Interview with S. Abu Dabbus and Author's Zbeidat Household Survey, 1980.

Appendix E

The Reliability of Official Statistics for the West Bank

[The following assessment of official W.B. statistics in excerpted from Hans Lofgren's Migration from the West Bank (Stockholm University, 1982), pp. 26-17].

[West Bank] population statistics are based on the September 1967 census. They have been adjusted to the various components of population change, i.e. vital statistics (births and deaths) and migration (permanent emigration, "visitors" going abroad who did not return and entrance for "reunion of families").(1) It is not clear how the migration component of population change has been calculated. In this study the estimates of "net out-migration have been derived by subtracting "total increase" from "natural increase". In several other studies the same procedure has been enployed in order derive the migratory balance for the year in question.(2)

The labor data have been obtained from a survey of families in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This survey has been conducted currently since August 1968. Each family is visited every quarter year. Until July-september 1973 it included 4,500 families. Since then it has covered 6,500 families.(3) The following definitions have been used: (i) "Employed" are persons who worked at least one hour during the determinant week (i.e. the week preceding the enumerator's visit); (ii) "Unemployed" are persons who did not work at all and actively sought work during the determinant week, (iii) "outside the labor force" are all persons aged 14 and over who were neither employed nor unemployed. Housewives, students and persons living on pensions belong to this latter group. The definitions coincide with those used for the Israeli population.(4) The constant low unemployment figures suggest that people not employed were not nomally registered as "unemployed". Instead they were excluded from the labor force. An ILO-report has mentioned the possibility that only workers who have been refused work in Israel are registered as unemployed.(5) If so this can mean that persons seeking jobs on the WB use other channels, while at least some of the persons who seek employment in Israel register at the labor exchange bureaux.

According to Bregman, ... (Bank of Israel), further information regarding

WBers employed in Israel is available from labor exchange bureaux (existing in all main WB and Gaza Strip towns). The estimates are, according to Bregman, derived from both sources, i.e. family survey and labor exchange bureaux and cross-checked against one another. Bregman, writing in 1974, states that "in the main, the annual estimates on population, employment and wages are fairly reliable and serve as a basis for analysis of annual trends in the system as from 1969".(6)

As far as the population estimates (and thereby net out-migration estimates) are concerned the statement of Bregman does not appear to be contradicted by other sources. His statement about wage and employment data must, however, be modified, partly because of later developments.

The statistical treatment of the highest wages has been changed twice, in January 1975 and October 1980. (Probably the effects of the high inflation on wage levels are the cause of the modifications). Therefore the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics advices that comparisons between wages data has certainly also been negatively affected by the occurence of illegal employment (see below).

As to employment data the situation is more complicated. There is general agreement about the fact that part of the Palestinians from the occupied territories work illegally in Israeli, i.e. without work permits. There is, not surprisingly, no agreement about the size of this underestimate; for 1978 Khouri suggests that the underestimate is 10%, whereas Muslih claims that it is somewhere in the neighborhood of 100%.(8) The existence of illegal employment would be a less serious problem in published data reflect variations in employment in Israel, leaving out a constant share of the workers. It is, of course, impossible to conclude that this is the case. Neither is it impossible that the family surveys are conducted in such a way as to secure that honest answers are given here meaning that the illegal workers in Israel are properly registered as working there. If so the critics are mistaken. According to Tamari "hardly any attempts are made by the government to control "illegal" work."(9)

... It seems likely that wage data are more reliable; they do reflect the wage for a considerable part of the WB population and the changes introduced in 1975 and 1980 do not seem to be fundamental. The wages of legally employed WB workers are not firmly regulated and to quite a large

extent determined by market forces. It is not far fetched to believe that wages for illegal workers have developed in approximately the same way as those for legally employed.

The relative absence of variations in unemployment rate makes it clear that it is an insensitive measure even if its few variations seem to be in the right direction. Its extremely low level does not seem realistic.

To sum up, wage data appear to be fairly acceptable indicators of real income changes; unemployment data seem to be more deficient.

Notes

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2. Muslih, Rose, "The Palestinian Workers in The Occupied Land-1," Shu'un Filastiniyya (in Arabic), 115, p. 14-29;
   Meron, Raphael. The Economy of The Administered Areas, 1977-1978. Jerusalem 1980.
3. SAI, 1981:111.
4. SAI, 1981:53, 105.
5. International Labour Office. 1981. "Report on the Stituation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories, "Report of the Director-General, Appendices. International Labour Conference, 67th Session, p. 28.
6. Bregman, Arie 1974. Economic Growth in the Administered Areas 1968-1973. Jerusalem, p. 102.
7. SAI, 1981:112.
8. Mushih, Rose 1981. "The Palestinian Workers in the Occupied Land -3," Shu'un Filastiniyya (in Arabic), 117, p. 108-132.

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Appendix F

Moshav Argaman

Argaman, half a kilmeter to the West, and built on the hills almost literally on top of Zbeidat, is not only one of those rare Herut settlements in the Jordan Valley, but also one of the very first Jewish settlements to be established in the West Bank (1968). While it was the adopted policy of the Labour Alignment (following the Alon Plan) to establish a permanent, agriculturally-based cordon of Israeli colonies between the river and the populated hilly areas of the West Bank, the Likud coalition later spearheaded by its Gush Emunim allies attempted to entrench themselves in the Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah hills. Argaman was the exceptic to this rule.

Both its ideological composition and the harsh living conditions in the Jordan Valley contributed to Argaman's continued non-viability as a settlement.

In 1968 it was established as a Nahal (military outpost) named after two Israeli soldiers killed in clashes with Palestinian guerrillas across the Jordan River.

From the status of a military outpost Argaman was elevated to a civilian settlement in 1971, the second such settlement in the Jordan Valle It became a collective moshav (moshav shitufi a form intermediate between Kibbutz and cooperative settlement). Menahem Begin (then MK) and General Ezer Weizman officiated at the ceremony in which the Jewish Agency gave tl settlers 2000 dunums, out of which only 600 dunums at the time were cultivated (100 dunums by the drip method).[1] The crops included onions, winter tomatoes, and eggplants (for export to England).

Although experts from the Technion and the Volcani Institute gave c tinued agricultural advice to Argaman farmers the settlement failed to attract a substantial number of farmers, with only 20 people (including 7 couples) venturing to stay. By 1972 the cultivated land had contracted t 350 dunums (half of what Argaman started with). An Israeli journalist ha the following impression of the place at the time:

> "From an agricultural and economic point of view (Argaman) was considered a failure. The impermeability of the ground did not allow for the salt to be removed, as in other places Jordan Valley. Perhaps for theat reason leaders of the Moshav and Kibbuts movements refued to adopt the settlement. Near the site line the Beduin tribe of Arab-al-Zbeidat and to the north Marj al-Naije, inhabited by Moslems (sic.) who were not born loving Zionism."(2)

By 1974 the cultivated area had further declined to 300 dunums, and all but three of the original settlers had left.(3) A decision (in 1975) was made to change the status of the settlement to a cooperative moshav (moshav ovdim) in which individual families cultivate separately, following ideological disputes and physical hardships which had threatened the unity of the formative group. Each new family was given a 20-25 dunum plot, and a cooperative turkey coop was added.

The gross annual income per Argaman household was calculated (in 1976) to be around IL.110,000 ($5238) compared to about IL.180,000 ($8570) in neighbouring Petza'el (built on the lands of the Arab village of Fasa'il).(4) In addition to the electric, water and housing infrastructures, the settlers were alloted a million-and-a half cubic meters of water annually (compared with 3000,000 c.m., for the whole village of Marj Na'je, with its 350 inhabitants and 700 dunums to cultivate). The turnover for 1975/1976 was 2.7 million pounds ($128,570).(5)

Notes

1. "Argaman Declared a Civilian Settlement", Ha'aretz, 19/5/1971.
2. Nehman Fabian, "A Member of Betar Needs to be a little Religious", Ha'aretz, 22/6/1972, p. 10.
3. Yehuda Litani, "There is No Permanent Settlement in Moshav Argaman in the Jordan Valley", Ha'aretz, 14/8/1974.
4. Yair Kutler, "Herut Moshavs: Words Versus Facts", Ha'aretz, 2/7/1976, p. 15.
5. "Argaman Declared Civilian Settlement", Ha'aretz, 19/5/1971, and Conversations with Mr. Muhammad Abu Hilal (1980: inter.).

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Abbreviations

ATSQ: Administered Territories Statistical Quarterly

CA: Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank (after 1981)

FSAA: Family Surveys in the Administered Areas

ICBS: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

IDF: Israel Defence Forces

MG: Israeli Military Government in the West Bank and Gaza

NHS: Natufa Household Survey

QSAT: Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories (same as ATSQ)

SLFAT: Survey of the Labour in the Administered Territories

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency for Palestinian Refugees

ZHS: Zbeidat Household Survey

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III. Interviews

Following are the identifications of persons interviewed by the writer, and cited in the text above:

Abdul-Al, Farouk (1980), Secretary of the Jericho Agricultural Cooperative Society, March 9.

Abu Hilal, Muhammad (1980), A leading farmer in Marj Na'je, July 20.

Al-Ansari, Adel (1980), Director of West Bank Agricultural Cooperatives, July 8.

Aranki, Rashid (1980), Former Assistant Director in the Department of Land Surveys, Government of Palestine, Birzeit, June-July.

Al-Salih, Suleiman and Hashem (1980), Major landlords in Ghor al-Faria. In addition, Mr. Hashem al-Salih is Mayor of Tubas, Nablus, April 25.

Barghuti, Dr. Abdul-Latif (1979), Then Professor of Arabic Literature and Palestinian Folklore in Birzeit University, Birzeit, February.

Damin, Mahmud (1980), Landlord, with estates in the Northern Valley, Nablus, April 23.

Hasan, Abdullah Muhammad (1980), Farmer, Zbeidat, February 22.

Jaradat, Ali (1980), Resident of Sa'ir, Hebron, May.

Ibrahim, Hussein (1979, 1980), Teacher and record keeper for the village of Zbeidat, Zbeidat, October 14, 1979; June 8, 1980.

Levi, Yehuda (1980), Secretary of Moshav Argaman. Interview conducted by Mr. Y. Letani of Ha'aretz for this study, Argaman, April 3.

Litani, Yehuda (1980), Then chief correspondent of Ha'aretz in the West Bank, Jerusalem, April 14.

Matar, Ibrahim (1980), Agricultural engineer, with expertise on problems of irrigated farming in the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem, June 10.

Nahhas, Fahmi (1980), Landowner-farmer, Jericho, July 7.

Sa'ati, Hanna (1980), Head, Land Registry, Financial Section, Ramallah, August.