Agricultural Development in the West Bank (ص 176)

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Agricultural Development in the West Bank (ص 176)

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the following ideas are pat forth as guidelines for cevelopaent po
1. TE wiewed strictly on their economic merits, ane may conclude a”
Poor predicament for most econonic and agricultural sectors as
long as Israel is in control of the occupied territories, The
researcher holds to a markedly different view. If Palestinian
econonists are to de drawn into dismissing developrental projects
om the preaise of negative economic feasibility, then this will
signal the end for aost areas of economic activity, possibly even
many for which local residents may possess an econoric comparative
advantage. It is quite clear that Israel can and has the means
ultimately to direct any economic sector to a situation where
abandonamt of that sector is the economically "rational"
Conclusion. fut it is important to note, however, that Israel
may incur for this purpose an exorbitant economic cost. It will
be naive therefore to refrain from supporting a more vigorous
Qrowth in an economic sector on account of inadequate economic
Wiability.
Tm respanse to this paradox the researcher suggests evaluating
Gevelopment projects on the basis of what aight be described as
their "national viability” which, obviously, carries a definite
Political connotation. Consequently, financial liabilities
entailed by inadequate profitability of certain projects should
be considered as a national obligation rather than merely an
@trepreneurial risk. In pursuance to this argument it becomes
Recessary to subsidize certain types of farming with a margin
“de enough to raise their economic feasibility to a level
Safficiently attractive to potential producers.
The concent of subsidizing agriculture in various forms is not
340
Uncommon in countries enjoying the benefits of national regimes,
whether with socialist or capitalist economies. Although
subsidization of agriculture is justified an social grounds, its
adoption in the occupied territories is further justified by the
inequitable exposure of local prodice to competition with Israeli
Products enjoying large subsidies and support.
Upon accepting the principle of selective subsidies, many practical
Questions remain to be solved, most importantly, how much is needed,
where to get it, and how to channel it. Some of these questions
will be answered in the remaining chapters.
a Gonforning with its policies of resisting any genuine development
in the local production base, the Military Administration is
expected to take a hostile stand against most proposed developmental
Projects. The most important measure they are likely to resort
to for this purpose is to obstruct the flow of aid earmarked by
Arab and foreign agencies’, Alternatively, the Military
Administration might try hard to manipulate the flow of appropriated
Aid in a way which serves its own political strategies, which are
Criented towards creating a substitute leadership to the PLO’.
This constraint to accelerated economic development in the occupied
territories was raised with many politicians and economists. It
is generally agreed that conditioning the flow of aid to Israel's
®proval is self-defeating and that a new strategy should be
Adopted, based on the following guidelines:
a. The principle of soliciting Israeli approval on aid received
d
Refer to Chapter IV for more details, especially under the section
®8 Qoperatives.
2
™Ost noted example is the creation of what are called "Village
The
bea ™, which were discussed in Chapter IV under the section on
operatives.
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Agricultural Development in the West Bank

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المنشئ

Hisham Masoud Awartani

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