Palestine: A Modern History (ص 29)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 29)

المحتوى

60 Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920
The Traditional Leaderhip’s Dilemma
Storrs lost no time in sending for the Mufti to instruct him to dissuade
those under his influence from adopting the second decision. He also
sought to break the new organisation by calling om the Mayor and other
leading figures of the Christian-Muslim Arab Committee who held
official-post$ in the Administration
to opt for an administrative or political career, the two being for the
present incompatible. The Mayor seemed grateful for this warning,
which enabled him to say that he thought he would be more useful
to his country as President of the Municipality.”
The efficacyof Storrs’ threats demonstrated the inadequacy of the
traditional political notability to lead the populace in situations of
conflict. When faced with a choice between a salaried government
career and an‘uncertain future as popular political leaders, the elderly
notables opted for the safer arid more rémunerative alternative.
In 1919 the realities of a long-term pro-Zionist British policy in
Palestine became undeniably clear, and Palestinian political circles were
confronted with a grave choice that could not be sidestepped or
ignored. The alternatives were acquiescence or defiance.
Aithough the opposition to Zionism was virtually universal among
the Palestinian Arabs, an important sector (class or group) of elderly
notables took the course of acquiescence, and new forces began to
compete with the propertiéd notables for political leadership. These
comprised the active and vocal members of the educated middle classes
in addition to:the ‘young bloods’ some of whom were'membérs of the
urban and rural upper classes. In January 1919, the first Scout organisa-
tion and the’ first Arab Worhen’s Club were founded.” ~ '
The? struggle between the’ quiescent elderly propertied notables and
the activist young' educated members of the -middle classes: became
apparent in the Palestine Arab Conference which met in Jerisalem
between 27 January and 10 February 1919. The Conference, which
comprised delegates from Muslim‘Christian Societies from various parts
of Palestine, was’ tdlled to discuss the presentation of Palestinian
demands fot self-determination before the Peace ‘Conference and to
voice Palestinian Arab fears fegarding “*Zionisni andthe prospect of
Jewish domination. a
According to a report on the Conference filed by Captain J.N. Camp
of the British Intelligence, eleven out of the twenty-seven delegates
were pro-British, two pro-French, two delegates with uncertain political
Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920 61
sympathies and the remaining twelve were pan-Arab or pro-Arab.” The
conference was presided over by Aref Pasha Dahudi Dajani and
dominated by the notables of Palestinian towns mostly representing the
propertied classes and vested political and economic interests. The most
outstanding members of the Pan-Arab group were two young intellec-
tuals belonging to the urban middle classes, ‘Izzat Darwaza and Yusuf
al-‘Isa, editor of Falastin.
Camp reported that, ftom the outset, the Conference was subject to
strong pressure from outside. ‘The pan-Arab influence of certain
members of the Muntada al-Adabi and Nadi el-Arabi was very persistent’ »
The struggle inside the Conference was between the pro-British bloc
and the pan-Arab bloc, and the split owed its origins to economic
factors as well as to a generation gap:
‘Young Moslems, members of the various Arab Societies agitate for
an independent Palestine, which would form part of a great indepen-
dent Arab State. Moslem villagers and Moslems who own any
considerable amount of property are nearly all pro-British.
Camp asserted that the fear of Zionism was
the main reason that leads the young pan-Arab element to favour its
union with an independent Arab Syria, for with Palestine joined to
an Arab Syria the people of Palestine with the help of other’ Arabs
would be able successfully to resist Jewish immigration.”
Herein lay the dilemma of the pro-British Palestinian Arabs: although
they were opposed to Zionism (the report spoke of ‘the unalterable
opposition of all non-Jewish elements in Palestihe to Zionism’), they
were actually helping’ the Zionist cause by being loyal to a pro-Zionist
Britain. They adopted’ the Zionist position: namely British rule and
separation of Syria and Palestine.”
In‘view of this ‘dilemma it was not surprising that Camp should have
Teported:
I have personally heard many Arabs, both Christians and Moslems,
déclare that they will forcibly resist any attempt to set up in this
land a Jewish State or anything resembling it. The pan-Arab young
bloods, very bold in speech, say’so openly, the elderly declare that they
will-sell out ‘and leave the country. | do not think the‘ threat of the
young Arabs is to be taken lightly, as they might cause much trouble
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تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

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