Palestine: A Modern History (ص 70)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 70)

المحتوى

146 The Lull: 1923-1929
British bayonets, and it was therefore necessary to fight Britain’ if the
struggle against Zionism was to achieve its goals. 56 The second
concerned the cowardice of :the ‘Palestinian fotables and their inade-
quacy to lead the Arabs in the struggle ‘against Zionism and British
policy in Palestine.
A further blow in this direction was meted out by J. Chancellor
(the H.C.) who issued on his return to Palestine an angry proclamation
in which he accused the Arabs of committing atrocious acts and
announced that in view of recent events he was going to suspend those
discussions with His Majesty’s Government on the subject of constitu-
tional changes in Palestine.
No Arab Atrocities
On top of Chancellor’s general accusations there were Zionist allega-
tions of Arab atrocities at Hebron of 24 August. When the Arabs”
denied that any acts of mutilations had taken place, a formal request.by
the Palestine Zionist Executive was made to the High Commissioner to
authorise the exhumation of bodies of Jews‘who had been killed at
Hebron.*’ Thereupon, Chancellor instructed the Director of Health to
appoint a special committee, composed of British doctors, to examine
the exhumed bodies with a view to ascertaining whether they had ‘been
mutilated or not, in the presence of Jewish and Arab representatives.
The special committee submitted a report on 13 September inswhich
it stated that the charges of ‘mutilation’ were not substantiated in the
cases of the twenty bodies which were exhumed, four of which were
referred to them by the Jewish representatives.*° The report of the
medical committee was looked upon as a political and moral victory for
the Palestinian Arabs who, in their turn, had insisted that the exhuma-
tion should be carried out.
In their turn the Arabs complained that the Attomey-General
Norman Bentwich was pro-Zionist and demanded his dismissal.5°
There were other complaints ,as well: ‘the severity of the ‘Police
which had reached a limit that they thought was unheard of in a
civilised country’, in addition to the rigorous supression of the Arabic
papers ‘for trivial reasons’.
The High Commissioner was anxious that the Executive should use
their influence to prevent incitement by boycott:
There was a serious danger at the present time when public opinion
was inflamed that.some small incident connected with boycotting
might develop into a disturbance on a large scale. They must bear in
f The Lull: 1923-1929 147
. mind that there was 4 large hlumber of troops in the country now,
} and any disturbance might lead to bloodshed .®!
Chancellor’s insinuation that any disturbance would soon develop
ry into-a ‘clash between the Arabs and British troops was hardly necessary,
@ as the Arab Executive were ‘already ‘advising moderation and were only
@: looking for Government help that ‘would strengthen their hands.°?
: Far' from offering the Arab Executive any concessions, Chancellor
@ affirmed the extension of the application of the much hated Collective
Punishment Ordinance over the whole' country.
; The Mufti’s Attitude .
, While a growing anti-Government militant mood was making itself felt
all over the country, Hajj Amin was assuring Chancellor, in a private
i interview on 1 October, that ‘there could be no doubt that the
a mass of the Arab population were amicably disposed towards Great
#@ Britain’. 63° Thé '"Mufti’s statement implied that he still believed it
# possible to confihe Palestinian opposition to Britain’s Zionist policies
‘and to the Zionists themselves and thus avoid a direct clash between
' t Britain and the Arabs. During the latter Part of September, Police
#. sources stated that:
Shekib Wahab, Syrian revolutionary leader, in conversation
with the Grand Mufti, offered :to organise bands for a guerrilla
campaign to last not less than a year. The Grand Mufti reported to
have considered this unnecessary at present.
Hajj Amin sought to impress Chancello? of his loyalty when he told the
High Commissioner that he considered himself ‘as‘one who was, in a
sense, an officer of the State’.©> A weék later:
The Mufti said he promised to help in the maintenance of order and
to cooperate with the Government. He had always held this attitude
and he held it stilland should continue to hold it even if Government
did not listen’ to his representations. He regarded this as his duty not
only to’ the Government but to God and the people’ and also to his
“own conscience.
# The Mufti pointed out to the High Commissioner the difficulties
pg involved in his pro-Government position which was particularly
t _ unpgpular in view of the Government’s refusal ‘to abolish the Collective
e ~ Punishment Ordinance: ‘during the last ‘few days he had been charged
i . himself with being in league with the Government in this matter’. On
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تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

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