Palestine: A Modern History (ص 76)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 76)

المحتوى

160 Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935
2. Until further development of Jewish lands and of irrigation had
taken place and the Arabs had adopted better methods of cultivation,
‘there is no room for asingle additional settler if the standard ‘of life of
the fellaheen is to remain at its present level.’ On State lands, similarly,
there was no room, pending development, for Jewish settlers.
Furthermore, Simpson expressed his conviction that Arab unemploy-
ment was serious and widespread and that it was wrong to admit‘Jewish
immigrants to fill vacancies in Palestine when unemployed Arabs were
capable of filling the vacancy.
Passfield’s White Paper
While upholding the theory of ‘Dual Obligation’ ‘under the' Mandate,
and the principle of ‘Economic Absorptive Capacity’ as a regulative
guide to the number of Jewish immigrants allowed into the country,
Passfield’s White Paper adopted, by and large, Simpson’s estimates'and
promised to implement his recommendations. Furthermore it declared
that the time had come to establish a Legislative Council on the lines
indicated in the Churchill White Paper.
The Zionist outcry against the Simpson Report and the 1930 White
Paper was vehement and overpowering. Weizmann protested that the
White Paper was inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate -and
informed Passfield that he had resigned his joint.office of President of
the World Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency. The Zionists
staged demonstrations in many Western countries and'their attitude was
openly supported by leading British ‘politicians. The ensuing ‘public
ventilation of the controversy was an impressive demonstration of the
Political power the Zionists could mobilise in England’.'*
Zionist agitation over this issue did not subside until it was
anfiounced in*November that the Jewish Agency had.been invited to
confer with HMG on the: White Paper, as a prelude to swinging back to
a pro-Zionist British policy in Palestine.
While not completely; satisfied with the White Paper, the Palestinian
leaders were; nevertheless, encouraged by the iniplication of what
seemed to be a fresh attitude on inimigration and land settlement. They
were hopeful that further favourable changes would be forthcoming.
Thus the Arab Executive announced on the eve of! the Balfour
Declaration’s anniversary that for the first time there would be no
strike proclaimed.’ Significantly, the Students’ Higher Committee
called for a strike on that occasion.”
Another indication of the conciliatory outlook of the Palestinian
notability was Jamal Hasseini’s ‘attitude of great reasonableness’ during
SaaS he atypr
v Bug
Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935 ‘ : 161
\
his conversations with the: officials of the Colonial Office in
December,”! In the course of these conversations, Jamal Husseini, who
was in London as a personal representative of the’ Mufti, agreed to a
Round Table Conference povided the Jewish répresentation was
confined to Palestine Jews to the exclusion of Weizmann and other
non-Palestinian Zionists. Any negotiations with Weizmarin, Husseini
argued, would involve an ‘acceptance.of Zionism’, which the Palestiniarts
were not prepared to accept under any circumstarices.
i On receiving news of the offiial talks between the Government and
the Zionists over the ‘White Paper’, the Arab Executive hastened to give
public expression td their apprehensions ‘and misgivings‘at the prospect
of a revision of the White'Papet in favour‘of the Zionists. Even before
the news of AHé talks, broke out, the Arabs were alarmed by the'Gdvern-
ment’s grant of 1,500 immigration certificates. These ominous signs.did
not deter Jamal Husseini, on his retum to Palestine, from:‘going ropnd
the country speaking warmly. of, the courtesy and consideration with
which he was treated by: the Officials of the Colonial Office» who, he
2 22
states, are sympathetic tothe Arab case’.
The ‘Black Letter’
Early:-in January 1931, Passfield* informed .Chancellor that in view of
the-necessity of finding a ‘Modus co-operandi’ with the Jewish Organis-
ation in’ the wake of the outcry against the White Paper; the
Government '
seem to have no alternative to writing and publishing, or allowing to
be published, a letter to Df. Weizthann, defihing our poli¢y in
Palestine in terms more. prétise and:moze acceptable to the Jews
than those of the White. Paper‘of whiclr it:is ‘to be the authoritative
interpretation on the matters with whictrit deals.?? t
.
I +a
Shortly before the publication of MacDonald’s letter to Weizmann,
Passfield anticipated that the intended letteremay have the effect of
increasing Chancellor's difficulties «with the Arabs and‘that the result
was unavoidable ‘for political and intemational yéasons'* arising from
Zionist pressufe. © .
+ In histietter to Weizmann, MacDonald asserted that HMG’intended
to stand by the Mandate, which they viewed as an obligation fo World
Jéwfy and:not only to. the Jews of Palestine, to uphold the JNH policy
by further land settlement-and immigration by Jews dnd to condone
the Zionist policy of insisting on Jewish+labour: for work on Jewish
we ER eet Aeon BSF TO owe
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تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

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