Palestine: A Modern History (ص 77)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 77)

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162 Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935 eos k
enterprises. In ‘Weizmann’s considered opinion the MacDonald Letter
was a decisive factor ‘which enabled us to make the magnificent gains
of the ensuing years’ .*
Not unnaturally, the Arabs read MacDonald’s ‘Black Letter’, as they
called it, with. distress and indignation. They took the Letter as proof of
:Zionism’s decisive influence on Whitehall and Westminster-and hence
ithe futility of expecting any.degree of justice from.Britain. ,
The political notability:were hard hit by the MacDonald Letter and
did not hesitate.to tell Chancellor, in their first interview with him after
the publication of the ‘Black Letter’, that their position before the
public had: become ‘precarious and anxious’.2* At the end of the inter-
view the .Arah leaders handed, Chancellor ,a memorandum of protest in
which they professed their loss of confidence in HMG and their
vehement objection to what they considered a sanctioning .of Jewish
boycott of ‘Arab labour. In turn they were considering boycotting the
Jews by virtue of the principle of reciprocation.
In*their manifesto to. the Palestinian public, the Arab Executive
declared that they were tuming to»the Arab'and the Muslim worlds for
help as they had given up all hope and confidence in Britain. The Arab
Executive called for ‘lawful and active’ struggle to -restore the
Palestinians? violated rights. On 3 March 1931, Reuters news agency
reported that Arab indignation over MacDonald’s Letter was rising-to
fever pitch. Under popular pressure the Arab Executive had decided
the previous day to boycott Jewish products and to encourage national
handicrafts and local goods.
Settling the Palestinians across the Jordan
At this point Weizmann decided to visit: Palestine ostensibly to promote
an ,Arab-Jewish .rapprochement. When the Zionist leader arrived in
Palestine, the Arab Executive boycotted him and vigilantly watched
every move he made. They published a declaration in the Press
denouncing ,anybody who dared to defy public opinion on a matter
that involved recognition of Zionism, the Balfour Declaration and the
Mandate. ‘Furthermore, they -accused him of corttemplating bribing
some Arabs with the intention of exploiting them for propaganda and
fund-raising purposes.2”7 The Arab Executive were not far off the mark
as‘ Weizmann ‘had, informed Chancellor that he believed that most of
the Arab leaders could be bribed.7*
‘Chancellor took a.dim view of the possibility of achieving an Arab-
Jewish entente through bribery and suggested instead a meeting in
London attended by both parties and representatives of HMG. Weizmann
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Sd PE ct Sam go ne RRR Too.
Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935 163
did not follow the matter through and directed, his attention to a
question which really interested’ him, namely. ‘developing land in
Trans-Jordan fonthe settlement of Palestinian Arabs’.??
MacDonald’s Letter dealt a severe blow-not only to the traditional
political leadership but alsoigo the tinderlying assumptions of their
conciliatory policies of ‘the ‘Black Letter’) The Administrative Officer
of Nablus Atea was-teporting that the Arab extremists: used the Letter
as a means of regaining their political prestige. The implications of the
Letter were unmistakable: the Palestinians were compelled to adopt a
new strategy of‘closer alliance ‘and cooperation with thé’ Afab and
Muslim* worlds'to achieve ‘Palestinian independence within the frame-
work of.Arab unity’. This set the stage for-two: political forcesewhich
were already assuming greater importance and initiative, narnely, Hajj
Amin and the Arab nationalist radicals,
An Islamic Revolutionary Scheme
In May 1931, the British authorities in Palestine began receiving sceret
imformation .tegarding a certain;revolutionary scheme throughout the
Arab and Islamic countries to deliver the Arab countries, particularly
Palestine and Syria from foreign suzerainty.*! The preliminary reports
indicated that,,Amir Shakib Arslans the prominent Lebanese: Druze
petsonality,’was the leader of the movement and that he was in touch
with all the major Arab Nationalists in Syria. Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and
Palestine and with various potentates in the entire Arabian Peninsula
and the Islamic countries. Aceprding to these reports Hajj Amin and
Shaukat ‘Ali; the Indian Muslim leader. were parties to this ‘scheme’.
The ‘schenje? itself consisted of organising gangs in Frans-Jordan, wadi
Sirhan and Sinai Province for guerrilla operations in Syria and Palestine,
perhaps simultaneously.
The neighbouring countries would extend material assistance. and.
forces from various Arab countries would co-operation to renew the
Syrian Revolution, perhaps, gradually. ‘ it
‘A monthilater it was reported that Arab .dissensionszin Palestine
and, the incompatibility’ of various Muslim -clements militated against
the ‘stheme”’s early materialisation». These reports also indicated that
Arslan was in véry close touch with Mostow which regarded Palestine
as the principal base for Soviet activities in-the area. This was significant
as.the Cdmintern had succeeded,.in the wake of the 1929 events. in
achieving a semblance of unity between the Arab and Jewish
Communists in Palestine.*?
Two -factors gave added weight and credence to the police reports
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تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

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