Palestine: A Modern History (ص 81)

غرض

عنوان

Palestine: A Modern History (ص 81)

المحتوى

170 = Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935
of Palestine. The policy of non-co-operation was discussed and the
Istiqialists suggested social and political boycott of Government, the
non-payment of direct taxes such as tithes, werko (a rural'tax), urban
property tax ‘and the baycott of British and Jewish goods as well.
However, 5
Party conflict between the pro and anti-Mufti factions reigned...
It was clear that the anti-Mufti faction was mainly concerned in
placing Haj Amin in a critical position in insisting on his
resignation.” '
from the Muslim Supreme Countil as a first act in the.policy of non-
codperation. The Husseini-Nashahibi antagonism was ‘not the only
snag to the adoption of .the policy of noh-co-operation. The propertied
participants: were apprehensive of.the consequence of non-payment of
taxes. The assembly adopted the principle of'mon-to-operation and
restricted its application to the boycott of Government receptions and
Boards on the political-social level and the boycott. of British and
Zionist goods on the economic level. On'the more cruciak aspects of the
non-co-operation policy, namely, the non-payment of taxes, the wiser
counsels of the propertied classes prevailed:** The'issue was referred to
a.committee of the members of the Aral*Executive.including a member
representing each of. the parties in the country, to study the various
implications, and methods that would lead to the'execution of the
idea of non-co-operation. A similar decisien taken tén years-earlier led
to;the suppression of the idea altogether. The assembly was dominated
by pro-Mufti.elements. Ragheb Nashashibi did not attend and his
supporters withdrew before the meeting came to an end, arid the
watering dawn of the policy on non-co-operation reflected Hajj Amin’s
friendly, relatidns with the High Commissioner, as well as the vested
interests of some of his political associates.
The lukewarm attitude of the leadership notwithstanding, the general
Palestinian mood was ‘becoming ‘increasingly: militant. When the
Colonial Secretary toured Palestine.in April 1933, the Arab Executive
called for his boycott and alleged that he had come-to ‘strengthen the
pillars of British and Zionist colonization’ and to, paye the way for
evicting Arabs.to bring more Jews into the country.” a
Fhe proposed committee omnon-co-operation did not materialise
and the High Commissioner reported.that the leaders were afraid of
legal lidbilities, that the pro-Nashashibi Party were definitely not
disposed to«participate in the proposed Committee, and that even the
Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935* * 171
Istiqlalists were not enthusiastic:®® The eviction of the ‘Arabs of Wadi
Hawareth by the Jews, withthe aid of Government forces, was the
subject of Arab agitation against Jewish immigration and Government
policy throughout the summer of «1933. On 10 August; the CID
reported that political leaders were-“intéresting themselves in finding
a’means to redeem lands’ and-tHat delegdtioris were visiting: villagers in
‘Wadi Kabbani to warn against sale of lands’ to Jews.
The Pressure of Jewish Immigration
The flow of legal and illegal Zionist immigration assumed alarming
proportions and the resolutions:of the Zionist Congress in Prague,
which dwelt on opening the gates of’Palestine to unrestricted Jewish
immigration in ‘view of the Nazi ‘persecution, added oil to’ the
Palestinian’s fire.” Even the lethargic Arab Executive were induced to
take a more radical stand and decided‘ during a meeting‘in early
September to sthge a general; denfonstration in Jerusalem on 13
September without applying,for Government permission. Other towns
were-to observe a strike'on the same day:
At first the Government efhdeavoured to talk the leaders out of this
thallenge to its authority,® but laterirequested that the demonstration
should not transcend the ‘limits of the Old City. The well advertised
demonstration was led by leaders: from all political groups which
inspired an unprecedented feeling of national unity and determination.
Eventually, the demonstrators» clashed: with the police, and the
authorities took legal action against a number of Arab’ leaders. Follow-
ing the demonstration the members of the Arab Executive met at Musa
Mazem’s house and resolved “td stagé‘ another demonstration in Jaffa
four weeks later.#In a memorandum to*the High ‘Commissioner, dated
30 September 1933, a numbét- of Arab Natioridlists from Nablus
aécused the Government of Palestihe of working for the destruction of
the Palestinian Arabs and their replacement by Jews and threatened to
adopt self-défénsive measures abainst the flood: of Jewish Immigrants.
On 8 OctoBér, the Arab Executive decided to hold ‘another
demonstration on 13 October in Jerusalem, in defiance of the orders of
the ‘High Commissioner. Before'the Friday prayers were over, the shops
were closed and scores of Christians and about 50 womeh were waiting
outside the Haram to join the demofistration at its starting point. The
demonstration of sevéral thotisand ‘strong révéaled the depth of
hdstility towards the:Police! and baton charges by the latter against the
demonstrators reinforcéd’that feeling. Fivé-members of thé Police and
six members‘of the public were injured.

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

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