Palestine: A Modern History (ص 94)

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عنوان

Palestine: A Modern History (ص 94)

المحتوى

198 The Great Palestine Revolt: 1936-1939:
Wauchope accepted Ormsby-Gore’s suggestion that should the Arabs
stop acts of disorders unconditionally the British Government would of
their own volition suspend all immigration while the Royal-Commission
were conducting their Enquiry. On the other hand Wauchope’ dropped
his opposition to the cantonisation of Palestine 2° which was supported
and promoted by Weizmann.”” While cantonisation was being discussed
at length at the Colonial Office, Ormsby-Gore assured Jamal Husseini
and. his associates on 14 July. that Britain meant to remain in Palestine
and to govern it justly in ‘the interest ofall the inhabitants.?*
The Role of the Arab Rulers
At the same time the British Government decided to use the influence
of the neighbouring Arab rulers to talk the Palestinian Arabs out of
their rebellions, general strike and armed resistance.*? Cornmunications
with Sa‘udi Arabia and the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Nuri el-Said, took
place for that purpose. About the middle of July, ‘Abdullah of Jordan
‘was, encouraged by the Government to attempt to mediate with the
Arab High Committee in the cause of peace’.
On7 August, ‘Abdullah invited the Higher Arab Committee to Amman
whose members hastened to inform him that they were powerless to
stop the strike unless Government decided to suspend Jewish immigra-
tion. Two weeks later Nuri Pasha arrived in Palestine as the
Government’s guest and offered his services as an unofficial mediator
between the Government and the Higher Committee. As the Iraqi
Foreign Minister could make no promises on the Government’s behalf
the negotiations broke down. In a manifesto published on 30 August,
the. Higher Committee declare that while they were willing.to trust to
the mediation of the Govemnntent of Iraq-and their Majesties and
Highness the Arab Kings and Prince the Nation, nevertheless, ‘will
continue its general strike with the same steadfastness and conviction it
has shown’.
The failure of Nuri’s, mission was not the only. setback to British
hopes for an early termination-of the general strike and the rebellion.
During August Wauchope reported to Ormsby-Goye that communica-
tions were still constantly being seriously damaged.and trade hampered
in every direction.
Simultaneous with the arrival of Nuri the Syrian revolutionary leader,
Fawzi (ed-Din) al-Kawuk ji, entered Palestine at the head of an armed
band and declared himself the Commander-in-Chief of the Arab
Revolution in Southern Syria (Palestine)."* Soon gfter Kayukji’s
assumption of control, Peirse reported:
The Great Palestine Revolt: 1936-1939 199
Rebel tactics improved and the bands showed signs of .effective
leadership and organization. They were well supplied with arms and
ammunition and the’ extension of their sphere of operations to
districts outside the habitually active areas showed that their numbers
had increased considerably.**
Other Syrian rebel leaders like Said el-‘As (who was killed in October
1936) and Sheikh Muhammad al-Ashmar arrived during tne first week
of September probably as a result of the Mufti’s efforts.”
Despite:the growing strength of the rebels and the perseverance of
town-dwellers in their general strike, the Palestine political leaders were
anxious to hammer out,a compromise with the.Government. During the
second part of August, ‘Awni wrate,to Wauchope ‘saying in effect, that
the Arab leaders might be prepared to call off-the strike and disorders if
they could be assured that the restoration of order would be followed
bythe complete stoppage of immigration’,*> which was, largely in line
with the solutign Wauchope and Ormsby Gore -had advocated a few
weeks earlier, which was supported by many British officials, in view of
‘the growth of the Arab national spirit’.*° Time and again Wauchope
warned that the alternative ,advocated by the military, was the ‘adoption
of most drastic means tg end disorder which will become more violent
than now, a large increase of present garrison and an end to all hope of
securing a settlement, that will also leave as, embittered, sullen, and in
their hearts, rebellious Arab population ready to rebel in any future
year’,*”
Convinced though he, was that Wauchope’s recommendations
constituted the best course .of, action, Ormsby-Gore found himself
unable to act in accordance with his convictions. On 19 June 1936, the
House of Commons discussed the situation in Palestine. In the speeches
of the members the immense strategic value of Palestine in war and
peace was.emphatically. stressed, The speakers tended to equate the
security of British interests with. the success of Zionism in Palestine.
The Zionist campaign against the proposed temporary suspension of
Jewish immigration ,was highly effectiye in forcing the Government to
change-its attitude. In an interview with Ormsby-Gore, Weizmann and
Ben Gurion intimated that if Britain appeased the Arabs the Zionists
might change alliances and assist in, dislodging Britain from the area ‘but
they had steadily rejected any overtures of this kind’.*®
Britain’s Course of Action
In a meeting of the Cabinet devyted to the discussion of the, latest
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تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

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