Palestine: A Modern History (ص 97)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 97)

المحتوى

204 =‘ The Great Palestine Revolt: 1936-1939
It is common belief aniong Arabs and Jews that if the report of the
Royal Commission and His Majesty’s Government’s decision thereon
are unfavourable to the Arabs, disturbances will break out again.°*
An article published on 21 December in al-Difa ‘reflected the
prevalent Arab resentment of Britain when it declared that ‘The Arabs
of Palestine are looking at the Government with an eye of hate’. The
responsibility for all the trouble fell ‘first on the Government‘and then
on the Jews’ and hinted that more sacrifices might be needed to save
Palestine from ‘the madness of imperialism’.
These feelings of resentment and hostility were reflected, slowly but
surely, in Hajj Amin’s relations with the Government. By the end of the
summer the British were anxious that the Mufti was firmly backing the
strike and providing ‘relief? funds, which were collécted in Palestine
and the neighbouring countries towards the upkeep of the armed bands
and the purchases of arms.©? Both the High Commissioner and the
Colonial Secretary were determined to remove the Mufti from the
political scene. Wauchope, however, warmed Ormsby-Gore against an
exaggerated impression of the role of Hajj Amin.
_. it would be the height of folly to imagine that by the removal of
the Mufti or this Committee the danger of a fresh Arab rising will be
ended or even greatly reduced. Compare the tenacity of villagers who
have opposed us for six months with little pay and no loot, with
the feebleness and a lack of any great qualities of'leadership among
the Committee of Ten. Remember Arab genuine fear and deep
hatred of Zionism.”
The High Commissioner rightly pointed out that the fear of
imminent Jewislt' domination was felt by all from the highest to the
lowest and was the mainspring of the disturbances and that the bodies
which organised the strike and the rebellion ‘sprang up locally and
spontaneously’.®* In view of the fact that the bands were not disarmed
and the National Committees were still in close touch with the
population and with the rebels, the British expected a renewal of
serious disturbances after the Royal Commission submitted their report
and recommendations.
Aware of the opportunities provided by the explosive situation, the
Jews pressed for further concessions from the British. During the first
week of January 1937 Dr Brodetsky informed the Colonial Office that
the Arabs were collecting funds in preparation for future disorders and
The Great Palestine Revolt: 1936-1939 205
suggested a tougher policy with the Mufti and his associates. He added
that although the Jews ‘appreciated the action of the High ‘Commis-
sioner in authorising the formation of the Jewish Constabulary’, they
wanted a large Jewish ‘force that would enable them to hold their own
in any future disturbances.© "
Although Wauchope fully expected the renewal of disturbances
following the publication of the Peel Commission Report, he availed
himself of the opportunity provided by, the. ‘interlude’ to use the
influence of the Higher Committee in the interest of moderation. In
particular, he was anxious to restore respect for law and order and stop
the continuing campaign of political assassinations, which was renewed
after the Royal Commission’s departure.
For their part the Higher ‘Committee were willing to show a more
friendly attitude towards Wauchope, although for reasons connected
with the ,state of public opinion they could not agree to the presence of
a Palestinian at the coronation of the King. In the course of an interview
with Wauchope, Hajj Amin (and ‘Awni ‘Abdul Hadi) stated that the
sooner friendly relations with the British were re-establishéd the better
for the Arabs.®”
Wauchope attributed the Mufti’s more conciliatory attitude to the
influence of Ibn Sa‘ud and the influence of moderate Arabs outside
Palestine:
But I fear under certain circumstances that the influence of local
Shabab and the Istiqlal Party may later on bring pressure to-bear
against satisfactory co-operation with Government and counsels
of moderation which the Mufti now preaches and, as regards his
Sheikhs and Qadis at present practices.®*
Factors Against Moderation
The influence of the Shabab and the /stigialists was not the only factor
militating against modération. In addition to the landless Arabs, which
according to Government estimates constituted one quarter of the
Arab rural population,®® there was.the question of Arab unemployment,
which Wauchope described in the report as ‘most serious problem and
is neither temporary nor local’. This problem was raised ‘in every town
and village’ he visited and threatened to loom larger-both in the political
as well as in the econontic field. The Government’s discrimination
against Arab labourers in favour, ofthe Jews added fuelto Arab resent-
ment: ‘On many roads the Arab receives little more than half the
wage for equaLoutput’.”

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

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